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PARALLELISM OF THEME AND IMAGERY IN *AENEID* II AND IV.

Many recent studies directed toward the investigation and analysis of the structure of the *Aeneid* have furnished abundant evidence of the extremely complex and highly unified structural patterns upon which the poem is constructed. By "structure" or "structural patterns" I mean the organization of the poem as a whole—the system of relations, correspondences, antitheses, and balancing of various elements which serves to illuminate or intensify the meaning and effect both of the individual elements themselves and of the total poetic framework of which they each form a part. In a poem like the *Aeneid*, where profound insights and subtle perceptions pervade its entire fabric, we may expect the poet to utilize this tool of internal complexity and elaborate inter-weaving of motifs far more than direct statement, or even the time-honoured poetic devices of metaphor, simile, and the like. Indeed, the very nature of Vergilian poetry necessarily entails this more elusive, less obvious manner of expression; because of the complex significance and numerous levels of meaning which Vergil strove to incorporate in the *Aeneid*, a simpler and less involved style must have resulted in comparative crudity, in a haziness and a distortion of the poet's initial insights.¹

¹ Cf. R. Heinze, *Virgils Epische Technik* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1915), p. 436: "Aristoteles hatte gelehrt, dass wie in der Tragödie, so auch im Epos Einheit der Handlung erforderlich sei"; p. 438: "Die zweite Forderung ist, dass die einzelnen Teile des Epos notwendige Bestandteile des Ganzen sein sollen." Perhaps the best statement in this regard is

Keeping this in mind, I should like to examine the second and fourth books of the *Aeneid* with a view to demonstrating, in terms of the larger poetic structure in which they are framed, the principal means by which a vital connection between the two is effected. Briefly, these means are the following: the figure of Aeneas himself, as it is illuminated in two contrasting situations; the pervading tone of tragedy and deceit continually present in both books; imagery and symbolism; the strong parallelism between the fates of Dido and Priam.

One might be surprised, at first, at the thought of there being close similarities or correspondences between these two books which seem, superficially at least, to have little enough in common. In recent attempts to analyze the structure of the *Aeneid* there has been no consideration of II and IV with specific regard to their relations to one another. G. E. Duckworth, in a recent article,² has shown that the *Aeneid* as a whole falls into two halves or panels, I-VI and VII-XII, with each book of one panel balanced by the corresponding book in the other; e. g. I bears close resemblance to and is balanced by VII, while the same is true for II and VIII, III and IX, etc. That the *Aeneid* does exhibit such a structure is, I think, hardly to be denied. But it will be observed that according to this analysis all of the odd-numbered books are balanced by others of the same kind, while the even numbers are balanced by other even numbers. Moreover, R. S. Conway³ has pointed out that, on the whole, the odd numbers "show what we may call the lighter or Odyssean type; the books with the even numbers reflect the graver colours of the *Iliad*."⁴ Duckworth later adopted this statement of

that of V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils, Bild und Symbol in der Aeneis* (Innsbruck, 1950), p. 6: "Ich wüsste keine, die besser zum Ausdruck bringt, dass Kunstformen nicht Gefässe sind für einen Inhalt, der eine von ihnen abgetrennte Existenz hat, sondern selber Inhalt, ja, nach Hebbels Wort, der höchste Inhalt."

² G. E. Duckworth, "The Architecture of the *Aeneid*," *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 1-15.

³ R. S. Conway, "The Architecture of the Epic," *Harvard Lectures on the Vergilian Age* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 129-49.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 141. Cf. Heinze, p. 463: "Die Variation hat Virgil bereits beim ersten Entwurf des Gesamtwerks mit ins Auge gefasst. Die Bücher II, IV und VI stellen jedes in seiner Art einen Höhepunkt der pathetischen oder erhabenen Wirkung dar; sie sind durch die ruhigeren Bücher III und V getrennt, und man bemerkt wohl, wie wichtig es

Conway's and expanded it in working out his analysis of the poem's structure. Victor Pöschl,⁵ in his book on Vergil's symbolism and imagery, has seen the poem as divided into three sections: I-IV, V-VIII, IX-XII, which show an alternation of mood and theme between light and darkness—*Dunkel, Licht, Dunkel*. Except for some slight reservations,⁶ most readers would probably agree that this variation of light and dark tones in the *Aeneid* does exist. As a result, in the structural analysis of Conway, Pöschl, and Duckworth, II and IV fall more or less into the same general grouping. If, then, Pöschl is correct in considering I-IV as a unit, and Conway is right about the pervading tragic tone of the even-numbered books, we might have even further reason to expect some relation between II and IV, despite the great difference in their respective subject matter.

Dido, queen of Carthage, and the burning city of Troy represent two great "tests" which Aeneas must face before he can reach Italy.⁷ That is to say, in both II and IV he is faced with something more than the routine hardships and numerous delays which confront him during the whole period previous to his

auch von diesem Gesichtspunkt ist, dass V nicht unmittelbar auf III, und VI auf IV folgt."

⁵ Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 280: "Schmerz und Freude, Sieg und Untergang, Durchbruch der Leidenschaft und Triumph des Geistes, der Idee, sind nicht nur in kunstvoller Verschränkung verflochten, sondern sie durchdringen sich gegenseitig."

⁶ As Duckworth remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 7, n. 24), the activity of Allecto in VII in hardly in keeping with the supposed light tone of the whole section, and the victories of Aeneas in X and XII presumably keep the last section from being completely dark. Pöschl himself says, however (p. 280): "In einzelnen jedoch ist das Licht immer vom Dunkel überschattet, und aus der Finsternis bricht immer wieder das Licht hervor."

⁷ Cf. A. S. Pease, *P. Vergili Maronis Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), pp. 138, 146; Pease speaks of Dido and Turnus as the two great obstacles to the mission of Aeneas. Looking at the poem in an over-all perspective, this is certainly true. However, II and IV clearly represent the two major crises in the story before Aeneas arrives in Italy. In regard to the danger in IV, cf. Anchises' words to Aeneas in VI, 694: *quam metui ne quid Libyae tibi regna nocerent!* The sense of *nocerent* is somewhat ambiguous, referring possibly to the *ferocia Poeni cordia* (I, 302-3), or, more probably, to the possibility of Aeneas' yielding to the charms of Dido, remaining in Carthage, and abandoning his destiny altogether.

arrival on the new continent. Rather, in each of these books he is involved in a major crisis, either of which could have resulted in his failure to fulfil his destiny and carry his gods to Latium.⁸ It may, in fact, seem a statement of the obvious to say that II and IV represent major crises or tests for Aeneas, and yet some of the implications of this fact have often been overlooked. For by concentrating his attentions on the particular qualities of Aeneas' character and personality which the tense situations of the two books naturally evoke, as well as on important traits which appear constantly in Aeneas' behavior no matter what the situation or circumstances are, Vergil has succeeded in these two books in producing a fairly complete and composite picture of his hero. It is by no means my intention to be drawn into an elaborate discussion of Aeneas' "character" here, but rather to point up some aspects of Vergil's use of dramatic method—i. e. his method of developing Aeneas' character through the latter's own reactions to situations in which he finds himself involved.

As far as the situations themselves of II and IV are concerned, one is at first struck far more by their differences than by their similarities. As Troy is destroyed, we see Aeneas mainly as a warrior, as a dutiful son, a husband, and father. His duties here, his loyalties and obligations are obvious and clear-cut, while attention is focused on his prowess as a warrior and on his family-type virtues, his *pietas*.⁹ At Carthage, however, Aeneas is faced with an entirely different kind of problem—one in which

⁸ It may, in fact, be objected that just as the fall of Troy was, at least within the limits of tradition, a historical fact, so Aeneas' survival, which is the minimal necessity for the continuity of the story, is something that is never in doubt. But we must not confuse the position of the reader with that of Aeneas, who, in the course of Troy's capture, does not know whether he will survive or not. That he even expects to die is shown by his own words (II, 353): *moriatur et in media arma ruamus*. The importance of Aeneas' ignorance in this matter for my argument here rests in the reactions elicited from him during each of these crises.

⁹ Cf. R. Allain, "Une nuit spirituelle d'Énée," *R. E. L.*, XXIV (1946), pp. 189-98; Allain points out that Aeneas' *pietas* is strikingly eclipsed for a good part of the second book. This is true, however, only for the first part of II. Indeed, Aeneas' famous act of carrying Anchises out of the city on his shoulders became proverbial as a symbol of *pietas* in the highest degree.

his bravery and virtues as a warrior serve no purpose. The problems he must cope with are infinitely more subtle, and in their way, more dangerous because of their subtlety. It is a situation in which Aeneas must call for aid upon resources in himself far different from the ones which saved him at Troy, and the enemy he must resist is one which for a long time he fails even to see.

It is clear, then, that Vergil is presenting Aeneas in two different lights; he is building a multi-sided picture of his hero by placing him in these strongly contrasting situations which serve to focus attention on different facets of his character and personality.

In describing the character of Aeneas, it is a commonplace to assert that he is completely subject to the will of the gods, and that his actions are never motivated by personal desires; but that once he receives a command from heaven, he complies with robot-like alacrity. The following statement of G. Boissier may serve to illustrate this point of view: *Énée . . . est tout à fait dans la main des dieux, et tient toujours les yeux fixées sur cette force supérieure qui le mène. Jamais il ne fait rien de lui-même. Quand les occasions sont pressantes, et qu'il importe de prendre un parti sans hésitation, il n'en attend pas moins un arrêt du destin constaté pour se décider. . . . Il faut que la terre tremble, que le bruit des armes retentisse dans l'air pour qu'il accepte un secours dont il ne peut guère se passer. Mais une fois que le ciel a parlé, il n'hésite plus.*¹⁰

It is surely significant that the two most notable occasions on which Aeneas does not strictly conform to this rule are found in II and IV. In II (270 ff.), as Aeneas lies sleeping, the shade of Hector appears to him, bidding him take his household gods and flee the city, which is already in flames. An important part of Hector's message is to tell Aeneas specifically that after long wanderings he is to found a new city. Hector then brings to him from the inner part of the house the things he is to take away with him upon his final departure from Troy (293-7):

sacra suosque tibi commendat Troia penates;
hos cape fatorum comites, his moenia quaere
magna, pererrato statues quae denique ponto.

¹⁰ G. Boissier, *La religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins* (Paris, 1874), I, pp. 274-5.

Sic ait et manibus vittas Vestamque potentem
aeternumque adytis effert penetralibus ignem.

Hector is perfectly specific in these instructions, and since they are of greatest importance, the reader naturally expects Aeneas to be prompt in carrying them out. Moreover, the first person Aeneas meets after awakening is Panthus (318 ff.), who is carrying away his own household gods, something that should have reminded Aeneas of the words Hector's ghost had just spoken.¹¹ It is quite clear that the poet is emphasizing here the importance of Aeneas' immediate escape and the preservation of the sacred images. But when Aeneas, seemingly oblivious of everything that had just been told him, proceeds to ignore Hector's words for the greater part of the book, it is equally clear that the passage requires closer examination if we are to ascertain the poet's intention.

Homer tells us that Aeneas was not to die at Troy, but to go free after the city was taken. But for Vergil, something more than this was needed. It was a requirement imposed upon him that the ancestor of the Romans possess, in addition to the frequently emphasized virtues of *constantia*, *virtus*, and *pietas*, great military prowess as well. It was necessary that he recall the great heroes of the Trojan war, and be able to hold his own among them. But had Aeneas left Troy immediately, as indeed Hector had told him to do, his reputation as a warrior would have been seriously diminished; so instead we see him attempting to defend his city, even though against hopeless odds, an act which satisfies, at least in part, this important requirement.

But even the casual reader cannot help but notice this seemingly clumsy discrepancy between Hector's words and Aeneas' subsequent behavior. Surely a display of prowess by Aeneas does

¹¹ I am indebted for the source of a number of the following ideas to R. Allain, *op. cit.*, and Duckworth, "Fate and Free Will in Vergil's Aeneid," *C. J.*, LI (1955-56), pp. 357-64. Allain concerns himself chiefly with the problem of Aeneas' *pietas* in II (cf. note 9 above), and the significance of the *furor* which seizes his senses. Although I am taking a different approach and placing my emphasis elsewhere, I am basically in agreement with his major thesis, that Aeneas' experience with *furor* conveys a lesson which he never again forgets—that it is futile to act in opposition to the will of the gods or without their support. Cf. II, 402: *heu nihil invitis fas quemquam fidere divis!*

not necessitate disobedience on his part of divine injunction. Vergil could presumably have had Hector appear to him after he had already been fighting for some time, and thus satisfy the need mentioned above. One can only conclude that Vergil desired this discrepancy and deliberately inserted it. Here again, the motive can scarcely be mistaken; Aeneas, at least for the moment, is being dominated by strong emotions which drive out every thought except that of defending his city, and it is by no means the will of the gods which is uppermost in his mind at this point.

But is this the only thing which drives Aeneas into combat, making him oblivious of everything except the fierce struggle in which he is engaged? Certainly the motives mentioned above play a large part—patriotism, the desire to protect his family and city, etc. But Aeneas is here also in the grip of something very like the Homeric Ate. One of the constantly recurring words in II is *furor*, or *furere*, used specifically in reference to Aeneas. Describing his own state of mind, he says (316-17): *furor iraque mentem / praecipitat, pulchrumque mori succurrit in armis*; compare with this the words in line 355: *sic animis iuvenum furor additus*. Again, when Venus appears to Aeneas, she asks (595): *quid furis aut quonam nostri tibi cura recessit?* This same word is again applied to Aeneas as he madly searches for the lost Creusa throughout the burning city (771-3):

quaerenti et tectis urbis sine fine furenti
infelix simulacrum atque ipsius umbra Creusa
visa mihi ante oculos et nota maior imago.

Cicero defines *furor* as *mentis ad omnia caecitas*,¹² and this precise use of the word can clearly be seen when it is used to describe the Trojans dragging the wooden horse into the city (244): *immemores caecique furore*. The same word, thus defined, is also well used to describe Aeneas' behavior throughout the action of the second book, blinded as he is by this madness which seizes him. Moreover, that this is precisely what Vergil intended is indicated by Venus' words when she lifts the *cloud of darkness from his eyes*. Here the cloud of darkness is a visual and dramatic representation of the nature and effect of *furor* as

¹² *Tusc. Disp.*, III, 5, 11: *furorem autem rati sunt mentis ad omnia caecitatem*.

a condition in which Aeneas is no longer thinking of or seeing his higher duty (604-6):

aspice (namque omnem quae nunc obducta tuenti
mortalis hebetat visus tibi et umida circum
calligat, nubem eripiam.

Of course, the ostensible reason for Venus' removal of the cloud is to enable Aeneas to see the gods who are destroying the city—i. e. she is permitting him to see the true state of affairs. The idea of the removal of the *furor* with which I am concerned here lies on a second level, but is probably the more important of the two. *Mortalis* and *tibi* thus take on enlarged significance. On one level, Aeneas is the only mortal (*tibi*) who can actually see what the gods are doing. On another level, the human weakness (*mortalis visus*) represented by the *furor* is now removed, and Aeneas resumes a role in which his heroic qualities rather than his fallible humanity are most in evidence.

Again in IV we find Aeneas temporarily forgetful of the words of the numerous divine agencies through which much of his fate had already become known to him. He certainly knew before he arrived in Carthage what his destiny was,¹³ and yet it requires the action of the gods to force him to leave the city. *Fama* describes both him and Dido as *regnorum immemores*, as, indeed, they were. It would seem, then, that just as Aeneas was made to ignore for a time the instructions of Hector in II, for the reasons mentioned above, so here in IV his neglect of his fated purpose serves to emphasize him as a real, a not faultless person, with many of the sentiments and emotions of an ordinary man. It is in this way that some of the multiple facets of Aeneas' personality that were mentioned earlier in connection with the different situations of II and IV are again pointed up

¹³ Aeneas had already received information concerning his destiny from the following sources: Hector (II, 294-5); Creusa (II, 780-4); the oracle of Apollo (II, 94-8); the penates (III, 160-8); the queen of the Harpies (III, 253-4). The discrepancy between Aeneas' behavior at Carthage and his knowledge of his destined purpose has been most recently discussed by R. B. Lloyd, "Aeneid III, a New Approach," *A. J. P.*, LXXIII (1957), pp. 133-51; cf. also G. Howe, "The Development of the Character of Aeneas," *C. J.*, XXVI (1930), 182-93, and H. L. Tracy, "The Gradual Unfolding of Aeneas' Destiny," *C. J.*, XLVIII (1952-53), pp. 281-4.

by his temporary swerving from the path of duty on these two different occasions.

Parallel to the *furor* which blinds Aeneas for a large part of the second book, is the *furor* which seizes Dido and drives her to destruction in IV. This same word is used of her on at least ten different occasions, of which a few may be cited as examples:

65-6 Quid vota furemtem,
quid delubra iuvant?
90-1 Quam simul ac tali persensit peste teneri
cara Iovis coniunx nec famam obstare furori.
101 Ardet amans Dido traxitque per ossa furorem.¹⁴

Dido, too, is caught up in the blinding power of *furor*, just as Aeneas was caught up at Troy, although the results, significantly, are not the same.¹⁵ Here again the poet is giving the reader further opportunity for a sympathetic understanding of Aeneas, who is human enough to allow this madness to control him for a time, but who is heroic enough, Roman enough, if you will, to shake it off finally, and shoulder his burdens anew. This Dido is incapable of doing, for once the *furor* has taken control of her, she never succeeds in escaping it. It is here, then, that much of the significance which Aeneas' behavior in II holds for the tragedy of Dido in IV becomes apparent. It is with masterly technique that Vergil combined the heroic and the warmly human in Aeneas through the manipulation of the motif of *furor*, while at the same time underlining the poignancy of Dido's situation by the tacit contrast of her extreme helplessness, which was the result of her warm, impulsive nature, with the "humanness" of Aeneas which was, however, so carefully controlled.

¹⁴ Cf. 68-9, 283-4, 298-9, 433, 465-6, 501-2, 548-9.

¹⁸ There are, of course, important differences between the *furor* of Dido and that of Aeneas. It is the madness of warfare that the latter exhibits, while it is an Aphrodite-like power that falls upon Dido. In each case, however, the results and symptoms are essentially the same—a passionate and fatal preoccupation with a single goal or object, accompanied by a consequent blindness to other important considerations. Cf. the blind rage (sc. *furor*) of Turnus (VII, 415, 464), and that of Amata (VII, 348, 350, 375, 377, 392, 406). We have here, in fact, one of the major underlying tragic themes of the *Aeneid*—the opposition of reason, discipline, and order, as represented by Aeneas, against the vehement, even heroic, but blind and undisciplined passion characteristic of Dido, Amata, and Turnus.

At both Troy and Carthage, then, Aeneas temporarily goes astray, forgetful of duties and obligations by which he knows he is bound. In both situations Vergil is slowly developing the figure of his hero as a sympathetic and human, as well as a heroic character. That there is even more than a parallelism, in fact a real, meaningful connection between the two situations, is shown by the motif of *furor*, which is not only prominent in each case, but which receives much of its significance in IV from its previous appearance in II.

My remarks thus far have all been oriented toward a consideration of those relations between II and IV which are effected through Vergil's use of the figure of Aeneas and the motifs (*sc. furor* and neglect of duty) connected with it. But when one turns to the tragic themes which constitute the essential fabric of the two books, far more numerous and striking parallels appear.

Throughout the stories of Dido and the fall of Troy, there runs a constant, ominous undertone of deceit, trickery, and deception. In II, of course, it is the craft and treachery of the Greeks which is constantly emphasized. Witness the words of Aeneas when he first realizes that Troy is in flames (II, 309-10):

tum vero manifesta fides, Danaumque patescunt
insidiae.

The tale of Sinon is easily the master bit of deception in the whole *Aeneid*, while in his story, and throughout the subsequent action surrounding the fall of Troy, the name of Ulysses hovers like a shadow.¹⁰ Not once is his name mentioned in a situation where tradition required that he appear; it is simply dropped, again and again, to enforce in the reader's mind this theme of guile and treachery.

6-8	quis talia fando Myrmidonum Dolopumve aut duri miles Ulixi temperet a lacrimis?
43-4	aut ulla putatis dona carere dolis Danaum? sic notus Ulixes?
261	Thessandrus Sthenelusque duces et dirus Ulixes.
435-6	Iphitus et Pelias mecum (quorum Iphitus aevo iam gravior, Pelias et vulnere tardus Ulixi).

¹⁰ Cf. W. F. J. Knight, *Vergil's Troy* (Oxford, 1932), pp. 58-61.

762-3 custodes lecti Phoenix et dirus Ulixes
praedam adservabant.

But even the Trojans are reduced to this expedient. When Coroebus, after Aeneas and his little band have made their first successful sally against the Greeks, suggests they don Greek armor to disguise themselves, his words strike a familiar note (390): *dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?*

As the time for Troy's destruction draws near, deception is practiced against the city even by the gods. Why are Laocoon and his sons killed, if not to confirm Sinon's words and remove any doubt from the Trojans' minds as to whether they should draw the wooden horse into the city? It may be objected, however, that the gods are playing here the same role they frequently have in the *Aeneid*, that of pushing the human actors in the direction they are already going of their own volition and represent, in this capacity at least, a second level of causation, and the inseparability of the human world from the divine order.¹⁷ It is, indeed, perfectly true that the Trojans, after hearing Sinon's story, were prepared to take the horse into the city in any event. But it seems far more likely that the real significance of this act of deception on the part of the gods lies in its connection with the larger pattern of deceit and trickery which is so much in evidence in the two books in question.

This same motif recurs frequently in the story of Dido. To go back to the first book for a moment, it will be remembered that Dido unknowingly takes onto her lap the god Cupid, who then proceeds to inflame her soul with love for Aeneas. Here again the reader may feel that the measures taken by Venus and Cupid are, strictly speaking, unnecessary, and that Dido could well be in the state she is at the beginning of IV without divine interference. But the gods do, nevertheless, victimize Dido, just as they did the Trojans, and in both cases, it may be remarked, they do so to insure the ordained march of fate;¹⁸ Troy must fall and Aeneas is to reach Italy, and in both cases the gods play mortals false to bring this about.

¹⁷ See Duckworth, "Fate and Free Will," pp. 358-9.

¹⁸ Venus' motive in causing Dido to fall in love with Aeneas, it will be remembered, was to prevent her or her people from harming him when he arrived in Carthage.

The exchange between Venus and Juno in the fourth book has heavy overtones of deceit, for the two goddesses are, throughout the poem, bitter antagonists.¹⁹ Juno's whole undivulged purpose is, of course, to keep Aeneas and the Trojans away from Italy. When the two goddesses part, Venus smiles, *dolis repertis* (128); she had, in fact, known from the beginning that Juno was speaking *simulata mente* (105). Venus, by the end of the book, certainly wins the advantage, and thus there is another correspondence which balances II and IV; Juno triumphs in the earlier book, Venus in the later one, and this alternation of victory between the two occurs elsewhere in the poem.²⁰

But the motif of deceit in IV is most strongly brought out in Dido's reproaches to Aeneas:

305-6 dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum
posse nefas tacitusque mea decedere terra?
365-6 nec tibi diva parens generis nec Dardanus auctor,
perfide.²¹

The most obvious effect which the poet achieves with this motif of treachery, especially where the gods are involved, is to concentrate the reader's sympathy on the side of the victims. But in Dido's reproaches to Aeneas there is a deeper significance, of which I prefer to defer discussion, however, until I have examined Vergil's use of a striking image which occurs both in II and IV.

Fire is a dominant image in each of the two books, and is used both as a positive and a negative symbol.²² By "positive"

¹⁹ That the scene is drawn with a subtle humor does not lessen its effectiveness as another link in the chain of deception which this book contains. Certainly the pact between the two goddesses is too important both for the progress of the story and the general tone of *dolus* to be merely a comic interlude. Juno's hatred is too deep to be forgotten even for a moment. Cf. Warde Fowler, *Virgil's Gathering of the Clans* (Oxford, 1918), pp. 39 ff.

²⁰ See Duckworth, "Architecture of the *Aeneid*," p. 12; one of the points he uses to illustrate the correspondence of I and VII is that in I Venus prevails over Juno, while in VII it is Juno who prevails over Venus.

²¹ Cf. IV, 421-2, 541-2.

²² For a detailed discussion of this same image from a different approach, see B. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame. The Imagery of the Second Book of the *Aeneid*," *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 379-400.

I mean favorable, by "negative" unfavorable to Aeneas and the Trojans.

The flames that consume Troy, and the torch used to signal the Greek fleet, need no comment in this regard, and clearly fall on the negative side. But in the midst of these destructive flames two omens appear, both encouraging, and both in the form of fire. The first is the flame that appears over the head of Ascanius (679-84), the portent which convinces Anchises that he must accompany Aeneas away from the city. A few moments later, in answer to a prayer from the old man, a second fire omen appears (692-7):

Vix ea fatus erat senior, subitoque fragore
intonuit laevum, et de caelo lapsa per umbras
stella facem ducens multa cum luce cucurrit.
Illam summa super labentem culmina tecti
cernimus Idaea claram se condere silva
signantemque vias.

In both these cases, and especially the latter, the use of fire as a favorable omen is highly significant, for it points out, as it were, the path that Aeneas and his followers are to follow—it shows the direction in which Aeneas is being driven by the fates—*signantemque vias*.²³ At the same time, however, the reader is never permitted to forget the flames that are destroying Troy, and so fire takes on this double significance; it serves at once both as a favorable omen and as an agent of destruction.

In IV the image of fire centers chiefly around Dido, where it possesses a threefold significance. It represents, first, her love for Aeneas, then her subsequent hatred, real or imagined, and finally reaches, through the interplay of these two extended metaphors, its climax in the queen's burning pyre where the fire images both from II and IV converge into a single scene which bears the accumulated impact of the dominant image.

The image of the pyre haunts the scene from the time of the first book. In the first passage there where Venus' plans for Dido are explicitly stated, there is a remarkable example of foreshadowing in which all three facets of the fire image significance are united (I, 673-4):

²³ Servius produces a rather fantastic explanation of all the symbolism he believes is involved here. However, his first words on these

quocirca capere ante flammis et cingere flamma
reginam meditor.

From the beginning, then, the scenes are all laid against the looming back drop of the pyre, and much of the dramatic force of the other uses of the image depends upon it.

In the first part of IV fire is consistently used to express or represent the passion of Dido:

2 vulnus alit venis et caeco carpitur igni.
54 his dictis impenso animum flammavit amore.
66 . . . est mollis flamma medullas.²⁴

Before long, however, the significance of this "fire" abruptly changes, and becomes the rage and passionate excitement of Dido when she learns of Aeneas' intended departure.

300-1 saevit inops animi totamque incensa per urbem
bacchatur.
362-4 talia dicentem iamdudum aversa tuetur
huc illuc volvens oculos totumque pererrat
luminibus tacitis et sic accensa profatur.

However, despite the seeming hatred which at times seems to overwhelm her, it is important to realize that Dido's love for Aeneas remains to the end, if we are to grasp the full significance of the final scene, where both aspects of the image, the hate and the love, are united. In the passage immediately preceding her death, the rage has left Dido's words, and a tone closely approaching tenderness has again crept into her voice (659-60):

dixit, et os impressa toro "moriemur inultae,
se moriamur" ait. "sic, sic iuvat ire sub umbras."

In the following lines the pyre breaks into the picture and begins to dominate the entire scene (661-2):

hauriat hunc oculis ignem crudelis ab alto
Dardanus, et nostrae secum ferat omina mortis.

Earlier, as the image was moving ominously toward this climax, Dido, in a statement which caught up and continued the sinister import of Venus' threat in I, spoke to Aeneas in words which

lines may be worth remarking: *stellae huius cursus ita significat Troianos conglobatos ad domum Aeneae Idam petere.*

²⁴ Cf. IV, 23, 101.

distinctly evoked the image of the pyre (384), and which served to maintain the significance of the fire image on all three levels, while at the same time revealing and re-emphasizing the direction in which the story was moving:

sequar atris ignibus absens.

In terms, therefore, of the unconscious foreshadowing by Dido in these last words, and the double import of the fire image regarding her feelings, the image reaches its culmination in the flames of the pyre, where the fire becomes symbolic of Dido and all that she represents. United in this fire one sees both her love for Aeneas and her final curse and call for an avenger. The pyre underlines and concentrates into a single image all of the anguish and pathos of Dido's tragedy and marks, as did burning Troy, the end of something that Aeneas loved, but which the gods and his destiny drive him to desert. He leaves the blazing pyre as he left the flames of Troy—both times he leaves unwillingly, and both times the gods force him to do so.²⁵

But at the same time the pyre is a positive image. As has already been pointed out, Dido and Carthage represented the second of the great tests which Aeneas had to face before his arrival in Latium. When the pyre goes up in flames that second danger has been passed—Aeneas has successfully undergone the second trial as he did the first, and the flames which now consume the body of Dido symbolize, cruel as it may be, his success in the face of this second ordeal and, something that is perhaps even more important, the power of the forces that are moving behind him.

It is at this point then that the two fire images from II and IV converge, to point up and broaden the implications of the scene. As Aeneas sails away toward Italy, he is headed once more in the direction the fates would have him go; and as in II he learned the direction he was to take from the shooting star which fell onto Mt. Ida, so here this same image of fire pointing his way and symbolizing his journey is caught up and continued by the pyre of Dido.²⁶

²⁵ For a discussion of Aeneas as an unwilling subject under the pressure of his own destiny, see Heinze, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-2. *Volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt.*

²⁶ Cf. Servius (Dan.) on line 662: *et bene infausta omnia imprecatur ei, quia ad novi regni auspicia properat.* It must be admitted that the

In connection with the motif of Aeneas' departure, both from Troy and from Carthage, his final words with Creusa in II and with Dido in IV deserve a brief examination.

The loss of Creusa is, of course, necessary, both for the Dido story and for all of the action in the second half of the poem. But the same may be also said for Dido, for much the same reason, because her desertion is as much a part of the scheme of things as is the loss of Creusa. Although when his wife appears to Aeneas for the last time she is performing the important mechanical function of informing him of some of the further trials he is to face, she makes the scene a memorable one by reason of the rather wistful pathos of her final words. But when Aeneas tries to clasp her, her shade eludes his grasp, and leaves him *multa volentem/dicere* (790-1). Aeneas' last encounter with Dido is quite the opposite of this; instead of a picture of his future greatness she leaves him a curse. Behind the towering, forceful figure of Dido the shadowy Creusa is almost forgotten; but when the queen had uttered her parting words to Aeneas, she was then taken by her servants to her chambers, leaving him *multa parantem / dicere* (390-1). In addition to the verbal similarity between the two passages, one's attention is caught by the fact that both expressions occur in exactly the same place in the hexameter line. The words *multa volentem* or *multa parantem* are placed, in both cases, at the end of the line, while *dicere* both times begins a new one. Considering the circumstances this could hardly be accidental. Moreover, the shift from *volentem dicere* in the case of Creusa to *parantem dicere* in the case of Dido is a remarkable example of brief, but penetrating psychology. What it amounts to is an implicit comparison between Aeneas' relations with each of these two women.

connection between the falling star and the pyre of Dido is not nearly so striking as that between the pyre and the flames of Troy. The use of fire, however, as an omen connected with Aeneas' destiny is continued later in the poem. Cf., for example, the flaming arrow of Acestes (V, 519 ff.) and the appearance of the flame upon the head of Lavinia (VII, 72-7), an omen which recalls the similar experience of Ascanius in II. On the other hand, the immediate result of the fire portent as well as the other ominous warnings experienced by Lavinia is to forestall her marriage with Turnus, and thus concerns Aeneas only indirectly. Moreover, the significance of Acestes' arrow is not clear. For a discussion of the difficulties of this passage, see Heinze, pp. 165 ff.

With Creusa he was obviously unrestrained, relaxed, and perfectly sincere; for when the moment of their parting came, words quickly rushed to his lips—too many, in fact, for him to have time to utter them all. But one has the impression that he was never completely at ease with Dido, and when, in one of the supreme moments of her passion, she pours a torrent of abuse upon him, he presents an almost ridiculous figure as he stands before her, *planning* what he is going to reply.²⁷ It would be difficult to find a better example either of the economy or the eloquence of Vergil's art.

In returning to the motif of *dolus* which permeates II and IV, we may now consider the further significance of Dido's accusations against Aeneas that I spoke of earlier.

In a number of ways, Aeneas repeats at Carthage an experience much like the one he had on the night of Troy's

²⁷ These lines have been much discussed. Cf. A. Cartault, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* (Paris, 1926), pp. 321-2: "Elle interrompt brusquement l'entretien, laissant Énée dans la situation ridicule que Virgile ne lui épargne pas, de quelqu'un qui aurait bien des choses à dire, mais qui n'en trouve pas le moyen." E. K. Rand, however (*The Magical Art of Vergil* [Cambridge, Mass., 1931], p. 360), interprets Aeneas' actions here as arising from fear of hurting Dido further, and R. Austin (*P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* [Oxford, 1955]) puts forth a similar interpretation. There is much truth in this point of view, but I feel the scene takes on both greater significance and added emotional impact through the almost pathetic contrast of Aeneas' clumsy outward behavior in this "situation ridicule," and the terrible struggle within himself, a struggle which gives his character its most profound and tragic expression. Cf. G. Carlsson, "The Hero and Fate in Virgil's *Aeneid*," *Eranos*, XLIII (1945), pp. 117-18. Pöschl has described this inner conflict with great sensitivity (p. 74): "Die schmerzvolle Entsagung Aeneas besteht nicht in dem Verzicht auf das Glück der Liebe, sondern darin, dass er sich versagen muss, den Schmerz der Königen zu lindern, dass ihn die religiöse Pflicht gegen die Götter und Enkel zwingt, seine menschliche Pflicht gegen Dido zu versäumen." C. Buscaroli's attempt (*Il libro di Didone* [Milan, 1932]) to get around what he considers an undesirable picture of Aeneas here by treating *multa* as an adverb is unconvincing. He translates 390-1: "lasciandolo molto irresoluto per tema e mentre molto si disponeva a dirle." Cf. *Georg.*, IV, 499-502 (Orpheus and Eurydice):

dixit et ex oculis subito, ceu fumus in auras
commixtus tenuis, fugit diversa neque illum
prensantem nequiquam umbras et multa volentem
dicere praeterea vidit.

capture. Most of these parallels have already been discussed. Both times he leaves something he loves, and in each case it is his own personal destiny which forces him to do so. In both cases he temporarily forgets or chooses to ignore what he knows the gods require him to do, and both times his recollection of his fated purpose and his departure for Italy are marked by the image of fire pointing his way. But under the reproaches and imprecations of Dido, Aeneas is driven into a position clearly parallel, even analagous to, the role played by the Greeks at Troy.

It will be recalled that in II it was the treachery of the Greeks that was constantly emphasized; but in IV it is Aeneas who is repeatedly accused of faithlessness. His first words in II, in a passage already cited, after he realized that Troy was betrayed, were (309-10):

tum vero manifesta fides, Danaumque patescunt
insidiae.

Compare with this the words of Dido (IV, 373): *nusquam tuta fides*, or again (597-9):

en dextra fidesque,
quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis,
quem subiisse umeris confectum aetate parentem!

In connection with this, the reader may refer to other statements of Dido (305-6, 365-6) cited above. Aeneas is the stranger who comes to a foreign land. While he did not, as did the Greeks, arrive with hostile intent, he nevertheless leaves the queen dead, just as the Greeks left Priam dead, and both the Greeks and Aeneas leave with flames at their backs. A further significance of the flame image begins to emerge.

The implicit comparison between Dido and Priam in my last remarks leads me, finally, to a comparative examination of the tragic fate of these two rulers, where we find one of the most important and clearly delineated motifs connecting II and IV. It is here that the position of Aeneas at Carthage is most noticeably reversed from the one he held at Troy, and where this reversal is, indeed, the most ironical.

There is a heavy overtone of irony which runs through both II and IV. Sometimes it is brutally explicit, as when the Trojan children play about the wooden horse as it is being drawn

into the city (II, 238-9). But Vergil more often uses this irony in a more intricate manner by weaving it into larger scenes whose issues are greater, and whose implications are more far-reaching. It is this irony which he employed as one of his chief devices in uniting into a single motif the respective fates of Dido and Priam.

It was Priam himself who first ordered that the bonds be removed from Sinon's hands (II, 146-7):

ipse viro primus manicas atque alta levavi
vincla iubet Priamus.

It is, again, Priam who welcomes Sinon and invites him to become one of his own people (148-9):

Quisquis es (amissos hinc iam obliviscere Graios)
noster eris.

In the first case cited above, the poet is obviously calling attention to the irony implicit in the situation with the emphatic use of the two words *ipse* and *primus*, while the words of Priam in the second example find a close echo in Dido's words of welcome to the Trojans in I (573-4):

urbem quam statuo, vestra est; subducite naves;
Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

In both these cases a ruler generously welcomes a helpless stranger, and is in turn destroyed by the person whom he so received.

As Priam approaches his death, his extreme weakness and feebleness are dwelt upon (II, 509-11):

arma diu senior desueta trementibus aevo
circumdat nequiquam umeris et inutile ferrum
cingitur.

When, in a pathetic last effort, he casts his spear at Pyrrhus, the missile is weak and without force (544-5):

sic fatus senior telumque imbelles sine ictu
coniecit.

The corresponding weakness of Dido is not so explicitly stated, but is nevertheless to be understood. She is, indeed, as helpless in the grip of fate as was Priam, since she is no more successful in delaying Aeneas' departure than Priam was in halting the onslaught of the Greeks and of Pyrrhus. Moreover, when

Aeneas leaves, Dido realizes that she can no longer face without him the formidable neighboring tribes whom she appears to have handled capably enough before his arrival. Cf. 534-6:

En, quid ago? rursusne procos inrisa priores
experiar, Nomadumque petam connubia supplex,
quos ego sim totiens iam dedignata maritos?

Priam, just before his death at the hands of Pyrrhus, upbraids that young man for his cruelty, charging that he lies when he claims to be the son of Achilles (II, 540-1):

at non ille, satum quo te mentiris, Achilles
talis in hoste fuit Priamo.

Dido, too, accuses Aeneas of lying about his birth (IV, 365-6):

nec tibi diva parens generis nec Dardanus auctor,
perfide.

He could not be the man they say he is (597-9):

en dextra fidesque,
quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis,
quem subiisse umeris confectum aetate parentem!

The clamor and wailing that arise in the house of Priam as Troy is destroyed closely resemble the lamentations described at the death of Dido. As the doors of Priam's palace are battered down, the rooms resound with the cries of women (486-8):

at domus interior gemitu miseroque tumultu
miscetur, penitusque cavae plangoribus aedes
femineis ululant; ferit aurea sidera clamor.

Compare with this the scene around Dido's pyre immediately after her suicide, where much the same kind of description is given (665-8):

it clamor ad alta
atria; concussam bacchatur Fama per urbem.
Lamentis gemituque et femineo ululatu
tectae fremunt, resonat magnis plangoribus aether.

It will be easily seen that the verbal similarity between these two passages is remarkable.

II

plangoribus femineis ululant
ferit aurea sidera clamor
penitusque cavae plangoribus
aedes

IV

femineo ululatu
it clamor ad alta atria
resonat magnis plangoribus
aether

Finally, as the body of Priam drops to the ground, the poet reflects upon his former greatness and good fortune (556-7):

. . . tot quondam populis terrisque superbum
regnatorem Asiae.

But now he sees his city destroyed (555-6): *prolapsa videntem / Pergama*, and falls, a headless and nameless trunk (558): *avulsumque umeris caput et sine nomine corpus*.

Dido, too, about to die, tearfully recounts all that she had accomplished during her lifetime, contrasting that former state with her present misery (655-8):

urbem praeclaram statui, mea moenia vidi,
ulta virum poenas inimico a fratre recepi,
felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum
numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae.

At this point we may return to the first book again to examine a scene where the parallel fates of Dido and Priam are distinctly foreshadowed. I have already called attention to a statement of Venus (673-4) in which the triple meaning of *flamma*, i. e. the love and the hatred felt by Dido, as well as the pyre itself, is clearly to be seen:

quocirca capere ante dolis et cingere flamma
reginam meditor.

It is only a few lines later that the flames of Troy are mentioned in a verse packed with sinister double meaning. Ascanius, says Venus, is bringing Dido *gifts*, and those things that remain from the flames of Troy—*dona ferens pelago et flammis restantia Troiae*. One of these gifts is a robe of Helen, and the sinister implication here can hardly be mistaken. Would it be too much to suggest here a reversal of Laocoon's famous words (II, 49), *quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentis*.

But the passage in I which has the most significance for the point at hand is where Aeneas stands gazing at the carved figures in the temple of Juno at Carthage. Here, in Carthage, the city of Dido, he is reliving incidents from the great war. The scene is dominated by the image of battle. Priam himself is mentioned three times, each time to illustrate his tragedy. The scene then shifts abruptly to Dido, and again we have her presented in close conjunction with the mention of the fall of Troy. Here, then, the tragic tale has reached its middle point,

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and the story hangs in the balance between the fates of Priam and of Dido—the first already passed, the second yet to come. The past, present, and future are all combined into a single scene of immense tragic implications as Dido enters the temple where Aeneas stands gazing at the carved representations of the war of Troy. The two tragedies are placed side by side, with Aeneas the connecting link standing between them. Through the parallels already implicit between these two rulers, between these two tragedies, and the presence of Aeneas the catalytic agent which fuses them into a unit, the irony of the scene becomes almost unbearable.

But in returning to IV, the passage which serves as the ultimate crux of the parallelism between Priam and Dido, which makes explicit the latent implication of all that has gone before and crystalizes the reversal of Aeneas' role, comes in lines 669-71 where, following the lamentations of the women quoted above, *the scene around Dido's pyre is compared to the capture of a burning city*:

non aliter quam si immissis ruat hostibus omnis
Karthago aut antiqua Tyros, flammaeque furentes
culmina perque hominum volvuntur perque deorum.²⁸

Here the scene is completely dominated by the pyre. Aeneas has faded into the distance, and remains in the background only as a motivating force determining the actions of Dido. There is, of course, a great difference between a single individual's pyre and an entire city in flames, and yet, by the time the climax has been reached, this lone figure, this single individual, or rather, the *importance* and the *tragedy* of this one person have assumed enormous dimensions and can, indeed, easily bear the full weight of parallelism with an entire city.²⁹

²⁸ Notice the constant presence of the flame image here. Pöschl considers the significance of this simile to lie in the identification of Dido with Carthage itself, as the destiny of her city is represented in the flaming pyre (p. 124): "Das Schicksal Didos wird transparent und fließt mit dem Schicksal ihrer Stadt zusammen." A further example of the extraordinary richness of Vergilian imagery.

²⁹ Cf. Paratore's note on line 669 (*Virgilio Eneide libro quattro* [Rome, 1947]), where he cites Macrobius (*Sat.*, IV, 8, 1-5), "il qualé cita il luogo virgiliano come essemplio di *pathos* nascente dal fatto che *aliquid proponitur quod per se magnum sit, deinde minus esse ostenditur quam illud quod volumus augeri.*"

It is clear that Dido, through her close similarity to Priam here, draws further sympathy upon herself, and distinctly at the expense of Aeneas. The reader may well ask himself if Vergil is not going too far, for he has been consistently using the devastating irony of this parallelism to force Aeneas into what seems a distinctly unfavorable position. This view, however, ignores the fact that Vergil, as has already been pointed out, continually manipulates a number of emotional and intellectual currents simultaneously, especially in the more important scenes,³⁰ with the result that any attempt at such over-simplification must remain inadequate. A further example of such technique is to be found in a recurring simile in the second and fourth books which has direct bearing on our interpretation of the situation in which Aeneas finds himself involved in IV, and in terms of which his actions there must be interpreted.

Troy, as it sinks into ashes, is compared to a great tree which, after having been furiously chopped, begins to totter, and finally crashes to earth (II, 626-31):

Ac veluti summis antiquam in montibus ornum
cum ferro accisam crebrisque bipennibus instant
eruere agricolae certatim; illa usque minatur
et tremefacta comam concusso vertice nutat,
vulneribus donec paulatim evicta supremum
congemuit traxitque iugis avolsa ruinam.

In IV Aeneas, under the tears and entreaties of Dido and Anna, is also compared to a great tree, this time an oak, buffeted by the winds (441-6):³¹

ac velut annoso validam cum robore quercum
Alpini Boreae nunc hinc nunc flatibus illinc
eruere inter se certant; it stridor, et altae
consternunt terram concussam stipite frondes;
ipsa haeret scopulis et quantum vertice ad auras
aetherias, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.

The effect of these passages is unmistakable. Much of the significance of the simile in IV lies in the fact that there the tree does not fall; but the strength of this particular tree, and

³⁰ Cf. note 27 above.

³¹ Another much discussed passage; cf. Pease, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-8; for an excellent treatment, see Pöschl, pp. 75-8.

so that of Aeneas himself, is all the more strongly emphasized because the reader cannot help but recall the tree from II which was destroyed. Through the medium of the simile Aeneas is indirectly compared with the defeated city of Troy, and, by implication, with the role he himself played there. The implication is that Aeneas has increased in heroic stature, or perhaps more accurately, his heroic stature is receiving increased emphasis, and the tree which tragically fell in II now stands firm and will not go down a second time. Vergil, in his unobtrusive way, is again reminding his audience that there are larger and greater issues at stake here than just the relations of Dido and Aeneas.³² By juxtaposing the hint of these larger issues with the unquestionable taint of guilt on Aeneas, brought out by his resemblance to the Greeks at Troy, he is again pointing up two sides of his hero—his fortitude as against his personal nature which is by no means faultless, and thus succeeds in maintaining a delicate emotional balance as well as an enlarged perspective in this difficult situation.

The tragedies of Troy and Dido thus parallel one another, and form together the first tragic movement of the poem. Any attempt to analyze more fully the implications of the interrelations between these two books is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, however, that Pöschl's view of I-IV as a unit whose predominant cast is one of darkness, and the importance attached by Conway and Duckworth to the general similarity between the even-numbered books, are, at least in terms of II and IV, fully justified. This position is supported not only by the tragic tone of the two books, upon which they principally base their analyses, but even more by the numerous interlocking motifs connecting these two episodes which serve such similar functions in the story of Aeneas and his destiny.

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³² This particular simile is not, of course, the only means used by the poet to give the situation greater depth and wider implications. I have chosen it as an illustrative example only because of its immediate relevancy to my subject, as one of the connecting links between II and IV.

ISOCRATES' METHODS OF TEACHING.

In a previous note ¹ I foreshadowed further comments on the teaching methods used by Isocrates in his school. Despite a fair amount of recent discussion of the teacher and his work,² I have never seen any attempt fully to elucidate the actual details of these methods and their relation to Isocrates' general philosophical beliefs. Yet I feel such an attempt is worthwhile for two reasons. First, as Jebb ³ points out, "the school of Aristotle—in which rhetoric was both scientifically and assiduously taught—produced not a single orator of note except Demetrius Phalereus; the school of Isocrates produced a host. Why was this so? Clearly because Isocrates, though inferior in his grasp of principles, was greatly superior in the practical department of teaching." The methods of such a teacher are worth elucidating for themselves. Secondly, it may be of wider interest to observe Isocrates' teaching methods as the practical reflection of his broader philosophy—the aspect of him which is now receiving most attention. Such a study may add depth to our view of his teaching while giving a new insight into his philosophy.

Teaching methods vary with the subjects taught, and the subjects in a curriculum vary with the aims set before pupil and teacher. Isocrates aimed to produce statesmen; it would be so convenient if he had left us a list of the subjects his pupils studied to that end—but we have only inference to guide us. Burk ⁴ lists eleven subjects, to which one is quite entitled to add

¹ *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), p. 297.

² Notably, A. Burk, *Die Pädagogik des Isokrates* (Würzburg, 1923); W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III (Blackwell, 1945); H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (3rd ed., Sheed and Ward, 1956); W. Steidle, "Redekunst und Bildung bei Isokrates," *Hermes*, LXXX (1952), pp. 257-96; E. Mikkola, *Isokrates* (Helsinki, 1954).

³ R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators*, II (London, 1876), p. 431.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 118-19. "Die Zahl der Fächer die in der isokratischen Schule der Verstandesbildung dienten, war freilich nicht gross. Es gab eigentlich nur ein Fach: die Rhetorik. Aber darin war eine ganze Reihe unserer modernen Unterrichtszweige eingeschlossen: Grammatik, Stil, Aufsatz- und Vortragslehre; Heimatkunde, Geschichte und Archä-

Geography, Political Science, perhaps Strategy; clearly there is no safe way of deciding exactly what subjects Isocrates taught besides formal rhetoric. In any case, while we may assume that such topics as I have cited would be discussed by Isocrates' pupils, one can hardly imagine that Isocrates conformed to the practice of a modern institution and taught each subject for a fixed number of hours per week with examination and credits at the end of the course. His "curriculum" was almost certainly ill-defined, within certain broad limits: he taught no mathematics (though he approved of the study as *γυμνασία τῆς ψυχῆς*)⁵—still less the other sciences; he taught the technique of oratory; and his pupils learned the matter necessary to form their political, social, and ethical judgements and to provide content for their speeches. Fortunately, for a consideration of his teaching methods, such broad limits are enough; these methods varied according as Isocrates was teaching how to compose a speech or what to put in it.

In the teaching of rhetoric Isocrates believed in the educational trinity of natural ability, sound teaching, and practice,⁶ which he had learnt from Protagoras.⁷ Of these three factors he regarded teaching as least important;⁸ and though he valued natural talent very highly, it is beyond the teacher's power to produce it. Therefore he concentrated his efforts on seeing that his pupils practised hard, and on prescribing and correcting what they practised. In a passage of the *Antidosis* (180-5) he compares the teacher of rhetoric to the *paidotribes*; the passage is of fundamental importance in illustrating Isocrates' method, and part must be quoted:

Ἐπειδὴν γὰρ λάβωσι μαθητάς, οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβαι τὰ σχήματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εὐρημένα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκουσιν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες τὰς ιδέας ἀπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. ἐμπείρους δὲ τούτων ποιήσαντες καὶ διακριβύσαντες ἐν τούτοις πάλιν γυμνάζουσιν αὐτούς, καὶ πονεῖν ἐθίζουσιν, καὶ συνείρειν καθ' ἕναστον ὃν ἔμαθον ἀναγκά-

ologie; Jurisprudenz auf ihren verschiedensten Gebieten; nicht zuletzt Religionslehre, Lebensweisheit und Philosophie."

⁵ *Antid.* 266.

⁶ *Antid.* 187.

⁷ Cf. H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, II (West Berlin, 1952), p. 264.

⁸ *Antid.* 192.

ζουσιν, ἵνα ταῦτα βεβαιότερον κατὰσχωσι καὶ τῶν καιρῶν ἐγγυτέρω ταῖς δόξαις γένηται. . . . Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελόμενοι καὶ παιδεύοντες μέχρι μὲν τοῦ γενέσθαι βελτίους αὐτοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺς μαθητὰς καὶ ἔχειν ἄμεινον, τοὺς μὲν τὰς διανοίας τοὺς δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ξέας, ἀμφοτέροι δύνανται προαγαγεῖν.

Obviously, the techniques of the one teacher are in essence the techniques of the other; it is essential to examine with some care the techniques of the *paidotribes*.

In the first place, he does not teach a class of boys at once; the sort of mass gymnastic exercise one sees at a modern gymkhana is not found in the Athenian palaestra—any mass movements were restricted to military or choral drills. The normal teaching of a *paidotribes* with a class, as we can gather from vase-paintings, is to attend to one or two boys exercising, while the rest of the class either watch and listen or go on with their own exercises until he comes to them—the same procedure as is found on most athletic grounds today.

The athletic instructor takes his boys and teaches them, individually, the "schemata"—the holds and grips and throws of wrestling, the stances and moves of boxing, the positions and gestures of the other athletic events. One by one he explains these, and puts the boy into one position after another, always making sure that he can take up the position or make the move by himself, and exercising the pupil often in that particular move or position. He points out distinctions amongst the schemata and makes sure the pupil understands and is well practised.

This is only the first step. The pupil who has learnt individual moves and positions must learn to "string them together" (*συνείρειν καθ' ἐν ἑκαστον*), much as children learn to string together syllables, to read and pronounce polysyllabic words. Thus the pupil is exercised in fluency of movement, and may be set, say, to wrestle with another under the eye of the *paidotribes*. In the actual wrestling competition he learns to choose and employ and combine the individual holds and moves, to apply particular ones for particular opponents, to avoid those which expose his own weakness; and all this time the *paidotribes* is likely to halt the match and correct and show the proper way and put both competitors through further exercises on individual moves or combinations of moves.

How are these techniques applied to the school of rhetoric?

In the first place, the practice of individual tuition. Isocrates had a school of very few pupils—probably never more than eight boys at a time in all stages of the course. Therefore he could hardly fail to give them most painstaking and detailed attention. Furthermore—as in the palaestra—all could listen and draw profit from the particular instruction given to one.

In the instruction of the individual pupil, Isocrates still follows the same technique as the *paidotribes*. First he teaches the *schemata*, as he says (*Antid.* 183) “all the *idéai* used in a speech.” Hubbell in his study of Isocrates⁹ makes a full examination of the meaning of *idéai* (pp. 6-9), and proves, particularly from *Ep.*, VI, 8, that they are not just the divisions of a speech nor “the schemata of Gorgias (the figures of rhetorical speech) but the thought elements or ideas, as we should call them, which the orator has ready as part of his stock in trade” (p. 7). Jaeger¹⁰ sees in this teaching of patterns of thought the influence of Greek medicine. The comparison to a physician is as apt as Isocrates’ analogy of the *paidotribes*. Each, as well as the teacher of rhetoric, is teaching pupils to deal with limitless individual cases—of disease, of athletic rivalry, of intellectual conflict. Each makes and teaches a classification of those cases—types and symptoms of disease, build and grips of opponents, arguments and styles of speech; each teaches the total of techniques which may be applied in medicine, wrestling, arguments or oratory to prevail over each particular type. The pupil’s business in each case is the same—to diagnose the methods of his enemy and to choose the appropriate course of action.

Then Isocrates pits pupil against pupil in the rhetorical counterpart of the wrestling match. The pupil has previously composed sections of speech and even whole speeches—single speeches, spoken without opposition. In rhetorical competition he learns how to apply these arts of composition—“to choose and blend and arrange them suitably, to use them at the right time.”¹¹ Just as the wrestler learns by experience that a particular opening is best exploited by a certain type of attack, so the young rhetor learns what arguments are most convincing

⁹ H. M. Hubbell, *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides* (Yale University Press, 1913).

¹⁰ *Paideia*, III, p. 61.

¹¹ *Against the Sophists*, 16.

in a given case, in a given part of a speech, or against a particular opponent. Just as the medical student for all his book learning is incompetent until years of clinical experience have taught him to recognize and deal with ailments, so the pupil is no rhetor until he can stand up to the fire and cunning of an opponent in public debate, and vanquish him by the arguments and style of delivery appropriate to that particular case.

However, there were other subjects in Isocrates' curriculum besides composition. The pupils had to learn the merits of various literary styles, and had to be taught the necessary materials for forming sound political judgements. History, political science, geography, ethics, literary studies are included in the curriculum. The methods of teaching these subjects may be deduced from the fact that Isocrates' school was a school of political rhetoric. Inevitably, these studies were taught not for their own sakes as they are in a modern university, but for the help they could give to a rhetor in making decisions or influencing an audience. Being ancillary to rhetorical composition, the subjects were covered as composition required.

The simplest illustration of this principle at work is the method of teaching what I have called literary studies—that is, the analysis and stylistic criticism of literary works in verse and prose. This study in Isocrates' school is merely the complement of composition; the pupils see the excellence and faults of others and learn to imitate the one and avoid the other. The method of teaching could possibly be by lecture—Isocrates pointing out the merits and demerits of a given piece, the pupils passively taking notes; but it seems more likely that he would have encouraged the pupils themselves to criticize and discuss the pieces—the practice of group-discussion was a feature of the school on which I shall have more to say. The examples of the *Busiris* and Plato's *Phaedrus* present another hypothesis—that the pupils were given two works on a single topic (Polycrates and Isocrates on *Busiris*, like Lysias and Socrates on *Eros*) and asked to compare and discuss them in detail. In the *Protagoras* Plato presents the scene of Socrates and Protagoras arguing over the details of diction in a poem of Simonides; it would appear from Isocrates' encouragement of discussion and his attention to detail that the studies in literature in his school followed a similar procedure—with the pupils then embodying in their compositions the fruits of their discussion.

The subjects more concerned with content—history, ethics, political science, geography—were dealt with in a somewhat different way. These, after all, are merely the facts with which judgements are made. They were not elevated into the autonomous disciplines they are nowadays, requiring such dissimilar subsidiary subjects as archaeology, meteorology, and metaphysics. The *historiae* of Thucydides and of Hellanicus of Lesbos were both books requiring no specialist knowledge beyond the ability to read, nor any difference of mental approach that warranted a difference in methods of teaching or study; yet from one book the pupils learnt history, from the other geography. Since these subjects required no specialized techniques of teaching or learning, it seems likely that they were not so much taught to the pupil as read by him—and the knowledge employed in his composition. It is obvious from Isocrates' exhortations to Demonicus¹² and Nicocles¹³ to read the poets, and his discussion of written compositions in the *Evagoras*,¹⁴ that he had no objection to his pupils' learning material from books. There is certainly no evidence that he preferred the lecture method. Therefore it seems most likely that as the pupils' compositions came to require political knowledge or history, geography or an ethical message, Isocrates recommended the appropriate reading to them and supplemented this with his own knowledge or opinions.

This method does not necessarily mean that these subjects in Isocrates' school were dealt with in a careless and unscholarly manner—the school, after all, produced the major historians Theopompus, Ephorus, and Androtion. In the debates which were so much a part of Isocrates' teaching, naturally the advantage would go to the pupil with the more extensive reading, the more exact knowledge of the facts. Isocrates himself and all the school listened ready to correct and question—a procedure familiar to any student who has ever attended a tutorial, and a procedure certainly discouraging to inexact or inadequate scholarship. There is little reason to suppose that the criticism of Isocrates and eight or so keen-witted youngsters was much less

¹² *Demonicus*, 51. It would be out of place here to discuss the disputed authenticity of the *Demonicus*. It has little bearing on this essay.

¹³ *Ad Nic.* 13; cf. 3, 43.

¹⁴ *Evag.* 73-7.

stringent than Socrates' dissection of Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus*.

Furthermore, the process would naturally give rise to speculation and reflection. The pupils were to find policies and advance them, and oppose them and find counter-policies. Minds could hardly be more keenly stimulated, striving thus over months and years—and considering always the same types of question, on constitutions or internal and foreign policies. Ethics and political science would especially flourish in such an atmosphere as the precepts of the moralists were adapted to contemporary conditions and to public as well as personal morality. Isocrates' own works provide examples of such speculation coming to fruition in the *Cyprians*, *Areopagiticus*, *Panegyricus*, and *Panathenaicus*.

It is important to realize that all these methods of teaching—by practice in composition, by literary analysis and discussion, by reading and competition—are accompanied by the most detailed attention and correction from the master himself and other pupils. In the *Antidosis* (206) he claims that one should be able to recognize the pupils of any good master, "men who have shared the same *paideia*," by a certain similarity amongst them; to achieve this in pupils would require incessant direction from the master. In the *Areopagiticus* (37, 47-8) he commends the old Athenians for continually correcting the young and in the *ad Nicoclem* (4) he laments the fact that princes have none to correct them—evidently he regards all education as a process of correction. Thus in listening to a pupil's composition, he would be preparing to correct not only his manner of delivery and the various points of literary style and rhetorical structure, but also the policy taken, the arguments used, and the facts on which those arguments were based; after the oration the pupil would hear these criticisms and corrections, the recommendations for further reading and further models to analyse and imitate, and the prescriptions for further composition which Isocrates would propose. In this way the entire course is centered on rhetorical composition, yet ensures not mere empty polish of technique but a breadth of knowledge and soundness of judgment such as to outweigh in educational value the purely vocational training provided.

A curious form of this constant correction is the practice of

group-criticism which seems to be a feature of the school. On at least two occasions in public speeches Isocrates describes how his own orations were scrutinized and criticized by his pupils before delivery. In the *Panathenaicus* he uses the story as an integral part of the speech: Isocrates describes how he was correcting the speech with his pupils, and sent for a former student, a Laconophile, who might examine the speech for truth or bias (*Panath.* 200). Most of the remainder of the speech is presented as the remarks of this ex-pupil and the replies of Isocrates. Again in the speech to Philip (17-23) he tells how his pupils had seen and passed judgement on the work before it left his hands for Philip's. Isocrates says that a teacher should supply models for his pupils (*Soph.* 18); but this is obviously something different. If the master would discuss with his pupils works in preparation or near to publication, it is safe to infer that such mutual criticism was a normal practice with the works of the pupils themselves. Thereby each gets the advantage of the help of all the others; and all get help and practice from every work composed in the school.

It is this last feature that is particularly significant in Isocrates' methods of teaching. Many of his other methods are derived from others: the systematic rules of rhetoric, the analysis of examples, the emphasis on practice—all these were part of the training given by the sophists of the fifth century.¹⁵ Certainly these sophists would have carefully corrected their pupils' efforts in rhetoric; but nowhere is there any suggestion that the pupils corrected the teacher, nor each other. Whatever the reliability of Plato's evidence, his pictures of the sophists are of authoritarian teachers, lecturing, expounding, indulging in close argument only to dazzle the unskilled, not at all relishing the more equal match with Socrates. Isocrates, on the other hand, positively seeks discussion—good-tempered, searching discussion, and group criticism.

This is not surprising when we consider his theories on the nature of thought and of knowledge. These theories may be concentrated in three words—*δόξα*, *λόγος*, *καιρός*—and the mean-

¹⁵ Marrou (*op. cit.*, pp. 53-6) gives a detailed picture of the teaching of these sophists. He treats them more sympathetically than Burk (*op. cit.*, pp. 22-3) who conceives them as giving an extremely authoritarian and illiberal training in formal rhetoric.

ings Isocrates attaches to them. The meanings and the theories are well known,¹⁶ but their exact integration with every detail of Isocrates' teaching methods does not seem to have been remarked.

Plato set *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* in antithesis, and Isocrates continued it; but "the distinction usually drawn, in Plato for instance, between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, the one 'opinion,' the other 'knowledge,' is not exactly that made by Isocrates. *δόξα* is here, not irresponsible opinion, but a working theory based on practical experience—judgement or insight in dealing with the uncertain contingencies of any human situation which presents itself. In this realm, he holds, there can be no exact science."¹⁷

δόξα is the outcome of *λόγος*. Isocrates' opinion of *λόγος* is expressed in two celebrated passages, too long to quote.¹⁸ In them Isocrates sets out the function of *λόγος*—to persuade, and to communicate ideas; to discover laws; to convict and extol—that is, to know good and evil; to educate; to debate and enquire. It is the mark of intelligence and judgement; it is the only true standard by which to judge a man's *ἀρετή*.

What is the conception of *logos* that underlies these eulogies? Isocrates conceives *logos* as speech—but more than speech. To speak one must have matter—facts, arguments, and reasons, appeal to feeling; *logos* is the power to discover these. It is also the power to express them in order. But it is still more; these qualities never founded cities, established laws and gave the beginnings of civilization. *Logos* is, at its deepest, the discourse of the mind with itself—the processes of thought. "The same arguments by which we persuade others in speech, we also use in our deliberations, and so, while we give the title of rhetoricians to those who can speak in public, we attribute prudent counsel to those who can most effectively debate their problems in the privacy of their own minds."¹⁹ Here, *logos* comes very close to logic; one can see how in the beginning primitive men "debating

¹⁶ They are discussed, often at length, in all the works cited in note 2 above—by Jaeger, Steidle, and Mikkola particularly.

¹⁷ G. Norlin, *Isocrates* (Loeb ed., 1929), p. 290, note.

¹⁸ *Cyprians*, 5-9, repeated word for word in *Antid.* 253-7; and *Paneg.* 47-9. Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

¹⁹ *Antid.* 256. Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 189E: . . . λόγον δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ.

their problems in the privacy of their own minds" observed phenomena and drew conclusions and established laws; perceived where their advantage lay and persuaded others and founded cities; discovered moral codes and material goods, and taught their children the conclusions of their interior discourse.

In summary, then, Isocrates did not believe in the possibility of certain moral knowledge, of *ἐπιστήμη*, but only of *δόξα*. This is reached by *λόγος*. And one of the most important conclusions for *λόγος* to reach is the judgement of the *καιρός*—the opportune moment, the opportune circumstances, the opportune methods for advocating a course of action. Isocrates prides himself on the flexibility of mind that this implies, and takes issue with his predecessors and rivals: "To learn the elements from which we make and arrange all our speeches is not every difficult, if a man goes not to the teachers who make extravagant promises, but to those who know something about these things; but to choose each of these suitably, and blend them with each other and arrange them appropriately, to judge the right occasion, and to dapple the whole speech with attractive arguments, and deliver it with harmony and rhythm—this requires great study and is the work of a manly spirit, a spirit sound in judgement."²⁰

Now what is the relation of these psychological and epistemological ideas to Isocrates' teaching methods? Briefly summarized, the methods are: instruction in the fundamentals of rhetoric; the analysis of examples; abundant practice in composition; competition; and group criticism. The first three points are common to the other teachers of rhetoric,²¹ and are the teaching and practice which figure in the educational trinity. The last two are the direct outcome of the theories I have just been discussing.

The group-discussion of policies and details of style which I have described as a feature of Isocrates' school is a reflection in the field of education of Isocrates' view of interior *λόγος* as the power of thought or exterior *λόγος* as the means of social progress. Only a man who had little faith in absolute certainty, in *ἐπιστήμη*, and at the same time had respect for the power of human minds acting in concert, would adopt such a system of education. It is a system which accords very closely with democracy in politics.

²⁰ *Against the Sophists*, 16-17. Cf. *id.*, 12-13.

²¹ Marrou, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-4.

Is it wrong to suppose that this method of teaching, with its training not merely in forms but in freedom of expression, and in critical ability, and in facing criticism—this method far removed from the flashy and arrogant attitude of other teachers²²—was in large part responsible for the prestige Isocrates enjoyed as a teacher and the remarkable success he achieved in his pupils?

The other element in his teaching methods—the pitting of one pupil against another, as in the wrestling school—is another expression of these fundamental ideas. Isocrates clearly shows his esteem for the *καίρος*,²³ and just as clearly states that certain knowledge of it is impossible. Only abundant practice in competition will make the pupil “generally able to hit upon the best solution in (his) judgements.”²⁴ The importance of direct experience and the continual awareness that error is possible are pillars of his thinking equally in pedagogy and other fields.

The most recent large-scale study of Isocrates begins with a salutary exhortation²⁵ not to break him into fragments but to realize his wholeness and the interdependence of all aspects of his thought. Such an approach adds to Isocrates' stature as a thinker. It also gives us a new appreciation of him as a teacher. It is, I think, axiomatic in educational theory that the most effective education is given when day-to-day teaching methods are integrated to the utmost with a whole philosophy of life valid outside the classroom. In Isocrates' school, that integration is clear. The desire to train rhetors is in itself a reflection of Isocrates' reverence for the *logos*. In that training, the relative importance of talent, study, and practice; the methods

²² *Against the Sophists*, 1, 3, 9.

²³ Steidle, *op. cit.*, pp. 270 ff., makes a detailed examination of the importance of this element in Isocrates' philosophy.

²⁴ *Antid.* 271.

²⁵ Mikkola, *op. cit.*, p. 5. “Wenngleich die Gedankenwelt eines Menschen oft voll von Widersprüchen ist, hat er doch im Denken ein zwingendes Bedürfnis nach der Ganzheit, in der alle Teile sich nahtlos aneinander anschliessen, woher auch immer ihre eigentlichen Baumaterialien stammen mögen oder wieviel auch immer man sie anderswo verwendet haben mag. Darum handeln wir unrecht gegenüber dem betreffenden Menschen, wenn wir sein Denken in Stücke schlagen, indem wir untersuchen, wessen Gedanken er in jedem Augenblick als die seinigen vorträgt.”

of teaching rhetoric, by precept, example, practice, competition, and criticism—and of teaching speech-content, by reading, incorporation in speeches, criticism (like a modern tutorial class); disbelief in the possibility of certain knowledge; high esteem for discussion, judgement, and appropriateness; all these are mere reflections in the school-room of Isocrates' whole outlook on life. If space permitted, a clear connection could be shown—through the fundamental ideas of λόγος and δόξα—between these details of day-to-day teaching and Isocrates' ideal of the rhetor and his concept of ἀρετή; and these concepts would then lead on to his ideal of the state, and his concept of παιδεία, and of the meaning of man's life.

Isocrates' philosophy is praiseworthy if not profound;²⁰ and his few basic ideas permeate every aspect of his life, so that his educational methods are related to a political ideal and indeed an elevating *weltanschauung*. This gives his schooling that depth which, according to our nuances, distinguishes "education" from "training."

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²⁰ That its depth is underestimated is one theme of both Steidle and Mikkola.

HORACE, *CARMINA*, I, 2.

The second Ode of the first Book has commanded attention less successfully than the poems it most resembles, the third and the fourth of the Roman Odes. All alike address themselves to Octavian, the first explicitly and the other two tacitly: each in its way provides a mirror for magistrates. The Roman Odes have excited, if perhaps also evaded, considerable speculation as to their political meaning, but by dedicating *C.*, I, 2 to the ruler Horace has encouraged the assumption that he must be writing a paean. His tentative identification of Octavian and Mercury (41 ff.) has monopolized discussion, and one sometimes receives the impression that Horace concerned himself only to write a foot-note to the history of the ruler cult. Debates as to whether Horace thinks Octavian actually a god, metaphorically a god, or only very like a god, have moved from the confines of the text to the ampler context of comparative religion, sometimes with an almost apocalyptic suggestiveness.¹ Yet Horace's religion shows itself here to be an eminently practical one, and as a document in contemporary politics the Ode yields the clearest reading. Those who allow a diplomatic rather than a theological bias usually take the Ode as symptomatic of the poet's reconciliation to Octavian's rule. "The Ode is fitly placed in the forefront of the three Books, as containing once for all Horace's palinode and 'apologia.' He is professing and explaining his conversion to Caesarism."² Such a verdict bases itself primarily on the function—*Caesaris ultor*—which Horace prescribes for Mercury, incarnate in Octavian (44). For Sellar

¹ Zielinski ("Le Messianisme d'Horace," *L'Antiquité Classique*, VIII [1939], pp. 171-80) invokes the Arcadian Hermes and his son Logos, and incorporating the Gospel according to St. John emerges with a remarkably hospitable view of Octavian as "le Verbe, Verbe créateur, Verbe, identifié à la seconde personne de la Trinité, Verbe, identifié au Messie" (p. 179). Cf. K. Rupprecht, "Gott auf Erden," *Würrz. Jahr. für Alt.*, I (1946), pp. 67-78.

² E. C. Wickham, *Odes of Horace* (Oxford, 1904), *ad loc.* Cf. the editions of C. L. Smith (Boston, 1903), C. H. Moore (New York, 1902), P. Shorey (Norwood, 1923). I used the text of Kiessling-Heinze, 8th ed. (Berlin, 1955).

the phrase was sufficient to convict Horace of suggesting that Octavian's "first duty was, as the avenger of Julius Caesar, to crush the remnants of the party for which Horace himself had fought."³ Yet Horace has come less to praise Caesar than to bury him, and his "declaration of allegiance"⁴ to Caesar's adopted son and heir presents at the same time a warning. Summaries naming the Ode a clear panegyric preserve only a half truth, and it is my purpose to emphasize the other half; to show that if the Ode displays the characteristics of a paean, it betrays those of Cautionary Verses.

What is the poem about? Primarily revenge, as the repetition of *ultor* insists (18, 44, 51). We hear of Jupiter's punishment of the Romans, and of the river god Tiber's; Mercury is hailed as avenger of Caesar, and urged to exact revenge, under Octavian's leadership, from the Medes. The concept of vengeance includes those of crime, punishment, and expiation. The first stanza suggests that a divine wrath pursues the Romans; we learn of their *vitium* (23, 47) and *scelus* (29), and of the need for expiation (29). The opening words, *iam satis*, announce an accompanying theme of excess, one reinforced by the persistent hiss of the *s*'s in the first two lines. The plea for a savior, *tandem venias* (30), confirms our sense of a too long continued punishment, as does the repetition of *nimum* (17, 37). Excessive revenge emerges as the subject of the first five stanzas, as images of natural chaos—snow, hail, lightning, and a flooding of the Tiber—declare a divine wrath against the Roman people. The tempest Horace describes has been so severe as to approach that survived only by Deucalion and Pyrrha, when the disruption approximated the ultimate fantasy of traditional *adunata*. Fishes clung to trees (9-10), and does (11-12) swam in the sea—one scholiast detected here an inappropriate levity: *leviter in re tam atroci et piscium et palumborum meminit, nisi quod hi excessus lyricis concessi sunt* (Porphyrio, *ad loc.*). It is surprising to find Mr. Wilkinson even less indulgent: "Horace has got onto a well known *locus* and let his fancy lead him astray."⁵

³ *Horace and the Elegiac Poets* (Oxford, 1924), p. 153.

⁴ Smith, *ad loc.*

⁵ *Horace and his Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 63. Peerlkamp (Amstel, 1862) and Meineke (Berlin, 1874) simply omit the stanza as unworthy: *totius carminis maiestate indignissimos* (Meineke *ad loc.*).

In evoking a somewhat mannered vision of Pyrrha's age Horace is exercised less by his fancy than by the effort to find a sufficiently grotesque illustration of the chaos his generation has witnessed. Fishes assume the actions of birds (*haesit ulmo*, 9) and land animals those of fish (*natarunt aequore dammae*, 11-12): earth, sea, and sky become inchoate. If the first three stanzas insist upon the violation of nature's processes, the next two announce a shattering of divine sanction as well:

vidimus flavum Tiberim retortis litore Etrusco violenter undis ire delectum monumenta regis templaque Vestae,	15
Iliae dum se nimium querenti iactat ultorem, vagus et sinistra labitur ripa Iove non probante u- xorius amnis.	20

The link with myth now becomes aetiological rather than comparative, as an excessive desire for vengeance—for whether we take *nimium* with *querenti* or *ultorem* the sense remains clear^a—defines itself as the cause of Rome's misfortunes. Jove's disapproval (19) of Tiber's excessive zeal seems to confirm Horace's hope that the Father has sufficiently punished his people (1-4). The sacrilegious character of the river god's revenge is dramatized by the buildings he attacks. Horace mentions only the Regia, built by Numa the Good and official residence of the Pontifex Maximus, and the shrine of Vesta, peaceful goddess of the hearth.

The poem's logic demands that we take the first twenty lines as something more than a report on actual weather conditions at Rome. Unless we allow the first five stanzas to stand as symbols of political chaos, the sixth has no meaning in terms of what precedes:

audiet civis acuisse ferrum, quo graves Persae melius perirent, audiet pugnas vitio parentum rara iuventus.	21-4
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If Horace compels us to a larger interpretation only at line

^aL. Mueller (St. Petersburg, 1900), Wickham, and Kiessling-Heinze understand the first, which seems preferable; Plessis-Lejay (Paris, 1909), Shorey, and Moore take the second.

twenty-one, he has already prepared us for the transition from meteorological to political terms. The animals (does and doves) and buildings bearing the force of the storm associate themselves with peace,⁷ while the violence of Tiber's attack—*retortis undis*,⁸ *violenter*, *deiectum*—suggests an analogy with battle. If the *horrida tempestas* gathering in the thirteenth Epode bore a political relevance,⁹ the storm clouds are now seen to have broken in full fury. To take the various aberrations of nature as symbols of civil war in general is preferable to Porphyrio's popular identification of them as the portents following the murder of Caesar:

Post occisum C. Caesarem, quem Cassius et Brutus alique coniurati interfecerunt, multa portenta sunt visa; Tiberis enim ita crevit, ut prodigii loco haberetur. Haec autem omnia (omina?) vult videri in ultionem occisi principis facta et poenam eorum, qui bella civilia agere non desinebant (*ad* 1, ed. Hauthal).

The earliest estimate puts the Ode eight years after Julius Caesar's death, while it is probable that fifteen years had elapsed:¹⁰ would Horace's storm still convey so specific a reference to his contemporaries? The commentator's interpretation is narrower than the poet's, for Horace does not so restrict himself. His images of disorder are not markedly similar to the portents after Caesar's death recorded by other authors, and he has deliberately neglected the most remarkable—sweating and

⁷ Horace later connects the temple of Vesta explicitly with peace; from her the Romans entreat a savior to end civil wars (26-8).

⁸ The phrase has caused much confusion as to its meaning in terms of the Tiber's actual course; see any commentary *ad loc.* Horace perhaps wrote *retortis undis* because he wished primarily to suggest violent turmoil, rather than with the wealth of geographical detail in mind which his editors assume.

⁹ See C. Giarratano, *Il libro degli Epodi* (Pescia, 1930), pp. 89 ff.; J. Stroux, "Valerius Flaccus und Horaz," *Philol.*, XC (1935), pp. 325 ff.; A. Y. Campbell, *Horace* (London, 1924), p. 143; V. Pöschl, *Foundation Hardt*, II (Geneva, 1953), p. 100. Wilkinson (p. 128) suggests a reference to "the political storm which blew up in 33-2 B. C. and burst at Actium."

¹⁰ H. T. Plüss (*Horazstudien* [Leipzig, 1882], pp. 39 ff.) dates it in 36 B. C. Most modern editors agree that a date after Actium is practically certain, though they disagree as to the precise date between 29 and 27 B. C. See below, pp. 52 ff.

weeping statues, wolves in the streets, speaking cattle, volcanos and earthquakes.¹¹ Debates over the possible applicability of Horace's stanzas to the events of 44 B. C. obscure a central point: had he intended an immediately recognizable description he could easily have given one, for the material was not lacking.¹² His description is, rather, deliberately vague enough to include the unnatural events after Caesar's death without being so detailed as to restrict itself to these alone.

The fact that a flood of the Tiber apparently formed no part of the portents of 44 B. C. also militates against so specific an application. In asserting that there had been such a flood Porphyrio was guilty of a type of scholarly reasoning which is not without parallel. On the assumption that Horace was describing the portents of 44 B. C., it followed that the Tiber's flood must be among them. Porphyrio then asserted inference as fact.¹³ After thus canonizing the Tiber's flood, Porphyrio could explain Ilia's anger, which causes it, as the result of Caesar's murder. Later editors confirmed and embellished this explanation by invoking a genealogy in which Ilia is daughter of Aeneas. As a charter member of the *gens Iulia*, and thus ancestress of Julius Caesar, she then achieves a plausible motive for her complaint against the Romans. Yet Ilia was not popularly supposed to be ancestress of Caesar: the *Iulii* derived their descent, as their name, from Aeneas' son Iulus, who seems not to have figured in the legends concerning Ilia.¹⁴ Horace empha-

¹¹ Cf. Vergil, *G.*, I, 466 ff., Tibullus, II, 5, 71 ff., Ovid, *Met.*, XV, 782 ff., Dio, XLV, 17. See also M. E. Hirst, "The Portents in Horace *Odes* I, 2, 1-30," *C. Q.*, XXXII (1938), pp. 7-9. Yet many editions continue to follow Porphyrio in treating the first five stanzas as a description of the portents after Caesar's death. See Moore, Shorey, Wickham, T. E. Page (London, 1895), Plessis-Lejay, Villeneuve (Paris, 1927).

¹² Particularly after the appearance of Vergil's first *Georgic*, which Horace almost certainly imitates. Ps.-Acro early commented upon the connection, while Franke (*Fasti Horatiani* [Berlin, 1839], p. 142) elaborated the details. See also Birt, *Horaz's Lieder* (Leipzig, 1925), II, pp. 54 ff.; Barwick, "Horaz Carm. I, 2 und Vergil," *Philol.*, XC (1935), pp. 257 ff.

¹³ "Porphyrios Notiz zu v. 1 . . . ist offenbar aus unserer Stelle geschöpft" (Kiessling-Heinze *ad* 13). Cf. Hirst, *op. cit.* Others have maintained that Horace was thinking of a flood of the Tiber which took place in 27 B. C.; see below, note 45.

¹⁴ Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.*

sizes only her traditional role as mother of Romulus, for to describe her execution is to presuppose her crime in bearing twin sons.¹⁵ Others have tied Ilia directly to Caesar on the grounds that he was Pontifex Maximus; hence his murder would seem a sacrilegious insult, calling for revenge from the Goddess he served.¹⁶ Such an explanation must take Ovid (*F.*, III, 699-700) rather than Horace for its text:

ne dubita meminisse; meus fuit ille sacerdos:
sacrilegae telis me petiere manus.

Horace's Ilia makes no such claim, and the Regia represents more than one of Julius Caesar's official residences (see above, p. 39). Ilia's anger may well include such particulars, but should not be confined to them. Porphyrio's explanation is needlessly restrictive, and demands that we accept an historically dubious flood as its basis. In any case, the source of her complaint cannot be crucial, or it would be less equivocally presented. Effects rather than causes are at issue, and Horace means us to remember the excessive and unholy convulsions produced by an overly zealous relative. The lines are more significant as an image of a possible type of revenge than as the description of a specific punishment.¹⁷

If punishment rather than crime controls the initial argument, the one implies the other, and an awareness of sin is tacit, not absent. Although the crimes of the Romans include

¹⁵ Ilia was a vestal virgin, and as punishment for conceiving Romulus and Remus was cast into the Tiber. The river god then took her as his wife; thus *uxorius amnis* (20). Only as father of Romulus, by Ilia, could Mars be considered *auctor* (36), and the Romans his descendants, *nepotes* (35). Cf. *O.*, III, 3, 30-1; *Aen.*, I, 274; Livy, I, 4, 1.

¹⁶ Cf. Birt, *op. cit.*, p. 61; Rupprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 68; and Shorey, *ad loc.*

¹⁷ We should not forget that one motive for her anger might be her own murder. Revenge is administered by an overly fond relative, and one would assume that the crime had been committed against Ilia herself. If we allow the episode a symbolic significance there need be no difficulty in the seven hundred years which elapsed. Ennius (*Ann.*, I, 40, 42, ed. Vahl.²) seems to describe a flooding of the Tiber after Ilia's execution, and Horace may be adapting this flood rather than referring to a contemporary one. *Vidimus* (13) need not be taken literally. It seems parallel to *scimus* (*O.*, III, 4, 42) which includes both mythical past, in the Gigantomachia, and political present, in Actium, to which the Gigantomachia almost certainly refers.

Caesar's assassination—*Caesaris ultor* (44) guarantees as much—they are not limited to it, as Horace's generalized treatment of the storms and floods suggests. By comparing the deluge with that survived only by Pyrrha and Deucalion, Horace insinuates an almost archetypal context. Jupiter seems not so much to punish a specific crime as to level an indictment against the wickedness of whole generations.¹⁸ Nor are Caesar's assassins the sole object of Ilia's complaint.¹⁹ All the Romans are murderers of a sort, and Caesar's death epitomizes rather than exhausts their *scelus* (29), which like *vitium* (23) must refer to fratricide in general:

quem vocet divum populus ruentis	25
imperii rebus? prece qua fatigent	
virgines sanctae minus audientem	
carmina Vestam?	
cui dabit partis scelus expiandi	
Iuppiter?	30

Ever since the murder of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B. C. the spectre of civil war had haunted Roman imaginations, and had emerged with a desperate clarity in the decade of the thirties: Actium might be seen simply as the culmination of a Hundred Years' War. Punishments were often as bad as the crimes: in 73 B. C. the rulers had revenged themselves upon six thousand followers of the revolutionary Spartacus by nailing them to crosses every fifty yards from Capua to Rome (Appian, *B. C.*, I, 14, 120). The capitulation of Perusia was followed by the execution of the unoffending Perusine Senate, though Octavian found it expedient to spare the object of his siege, Lucius Antonius—one story, whatever the truth, had it that Octavian sacrificed hundreds of leading citizens to the shade of Julius Caesar (Suetonius, *Aug.*, 15; Dio, XLVIII, 14). Proscriptions had become a commonplace. If not all Horace's contempo-

¹⁸ Cf. the flood of Noah, God's ultimate punishment for the sins of the whole race. Ovid (*Met.*, I, 211) specifies the cause of Jove's flood as the *infamia temporis*.

¹⁹ As Ps.-Acro takes it, apparently misunderstanding *partis* (29; as a genitive singular: *scelus partis*. Cf. Galloveti, "Il Secondo Carme di Orazio," *La Parola del Passato*, IV (1949), pp. 217-29, p. 218, n. 1. Villeneuve in his edition (*ad loc.*) and L. Hermann, "Nostrum Scelus," *Rev. Belge*, XV² (1936), pp. 981-5, both take *scelus* (29) as referring only to the murder of Caesar.

raries might remember those of Marius and Sulla, few could forget those of Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus after Julius Caesar's death. Two thousand Equites and three hundred Senators fell, and Cicero's head was impaled on the rostrum from which he had spoken (Florus, II, 16, 5). Philippi in 42 B. C., the naval battle against Pompey in 36 B. C., and Actium in 31 B. C. conspired to make civil war the most compelling fact of recent history.²⁰ To Horace, who had, after all, fought under Brutus at Philippi, Caesar's murder was significant less as a moral sin than for its historical consequences, for the blood spilled on the Senate floor prefigured that which was to flow in the fields and seas of the whole Empire.²¹

Only by referring to some original sin could Vergil account for the persistence of Rome's wars:

satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae. *G.*, I, 501-2

Satis iam pridem: iam satis terris. In testifying to an identical weariness, Horace endorsed his contemporary's conviction of an ancestral curse, and the third Roman Ode was to echo the accusation of Laomedon.²² "In Adam's fall, we sinned all," has been a common formulation of Christian theology, but if both Augustans seemed to anticipate such a verdict in pagan terms they sometimes varied as to the primary responsibility, and Romulus might play the part of Old Adam as well as Laomedon:²³

²⁰ *Ep.*, VII, XVI; *C.*, I, 35, 33 ff.; II, 1; Vergil, *G.*, I, 489 ff. If a fear of civil war informs some Epodes and early Odes, the later Odes celebrate Augustus as above all the restorer of peace. For a sketch of the bloodshed of the whole century see R. S. Conway, *New Studies of a Great Inheritance* (London, 1921), pp. 49 ff., who catalogues twelve civil wars and five proscriptions.

²¹ *Ep.*, VII, 3; *C.*, II, 1, 29; Vergil, *G.*, I, 491-2; Ovid, *Met.*, XV, 824. For Vergil too Caesar's murder was less important as an individual crime than as a historical cause of further war: *ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis* (*G.*, I, 489).

²² *C.*, III, 3, 21-4, 26-7. Since Troy was regarded as the ancestral home of the Romans, the divine anger evidenced by their civil wars might be explained by the fraud which Laomedon practised upon the gods in founding Troy (*Il.*, XXI, 441 ff.). Cicero (*Pro Marcello*, 18) also suggests the possibility of some original sin, though without specifying the crime.

²³ Cf. *Aen.*, I, 292, where the return of the Golden Age—i. e., Augustan

Quo, quo scelesti ruitis aut cur dexteris
 aptantur enses conditi?
 parumne campis atque Neptuno super
 fusum est Latini sanguinis,
 non ut superbas invidae Carthaginis
 Romanus arcis ureret,
 intactus aut Britannus ut descenderet
 Sacra catenatus via,
 sed ut secundum vota Parthorum sua
 urbs haec periret dextera?

• • •
 sic est: acerba fata Romanos agunt
 scelusque fraternae necis,
 ut inmerentis fluxit in terram Remi
 sacer nepotibus cruor. *Ep.*, VII, 1-10, 17-20

One critic has appealed to these lines to prove that *scelus* (*C.*, I, 2, 29) cannot refer to civil war.²⁴ The seventh Epode, he feels, defines the crime of the Romans as Romulus' murder of Remus, while civil war is their punishment. Yet the tragedy of Rome's history lies in the fact that punishment not only fits the crime but is the crime—for what is civil war but expanded fratricide?²⁵ War both punishes an original *scelus* and itself perpetuates it. In the same Epode (VII, 1) Horace may thus apply *scelesti* to those contemporaries bent on renewing the past: *quo quo scelesti ruitis?*²⁶ Words like *impius* or *nefastus* also

Rome—is signalled by the reconciliation of the two brothers. The third Roman Ode is written to honor Romulus, and thereby Augustus, who almost took his name; see Suet., *Aug.*, 7; Dio, LIII, 16, 7-8; Florus, II, 34, 66; K. Scott, "The Identification of Augustus with Romulus-Quirinus," *T. A. P. A.*, LVI (1925), pp. 82-105; J. Gagé, "Romulus-Augustus," *Mélanges d'Arc. et d'Hist.*, LXVII (1930), pp. 138-81. Hence Horace cannot very well remind the Romans of Romulus' crime which he dwelt upon in the seventh Epode, and invokes in its place the crime of Laomedon.

²⁴ Zielinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-2.

²⁵ Thus Horace may use *fratres* as a shorthand for civil war in general in *C.*, I, 35, 33-4. The context makes it clear that he is thinking not of Romulus and Remus, but of more recent history.

²⁶ Cf. *sceleris*, *C.*, I, 35, 33. *Nostrum scelus* (*C.*, I, 3, 39) probably refers to man's innate refusal ever to accept his place, and not to civil war. However, as would be appropriate in an Ode addressed to Vergil, it may be an echo of Vergil's own *sceleris vestigia nostri* (*Ecl.*, IV, 13), which is "almost certainly a localized reference to the civil wars," according to J. P. Elder, "Horace, *C.*, I, 3," *A. J. P.* LXXIII (1952), pp. 140-58, p. 157.

refer more often to the immediate than to the distant past, and form a melancholy tribute to the sustained power of *acerba fata*.²⁷

Not yet have the Romans expiated their *scelus* (*cui dabit*, 29), and if Horace could relegate civil war to the past there would be no point in casting the sixth stanza into the future: *audiet* (21). The past of the future is of course the present, and the sinful ancestors (*vitio parentum*, 23) of later generations (*iuventus*, 24) are Horace's contemporaries.²⁸ Only from our secure vantage point of two thousand years does the date customarily assigned to the end of the Roman civil wars (30 B. C.) seem an inevitable one. The fall of Alexandria did not provoke such clear confidence among contemporaries, who had been well schooled in scepticism by the collapse of each successive settlement of the last two decades. By reminding us of an unresolved fear, the sixth stanza bridges the poem's two halves. A relation of present and future now replaces that of past and present, as possible remedies (*quem vocet divum populus?*) juxtapose themselves with immediate difficulties (*ruentis imperi*). Prospect succeeds retrospect as Horace turns from past verbs to future, from exposition to command:

quem vocet divum populus ruentis imperi rebus? prece qua fatigent virgines sanctae minus audientem carmina Vestam?	25
cui dabit partis scelus expiandi Iuppiter? tandem venias precamur nube candentis umeros amictus, augur Apollo;	30
sive tu mavis, Erycina ridens, quam Iocus circum volat et Cupido; sive neglectum genus et nepotes respicis auctor,	35
heu nimis longo satiate ludo, quem iuvat clamor galeaeque leves acer et Marsi peditis cruentum vultus in hostem;	40

²⁷ Cf. *Ep.*, XVI, 9; *O.*, I, 35, 33-5; II, 1, 30; Vergil, *G.*, I, 468.

²⁸ The forceful present *ruentis* (25) emphasizes the immediacy of the danger; cf. *Ep.*, VII, 1; XVI, 2. Horace elsewhere uses a technique of dire prediction as an incitement, as in the sixteenth Epode as a whole, or the end of the sixth Roman Ode.

sive mutata iuvenem figura
 ales in terris imitatis, almae
 filius Maiæ patiens vocari
 Caesaris ultor,

serus in caelum redeas diuque 45
 laetus intersis populo Quirini,
 neve te nostris vitiis iniquum
 ocior aura

tollat: hic magnos potius triumphos,
 hic ames dici pater atque princeps, 50
 neu sinas Medos equitare inultos
 te duce Caesar.

The coming savior's task is threefold: to save the empire from civil wars, to expiate the Romans' *scelus*, and, as we infer from line forty-four, to avenge the death of Caesar. Although Horace does not grant to the last the initial importance of the other two, later commentators have dwelt upon it as evidencing the poet's conversion to Caesarism. At the battle of Philippi Octavian vowed a temple *pro ultione paterna* (Suet., *Aug.*, 29; cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, V, 569), and the two thousand dead after the proscriptions of 43 B. C. testified to his seriousness. Ovid found it expedient to hymn the revenge Octavian exacted,²⁹ but Horace was never to repudiate his Republican friends, and Sellar's suggestion that he encourages Octavian to "crush the remnants of the party" is untenable.³⁰ The Ode recommends not vengeance but an abandonment of vengeance against the Romans: *iam satis*. The phrase *Caesaris ultor* (44) is by its context rendered almost ironic. Jove himself has disapproved Tiber's punishment of the Romans, whether for Caesar's murder or for a more general *scelus*. To exact vengeance would be to perpetuate the sin of civil war rather than expiate it, to renew the past and not redeem it.

The gods Horace invokes confirm such a conclusion, for the

²⁹ *Met.*, I, 200-5; *Fasti*, III, 707-10. Velleius Paterculus excused Octavian on the grounds that he had been compelled to the proscriptions by Antony and Lepidus (II, 66, 2), though Seutonius records that Octavian proved himself more severe in his vengeance than either of his fellow triumvirs (*Aug.*, 27, 1).

³⁰ This is not, of course, to suggest that Horace remains an unreconciled Republican—*C.*, I, 2 itself sufficiently refutes such a view—but merely that he wishes no further punishments.

character of each belies the title *ultor*. It has been often remarked that each of the first three divinities could boast a connection with the Julian house or Roman race. Apollo was special patron of Augustus, and the emperor's calculated program to identify himself with this god has been amply documented.³¹ As mother of Aeneas, Venus was ancestress of the Julian line through her grandson Iulus, and the *Carmen Saeculare* salutes Augustus as *clarus Anchisae Venerisque sanguis* (50). Mars, as father of Romulus, was author of the Roman race itself. Multiplying the possible references of each of these figures is an intoxicating and frequently exercised right of scholarship, but for the purposes of his poem Horace tells us exactly what he wants us to remember. *Neque semper arcum tendit Apollo*, and the god appears not as the warrior of the fourth Roman Ode but as the *augur* of the *Carmen Saeculare*, presiding deity of Rome's revival. As a model for Venus, Horace may have in mind Lucretius' *Aeneadam genetrix*,³² perhaps remembering that for the older poet she was not only goddess of growth but the Romans' best hope for *placidam pacem* (*De Rer. Nat.*, I, 40). As *Erycina ridens*, in any case, she represents gentleness, and her companions *Iocus* and *Cupido* are calculated to confirm the benevolence implicit in the adjective. Mars is summoned not as a warrior but as *auctor* of the race. Though delighting in the battles of Roman foot soldiers, the Marsi, against the enemy, even he is now satiated by the too long continued civil wars.³³ The last deity Horace invokes is Mercury, whom he summons to earth in the bodily guise of Octavian. By suggesting such an identification Horace has provoked frequent arguments as to whether there was in fact a cult of Mercury-Augustus at Rome³⁴—a consideration having very little

³¹ See Fr. Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion* (English tr., London, 1938), pp. 365 ff.; J. B. Carter, *The Religion of Numa* (London, 1906), pp. 164 ff.; E. H. Haight, "An Inspired Message in Augustan Poets," *A. J. P.*, XXXIX (1918), pp. 341-66; W. Deonna, "Le Trésor des Fins d'Annecy," *Rev. Arch.*, 5e Série, XI (1920), pp. 112-206, pp. 161 ff.

³² Kiessling-Heinze, Shorey, Smith, Plessis-Lejay, etc. note the similarity.

³³ *Respicis* (36) implies a gracious glance. See Rupprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

³⁴ See *C. I. L.*, X¹, 888; Roscher, *Lexicon*, II² (1894-7), s. v. *Mercurius*,

to do with our understanding of the Ode. Horace's views emerge from the poem itself rather than from contemporary cult practice, and perhaps the most important thing about Mercury is the fact that he is never named. *Almae filius Maiæ*: the periphrasis is significant. Horace may now introduce the adjective *almus* (which might sit oddly upon the god himself), thus suggesting the character Mercury, and, by extension, Octavian, is to display. *Alma* was the attribute of Lucretius' Venus (*De Rer. Nat.*, I, 2), as it was of Horace's Muses (*C.*, III, 4, 42). Like both of these Mercury suggests the twin conceptions of nourishment and peace.³⁵ As an intermediary between gods and men (thus the reminder of *ales*), Mercury, like the Muses, is the vehicle of *lene consilium* (*C.*, III, 4, 41), though as the embodiment rather than the donor of it. Nor was his character inappropriate to such a role. As patron of the peaceful arts of commerce and poetry his statue won admission to the temple of *Concordia*, next to that of the Goddess herself.³⁶ Horace's hymn to Mercury invokes him as god of the lyre and tamer of *feros cultus hominum* (*C.*, I, 10, 2): the union of poetry and civilization recalls that of the fourth Roman Ode.

If, after emphasizing the peaceful aspect of each god, Horace proposes "the son of gentle Maia" as *Caesaris ultor*, his implication is clear: there is to be no vengeance. Horace has displayed two types of revenge. Tiber, "boasting himself" the avenger of Ilia's excessive complaints, stands in pointed contrast to Mercury, "enduring to be called avenger of Caesar." Tiber's

p. 2818; H. Heinen, *Klio*, XI (1911), pp. 150 ff.; Deonna, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-8; J. Six, *Rev. Arch.*, IV (1916), pp. 257-64; Pasquali, *Orazio Livico* (Firenze, 1920), pp. 182 ff.; Altheim, *op. cit.*, p. 365; K. Scott, *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), pp. 15-33; J. Elmore, *C.P.*, XXVI (1931), pp. 261 ff. Though coins, statues, and altar portraits have been cited, Horace's Ode remains the only sure literary evidence for the identification. Scott, like Kiessling-Heinze, concludes that Horace either indulges a private fantasy or else is influenced by Eastern beliefs; see note 48.

³⁵ In the first proem Lucretius appeals to Venus not only as life-giver to all nature, but as donor of peace to humans; 29 ff.; 40 ff. Horace's Muses both "recreate" Caesar and his tired cohorts, and give to him "gentle counsel" (*C.*, III, 4, 37 ff.).

³⁶ Altheim, *op. cit.*, p. 531, n. 49. Plüss, *op. cit.*, p. 35, cites Ovid's description of him as *pacis et armorum superis imisque deorum arbiter*. On Roman coins the Caduceus he carries is to be understood as a symbol of peace; see DeWaele, *The Magic Staff or Rod in Antiquity* (The Hague, 1927), p. 75.

vengeance is not an allegory: Ilia is not Julius Caesar nor is the river god Octavian. But without insisting upon the definitive austerity which an allegory implies, we may take lines 17-20 as an evocative symbol of one type of revenge for the murder of a relative.³⁷ Horace presents a kind of parable to caution Octavian, the self-proclaimed avenger of his father, against further punishments. Yet the last of Caesar's assassins had been already executed (Vell. Pater., II, 87), and fifteen years after Philippi the threat of renewed vengeance could hardly have oppressed the remaining Republicans. Ilia, as we saw, appears as ancestress of the race, while the Roman's *scelus* is war in general, Caesar's murder being a representative rather than isolated example. Horace's indictment is deliberately broad. It embraces not merely those who had fought against Caesar, but all who had been involved in the shedding of Roman blood. Pompeians and Antonines³⁸ as well as Republicans were still in evidence, and even those who had not borne arms were guilty with the rest. In the name of all alike Horace issues a covert plea for mercy, and praise of the avenging victor unites with a prayer for his sinful people.

The fourth Roman Ode, at once paean and elegy, betrays a similar intent. Probably written shortly after Actium, the account of Zeus' victory over the Giants decorates rather than disguises praise of Octavian's triumph over Antony. To the tired victor the *almae Musae* recommend *lene consilium*, mild counsel (41). In the first nine stanzas Horace had donned the elaborate robes of a traditional *vates*, asserting himself spokesman of the Muses, and thus suggesting that their *lene consilium* is the Ode itself, both praise of and prayer for wisdom in the ruler.³⁹ In C., I, 2 Mercury, patron of poets,⁴⁰ reminds us of

³⁷ Ovid compared Jove's vengeance in Pyrrha's flood with that taken by Octavian, though he approves equally of both: *Met.*, I, 200 ff. Franke (*op. cit.*, p. 138), sees that Horace intends a parallel between Tiber and Octavian, but interprets the picture of Tiber as a compliment.

³⁸ We should remember that in 32 B. C. over three hundred Senators and both Consuls had sided with Antony, and tried (unsuccessfully) to vote a censure of Octavian.

³⁹ Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 69 ff., rightly insists that the last stanzas evoke sympathy for those defeated by Zeus, and that the whole poem expresses Horace's plea "for a real amnesty" (p. 71).

⁴⁰ Horace calls himself a *Mercurialis vir* (C., II, 17, 29-30), and

the same union of poetry and political wisdom; the poem itself recommends the qualities which the *almae filius Maiæ* embodies. In delivering himself of a *peccavi* for his former Republicanism, the poet delivers a *caveat* to the ruler. A strategic rather than confessional bias dictates the Ode, and the fact of Horace's past errors is less urgent than the possibility of Octavian's future ones. The fourth Roman Ode, as its Pindaric echoes suggest,⁴¹ stands as a hymn to Peace, and *C.*, I, 2 readily adapts itself to the same form. To punish the Romans, warns Horace, would be to confirm Rome's *acerba fata*. Punishment would be a kind of further civil war, and itself a *scelus*. In dispatching his peace-loving son Jove declares his will: *iam satis*. The excesses, *nimium* (17), symbolized by Ilia and Tiber seem acknowledged even by Mars, *nimis longo satiate ludo* (37). For avenger to become expiator only one course is possible: Roman swords must turn against foreign enemies.⁴² The *Caesaris ultor* (44) must transmute the type of Tiber's revenge, *iactat ultorem* (18), into punishment of the Medes:

neu sinas Medos equitare inultos
te duce Caesar.

51-2

The last two lines thus seal the poem's logical progress, and lose the effect of an afterthought which a first reading might suggest. We have been often reminded that one man's Mede is another man's Persian, and hence Horace's concluding plea echoes a deceptively casual line (21-2):

audiet civis acuisse ferrum,
quo graves Persae melius perirent.

Since this stanza is cast into the future (*audiet*), the imperfect

asserts that Mercury rescued him from Philippi (*C.*, II, 7, 13 ff.). Cf. *C.*, I, 10, 6.

⁴¹ See especially the opening of Pythian VIII, which treats the rebellion and defeat of the Giants. The Ode is a prayer to *Ἥρα*, who knows "with perfect fitness the secret of gentleness." She holds the "masterkeys of councils and of wars" (cf. *vis* and *consilium* in *C.*, III, 4), a phrase Farnell's edition (London, 1932) *ad loc.*, explains as follows: "for the true object of a righteous war is to secure a lasting peace."

⁴² Horace does not, as Rupprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 70, suggests, summon Mercury "Kriege gegen die inneren und äusseren Feinde Roms zu führen."

perirent does not rule out hope of fulfilment. Persians may still perish by Roman swords, vengeance may yet be exacted from the Medes, if Horace's advice is heeded.⁴³ Elsewhere (*C.*, I, 35, 33-40), in lines which seem almost an epitome of *C.*, I, 2, he proposes the same alternative, while exhibiting an identical shame at the *scelus* of the past:

eheu cicatricum et sceleris pudet
 fratrumque. quid nos dura refugimus
 aetas, quid intactum nefasti
 liquimus? unde manum iuventus
 metu deorum continuit, quibus
 pepercit aris? o utinam nova
 incude diffingas retusum in
 Massagetis Arabasque ferrum.⁴⁴

If, as the verbal texture declares, the Ode deals with the varieties of vengeance, we should perhaps reconsider the date of composition. Most editions suggest the end of 28 B. C., on the assumption that Horace is exercised by the prospect that Octavian might return to private life, and that chaos would come again. With whatever sincerity, Octavian did make such a proposal to the Senate on Jan. 13, 27 B. C., and possibly he had earlier given public indications of it.⁴⁵ Yet the concern with

⁴³ If, with Kiessling-Heinze, we accept Bentley's emendation of *Marsi* for *Mauri* (39), Mars becomes a kind of exemplum to Horace's sermon. He rejoices in the shout and bloody face of the Roman foot soldier only when turned *in hostem* (40).

⁴⁴ Cf. *C.*, I, 21, 13 ff. *Ep.*, VII, 7-8 hints at the same alternative.

⁴⁵ Though this seems unlikely in view of the stir his announcement created; see Dio, LIII, 11. Moore, Shorey, Barwick, and Kiessling-Heinze all agree upon a date shortly before Octavian's proposal. Galavotti (*op. cit.*) puts it even later, holding that the flood of the Tiber which Horace describes is that which took place in Jan. of 27 B. C. The flattering interpretation put upon the flood at that time (Dio, LIII, 20) makes it improbable that Horace refers to this flood. His treatment of it—*nimum, Iove non probante*—could seem only an impertinence if the flood were popularly supposed to be a tribute to the new ruler.

Princeps (50) need not refer to the official title of *Princeps Senatus* which Octavian received in 28 B. C., but is probably an informal term of respect; see H. F. Pelham, "*Princeps* or *Princeps Senatus*?" *J. Phil.*, VIII (1879), pp. 323-33. Certainly *Pater*, in the same line, cannot refer to the official title of *Pater Patriae* which Augustus received only in 2 B. C.

revenge in the poem's first half, and the sense of expectancy in the second, sit ill with such an interpretation and so late a date. Three and a half years after Actium, fear of punishment need agitate no one, while an effusive welcome, accompanied by guesses as to the savior's identity, might seem a somewhat coy anachronism. A date better according with the feeling of the Ode would be either just before or just after Octavian's return to Rome in July of 29 B. C. for the first time since Actium.⁴⁶ He had by then completed his triumphal⁴⁷ swing through the East, yet a question would remain as to what policy he might adopt upon his return, thus providing the two elements of joy and apprehension informing the poem. *Hic . . . hic* (49-50) might oppose Rome to the East: Horace entreats, or possibly applauds, the ruler's return to the capital to celebrate his victories. Such a geographical antithesis helps explain the presence of Mercury, for whom scholars have often felt constrained to apologize as a rather minor Olympian. A possible influence of the Egyptian Thoth-Hermes has been frequently remarked, and certainly the idea of a god incarnate suggests an Eastern provenance.⁴⁸ If Octavian were still in the East, Horace's summons to a God easily associated with Egyptian conceptions might strike his readers as peculiarly apposite. Nor would it, perhaps,

For a discussion of other dates which have been proposed see Elmore, *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ A date before Octavian's return to Rome is accepted by Plessis-Lejay, *op. cit.*, intro. to *O.*, I, 2; G. Schörner, *Sallust und Horaz über den Sittenverfall und die sittliche Erneuerung Roms* (Erlangen, 1934), p. 66; Elmore, *op. cit.*, pp. 398 ff.

⁴⁷ *Triumphos* (49) has been thought to refer to the triumphs of Octavian celebrated in August of 29 B. C., thus establishing a *terminus post quem*. But it is not necessary to assume that his victories had been already celebrated at Rome: the military facts would justify Horace in terming them *triumphos*. Cf. Vergil, *G.*, I, 503, written, and read to Octavian, before he had returned to the capital.

⁴⁸ The Egyptian herald in Aesch., *Suppliants*, 920, invokes Hermes as "greatest of patrons." Eastern influence has been emphasized by R. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres* (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 176 ff.; D. Norberg, *Eranos*, XLIV (1946), pp. 389 ff.; K. Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff. Keissling-Heinze (*ad* 41) hold that unless an influence of "der ägyptisch-hellenistische Hermesglaube" is responsible, Horace himself invented the identification. Pasquali, *op. cit.*, p. 183, notes that in Egypt Mercury was not only a god but also a great king, a god incarnate, an idea alien to Roman religion; see Cicero, *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.*, 14, 41.

be extravagant to detect a hint that the time had come for a descent to earth after the virtual divinization that Octavian had received in Egypt.⁴⁹

The Ode might be seen as a welcome home much in the manner of Vergil's *Georgics*.⁵⁰ Its closeness to the conclusion of the first *Georgic* has been often emphasized, yet the differences are also instructive. With *iam satis* Horace acknowledges his debt.⁵¹ His Ode in a sense succeeds, complements, and qualifies the Vergilian cry.

Di patrii, Indigetes, et Romule Vestaque mater,
 quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia servas,
 hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo 500
 ne prohibete! satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
 Laomedontaeae luimus periuria Troiae;
 iam pridem nobis caeli te regia, Caesar,
 invidet atque hominum queritur curare triumphos,
 quippe ubi fas verum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem 505
 tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro
 dignus honos, squalent abductis arva colonis,
 et curvae rigidum falces conflantur in ensem.
 hinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum;
 vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes 510
 arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe;
 ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae,
 addunt in spatium, et frustra retinacula tendens
 fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas.

Vergil probably wrote these lines several years before the Horace Ode, for *saevit toto Mars impius orbe* would hardly be appropriate after Octavian's settlement of the East.⁵² For Vergil the mere presence of *hunc iuvenem* seems to guarantee an end to the

⁴⁹ Where he had a special cult as Zeus Eleutherios, and was popularly honored as divine; see L. R. Taylor, *Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown, 1931), pp. 142 ff. Even when most frankly eulogistic in the Odes, Horace places Octavian's apotheosis in the future: *C.*, III 3, 12; III, 5, 2.

⁵⁰ Which were read to Octavian on successive days at Atella, where he rested on his way to Rome after landing at Brundisium in the summer of 29 B. C.

⁵¹ Horace often uses the first few words as indication of his source, then goes on to develop the theme in his own way; see *C.*, I, 9; I, 12; I, 37.

⁵² These lines are usually dated before Actium; see the commentary of Papillon and Haigh *ad loc.*

wars following Caesar's death (489 ff.), and the parallel *satis iam pridem . . . iam pridem* (501-3) tacitly identifies the hoped for end of an ancestral curse with the arrival of Octavian. For Horace expiation depends less upon the presence than the character of the ruler—for it is with possible characters that the Ode's latter half deals, as Horace seeks a God suitable to endure being called *Caesaris ultor*. Vergil's background is one of undifferentiated chaos, while Horace sees foreign wars not as simply part of an *everso saeclo*, but as an alternative to civil wars. One poet thinks in terms of the ruler's presence, the other in terms of his policy: where the former demands only that a charioteer seize the reins, the latter suggests a course for him to follow. We should remember that while Horace was still recovering from the Republicans' defeat at Philippi, Vergil was allowing his rustics to greet Octavian as a God (*Ecl.*, I, 6), and the almost Baroque fancy of the proem to the *Georgics* testifies to an ever increasing enthusiasm. The dangers of a single ruler presented themselves with greater immediacy to Horace than to his contemporary, and apprehension perceptibly qualifies his praise. Mercy, he suggests, is the tax on power. By reminding Octavian that the hope of the future depends upon his wisdom in the present, the Ode becomes a summons to greatness no less than a celebration of it.⁵³

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⁵³ I regret that when this article was submitted I had not seen Eduard Fraenkel's treatment of *C.*, I, 2 in his *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 242 ff.

THEOPHRASTUS, *DE SENSIBUS* 66: DEMOCRITUS'
EXPLANATION OF SALINITY.

άλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ περιφερῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων
μὲν σκαληνῶν, <ἐπὶ δὲ πλείστον οὐ σκαληνῶν>, διὸ οὐδὲ
πολυκαμπῶν (βούλεται δὲ σκαληνὰ λέγειν ἅπερ περιπάλαξιν
ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ συμπλοκήν). μεγάλων μὲν, ὅτι ἡ
άλμυρὸς ἐπιπολάζει· μικρὰ γὰρ ὄντα καὶ τυπτόμενα τοῖς
περιέχουσι μείγνυσθαι ἂν τῷ παντί· οὐ περιφερῶν δ' ὅτι τὸ
μὲν ἄλμυρὸν τραχὺ τὸ δὲ περιφερὲς λείον· οὐ σκαληνῶν δὲ
διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπαλάττεσθαι, διὸ ψαφαρὸν εἶναι.

Thphr., *Sens.*, 66 (= *Vorsokr.*^a, II, p. 118, 17-23)

In this passage, as it stands in the manuscripts, there is a contradiction between ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν in the first sentence and οὐ σκαληνῶν in the final sentence; in the first sentence the atoms of the saline savor are said to be scalene in some cases, but in the final sentence they are said not to be scalene.

Hermann Diels made two attempts to remove this contradiction. In *Doxographi Graeci* (p. 518, 9-15) he accepted Philippson's deletion of οὐ before σκαληνῶν in the final sentence, and he changed μὲν to καὶ in the first sentence. This solution merely leads to a new contradiction; in the final sentence the atoms are now said to be scalene because they do not interlock, but in the parenthesis of the first sentence scalene atoms are said to be those that do interlock.

In *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, from which the above text is taken, Diels sought to remove this new contradiction by restoring the deleted οὐ and by adding ἐπὶ δὲ πλείστον οὐ σκαληνῶν after ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν in the first sentence. This solution, too, is objectionable. With no evidence whatever Diels has made a substantial addition to Democritus' theory by ascribing to him the notion that there are two kinds of atom in the saline savor, some scalene and others not. Theophrastus does say that Democritus held that each thing contains atoms of different kinds (*Sens.*, 67); but by this is meant, undoubtedly, that the different qualities of a thing are accounted for by the different component atoms and not that different atoms cause the same quality. In the final sentence οὐ σκαληνῶν provides for no exceptions and presumably must apply to all atoms of the saline savor.

Gustav Kafka (*Philologus*, LXXII [1913], pp. 76-9) for ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν proposed ἐπιπέδων μὲν σκαληνῶν δ' οὐ, which he translated: "von ebener aber nicht von ungleichmässig." This emendation strains the normal use of μὲν and δέ; there is not even a weak antithesis between ἐπιπέδων and σκαληνῶν . . . οὐ, and on Kafka's interpretation they are virtually synonymous. There are more serious objections to ἐπιπέδων. Kafka recognized that as a planimetric term ἐπίπεδος could not properly be applied to the solid atoms; he thought its use possible here because the context did not demand a mathematical exactness of expression. But to use ἐπίπεδος with the meaning ἐπιπέδους περιεχόμενος would be more than what Kafka called a "risky brachylogy." In neither mathematical nor non-mathematical language does the word mean 'smooth-sided.' In mathematics ἐπίπεδος is 'plane' as opposed to στερεός, 'solid.' In non-mathematical descriptions of solids it does not mean that all the surfaces are smooth; it refers to one surface only, usually the upper, as if for the purpose of the description the solid had no depth. Moreover, granted that the individual surfaces of the atom are smooth, the atom as a whole is rough, and its roughness is stressed as one of its main characteristics. Some reference to its roughness is to be expected in the introductory sentence of the description rather than such exclusive emphasis on smoothness as results from Kafka's interpretation.

A further difficulty common to the second solution of Diels and that of Kafka is the relation of διὸ οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν to the preceding words. According to these solutions, the text states that the atoms are not—or for the most part are not—σκαληνός and are therefore not πολυκαμπής either. The meaning of these terms will be discussed later. It may be pointed out here that they cannot be related in the way that Diels and Kafka have supposed. οὐ σκαληνός does not imply οὐ πολυκαμπής. Theophrastus says that the pungent savor σκαληνὸν οὐκ ἔχει (*Sens.*, 67) and that its atom is κάμπυλος (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6, where κάμπυλος corresponds to πολυκαμπής in *Sens.*, 65-7). An atom that is not σκαληνός may nevertheless be πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος).

Clues to the correct solution are, I believe, to be found in three passages that Diels and Kafka seem not to have used. These are:

- 1) ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν γωνιοειδῆ καὶ εὐμεγεθῆ καὶ σκολιδὸν καὶ ἰσοσκελῆ.
Thphr., *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6;

- 2) ἥκιστα τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου (sc. τὸ ἄλμυρόν) ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ ἐπιπολάζειν. πανταχοῦ γὰρ πλατέα καὶ μεγάλα τοῖς ὕγροῖς ἐπιφέρεσθαι, ἀσύμπλεκτα δὲ καὶ ἀκόλλα διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σκαληνές ἀλλὰ γωνοειδῆ τε εἶναι καὶ πολυκαμπῆ.

Thphr., *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3;

- 3) ἐπεὶ ποιοῦντι <γε> τοὺς χυλοὺς διὰ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὸ ἄλμυρόν ἐγ μεγάλων καὶ γωνιοειδῶν . . .

P. Hib., 16, 40-43 (= *Vorsökr.*⁹, II, p. 108, 22-3).

The first of these passages is from a summary of Democritus' theory of taste. In the second the name of Democritus does not appear, but there can be no doubt that the doctrine is that of Democritus (see Schneider, *Theophrasti Opera*, IV, p. 472). In the papyrus containing the third passage all but two letters of Democritus' name have been preserved. This papyrus has been assigned to the *περὶ ὕδατος* of Theophrastus.

It will be observed that none of these passages supports the view that there are two kinds of saline particle. All three agree with *Sens.*, 66 that the atom is large; and, like *Sens.*, 66, 2) states that the atom remains on the surface because of its size. 2) agrees with the final sentence from *Sens.*, 66 (against the first sentence from *Sens.*, 66) that the atom is not scalene; and in 1) *ἰσοσκελῆ* is apparently used as a privative of *σκαληνόν*. 2) agrees with *Sens.*, 66 that the absence of scalene atoms causes the saline to be friable.

There are, however, two major disagreements. While *Sens.*, 66 has οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν, 2) states that the atom is πολυκαμπής; in 1) σκολιόν is apparently the corresponding term. Secondly, while all three passages say that the atom is γων(ι)οειδής, *Sens.*, 66 has nothing to correspond. It should be noted, too, that γωνιοειδῆ τε καὶ πολυκαμπῆ in 3) is found also in Theophrastus' account of the acid savor in *Sens.*, 65 and is paralleled by γωνοειδῆ καὶ κάμπυλον in his accounts of the acid and pungent savors in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6.

In short: 1) and 2), as well as the final sentence from *Sens.*, 66, suggest that οὐ σκαληνῶν should be read in the first sentence from *Sens.*, 66; 2) shows that οὐ σκαληνῶν is compatible with πολυκαμπῶν and that therefore the negative before πολυκαμπῶν in *Sens.*, 66 may be incorrect; 1), 2), and 3) suggest that γωνιοειδῶν may have dropped out of *Sens.*, 66; and the parallels to γωνιοειδῆ τε καὶ πολυκαμπῆ in 2) suggest that γωνιοειδής was

regularly applied to the same atom as πολυκαμπής was and that γωνιοειδών may have been linked with πολυκαμπών in *Sens.*, 66. That is, if *Sens.*, 66 is to agree with these other accounts it should say that the atom is not σκαληνός but is γωνιοειδής τε καὶ πολυκαμπής.

In investigating the manuscripts of the *De Sensibus* I have found that many errors appear to have been caused by the erroneous application to the text of interlinear corrections made in a lost ancestor of the exemplar from which our two earliest manuscripts (PF) were copied. Sometimes the correction has been copied into the text after the error (e. g., Παρμενίδου Παρμενίδης, *Sens.*, 2, where Παρμενίδης is the intended correction). Often the correction has been scrambled into the text in such a way as to compound the error and make it difficult to detect. It seems probable that in the present case ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδών τε was omitted and later added above the line and that it is concealed in ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν . . . διὸ οὐδὲ of our manuscripts. After the correction the early manuscript would read:

ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ
ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδών τε
περιφερῶν οὐδὲ σκαληνῶν καὶ πολυκαμπῶν.

The correction was intended to be added after σκαληνῶν. The scribe of the next copy could make out only a few letters of the correction; and he thought that there were two corrections, the first intended to replace οὐδὲ before σκαληνῶν, the second intended to replace καὶ before πολυκαμπῶν. From ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδών he derived ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν, and from δῶν τε he derived διὸ οὐδὲ, which he substituted for οὐδὲ and καὶ respectively. Thus he wrote: ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ περιφερῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν διὸ οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν. He should have written: ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ περιφερῶν οὐδὲ σκαληνῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδῶν τε καὶ πολυκαμπῶν.

This reconstruction brings *Sens.*, 66 into agreement with the three other accounts of the theory, and it eliminates the contradiction between the first and last sentences.

To interpret the reconstructed sentence and the other passages that have been discussed above it is necessary to consider some of the terms used to describe the atoms. These terms are not only important for Democritus' explanation of the savors; they

throw some light on the atomic theory as a whole. The description of the savors in *Sens.* provides the fullest extant evidence for their meaning and relation to one another. They have been misunderstood because of the corrupt *διὸ οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν* in *Sens.*, 66.

Theophrastus says that, according to Democritus, atoms that interlock are scalene. If, then, the atoms of the saline savor are not scalene—or for the most part are not scalene (Diels)—and are therefore not *πολυκαμπής* either, it would appear that *πολυκαμπής*, like *σκαληνός*, referred to a characteristic of the atoms that caused them to interlock. Further, the atoms of the bitter savor have *καμπαί* which cause viscosity (*Sens.*, 65); presumably it is because of the lack of such *καμπαί* that the saline savor is friable. On the basis of the manuscript reading in *Sens.*, 65, therefore, *πολυκαμπής* has been taken to mean ‘provided with many hooks’ (Stratton, similarly Kafka). But the word cannot have this meaning; for, as has been noted, in *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3 Theophrastus says that the particles of the saline are *πολυκαμπής* but do not interlock and adhere. Evidently, then, *πολυκαμπής* does not refer to the *καμπαί* that cause viscosity in the bitter savor. The interpretation of LSJ, ‘with many curves,’ is no more satisfactory. If, as seems to be intended, the curves are thought of as determining the general shape of the atom (e. g., as in the crooked branch of a plant or a winding path), such curves, if they have any effect, must cause the atoms to interlock as the supposed hooks would. Nor is it any better if the curves are thought of not as causing interlocking but as giving the atoms rounded surfaces. In Theophrastus’ accounts of the savors *πολυκαμπής* and *κάμπυλος* are always closely associated with *γων(ι)οειδής*. These combinations of adjectives cannot mean either that some atoms of a savor are rounded and others are angular or that the same atom is both rounded and angular. True, Lucretius says that sea water is composed of smooth round atoms and rough atoms; but he means that the round atoms cause the fluidity of the water and the rough atoms the salinity.¹ The account of Theophrastus is not parallel; he is concerned only with salinity, not with the saline solution. The only atom that combines roundness with angularity is that of the pungent savor. All other atoms of the savors are *either περιφερής* (or

¹ See note 5, below.

στρογγύλος) or γων(ι)οειδής (or πολυγώνιος). The atom of the pungent savor, possibly an icosahedron, is περιφερής, γων(ι)οειδής, and κάμπυλος (*Sens.*, 67; *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). But κάμπυλος does not refer to its roundness; atoms that are πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος) are also γων(ι)οειδής, and those of the astringent (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6), the acid (*ibid.*), and the saline (*Sens.*, 66) are specifically said not to be περιφερής. Theophrastus says in *Sens.*, 66 that the saline is not composed of atoms that are περιφερής because such atoms are λείος, while the saline is τραχύς. This distinction is borne out by all his descriptions of the atoms in *Sens.*, 65-7 and *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6. Atoms that are περιφερής are, with the exception of that of the pungent, λείος; but atoms that are πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος) and γων(ι)οειδής, including that of the pungent, are τραχύς (or ὀξύς), and no mention is made of any other characteristic that would be due to their shape. It becomes clear, then, that unless πολυκαμπής and κάμπυλος are superfluous and tell nothing of the atom's shape—a possibility that need hardly be considered—they refer to the same feature of the atom's shape as γων(ι)οειδής does. In combination with it they mean that an atom has (many) bends and angles that cause the atom to have several sharply defined surfaces and, therefore, to be rough. That is, these combinations of adjectives are opposed to περιφερής, which means that the atom is more or less spheroid and has a single smooth surface.²

Misinterpretation of πολυκαμπής as referring to hooks or curves that cause the atoms to interlock has necessitated misinterpretation of σκαληνός. If atoms that are not σκαληνός are for this reason not πολυκαμπής either, and if the καμπαί are hooks or curves that cause interlocking, σκαληνός cannot have its usual geometrical meaning; for it does not follow that because the sides of the atoms are unequal the atoms do not have many hooks

² The other term used by Theophrastus to indicate the angularity of atoms is πολυγώνιος. The astringent savor is said to be composed ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ πολυγωνίων καὶ περιφερὲς ἥκιστ' ἐχόντων (*Sens.*, 66; cf. *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). By this is probably meant that the atoms are irregular jagged masses with sharp angles. γωνιοειδής and πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος), if not merely synonymous, may have been used together to indicate less extreme angularity than πολυγώνιος; that is, πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος) may have been added to γωνιοειδής to qualify it, to indicate that the angles are less numerous and sharp than in an atom that is πολυγώνιος.

or curves. Stratton has, therefore, taken *σκαληνός* to refer to the crooked shape of the atom, Kafka to an irregularity of the atom's surfaces; and LSJ noncommittally gives 'uneven, unequal, rough' for its use in *Sens.*, 66. These interpretations are correct only in so far as they recognize that some sort of irregularity is meant; they mistake the nature of the irregularity. In *Sens.* Theophrastus uses *σκαληνός* only in connection with the atoms of the saline and pungent savors (66, 67) and with the rough (*τράχυν*) atoms of the black, which are contrasted with the smooth round (*λείος, περιφερής*) atoms of the friable white (73-4). Elsewhere in references to the atomic shapes of Democritus and Epicurus *σκαληνός* is used along with *δξυγώνιος* and *πολυκαμπής* in contrast to *λείος* and *περιφερής*.³ Clearly, it refers to some quality of atoms that have angles and bends as opposed to those that are round. Since atoms that have angles and bends are rough, it is to be expected that *σκαληνός* should occur in association with *τράχυν* and in opposition to *λείος*. It does not, however, mean 'rough' (LSJ), nor is it applicable to all atoms that have angles and bends; for the atoms of the saline and pungent have angles and bends and are rough, but they are not *σκαληνός* (*Sens.*, 66-7; *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6, VI, 10, 3). It means, as it does in geometry, 'with unequal sides.' That Theophrastus so understood the word is certain; in his description of the saline savor in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 *ισοσκελής* is the equivalent of *μηδὲν ἔχειν σκαληνές* in *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3 and *οὐ σκαληνῶν* in *Sens.*, 66. This meaning is confirmed by Hesychius, who defines *ἀσκαληνές* (Diels' correction of MS *ἀσκαληρές*) as *ἰσόπλευρον παρὰ Δημοκρίτω*. Thus scalene atoms are atoms with angles and bends whose sides are unequal. The inequality of the sides causes the atoms to interlock, as irregular polygonal stones do in a wall; and it is analogous to the bends on the surface of the smooth round atoms of the bitter savor.

In *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 Theophrastus says that the atom of the saline savor is *σκολιὸς καὶ ἰσοσκελής*. On *σκαληνός* LSJ adds the note: "prob. akin to *σκολιός*." If this note is correct for the use, and not merely the origin, of the two words, Theophrastus has assigned incompatible attributes to the atom; the same atom is both scalene and isosceles. But it has been seen that

³ Thphr., *C. P.*, VI, 7, 2; Epicurus, *Ep.*, II, 109; Plut., *Mor.*, 697 A-B, *Mor.*, 1088 A (where the Epicureans are refuted in their own language).

σκολιός in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 is the equivalent of πολυκαμπής in *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3 (and *Sens.*, 66 as restored). This equivalence is supported by the fact that in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 σκολιότης is used with reference to the καμπαί of the atoms of the bitter savor mentioned in *Sens.*, 66. Confusion of σκολιός and σκαληνός as atomic terms is likely to result not only from the misinterpretation of σκαληνός as 'crooked' or 'uneven' in *Sens.*, 66 but also from Hesychius' definition: σκαληνόν· σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον· τοῦ γὰρ τριγώνου εἶδη τρία ἰσόπλευρον ἰσοσκελές σκαληνόν. (The same definition, with minor differences, is given in the scholium to Plato, *Euthphr.*, 12 D.) Since σκολιός, like σκαληνός, indicates an irregularity, if any of the three types of triangle is σκολιός, it is probably the scalene. But the explanatory clause in the definition does not say that σκαληνός and σκολιός are interchangeable terms for a type of triangle; and it says nothing of the other adjective, πολυγώνιος, which refers to the number of angles in a figure, not the relative length of the sides, and which is in any case not applicable to a triangle. The definition, in fact, seems to be compounded of two distinct elements—or, rather, two different definitions—which have no connection with each other: the explanatory clause gives an example of the planimetric use of the word to be defined; but the phrase σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον gives two equivalents to the word, one of which at least is not a planimetric equivalent. The first definition (σκαληνόν· σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον) was probably, like the definition of ἀσκαληνές, derived from an atomic text, which was misunderstood by the author of the definition. As has been noted, Theophrastus uses σκολιός as the equivalent of πολυκαμπής; and several times he uses πολυγώνιος, instead of γωνιοειδής, in descriptions of the angular atoms (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6; *Sens.*, 66). As applied to the atoms σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον may, then, be equivalent to πολυκαμπές τε καὶ γωνιοειδές. The author of the definition σκαληνόν· σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον probably found the three terms regularly used of the same atom and thought that the first was interchangeable with the other two. He did not notice that, although atoms that are σκαληνός are σκολιός καὶ πολυγώνιος, the converse is not necessarily true, since atoms may be angular without being scalene.

The significance of these terms as they are used in Democritus' theory of savors may now be stated in summary. At the begin-

ning of his account of Democritus in *Sens.* (60) Theophrastus says that Democritus was not consistent but distinguished some objects of sense by size, some by shape, and some by order and position. Beginning his accounts of the savors he says that Democritus based his explanation on shape (*Sens.*, 64; *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). His detailed discussion of the savors does not bear out either statement. All atoms of the savors are distinguished by both size and shape. Size determines the extent and speed of penetration: the small atoms of the acid penetrate quickly everywhere, the large atoms of the sweet, slowly (*Sens.*, 65); the large atoms of the astringent stop up the pores (*Sens.*, 66), and those of the saline remain on the surface (*Sens.*, 66). There are two main shapes: round and angular. The round are περιφερής (*Sens.*, 65-7) or στρογγύλος (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). The angular areγωνοειδής τε καὶ πολυκαμπής (*Sens.*, 65, and 66 as reconstructed; *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3), γωνοειδής καὶ κάμπυλος (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6), γωνοειδής καὶ σκολιός (*ibid.*), or πολυγώνιος (*Sens.*, 66; *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). Apparently there are differences within each shape: atoms of the astringent are πολυγώνιος and least περιφερής (*Sens.*, 66); and those of the pungent are περιφερής καὶ γωνοειδής (*Sens.*, 67; and κάμπυλος *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). The physiological effect of the atoms depends primarily on their shape: the smooth round atoms of the sweet are soothing (*Sens.*, 65); the rough angular atoms of the acid and pungent heat the body (*Sens.*, 65, 67). The atoms are further distinguished as to whether or not they cohere: the smooth round atoms of the bitter have bends (καμπαί *Sens.*, 65; σκολιότης *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6) that cause viscosity; similarly, if angular atoms are scalene they interlock, but if they are not they cause the savor to be friable. The individual atoms of the savors are thus distinguished in three ways: by size, by shape, and by capacity to cohere.

Returning to the description of the saline savor in *Sens.*, 66 as reconstructed, we may see how these three distinctions are applied to its atoms. The saline savor is set out in contrast to the bitter savor that is described immediately before it. The bitter savor is composed of atoms that are small, smooth, and round but have bends that cause it to be viscous. The atoms of the saline savor have the opposite characteristics. "That savor is saline which is composed of atoms that are large and not round nor scalene but are angular and have many bends. (By 'scalene'

he means atoms that interlock and intertwine with one another.) The atoms are large because salt remains⁴ on the surface; for, if they were small and were battered against the surrounding particles, they would mingle with the whole. They are not round, because the saline is rough, while the round is smooth. They are not scalene, because they do not interlock; and that is why the saline is friable."⁵

⁴ ἐπιπολάζει, which Stratton translates "comes to the surface of bodies." Democritus probably deduced the large size of the saline atom from observing that when saline water is filtered the salt is left behind on the surface. Cf. Lucretius, II, 471-7.

⁵ Compare the account of salinity given by Lucretius, II, 464-77. He says that because brine is fluid it is composed of smooth round particles (*e levibus atque rutundis*, 466). With these are mixed rough painful bodies which must not be hooked and held together (*retineri hamata*, 468. Note also *non e perplexis sed acutis esse elementis*, 463, which, despite corruption in the preceding verse, clearly refers to non-cohesive rough atoms; cf. οὐδὲ σκαληνῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδῶν τε καὶ πολυκαμπῶν, as reconstructed in *Sens.*, 66). There must be round atoms, as well as rough, to explain the fluidity of brine (469-70). The presence of the rough atoms is proved by the fact that when sea water is filtered through earth the sweet water leaves behind the *tactri primordia viri* (471-7). (Bailey's translation of this passage misses part of the meaning. He translates *scilicet esse globosa tamen, oum squalida constant* (469) as "you must know that they are nevertheless spherical, though rugged." Here, as the context shows, the same atoms are not both spherical and rugged; there must be spherical atoms *although* there are also rugged atoms.)

Two differences between the accounts of Theophrastus and Lucretius may be noted. First, Lucretius calls sea water bitter (465). But his description of the rough atoms that cause the taste corresponds to Theophrastus' description of the atoms of the saline and not of the bitter.

Second, Lucretius does not call the atoms scalene. Corresponding to Theophrastus' οὐ σκαληνῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπαλάττεσθαι he has *ne tamen haec retineri hamata necessumst* (II, 468). Lucretius apparently uses *hamatus* to refer to the *καμπαί* of the round atoms and to translate both *πολυκαμπής* (or *κάμπυλος*) and *σκαληνός*. Thus he says that olive oil may be composed *magis hamatis inter se perque plicatis* (II, 394). Since olive oil is a fluid, it must be composed of round atoms (II, 451-2, 466), and *hamatus* must refer not to the general shape of the atoms but to projections from their surfaces (cf. II, 426-9), like the *καμπαί* which, according to Theophrastus, make the bitter savor viscous. Elsewhere he uses *hamatus* of rough atoms that interlock as opposed to smooth round atoms. In his account of the composition of stones the word

refers primarily, if not solely, to the interlocking of the atoms (II, 444-50; cf. 451-5). But in his accounts of the objects of taste, other than that of the salinity of sea water, although atoms that are *hamatus* interlock, it is their roughness and not their interlocking that explains their effects and distinguishes them from the smooth round atoms (II, 402-7; IV, 655-62). In passages of the latter two kinds *hamatus* is used as if it combined the meanings of *πολυκαμπής* and *σκαληνός*; that is, as if all atoms that had bends (and so were rough) interlocked. (Cf. Hesychius' definition of *σκαληνός*.) The result is that he gives contradictory explanations of bitterness:

at contra quae amara atque aspera cumque videntur,
haec magis hamatis inter se nexa teneri . . . (II, 404-5);
... nec tamen haec retineri hamata necessumst (II, 468).

In the first account *hamatus* stands for *πολυκαμπής*, and, as the context shows, it refers to the roughness of the atoms; in the second it stands for *σκαληνός*. In the first, things that are bitter and harsh are explained by their composition from atoms that are *hamatus*, which therefore "tear a way into our senses and at their entering break through the body" (II, 406-7); in the second, the atoms, although rough, are not *hamatus* and therefore do not interlock.

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ASPECTS OF NON-TECHNICAL VOCABULARY IN APICIUS.

It is a rather curious phenomenon of Apician scholarship that the exotic subject matter of this 4th-century Roman cookbook has perhaps deterred non-culinary investigations. Duller late Latin works have lent themselves to little but linguistic studies, but Apicius has inspired reams of popular and semi-popular writing which has in reality added little to its many difficult textual problems. This paper will attempt only to illuminate certain aspects of the long-overlooked non-technical vocabulary in Apicius, especially those elements which are common to most authors and which are as significant for the whole study of late Latin as for the understanding of this particular text.

The only existing lexicon to Apicius is the author's *Glossarial Index to De Re Coquinaria of Apicius*,¹ which was prepared from the most recent and scholarly edition, Giarratano and Vollmer,² and with the help of which one can find any word or form occurring in the chief MSS, E and V from the 9th century, and in the sole MS of the related Excerpts of Vinidarius, A from the 8th century. The references in this paper are made to page and line in that edition, and an asterisk indicates an occurrence in the Excerpts. The glossarial index, however, is not, and never was intended to be, a definitive glossary of all Apician terms. Its purpose was to make all forms readily available to scholars, and its very format precluded discussion of debatable problems. Moreover, it made no attempt to add to existing knowledge of meanings. The exact force of *liquamen*, *sphondylus*, *innula*, and many other technical terms, some unique in this author, is a fascinating aspect of Apician vocabulary study, demanding as much knowledge of antique botany and gastronomy as of philology for the glossing of so much as a single doubtful word; for the definitive establishment of the text, however, the less colorful

¹ M. E. Milham, *A Glossarial Index to De Re Coquinaria of Apicius* (Madison, 1952).

² C. Giarratano and Fr. Vollmer, *Apicii librorum X qui dicuntur De Re Coquinaria quae extant* (Leipzig, 1922).

adjectives, adverbs, and conjunctions are equally important and raise equally difficult problems of textual criticism.

Although a great deal of study has been given in this century to the principles of late Latin and to the texts from which we adduce our evidence, the Latinity of Apicius has barely been touched and only as a part of other studies. The classical scholars of Sweden have made outstanding contributions to this field, from the time of Ahlquist's study of the *Mulomedicina Chironis* at the beginning of the century to the contemporary work of Erik Wistrand, and, of this group, Svennung has dealt most with Apician forms in his penetrating study of Palladius,³ an author closely related in subject matter to Apicius. But the majority of vocabulary studies have been contributed by the dean of the Swedish group, Einar Löfstedt, who for more than a half-century has synthesized the work of his predecessors and compeers, at the same time expanding the field enormously by his own contributions. Löfstedt only occasionally draws upon Apician evidence but has established by exhaustive word-counts and grammatical analyses of many authors the major differences between the syntax and vocabulary of classical and post-classical Latin. This paper proposes for the first time to examine the cookbook of Apicius in light of the principles established by Löfstedt, specifically those dealing with non-technical vocabulary.

One of the most easily recognized characteristics of late Latin lies in its special types of verbal composition. A very common phenomenon is recomposition, wherein a compound verb preserves the vocalism of the simplex although a reduced vowel is expected in classical Latin.⁴ Thus *aspargere* occurs 57 times in *De Re Coquinaria* and 6 times in the Excerpts as opposed to 54 occurrences of the classical *aspergere*. In addition, *adspargere*, similarly attested in the *Mulomedicina Chironis*, occurs once (*81, 4), *superspargere* once (*81, 22), and *circumspargere* and *dispargere* each once in the main text (68, 24 and 27, 6 respectively). Likewise *pertangere* is attested once (66, 22), and *concapere* once (31, 8) in a reading attested by both E and V but held suspect by editors. Another phenomenon common

³ J. Svennung, *Untersuchungen zu Palladius und zur lateinischen Fach- und Volkssprache* (Uppsala, 1935).

⁴ E. Löfstedt, *Philologischer Kommentar zur Peregrinatio Aetheriae* (Uppsala, 1936), p. 259.

to late Latin is the adding of a second compounding prefix to an already compounded verb.⁵ Apicius attests *superinfundere* (66, 3), *superinmittere* (12, 23), and *reexinanire* (7 occurrences), the last also representing the type of recomposition in which *re-* rather than *red-* is used before vowels by analogy with the anteconsonantal form.

Frequently in late Latin the compound verb appears where we would expect the simplex, thus revealing that the prefix has lost its force or specialized meaning. Löfstedt's many illustrations of this principle⁶ are corroborated in Apicius, where *capere* is used only twice, but *accipere* appears 34 times, only 4 of these with classical meaning. In its other 30 occurrences in the main text it has the meaning of the simplex, usually occurring as a formula, *accipies*, directly comparable to our own recipe formula: "Take one egg. . . ." Similar forms appear in the gerundive of *accoquere* (66, 20EV) and the two occurrences of the past participle of *accurare*. Another prefix which often loses all force in late Latin is *per-*, exemplified by the common Apician verb *perfundere* (66 occurrences in the main text and 11 in the Excerpts).⁷

Apicius also reveals interesting late Latin vocabulary choices among synonyms. *Coepi* seems generally to replace *incipere* in late Latin; thus it is noteworthy that *coepi* appears twice in *De Re Coquinaria* and 3 times in the Excerpts, always in the form *coeperit*, while *incipere* is not represented at all.⁸ *Interficere*, another rare verb in late Latin, is also missing, while the more popular *occidere* occurs twice (43, 30 and *81, 19).⁹ Similarly *reperire*, a learned word according to Löfstedt, has been replaced by the more vulgar *invenire* (4 occurrences),¹⁰ and *edere*, the classical verb of eating which was replaced by *manducare* in France, Italy, and Rumania, does not occur in Apicius although *manducare* is attested 5 times.¹¹

Although the number of significant non-technical adjectives in Apicius is limited, expressions of size and amount are worthy

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

⁹ Löfstedt, *Syntactica*, II (Lund, 1933), p. 343.

¹⁰ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, pp. 232-3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

of note. Since the classical adjectives for "large" and "small" had a strong tendency to disappear in late Latin,¹² it is not surprising that both *magnus* and *parvus* are missing in the text of Apicius, although the comparatives *maior* and *minor* occur in a number of forms. The only substitutes for *magnus* occurring in this text are *amplus*, which occurs only once (12, 19) and *abundans*, which occurs 3 times, while the commoner substitutes for *magnus* (*grandis*, *enormis*, *infinitus*, and *ingens*) are also missing. On the other hand, *minutus* occurs 30 times in the main text and once in the Excerpts, *modicus* 28 and 6, the related substantive *modicum* 53 and 1, and the adverb *modice* 65 and 2. *Pauci* occurs just twice, *paulatim* 5 times in the main text, and *parvulum* once in the Excerpts (*82, 4). Apicius also reveals the late Latin substitution of *integer* for *totus*, since *integer* appears 14 times to *totus*' once (8, 28) and *universus*' twice (26, 19, and 59, 13).¹³ Incidentally *totus* in its only appearance has its classical meaning, not the late Latin force of *omnis*,¹⁴ which occurs 42 times in *De Re Coquinaria* and 8 in the Excerpts.

In any late Latin author the demonstrative pronouns are of considerable importance, especially since *is* tends to be replaced by other words.¹⁵ Apicius, however, seems to maintain more classical usages than Löfstedt has found in comparable 4th or 5th century texts. Forms of *is* occur in 57 legitimate citations in the main text, an additional dozen being either editorial emendations or meaningless and therefore presumed erroneous. Forms of *hic* are also quite common (42 and 13), but *ille* occurs only 7 times, 5 times as a substitute for *is* and 2 as an adjective (59, 16 and 26, 25). Another common late Latin substitution for *is* is *ipse*, thus found in 15, 9; 15, 21; and 29, 23. An interesting substitute for *hic* in the meaning "the following" is found in the 5 singular uses of *talis* in Apicius,¹⁶ but perhaps most significant of all is the total absence of *iste* in this text although it is a common pronoun in late Latin and highly significant for Romance developments.¹⁷

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 71-3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁵ Löfstedt, *Syn.*, II, p. 47.

¹⁶ Löfstedt, *Coniectanea* (Uppsala, 1950), pp. 129-30.

¹⁷ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, p. 123.

According to Löfstedt *idem* was sometimes substituted for *item* in vulgar Latin;¹⁸ in Apicius there is one clear example of this phenomenon, *mustum recens idem praestat* (8, 12) and 3 other probable examples (8, 7; 43, 23; 45, 21) in which the main verb is *facere* and *idem* may be construed either as n. sg. acc. or as an adverb equivalent to *item*, the latter seeming the better interpretation. Conversely, *ipse* is used for *idem*, a development significant for late Latin,¹⁹ in 2 clear examples, *aquam pluvialem ad tertias decoques . . . et ipsam aquam pro hydromelli aegris dabis* (9, 14) and *friges oenogaro. postea simul cum ipso oenogaro inferes* (*78, 23). Thus *idem* shows late Latin usages in Apicius, but whether *idemque*, as found in Gregory of Tours, Aethicus Ister, and others, is here attested is by no means certain.²⁰ In these authors a meaningless particle *-que* has been added to *idem*, but the only possible Apician example has an unfortunate ambiguity of syntax which renders it impossible of proof, especially since the copulative *-que* is attested elsewhere in Apicius: <*mittis*> *folii et croci dragma singulas dactylorum ossibus torridis quinque isdemque dactylis vino mollitis* (6, 6), the problem here being whether the last four words comprise an ablative absolute or an ablative of accompaniment parallel to *ossibus torridis*. A similar problem arises with the enclitic *-que* in 8, 30: *laser . . . mittis et nucleos pineos ut puta viginti cumque utendum fuerit lasere, nucleos conteres*, where the difficulty of understanding the material makes it impossible to decide whether one is dealing with a copulative *-que* or with a non-classical indefinite relative *cumque*, merely suffixal in such classical forms as *quandocumque*. In many cases, the technicality and frequent obscurity of Apicius' subject matter only increases the ambiguity of a most casual syntax, and editorial punctuation can hardly be used as a reliable guide.

The other 3 occurrences of enclitic *-que* in Apicius serve to introduce his distribution and uses of conjunctive and disjunctive particles; however, all occurrences of *-que*, characteristically a rare form in late Latin, are restricted to Book I (Epimeles).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²⁰ Löfstedt, *Vermischte Studien zur lateinischen Sprachkunde und Syntax* (Lund, 1936), pp. 39-40.

Although 7, 2-4 twice attests a seemingly conjunctive form in a doubtful passage of MS readings, *conditi Camerini praeceptis utique apsinthio cessante; in cuius vicem absenti Pontici terendique uncias . . .*, only 12, 3 can exhibit an indisputable conjunctive *-que*. *Ac* and *atque* are also as rare in Apicius as in such other authors as Vitruvius, Commodian, and the *Mulomedicina*, *ac* occurring 7 times in *De Re Coquinaria* and *atque* twice in the Excerpts.²¹ This paper will make no attempt to analyze or categorize the some 1050 occurrences of *et*, which remains the standard copulative particle in Apicius and the Excerpts.

The disjunctive particles in Apicius usually have their classical meanings rather than the conjunctive sense common in late Latin.²² *Vel* is most frequently attested (94 times in the main text and twice in the Excerpts), *aut* occurs 19 times and twice, *sive* 32 and 5, and *seu* only once (22, 10). In only three of these passages does conjunctive meaning seem preferable. In Book VI (Aeropetes), two passages have offered editorial problems as they appear in MSS E and V. 42, 13 has *gruem vel anatem lavas* (E, *levas* V) *vel ornas*, the second *vel* being emended by Giarratano to *et*. It would seem that this second *vel* is best interpreted as conjunctive, although Giarratano's emendation is unjustifiable in light of the demonstrated ambivalence of *vel* in other texts. Another example of the same ambivalence occurs in 43, 22, where E and V attest *et* but the derived group of MSS called ζ attests *vel*. Another recipe which seems to use *aut* as a conjunctive raises the same difficulty; 72, 16 advises, for *SALSUM SINE SALSO*, *iecur coques teres et mittes piper aut liquamen aut salem. addes oleum*. It hardly seems that any one of seasoning, broth, or salt would alone be able to make liver resemble salt fish. The difficulty of making such decisions lies in our incomplete knowledge of Roman gastronomy, in the fact that we do not know what would and would not please the Roman taste. These disjunctive particles also occur in a number of correlatives, the only ones worthy of note being the mixed correlatives *vel . . . aut . . . aut* (11, 23) and *aut . . . vel* (*80, 15). The comparative infrequency of *aut* in this text is also of interest, for it is the disjunctive particle which survived in the Romance languages.²³

²¹ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, pp. 85-7.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 197-8.

²³ Löfstedt, *Syn.*, II, p. 224.

A close relationship exists in Apicius, as in other late Latin authors, between those conjunctions and adverbs which tend to shift in both meanings and usage. Several significant forms which maintain their classical meanings in Apicius are the previously mentioned *atque*, elsewhere replacing *etiam*; *autem* (5 occurrences), elsewhere replacing *enim*; ²⁴ *exinde* (*pulpa . . . fricatur et exinde isicia plassantur* 12, 18), elsewhere replacing *usque*; ²⁵ *quemadmodum* (32, 25), sometimes temporal; *quando*, regularly temporal as in the 3 occurrences of *quando volueris* in Apicius but elsewhere sometimes modal; and *ubi* (19 occurrences), temporal, but elsewhere sometimes modal, sometimes causal.²⁶ In addition, *denuo* (7 occurrences), *enim* (*cum nervis sequetur . . . cum nervis enim manducare non potes* 43, 1), and *iterum* (6 occurrences) are here used regularly rather than in their late Latin adversative sense.

Certain other Apician adverbs and conjunctions, however, show late Latin usages. For instance *sed*, used 10 times in Apicius, does not always have adversative force. In one of the recipes attributed to Varro there is an example of the *come sed grandis* construction found in the *Peregrinatio*, *betacios sed nigros* (17, 8).²⁷ *Sed et* is also found twice in Apicius, but neither in true apodosis as it is sometimes used in late Latin,²⁸ nor as a substitute for *et*,²⁹ but in 8, 12 it seems best translated as if it were *sed etiam*. The rare late Latin adversative *sane*³⁰ also seems to be once attested: *cum ad bibendum voles uti, addito melle rosatum conficies. sane custodito ut rosam a rore siccam et optimam mittas* (7, 15). *iam* and *mox* are of particular interest because each is used as a conjunction in Apicius.³¹ Löfstedt long ago pointed out the MS readings *iam bulliit* (60, 13) and *iam bullivit* (*79, 4) along with another example of conjunctive *iam* from the *Mulomedicina*, but the same phenomenon is attested with *mox* in *patinam, mox constrinxerit, inferes* (*78, 18). The only other occurrence of *mox* in Apicius shows

²⁴ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, p. 139.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-9.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-80.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

³¹ Löfstedt, *Vermischte Stud.*, pp. 48-9.

it with the force of *modo*³² in *erunt tales quovis tempore quasi mox de arbore demptae* (11, 3).

Among other non-classical uses of adverbs in Apicius, the pleonastic use of *ita* before *ut* appears 25 times, a phenomenon so common that the two words had almost become felt as one, as in *sicut*.³³ Only once is *ita* used before *ne*, however: *in craticula igni lento exsiccabis, ita ne urantur* (50, 16). *Sic*, often having the force of *tum* in late Latin,³⁴ thus appears in many of its 76 occurrences in *De Re Coquinaria* and 17 in the Excerpts, a typical example being *ante tamen teres piper rutam liquamen et sic superinmittis iecur* (12, 23). Finally, *tam* sometimes replaced *et* in late Latin,³⁵ and it is with this meaning that it makes its only appearance in Apicius, *agitabis surculo lauri viridis tam diu coques* (64, 13).

It should also be pointed out that *tamen* occurs much less frequently than in the *Peregrinatio* (4 times),³⁶ each time with the force of *autem* and with an adverb meaning "before" to indicate that the given information should have been inserted sooner in the recipe, as in *assas iecur porcinum et eum enervas. ante tamen teres piper rutam liquamen* (12, 22). This last example also illustrates the late Latin preference for *ante* (8 occurrences in Apicius and 1 in the Excerpts), while *antea* occurs only once (26, 18).³⁷ *Post* is also sometimes used as an adverb in late Latin in place of *postquam*,³⁸ as in *post a charta praecluces* (63, 18), and *praeter* for *praeterea*³⁹ as in . . . *praeter quod subtracto igni in se redit* (6, 1).

The final group of adverbs are *saepe*,⁴⁰ *satis*,⁴¹ and *valde*,⁴² none of which are used as conjunctions but all of which are significant for late Latin vocabulary. Löfstedt presents a number of word-counts to prove that *saepe* was almost entirely replaced in late Latin, since it does not appear in the *Peregrinatio* and only three times each in Pomponius Mela, Firmicius Maternus, and Cassius Felix. Similarly it does not appear at all in the main text of Apicius, occurring only twice in the

³² Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, p. 241.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-5.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-4.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Excerpts (*81, 31 and *82, 16) and then in the comparative *saepius*. It is replaced in the main text by *frequenter* twice, *subinde* twice, and *aliquotiens* once. *Satis*, on the other hand, is attested 17 times in the main text, once in the Excerpts, 8 times in its classical adverbial sense, several times as a substantive, and once in the late Latin meaning "too" or "too much" in *holera electa non satis matura in vas picitum repone* (10, 5). Last of all, *valde*, which was especially popular in the *Historia Francorum* and Gregory of Tours, occurs 3 times in Apicius (31, 14; 47, 14 and 72, 26).

This then presents a broad survey of non-technical vocabulary in Apicius exclusive of prepositions, which are so complex and extensive as to demand separate analysis. It is obvious that this late 4th-century text has many late Latin forms and usages but is by no means so far removed from classical Latin as are the *Peregrinatio*, *Mulomedicina*, or certain other documents of the same period. Yet its late Latinity cannot be overlooked as has heretofore been its editorial fate. Even so recent and careful an edition as Giarratano and Vollmer's and so excellent a study as Brandt's⁴³ have indulged in emendations and restorations unjustifiable in light of the facts of late Latin syntax; no definitive edition can be produced in the future without full cognizance of these facts. It is true that scholars would like to know a great deal more about the meanings of Apician technical vocabulary, its adjectives and nouns and even verbs; but without a solid understanding of the non-technical pronouns, adverbs, and conjunctions which bring syntactic order out of a welter of technical terminology, the sometimes plebeian, sometimes fantastic, fare of the Roman cookbook must remain shrouded in doubt and mystery.

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⁴³ E. Brandt, *Untersuchungen zum römischen Kochbuche* (Leipzig, 1927).

REVIEWS.

BERNARD M. W. KNOX. *Oedipus at Thebes*. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 280.

The title of this excellent study might almost have been "*Oedipus at Athens*," for the author has based his interpretation of *Oedipus Rex* on a careful and penetrating examination of the intellectual history of Athens in the late fifth century. Oedipus himself, always an Everyman, is here revealed as an Everyman of specifically Athenian temper, delineated in terms of the πόλις τύραννος, and embodying to a large degree the vital but self-destructive genius of Periclean and post-Periclean Athens. This view of Oedipus, which is perhaps the book's principal theme, is powerfully supported by citations from Thucydides and other historians, as well as from the sophists, orators, and medical writers. Knox's knowledge of the period is admirable in general; but his analysis of the language and imagery of the play in the light of that knowledge (chiefly in Chapter 3) is a piece of real philological virtuosity, and we must feel grateful to the author for so enlarging upon his earlier study which appeared in *Tragic Themes in Western Literature* (ed. C. Brooks, New Haven, 1955). Sophocles' lines are analyzed in their wide range of cultural association as a rich poetic web representing the intellectual and spiritual concerns of Athens with dazzling fullness and brilliance. One emerges with the feeling that there was little of moment in the world around him which Sophocles did not reflect somehow in *Oedipus Rex*.

To find fault with such a book may seem ungrateful, but, as Gibbon once wrote, "Omnipotence itself cannot escape the murmurs of its discordant votaries." The votaries of Sophocles are not likely to agree about everything, and about the ultimate metaphysical implications of *Oedipus Rex* one may easily differ. Knox is by no means doctrinaire, but one has the impression that sometimes he is a little too much on the side of the gods. The very fact that the oracles are, in the final event, shown to be correct leads the author occasionally, though not always, toward the view that the play justifies the ways of God to man. This reviewer, at least, will never be convinced that "The play . . . is a reassertion of the religious view of a divinely ordered universe" (p. 47), or that Oedipus "has learned well . . . the existence of divine prescience and of an order beyond human understanding" (p. 50). Prescience, perhaps; but order does not follow necessarily from prescience, and Knox himself has stated clearly and correctly that "Sophocles has chosen to present the terrible actions of Oedipus not as determined but only as predicted, and he has made no reference to the relation between the predicted destiny and the divine will." And yet in his treatment of the Oedipus-Jocasta scene in general, the author keeps implying that the principals are morally wrong, and even impious, to doubt the oracles, and that they are somehow revolting against the divine

"order" in their necessary search for the truth. Surely the following, for instance, is an overstatement of the case about *εἰκὴ κράτιστον ζῆν*: "Jocasta makes her famous declaration which rejects fear, providence—divine and human alike—and any idea of universal order. Her declaration amounts almost to a rejection of the law of cause and effect, and it certainly undermines the basis of human calculation." To deny that there is any clear foreknowledge in human life is only to summarize what the play's events dramatize. The oracles had been explicit, of course, and their correctness comes out in the end; but Sophocles has exercised his subtlest dramatic skills to make them seem, even to the dimmest intelligence, unfulfillable. So far as "human calculation" is concerned, that of Oedipus and Jocasta is unexceptionable, and it is only because they use the full range of their intelligence that they ever find out the truth.

So too, things seem to get a little out of hand in the discussion of Jocasta's lines, 711 ff., where Knox (pp. 171 ff.) tries to prove that the queen, because she lacks naïveté, also lacks all trace of religious feeling. It seems unfair, when Jocasta has carefully avoided denying Apollo's foreknowledge, and even explicitly affirmed it, to torture her words into their opposite. Such an interpretation is perhaps necessary in order to motivate the ode at 863 ff. in the way that Knox sees it. But it is also part of the misconception that *Oedipus Rex* asserts a religious view of the world, and that anything which seemingly questions that religious view falls under the poet's disapproval. So too, one might draw very opposite conclusions from the staggering list of verbal equations between the gods and Oedipus, equations which Knox feels expose the "divine stature implicit in Oedipus' attitude . . . as false." These parallels, like the Homeric *δαίμονι ἴσος* and *θεοῖς ἐπιείκελος*, constitute no small part of what gives Oedipus the appearance of divine stature in the play. Finally, it is one-sided, to say the least, to declare that in the catastrophe Oedipus is found to be "not the measurer, but the thing measured" (p. 157), or that "there is a standard beyond man by which Oedipus is measured," and thus make Sophocles foreshadow and concur in the Platonic doctrine that God, not man, is the measure of all things (p. 184). Oedipus and Apollo have, in a very real way, measured each other, as the carefully balanced statement of *Oedipus Rex* 1329-31 makes clear. Sophocles was far closer to the age of Protagoras than to that of Plato; and in his initial analysis of Oedipus as hero, and in the very last sentences of his book, Knox has stated in a far more satisfactory way, indeed a wonderful way, what seems to me to have been Sophocles' intuitive metaphysical design. But there seems to be an undercurrent of modern religious feeling which intrudes occasionally upon the book's otherwise clear historical perspective.

It is this undercurrent, I believe, which accounts for the author's treatment of the controversial central stasimon (*Oedipus Rex* 863 ff.). Knox has assailed my own interpretation of the ode so painstakingly (p. 209, n. 98), even to applying the term "ingenious" (classical scholarship's most courteous cuss-word), that the temptation to reply is irresistible. Besides, for all Knox's ingenuity (there!), I still think that I am right in believing that the ode does

not add up to a unified conviction, positive or negative, on the part of the chorus about the value of oracles or of religion, but rather reflects the wavering views of the late fifth century, the lingering hope that divine order may prevail in the universe, and the growing fear that it may not. In the section devoted to the poem (pp. 99 ff.), Knox has ably canvassed the difficulties of its relevance to the play. His own explanation is an extension of his finely supported argument that Oedipus derives the salient features of his character from the national character of Athens herself, the πόλις τύραννος, brilliantly energetic, decisive, autocratic, yet subject to the weaknesses involved in such overwhelming endowments. That Oedipus and Athens do, on one level, closely resemble each other I should not wish to deny. But to identify them in the ode to the extent of saying that "the words of the chorus are a warning and a prophecy of Athenian defeat" (p. 104) is to fall into "a most abrupt *anankê*." Such a solution differs little from the view, which Knox dismisses, that Athens, not Oedipus, is the object of the choral strictures on ὕβρις, as the author seems to realize when he says that Sophocles here attributes "to Oedipus faults which are not to be found in the hero of the play but in the actions of the city of which he is the dramatic symbol." In that case, the irrelevancies to the play still stand. But the ode cannot be so specific and schematized; neither can I agree that Knox's paraphrase of it (p. 211) is justified, or that the chorus is exhibiting "the faith which moves mountains" (p. 210) when they beg Zeus to fulfill an oracle which is apparently incapable of fulfillment. The faith which moves mountains was not, I suspect, a characteristic of post-Periclean Athens, and not at any time a pronounced Hellenic trait.

All are agreed, or should be, that the oracles here under discussion are those given to Laius, not to Oedipus. I wonder now, however, if I was correct when I stated formerly that the chorus prays for their fulfillment. The chorus says that they are not being fulfilled (906 ff.), that if they are not fulfilled, then they (the choristers) will neglect the oracular centers of Greece, and they suggest that Zeus, if that is his right name, take account of the situation (903-5, where the subject of λάθου is unexpressed, and even the previous τάδε, which one understands as subject, may refer specifically to the oracles, or to the general moral scheme outlined in the three preceding stanzas). That might be interpreted as prayer; if so, it is of an old, formulaic kind, and it is certainly ambiguous. The first three stanzas are, indeed, prayer, punctuated by statements of moral and religious belief: the choristers pray first for purity in word and deed (863 ff.), then for the continuance of righteous effort which benefits the city (879 f.); finally they pray that evil fate may overtake the high-handed and irreligious man (883 ff.). Their statements about the heavenly origin of law (865 ff.), the necessary fall of tyranny and ὕβρις (874 ff.), the punishment for unrighteousness (883 ff.) strongly imply that they see the world as a morally comprehensible structure, and they add: "For if such (sc. evil) deeds are held in honor, why should I dance?" Here, of course, χορεύειν cannot mean simply "perform tragedy," as has been so often suggested. The art of tragic formulation occurs precisely as the result of the failure of such pat schemes as the chorus has just expressed; "dance" here

indicates any dance, or celebration in general, in honor of the gods, and the application to tragedy does not go beyond the fact that the theatre was sacred to Dionysus. The whole section, however, does imply that in the eyes of the chorus, religious observance and moral rectitude are symptoms, perhaps even conditions, of civilization itself (cf. 879 ff., and *Antigone* 370); if these fail, everything fails.

It is not really surprising that, at this point, Sophocles subtly turns the tables; his odes seldom embalm an idea or conviction, but rather reflect the tensions and contradictions of the action. In the famous first stasimon of the *Antigone*, for instance, after all the high praises of human accomplishment, peculiar ambiguities begin to arise: the line *ἄπορος ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον* is doubtless rightly translated "There is nothing in his future which he approaches without resource," but there is something in the word order and the surprising use of the article which suggests the interpretation "Without resource he passes to the future nothing (i. e., death)"; cf. Fg. 871, line 8 Pearson, and *Electra* 999 f. Is *φονγὰς* the accusative of *φονή*, and *ξυμπέφρασται* middle, or the nominative of *φονγὰς*, and the verb passive? Certainly 365 f. is a deliberate anticlimax: "With the devising of his skill a wisdom beyond hope—sometimes he creeps toward evil, sometimes toward good"; one might have looked for a less chance-ridden conclusion. (Cf. J. C. Opstelten, *Sophocles and Greek Pessimism*, pp. 144 ff.) The realm of unreason is never forgotten in Sophocles. And so too, here, in the *Oedipus*, only more clearly: after three stanzas of piety and prayer, the chorus says explicitly, "If oracles and their religious implications are not fulfilled, then I will neglect the holy places; let Zeus and his everlasting rule take heed of it; the oracles are indeed unfulfilled, Apollo is not clearly honored, and religion is on the wane." If this is the faith that moves mountains, it is no wonder that the mountains are in their usual places.

That the oracles are in fact fulfilled has nothing to do with what the chorus says at this point; the choristers are in the dilemma of trying wishfully to defend an apparent contradiction, and (I still say) they are confused. Sophocles, however, was not, and one might look a little further into his words. In the first strophe there is implied the old antinomy between *νόμος* and *φύσις*; the laws (*νόμοι*), offspring of Olympus and heavenly aether, stand forth treading high, embodying a great and ageless god. No mortal nature (*φύσις*) gave them birth. The root of *φύσις* is then taken up in *φυνεύει* (873): *ἔβρις* breeds the tyrant, the opposite of law. Is it not clear that law is not the product of human nature, but rather of the gods? Is it not further implied that human nature is dangerously full of *ἔβρις*, overstuffs itself on evil gains, and falls by its own ambitious vaultings, while the protection from that fate is to hold the god as one's champion (881)? Such, surely, is the familiar ethic, which the Greeks, from Hesiod down, had hoped was true, and indeed the contrast between *ἔβρις* and *τὸ καλῶς ἔχον πόλει πάλαισμα* (879 f.) is a little like Hesiod's two forms of *ἔρις*. Without the divine laws, we are animals which overstuff, and therefore destroy ourselves. (Cf. the medical language used to describe this phenomenon in both *Oedipus Rex* 874 f. and *Ajax* 758 ff.) And yet, neither the ode, nor the play itself in the last analysis, illustrates this hopeful pie-

ture: Oedipus, exercising his mind to save the city (τὸ καλῶς ἔχον πόλει πάλαισμα), in perfect purity of motive, is neither hybristic nor a gluttoned animal, but he is ruined; as for the gods, their oracles are fulfilled, but they scarcely prove to be either good for the city (civilization) or morally instructive. If anyone can derive any feeling of divine order from the text of *Oedipus Rex*, he will be hard put to it to say what it consists of, unless it is "order" for the gods to say "I told you so." The chorus' pious hope is dashed in a most exemplary manner, and a most ironical one, for the very token by which, as they imply, they will believe in divine order (namely, the fulfillment of oracles) is the precise means by which the just man, from whom they had benefited and in whom they had supreme faith, is brought to a nightmare of undeserved horror, as a striking example of the fact that the gods do fulfill oracles (i. e., have prescience), but do not reward moral excellence. So also, throughout the ode, the chorus is not really sure that the moral will hold. They assert that no forgetfulness (λάθα, 870) will put the laws to sleep, but they pray Zeus not to let these matters escape him (λάθου, 904). The whole last stanza shows, if it shows anything at all, that they are afraid that Delphi has misfired, that there is no divine order, that religion is passing away, and with it, by implication, all civilization.

Between such fears and the "passionate tumult of a clinging hope" the chorus is distraught, as well it might be just at the turning point of the action of the drama. Immediately after this ode, all the major roles are reversed, and the truth comes clear. The ode is indeed, as Knox says, "magnificently functional," and its function is to hold the metaphysical issue in suspense, in preparation for its clarification through action. It reflects, I maintain, not strong religious faith, but the impact of tragic experience upon the simpler moral generalities of Greek culture, and expresses with sorrowful compassion the confusion of those who are neither great thinkers nor great actors, but whose lives are shaken, and driven between hope and despair, by the dread unfoldings of human life.

But to digress so long over differences is only to emphasize the importance of Knox's work, which is really required reading. The book is tastefully, even eloquently, written, and the effect of its historical thoroughness should be to lay to rest forever such theories as the Freudian or the "detective-story" interpretations, and the other sordid vulgarisms of Sophoclean critique. It will be, fortunately, easily accessible to the reader who knows no Greek, and therefore of interest to all literary people. It is a pity that transliteration of Greek has been used in the text: some Greek words transliterate elegantly, but the general effect of transliterated sentences has the unhallowed look of jabberwocky. Also, the real Greek in the notes might have been more carefully proof-read. But these matters have little weight. *Oedipus at Thebes* is a magnificent contribution in a difficult field. Perhaps one may legitimately hope that Professor Knox may yet write a sequel about *Oedipus at Colonus*, to be called, in all seriousness, *Oedipus at Athens*, and exhibiting with equal insight and abundance of evidence the old Oedipus, now no longer the embodiment of Athens the πόλις τύραννος, but of Athens the Ἑλλάδος παιδεία.

CEDRIC WHITMAN.

FRANCO SARTORI. *Le eterie nella vita politica Ateniese del VI e V secolo A. C.* Rome, "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1957. Pp. 169. (*Università degli Studi di Padova, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Storia Antica*, III.)

Mabel Lang, in her fine study of "The Revolution of the 400" (*A. J. P.*, LXIX [1948], pp. 272-89) summarized (pp. 278-9) the "softening-up activities of the oligarchic clubs in the . . . order in which Thucydides presents them (first, a calculated kind of violence; second, a deceptively mild program; and third, the use of the first two as levers of persuasion and intimidation)." This account agrees so well with Plato's statement in the *Republic* (II, 365 D) that Plato may well have had the situation of 411 B. C. in mind, as Sartori himself now suggests (*Historia*, VII [1958], pp. 164-8); see also *Theaetetus*, 173 D, and, not independent of these passages, *Isocrates*, III, 54.

Students of Athenian politics have always been interested in the composition, the organization, and the activities of these clubs. George M. Calhoun's monograph on *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (*Bull. of the Univ. of Texas*, No. 262, issued Jan. 8, 1913) has been able to satisfy this interest, and his book is used and quoted whenever these clubs are mentioned. Calhoun admits quite frankly (p. 4) that his "investigation is but incidentally concerned with the origin or the history of the clubs," and his section on "Origin and Development" (pp. 10-17) and on "Political Tendencies" (pp. 17-24) are rather sketchy. He concludes (p. 24) that "the clubs were not restricted to any one party, (but) the majority of them seem to have been oligarchic." He is led to this conclusion (p. 18) by "the existence of hetaerics which supported popular leaders of the fifth century, Themistocles, Pericles, Alcibiades." Actually, our knowledge of the "clubmembership" of Themistocles is based on a passage in Plutarch's *Aristides* (II, 4) which goes back to Aeschines the Socratic, probably *via* Theopompus; in this passage the justice of Aristides is contrasted to the partiality of Themistocles. It is doubtful, moreover, whether in that early period there was as yet any alternative to the aristocratic organizations of the Athenian nobles. The case of Pericles is different (see also below, note 5), for we know even from Plutarch (*Pericles*, 7; 9, 2-3) that Pericles was an aristocrat until the 'sixties when Aristides had died and Cimon was away on military campaigns.¹ Alcibiades was, of

¹ This is confirmed by a passage of the Scholia on *Aristides* (III, p. 446, lines 17-26, ed. Dindorf) which does not seem to have been considered so far, although it appears to go back to Theopompus: καὶ τούτων μὲν (sc. τῶν δημοτικῶν) προίστατο Κίμων, πολλὰ διανέμων καὶ συγχωρῶν ὁπωρίσασθαι τοῖς βουλευμένοις, καὶ ἰμάτια διανέμων τοῖς πένησι (see *F. Gr. Hist.*, 115 F 89, and J. E. Sandys' comments on Aristotle's *Const. of Athens* 27, 3). τῶν δὲ ὀλιγαρχικῶν προίστατο Περικλῆς· κατηγορηθεὶς δὲ ὁ Κίμων ὑπὸ Περικλέους <ἐπὶ> Ἑλληνικῇ (ΕΠΙΛΑΝΙΚΗ codd.) τῇ ἀδελφῇ καὶ ἐπὶ Σκύρῳ τῇ νήσῳ, ὡς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προδιδομένου ἐξεβλήθη. δεδιώς δὲ ὁ Περικλῆς μὴ ζητηθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτικῶν, πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐχώρησεν· οἱ δὲ ὀλιγοὶ γαμβρὸν ὄντα θοοκυνδίδην τὸν Μελησίον τοῦ Κίμωνος ἀπεσπάσαντο, σκυλακώδη ὄντα καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν. The expulsion of Cimon evidently refers to his ostracism which has always been connected with Pericles (as accuser;

course, never a democrat, although he may have been popular. It is, therefore, clear that the clubs as such, whenever they were active in the political field, should be considered as antidemocratic, whether or not certain of their members courted popular favor to achieve and to maintain their political positions.

Since Calhoun's excellent book did not deal with the "historical development" of the clubs, there was a need for a study of "The *hetaireiai* in the political life of Athens during the sixth and fifth centuries B. C." This need has now been fulfilled by Sartori's book under review; its subject is of sufficient importance to justify the preceding introduction and the following lengthy discussion. Both Sartori and Attilio Degrassi (in the brief preface) claim that new discoveries and recent research have made Calhoun's book obsolete; it is surprising, however, how little new evidence on the Athenian clubs has been brought to light either by excavations or by the re-examination of old material. Nor has Sartori made use of all of the new information which has become available. I am thinking of ostracism: the few references (collected in the Index), all conventional, are based either on Calhoun (pp. 136-40, a very good account) or on Carcopino's second edition of *L'ostracisme Athénien* (1935) which is little more than a reprint of his splendid book of 1909. Actually, a great many ostraca have been found in recent years, and a great deal of work has been done on ostracism; see O. W. Reinmuth, *R.-E.*, s. v. *Ostrakismos*, and the list of articles in footnote 1 of my forthcoming article "Theophrastos on Ostracism" in *Classica et Mediaevalia*, XIX (1958). If Sartori really believed (p. 45) that the clubs were active in the ostracisms not only of Hyperbolus but also of Hipparchus, Aristides, Themistocles (see Ehrenberg, *People*, p. 340, note 4), Cimon, and Thucydides the son of Melesias, he should not have been satisfied with a passing reference to Calhoun's treatment, and with the addition of a few references in a footnote (p. 80, note 6) on the date of the ostracism of Hyperbolus (to which should be added *Phoenix*, IX [1955], pp. 122-6).

The first chapter (pp. 17-33) is devoted to an examination of the terms *hetaireiai* and *synomosiαι*, and to an attempt to show that these terms are not only not similar but actually contradictory (p. 17).² Actually, the two terms were used indiscriminately in references to the political activities of the oligarchic clubs between 424 B. C. and 403 B. C., by Aristophanes, Andocides, Thucydides, Plato, and Aris-

see Plutarch, *Pericles*, 9, 4) and Elpinice (as cause; see Andocides, IV, 33; Plutarch, *Cimon*, 15, 3; Scholia on Aristides, III, p. 515, line 15, quoting Didymus), but it is difficult to understand the reference to Skyros and to Cimon's betrayal of Pericles. R. Sealey, *Hermes*, LXXXIV (1956), pp. 234-47, discussed Pericles' entry into politics without considering his earlier aristocratic associations.

² The evidence offered is three Hellenistic inscriptions (*Syll.*³, 360, 526, 527) condemning *synomosiαι*, one of which (527) testifies also to the existence of *hetaireiai* as official divisions of the people of Dreros, just as they are known from the Gortynian Laws (*I. G.*, III, 72, X, line 38; see M. Guarducci's commentary on p. 168). This merely shows that *synomosiαι* can mean "conspiracy"; actually, it can also mean "confederation" as Sartori recognizes (p. 33). See now J. and L. Robert, *R. E. G.*, LXXI (1958), p. 195, no. 75.

totle; the former term (*synomosia*) had often a derogatory meaning, while the latter (*hetaireia* and *hetairikon*) was the more formal designation. On the whole, the matter of terminology has already been well treated by Calhoun (pp. 4-9). Nor does Sartori's second chapter, devoted to the character of the Attic *hetaireiai* (pp. 37-49), go beyond what Calhoun has already stated in his book.

In the third chapter (pp. 53-7: the Attic *hetaireiai* until the time of Cleisthenes), Sartori passes from the conspiracy of Cylon (whose associates are called an *hetaireia* by Herodotus, V, 71, *synomotai* by Plutarch, *Solon*, 12, 1) directly to the Alemeonid attack upon Leipsydriion (called *prodosetairon* by Aristotle, *Const.*, 19, 3) and to the conflict between Isagoras and Cleisthenes in which, according to Herodotus, V, 66 (and Aristotle, 20, 1), the *hetaireiai* were actively involved. Sartori mentions (p. 55), without approval and without reexamination, Beloch's old theory that the political divisions of the first half of the sixth century B. C. reappeared in the struggle for power after the expulsion of Hippias. Whatever may be the truth of this theory, a study of the *staseis* of old Athens should certainly have been included in an account such as Sartori's.

The meaning of *stasis* in the sense of "a group of people taking a certain political position" (we commonly use the related term "opposition") cannot be attested before the fifth century (see note 4), although it is probable that it originated in the political struggles of the late Solonian age.³ *Staseis* are first mentioned as existing immediately after Solon's reforms (Aristotle, 11, 2), and they are identified, anachronistically, as *demos* and *gnorimoi*; actually, these groups are said (2, 1) to have been at odds with each other even before Solon (see also 5, 1-2). We next hear of the *staseis* from Herodotus (I, 59-62, whom Aristotle follows, 13, 4-15) who reports that Peisistratus raised a third *stasis* in opposition to the two led by Lycurgus and Megacles. It is generally assumed that these three *staseis* comprised large segments of the population, as did presumably the two *staseis* of the earlier Solonian period, and that it is to these *staseis* that the Solonian law against "neutralism" refers (Plutarch, *Solon*, 20, 1); Solon himself would then have obeyed his own law (see Aristotle, 14, 2, and the parallel passages assembled in Sandys' edition). It is far more likely, however, that the three *staseis* were comparatively small groups led by ambitious aristocrats, and that

³ See Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, I, p. 584, no. 859 (= J. M. Edmonds, *Frag. Att. Com.*, I, pp. 778-9, no. 859): *στάσις· οὐχ ἡ φιλονεικία, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ οἱ στασιάζοντες*; for the formation of the word, see G. R. Vowles, *C. P.*, XXIII (1928), p. 42; E. Schwyzler, *Gr. Gramm.*, I, pp. 504-6. L.-S.'s *Lexicon*, s. v., III, 1, lists, I think incorrectly, Theognis, I, lines 51-2, a passage to which Herodotus' (poetic?) source in III, 82, alludes. This political view must be associated with Solon, fr. 3 (Diehl), lines 18-22, a passage to which, in turn, Herodotus refers in VIII, 3 (A. W. Verrall, *C. R.*, XVII [1903], pp. 98-9); see also the related *gnome* in I, 87. In all these passages, and in many others (see L.-S.'s *Lexicon*, s. v., III, 2), *stasis* is used in the sense of "the action taken by the group called *stasis*, faction (which also has a double meaning), sedition, discord"; for Aristotle's analysis of this term, see M. Wheeler, *A. J. P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 143-61, who calls Herodotus, I, 59, 3, the *locus classicus* but fails to notice that Herodotus uses the word here in a different meaning.

they were not at all different from the later *hetaireiai* of the time of Cleisthenes or of Alcibiades; see also Plutarch, *Solon*, 29, 2. This interpretation is confirmed by Herodotus who speaks (V, 69-72) of the *hetairoi* of Isagoras and of Cleisthenes as *antistasiotai*, *systasiotai*, *stasiotai*, and by Plutarch who consistently (following here one source, probably Theopompus) refers (*Aristides*, 7, 3; *Nicias*, 11, 4; *Alcibiades*, 13, 4) to the *hetaireiai* of Nicias and Alcibiades as *staseis*; only in one significant passage (based on Theophrastus) does he mention the *hetaireia* of Phaiax.⁴ It is clear, therefore, that the *staseis* of the first half of the sixth century should have been included in an historical account of the Attic *hetaireiai*; in fact, the political struggles of the age of Cleisthenes read like a repetition of those in the time of Peisistratus.

The sixty years from the battle of Marathon to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (a better break would have been the death of Pericles) are treated by Sartori on five pages (pp. 61-6). This is the period during which the law of ostracism was enacted and employed; only one ostracism (the freak one of Hyperbolus) took place after the death of Pericles. This is the period during which Athenian democracy developed against the opposition of the aristocratic elements united in the *hetaireiai*. This is the period during which Athenian politics was directed by the generals who were chosen and elected under circumstances which made possible the activity of the *hetaireiai* either on behalf of certain candidates or against them. Of all this, one reads next to nothing in Sartori's account; but this is not the place to present the story which he failed to tell.⁵

After the death of Pericles, as after the expulsion of Hippias, a new political situation arose; only this time it was Cleon, not Cleisthenes, who was the leader of the *demos*. Accordingly, the aristocratic groups were pushed still further into the background, gaining in strength only through Nicias' successes (especially his "peace") and through Alcibiades' bold adventures. The ostracism of Hyperbolus, as masterly a stroke as that of Themistocles more than

⁴ This is, of course, not the place to examine all the significant occurrences of *stasis* (and related terms) in Herodotus, Thucydides (e.g., IV, 71), Isocrates (e.g., IV, 79), Plato, Antiphon (*Harpocration*, s.v. *stasiotes*), Aristotle (e.g., *Oec.*, II, 1348a35-b4), and in other authors; attention may be called, however, to a few occurrences in Aeschylus because these have been combined and given a separate meaning in L.-S., *Lexicon*, s.v., II; see now G. Italie, *Index Aeschyleus*, s.vv. *stasis* and *stasiarchos*. Actually, they are the earliest testimonies to the use of *stasis* as "group of people who stand in opposition." There can be no doubt that to Aeschylus and to his audience the word *stasis* had a political meaning, and that its use evoked recollections of the political struggles of Athens during the sixth and early fifth centuries.

⁵ The reader may merely be warned that the quotation of the description of Pericles' activity by Plutarch (following Critolaus), *Pericles*, 7, 5: τὰλλα δὲ φίλους καὶ ἑταίρους καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπαρτεν (pp. 65-6) is incorrect. Calhoun (p. 18, n. 5) defends the MS reading φίλους καὶ ῥήτορας ἑταίρους, claiming that ἑταίρους is used here as an adjective; Lindskog-Ziegler (following Holzapfel) transpose ἑταίρους ῥήτορας; while B. Perrin (following Xylander) prints ῥήτορας ἑτέρους, an easy emendation which I consider to be correct.

fifty years earlier, was quickly followed by the bloody purge of the *Hermokopidai* and of the Mystery-Mockers. After the panic of the Sicilian disaster and again after the defeat at Aigospotamoi, the way stood open for an oligarchic revolution, and it was taken by men who formed no longer a loyal opposition but rather a subversive conspiracy. The overthrow of the Thirty marks the end of the political activities of the aristocratic clubs; they were and remained to be discredited.

The first part of this period (431-421 B. C.) is well treated by Sartori (pp. 69-76);⁶ the main evidence is the "Old Oligarch" and the *Knights* and *Wasps* of Aristophanes. Sartori points out that the oligarchic clubs became more and more associated in the mind of the *demos* with conspiracies to establish a tyranny. Whether this was merely the result of propaganda or whether there was some factual evidence for this suspicion, we cannot tell; the "Old Oligarch" certainly discourages all hope that the hated democracy may be overthrown.

The next lustrum (421-415 B. C.) stands in the shadow of Alcibiades who, like Pericles before him, was able to attain great popular support, especially since the democratic "machine" was in the hands of Hyperbolus upon whom contemporaries and later generations have heaped abuse, perhaps not unjustly. Sartori passes quickly over the years following the peace of Nicias and even over

⁶ He calls attention to a passage in Plutarch's *Præcepta gerendae reipublicae* (806F-807A) which, in his opinion, suggests that Cleon may have been associated with a "non aristocratic" (p. 72) *hetaireia* before entering politics. It so happens that a fragment of Theopompus' account of Cleon (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 115 F 92) is repeated without the author's name in Plutarch's *Præcepta* (799D), and I suggest that the story of Cleon's entry into politics also goes back to Theopompus; compare the similar account of Pericles' entry into politics (treated above, note 1) which can be attributed also to Theopompus. The newly identified passage should be associated with *F. Gr. Hist.*, 115 F 93 which speaks of Cleon's first political activities. It is, therefore, significant that before that time (i.e. 428/7 B. C.), Cleon is said by Plutarch to have attacked Pericles (*Pericles*, 33, 6-7; 35, 4). If the reference to Cleon's friends implies, therefore, his membership in an *hetaireia*, this does not mean that it was a "democratic club"; in fact, the passage in question indicates that Cleon abandoned his "friends" to take as *hetairoi* the worst elements of the people, following, it would seem (at least in the account of Theopompus), the example of Cleisthenes and of Pericles. In any case, the passage in Plutarch (*Præcepta*, 806F-807A) must not be used as evidence for the existence of a "democratic" *hetaireia* attached to Cleon; see now M. L. Paladini, *Historia*, VII (1958), pp. 54-6.

There is evidence, however, that Cleon did surround himself with a "gang" of supporters, which may have fulfilled a function similar to that of an *hetaireia*. In Aristophanes' *Knights*, the Sausageseller addresses Demos, saying (lines 850-7) that his adversary (Cleon) has a device by which he can avoid being punished by Demos, namely his gang (*stiphos*) of brush, honey, and cheese sellers, i.e. a private army. The use of this "squad" is indicated in the following lines (855-7): they will prevent their master from being ostracized, thus fulfilling the same function as the *hetaireiai* according to Andocides, IV, 4; see my comments in *A. J. A.*, LX (1956), p. 279.

the ostracism of Hyperbolus in which as many as three *hetaireiai* seem to have been involved, and he devotes this chapter (pp. 79-98) to a detailed but somewhat awkwardly presented account of the accusations made against Alcibiades and his friends, both before and especially after the departure of the Sicilian Expedition. He comes to the convincing conclusion that the mocking imitation of the mysteries (without any particular political aim) was done at many times, in many places, and by many groups of people, and that many friends of Alcibiades were involved in these actions and in the Mutilation of the Herms (which Sartori considers of political significance). The close association of the literary and the epigraphical evidence (following Pritchett's brilliant example) is certainly welcome and provides a better understanding of the composition of the *hetaireiai*. We need, however, a closer re-examination of the relation between the ostracism of Hyperbolus and the "purge" of the aristocrats on the charge of "impiety" not of "subversion" (Sartori never mentions this fact; see *A. J. A.*, LV [1951], pp. 229 f.). We also need a more thorough examination of all the individuals connected with the *hetaireiai*; Sartori merely makes some significant remarks on this point. Finally, one must distinguish between the cause and the effect of the Mutilation of the Herms; it seems, from Sartori's own excellent account, that the two were distinct, and that our only testimony for the cause, the story told by Andocides, is in many ways untrustworthy.

With the period from 415 to 412 B. C. (pp. 101-12) we enter the homestretch of the history of the Athenian oligarchs. Sartori examines Aristophanes' *Birds*, Eupolis' *Demoi* (see now J. M. Edmonds, *Frag. Att. Com.*, I, pp. 978-94), and Euripides' *Helen*, in order to extract from these plays some information on the working of the *hetaireiai*; the harvest is unfortunately small and unsatisfactory.⁷ The rest of this chapter is devoted to the activities of Peisander who does not seem to have had any contact with the *hetaireiai* until his return to Athens (see below).

The next chapter deals with the revolution of the Four Hundred and the part in it played by the *hetaireiai* (pp. 115-26). Sartori's careful account is based primarily on Thucydides, without ignoring, however, the various other traditions and pieces of evidence. At the

⁷ Sartori claims, perhaps rightly, that the name of Peisthetairos referred to the trust among the members of an *hetaireia*, without noticing that the passage from the text of the introduction to the *Birds* (which he quotes on p. 102) does not read *ὡς εἰ πεποιθὲν ἕτερος τῷ ἑταίρῳ*, but *ὡς εἰ πεποιθὲν ἕτερος τῷ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἐλπίζου ἕσσεσθαι ἐν βελτίοσιν*; see W. G. Rutherford, *Scholia Aristophanea*, I, p. 423 (whose unnecessary emendations have been accepted by J. van Leeuwen, on line 644 of his edition of the *Aves*); J. W. White, *The Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes*, p. 8. It may be noticed, moreover, that we have a tombstone from before the middle of the fourth century B. C. (*I. G.*, II², 5347) recording the death of Πιστοκλῆς Πισθηταίῳ(ν) Ἀθμονεύς; the Pisthetairos here mentioned was probably alive when the *Birds* were performed, and one may argue that Aristophanes had his name in mind; see, however, B. B. Rogers' introduction (pp. viii-x) to his edition of the *Birds* (1906), and White's comments (on line 1 of the Scholia) who gives the name confidently as Peithetairos. The name Πισθη[εταίρος] has been restored in another inscription (*I. G.*, II², 12440/1).

outset, he mentions C. Diano's startling thesis (*Dioniso*, XV, 1952) that Sophocles' *King Oedipus* belongs to the beginning of 411 B. C., and he lists (p. 104, and in the Index) the poet as one of the *probouloi* of 413-411 B. C.; see now H. Schaefer, *R.-E.*, XLV, cols. 1225-8. Next, he treats in some detail Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (Lysimache, according to D. M. Lewis, *B. S. A.*, L [1955], pp. 1-7), without, however, making it clear that Lysistrata and her women form a *synomosia* (182, 237, 914, 1007), seize the Acropolis (176, 241-2), like Cleomenes (274), wish to make peace with Sparta but not with Persia (1133-4), are accused of tyranny (618, 630), think little of *psaphismata* (697, 703-4), in other words act like an oligarchic *hetaireia*. Sartori was therefore mistaken when he interpreted the reference to Peisander (489-90) as indicating his leadership of the oligarchs; see also Sartori's comments in his earlier book, *La crisi del 411 A. C.* (1951), p. 12, n. 7. On the contrary, Peisander was at that time still considered a popular leader. Thucydides' account (VIII, 54, 4) of Peisander as "approaching" (*epelthon*) the clubs shows clearly that he did not belong to them; see A. G. Woodhead's fine study of Peisander in *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 137-8. It is hard to escape the impression that Aristophanes gives in this play a not unsympathetic account of the political position occupied by the oligarchic clubs on the eve of the revolution.

For the period from the overthrow of the Four Hundred to the Restoration of Democracy (pp. 129-43), Sartori uses, in addition to the well-known evidence of Lysias, Xenophon, and Aristotle, also Euripides' *Phoenissae*, Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, and Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Unfortunately, these plays add nothing to our knowledge of the *hetaireiai*, although they testify to the political unrest in Athens. For the period after 403 B. C. (pp. 147-52), Sartori only repeats what Calhoun has presented more fully, namely that the *hetaireiai* of which we read (mainly in the orators) concerned themselves with court matters, i. e. they returned to the activities originally attributed to them by Thucydides (VIII, 54, 4). Sartori's attempts to discover political significance in some of these references are unsuccessful;⁸ he promises (p. 148, n. 6), however, to devote a separate study to Plato and the *hetaireiai*, and in it (*Historia*, VII [1958], pp. 157-71) he gives an admirable account of the three meanings in which Plato used the word *hetaireia*: friendship, philosophical association (of the circle of Socrates), political association (disapproved by Plato).

Sartori's conclusions (pp. 153-5) repeat some of the weak points of his arguments: the essential difference between *hetaireia* and *synomosia*; the existence of democratic *hetaireiai*; Theramenes' membership in an *hetaireia*. On the other hand, Sartori emphasizes correctly the aristocratic (as distinct from oligarchic) character of the *hetaireiai*, and he suggests persuasively that the use of *hetaireiai* for political ends may be attributed to Thucydides the son of Mele-

⁸ His discussion of Andocides, IV, fails to consider the recent work done on this speech, both by myself (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIX [1948], pp. 191-210; *Hesperia*, XXIII [1954], p. 68, nn. 2 and 3; *Phoenix*, IX [1955], p. 123, n. 3) and by A. R. Burn (*C. Q.*, IV [1954], pp. 138-42).

sias. If so, this would be a revival of the factional conflicts of the late Solonian and of the Cleisthenian periods, with that difference that the earlier *staseis* were between *hetaireiai*, the one at the end of the fifth century B. C. between the oligarchic *hetaireiai* and the democracy. And this was exactly Peisander's aim (Thucydides, VIII, 54, 4) when he approached the *hetaireiai*, παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον.

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AUGUSTO SERAFINI. *Studio sulla satira di Giovenale*. Florence, Felice Le Monnier, 1957. Pp. xi + 441.

Juvenal has awakened considerable interest in the past ten years. In addition to the critical edition of Knoche (Munich, 1949), of fundamental importance to any future textual study of the poet, the scholarly world has received the second edition of Marmorale's *Giovenale* (Bari, 1950) and Highet's *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford, 1954). Now, Serafini joins this group with his extensive study on aspects of Juvenal's satire, a work which aims to correct the exaggerations of Marmorale and to probe deeper into problems lightly touched by Highet.

In his introduction, Serafini scans Juvenalian scholarship over the past. While paying due tribute to the elucidation of particular Satires and to such special studies as those of De Decker and Mrs. Ryberg,¹ while recognizing the progressive improvement in the text, Serafini argues that central problems still remain unsolved. He therefore rejects the method adopted by Highet and De Labriolle, namely, discussion of individual Satires, and takes up directly those issues which, he considers, provide the key to understanding Juvenal: "il problema scottante della verità storica e quelli non meno gravi del moralismo e della poesia. Sono le questioni di maggior interesse per chi studia Giovenale" (p. ix). Of secondary importance are chapters on rhetoric and style, on Juvenal's attitude towards the Greek world, and his connection with his satiric predecessors. Serafini ends his study with a discussion of Satire 10, which, though designed as a conclusion, fails to meet expectations.

Clearly, Serafini has read deeply in Juvenal, in the scholarship about the satirist, and in the authors and histories that shed light on the satirist's age; it is equally evident that his refusal to accept the Crocean depreciation of Juvenal, so pronounced in Marmorale and other Italians, marks an advance in the understanding of the satirist. On the other hand, it hardly seems necessary to argue so strenuously, and in many cases so unsuccessfully, through half the volume, matters which students of English satire have long since

¹ J. De Decker, *Juvenalis declamans* (Ghent, 1913); I. G. Scott-Ryberg, *The Grand Style in the Satires of Juvenal* (Northampton, Mass., 1927). Serafini consistently refers to the latter as J. G. Scott.

solved;² I doubt that we are still tremendously bothered about Juvenal's historical validity, his moral position, and his absolute rank as a poet. Perhaps some of us are, but not to that extent. Serafini might better have devoted more attention to Juvenal's language, rhetoric, and style, for the reader solves the general questions, if at all, when he correctly appreciates the particular factors of the satirist's technique.³

Serafini devotes 96 pages to the problem which Boissier labeled as primary in 1870 and Serafini still thinks most important: "vedere cioè se il quadro storico che risulta dalle satire giovenaliene è complessivamente veritiero oppure no" (p. 2). The argument against Juvenal's validity runs as follows: Satire acts as the conscience of society, mirrors its age, and provides our most reliable information on the life and thought of a people; Juvenal exaggerates, distorts scenes, and concentrates only on the negative; therefore, he is not honest, and consequently he is no moralist and an inferior poet. I shall criticize this syllogism subsequently, but first it is instructive to see how Serafini solves the problem. He attacks only the minor premise, with great discretion. Anyone who reads Juvenal senses the exaggeration, and Serafini would not deny it. Instead, he grants that the satirist distorts and attributes the distortion to Juvenal's passionate nature and the over-emphasis favored by his age. He accepts 1, 45 as a fact of Juvenal's personality: "scrive con l'animo sconvolto dall'ira" (p. 7). Furthermore, the satirist sees only the vicious aspects of his time, in contrast, for example, to Pliny. Granting all this, Serafini rightly observes that satire's *lex operis* requires fixed attention upon vice rather than virtue. He accordingly begins from these well-defined grounds: within the circumscribed world of evil which Juvenal takes as his subject, can he be conceded historical validity? After careful discussion of the course of Roman decline, as reflected in writers from the time of Plautus, of the vices central to individual satires, of the satirist's portraits of Roman emperors, Serafini reaches his conclusion: "la satira di G. . . è la testimonianza clamorosa della crisi di tutte le forze dell'impero (p. 96).

All this stirs reservations. Juvenal does erupt with fury over Roman degeneracy and imply that a critical point has been reached (cf. 1, 147 ff.), but he is no historian. As a satirist of his type, he dramatizes a special world of fact that possesses certain affinities with reality, but exists primarily for the interpretation which he will place upon it. Juvenal's reader, at least when the satirist succeeds, does not examine the historicity of facts, but follows with fascination the drama of voiced reactions to carefully selected details. In emphasizing drama, I question the validity of Serafini's concession, that Juvenal writes with a mind distorted by anger. Rather, Juvenal

² I cite as an excellent example M. Mack, "The Muse of Satire," *Yale Review*, XLI (1951-52), pp. 80-92.

³ Thus, De Decker fails to understand the function of Juvenal's rhetoric and arrives at the conclusion that Juvenal is dishonest and a claimer, not a poet. Serafini exhibits some hesitation on this point, often insisting that a forceful moral argument or a vigorous description has nothing to do with rhetoric; and his biographical explanation of much that is part of the rhetoric leaves this reader in doubt as to his grasp of Juvenal's technique.

assumes a fictive character (often called *persona*) in his Satires. All of which brings us back to the major premise of the syllogism above, for it now emerges clearly that satire does *not* mirror its time with historical accuracy; only with the self-consistency that one would require of drama. In a period of at least equal crisis (40-30 B. C.) Horace wrote Satires which impress us as the direct opposite of Juvenal's, not because he discussed different faults or himself was devoid of choler and passion, but because he chose to present a drama of the writer smilingly exposing the foibles of humanity, with no reference to Rome. In approaching Juvenal, therefore, the historian must content himself with such facts as are not affected by the drama: descriptions of dress, of social customs, of monuments, etc.

As Serafini notes, the problems of the satirist's historical and moral value are interrelated, and in Chapter II he deals with "moralismo." In particular, he combats the views of Marmorale, who refused to give the title of moralist to a satirist who lacked adequate education and a dispassionate mental attitude, possessed insufficient experience of life, and therefore wrote like a man suffering from bile. Since Serafini accepts these as criteria relevant to Juvenal, he must assume that satire should be a dispassionate moral critique based on profound philosophical insights. Under the circumstances, he can only point out that Juvenal never urges his reader to evil or dispraises virtue, sometimes rises above the rhetorical sources from which he seems to draw so much of his doctrine, expresses sincere reactions against vice; in short, that Juvenal is actuated by "sentimentalismo etico" (p. 158). Serafini therefore finds it necessary to consider the satirist's sexuality, to explain his misogyny, in part, as the result of disappointed love (p. 108).

Again, it seems to me, Serafini should have challenged the assumptions of the critics rather than attempt to re-interpret the Satires biographically. It is true, as he states, that Juvenal is *vir bonus* at the same time that he is *orator* (p. 156), but again in a dramatic sense. The satirist's *persona* lives in a consistent fictive world, where vice (highly emphasized) provokes indignation (equally stressed), and we think of the speaker as a true Roman dedicated to the lost, and therefore all the more strikingly affective, values of the past. Satire of Juvenal's type must *not* be dispassionate. The satirist can even afford to contradict himself in his outrage; for instance, in 2, 51 he can extol women (by contrast with male perversion), but in 6, 242 he expressly denies women the very trait for which he had praised them. In Satire 6, he paints an utterly negative picture of Roman women, thus remaining more true to his fictive emotions than to the moral facts.

The third major chapter of this study attempts to determine whether or not Juvenal is a poet. As I consider the question itself largely futile and Serafini's treatment extremely weak, I shall limit myself to brief comments, in order to place emphasis on the valuable aspects of this book. Serafini measures the satirist first by the standard provided in 7, 53-7 (but for *vatem egregium*), then by the esthetic dogmas of Croce and Gentile. Although he finds purple passages in profusion which demonstrate "abbandono poetico," "espressione lirica," serenity, and other presumably ideal qualities, he concludes with De Decker that Juvenal is either poet or declaimer, sometimes poet, but all too often a creature of rhetoric.

I found the two chapters on Juvenal's rhetorical and tragic satire useful. Serafini freely admits the rhetorical quality of Juvenal, and, although he fails to stress the essential function of rhetoric in the Satires, does resist the tendency of such people as De Decker to leap automatically to the assumption that rhetoric necessitates anti-poetic techniques. Juvenal abandons, he demonstrates, the *Musa pedestris* of Horace and adopts tragic manners and diction. Of special value in this discussion are sections on the satirist's language and style (pp. 263 ff.). Study of diminutives, adjectival formation, and other linguistic characteristics of *sermo cotidianus* proves unquestionably that Juvenal does not subscribe to Horace's satiric principles. Similarly, Serafini agrees with Ryberg that Juvenal employs the Grand Style as opposed to the *genus dicendi tenue*. These important innovations effected by Juvenal oblige Serafini then to consider the satirist's relation to the tradition behind him. In describing our satirist as "il nuovo Lucilio" he over-emphasizes the importance of Lucilius and ignores that of Persius. I myself would question whether the invective of Lucilius and Juvenal bears much resemblance and wish that Serafini had been acquainted with the antithesis established by Piwonka between the two satirists, both in satiric concept and style.⁴

To account for Juvenal's social orientation, Serafini fixes on the satirist's personality: "Anzitutto c'è un motivo personale" (p. 335). Consequently, he insists that the attitude expressed about the poor is unsullied by rhetoric. Juvenal himself is poor and sees the rich as the principal cause of Roman corruption. It seems safer, in my opinion, to assign the defense of the poor and the provincials and Juvenal's apparent poverty to the *persona* rather than to the writer. Otherwise, the varying attitude towards the poor and the diversity of mood between Satires 3 and 11 raise doubts. Umbricius, because he abides by the old principles, earns admiration; Trebius, because he submits to the insults of Virro, is properly treated as a buffoon. With the usual reservation, that too much of what is written is identified with Juvenal's deepest feelings, I find the chapter on the Greek world valuable. Serafini sketches the development of prejudice against the Greeks from the time of the Elder Cato and suggests that, in important respects, Juvenal has adopted the same Republican, conservative program as Cato. From the manipulation of Hellenisms in the Satires, Serafini rightly deduces that Juvenal does not appropriate Greek words as part of his own language, but uses them with distaste to demonstrate how Greek ways have insinuated themselves into Rome among the vices which the satirist most loathes.

In conclusion, Serafini has much to say that it is useful. As I have noted, the concentration on historical and moral validity and on Juvenal's absolute rank as poet strikes this reader as excessive and, since the book costs 4000 lire, might better have been reduced. Serafini has embellished his study with a wealth of relevant quotations from sources contemporary to Juvenal. In general, he has produced a handsome volume, with relatively few misprints,⁵ one

⁴ M. P. Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt, 1949), pp. 104 ff.

⁵ I list the misprints which I have noted: p. 10, n. 19: Trayan for

which could help the reader acquire a sympathetic attitude towards Juvenal.

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CLARENCE W. MENDELL. *Tacitus: The Man and his Work*. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 397. \$6.00.

This volume represents "an effort to gather together the chief results of [four and a half centuries of] Tacitean studies," and "some attempt at a revaluation of the man and his methods, not to estimate his greatness, but to try better to understand it"; it considers Tacitus as historian, lawyer, man of letters, and "man of strong individual personality." "People (some at least) will continue to read, study, and use the great Roman historian. It is for them that this book is compiled, to make their approach to Tacitus not merely easier but more immediately rewarding."

Part I, three-fifths of the whole, discusses the man, the writer, and the historian in eleven chapters ranging over biography, religious, philosophical, and political thought, style, composition, characterizations, sources, and credibility. Part II, in eight chapters, discusses the history of Tacitus' works from publication to discovery in the 14th century, describes in detail each of the extant MSS, considers their affiliations, and narrates the history of the printed text.

Thus the novice student of Tacitus may find here some discussion, either more or less, of almost any topic or question relevant to his studies. Yet this reviewer reluctantly and unhappily confesses to finding the book greatly disappointing.

The biography in chapter one is hardly satisfying. Tacitus' consulship has long been dated with confidence in 97, not "probably in 98." And Syme now (*Greece and Rome*, 2nd ser., IV [1957], p. 166) very plausibly suggests that "it might well have embraced the momentous month of October." "The year 100" as date for the prosecution of Marius Priscus is not very precise for a case which was commenced in 98 and concluded in 100, before the month of January ran out. There is extended discussion of the date of the *Dialogus*, and Mendell decides in favor of the early dating—"The decisive evidence to me is the whole tone and spirit of the essay. It

Trajan (cf. twice on p. 415); p. 33: rough breathing on *olkouménēs*; p. 63, n. 181: *Baltimora* for *Baltimore*; p. 90, n. 249: *sunt* omitted after *nostrum*; pp. 98, 100, and 129: *Knocke* for *Knoche*; p. 98, n. 3: *Handschriftliche* for *Handschrifliche*; p. 165: *sentimens* for *sentiments*; p. 179, n. 29: *Sejan* for *Sejan*; p. 208, n. 69: *Reth. ad Her.* for *Rhet.* (cf. p. 426); p. 340: *Les vieux client* for *Le vieux client*; p. 374, n. 91: for some reason the italics cease in the middle of the quotation; p. 383, n. 2: *I suppose* for *I suppose*; p. 409: the title of Weston's book has *Juvenal* for *Juvenal*; p. 414: umlaut needed on Beloch's *Bevölkerung*.

is written in a buoyant spirit in unmistakable contrast with the grim point of view that pervades the *Agricola* and the longer historical works." Yet if Güngerich's demonstration of Tacitus' use of Quintilian (*C. P.*, XLVI [1951], pp. 159-64) is not to compel the later date, it must be refuted; it cannot simply be ignored; or so it seems to this reviewer, who himself finds very perplexing some of the consequences of this late dating. No date at all is indicated for Tacitus' proconsulship of Asia; 112/13 seems fairly certain.

We have here, as also, to be sure, in the literary histories generally, 116 as the date of publication of the *Annals*. Now this is of course date for book II and, assumably, for so much as was published together with that book, *Annals* I-III or whatever it may have been. It is not necessary to accept in all its details the whole thesis of, e. g., Bretschneider, *Quo ordine ediderit Tacitus singulas Annalium partes* (Strassburg, 1905); it is yet difficult to suppose that the whole work was published at a single date. If Tacitus was, in A. D. 106/7, collecting material for his account of the year 79 (Pliny, *Ep.*, VII, 33, and Mommsen's dating), he was then less than half-way through the composition of the *Histories*. His writing was interrupted some years later by his proconsulate. Then the opening books of the *Annals* appeared in 116/17. Is it not reasonable, now, to suppose that the balance of his great work would hardly have been completed before, say, 125 or even somewhat later, and so, of course, that Tacitus' life was thus far prolonged?

Mendell concludes his account of Tacitus' career: "the evidence seems to indicate that his active life at the bar reached its peak in about 81 and that it led him to the quaestorship and the senate, *only to be thwarted to a large extent by the attitude of the emperor.*" (Italics added.) Thwarted, one cannot forbear to ask, of what? Not of the quindecimvirate, one of the major priesthoods. Not of the praetorship in 88. Not of a provincial governorship—"he was absent from Rome from 89 to 93, when he may have been governor of a Caesarian province (assignment to a senatorial provincee would have been for a shorter term) or, less probably, a *legatus legionis*" (p. 11). Not, one may add with probability, of a consulship. Syme has lately written: "It is generally (and conveniently) assumed that he owed the consulate to Nerva and to Nerva's friends. He might, however, have been on Domitian's list, designated already in 96.... (many of Domitian's designations being kept for concord, along with the candidates of the new government)" (*op. cit.*, pp. 164, 166). Whatever else the attitude of Tacitus, like that of his good friend Pliny, may have been toward Domitian, it was assuredly the basest ingratitude; to his favor they both owed their careers.

"Character Delineation" treats that topic very briefly in the *Dialogus* and the *Agricola*; then one reads: "It should be in a study of *Annals* 11-16 that we ought most easily to find out the method, if there is one, by which Tacitus presents his characters and makes them live." And to this is devoted the rest of a lengthy chapter. Thus, curiously, there is no consideration of the portrait of Tiberius, which most would certainly regard as Tacitus' masterpiece.

"Tacitus as historian of military affairs" handles B. W. Henderson as roughly as Henderson did Tacitus.

The chapter on "Credibility of Tacitus' history" occupies just

over three pages! Here Mendell remarks, "Scholars like Sievers, Freytag, and Stahr have done much to correct the total picture of Tiberius, and Marsh has had the last word in this area." Marsh's *The Reign of Tiberius* was published in 1931; there have been worthwhile words on Tiberius since then. The new student of Tacitus will need certainly to read, e. g., Charlesworth's wonderful chapter in *C. A. H.*, X (1934), and D. M. Pippidi, *Autour de Tibère* (Bucharest, 1944), to mention only two of the most obvious; but Mendell's bibliography will not suggest to him either of these.

The author emphasizes and reiterates, in judgment of Tacitus the historian, that his statements of fact are unimpeachable. "Tacitus' standard of integrity in the use of facts is above question" (italics added). So phrased, precisely, this is surely open to serious question. But Mendell continues: "His legal training and experience taught him how to present his facts effectively for his own purpose but not how to manufacture evidence or falsify the facts. Selection and arrangement were to him legitimate tools but not creation or distortion. This of course at once raises the question of whether Tacitus was primarily a lawyer or an historian" (pp. 100 f.). Follows a discussion whose conclusion is that he placed himself clearly in the convention and the tradition of historiography, except for the addition of a notably dramatic technique in the composition. This reviewer feels no confidence that the lawyer died when the historian was born.

We read again: "the significance of the story [of Calpurnius Salvianus in A. D. 25, *Ann.*, IV, 36] is such that, *without imputing deliberate and extensive dishonesty to the first lawyer of Rome*, one cannot deny that Tacitus is right in speaking of the great prevalence of prosecution at the time" (italics added; p. 136). Uninhibited to impute dishonesty and misrepresentation occasionally to the first lawyer of Rome in the mid-first century B. C., are we to be thus inhibited regarding the first lawyer of Rome a century and a half later? Again: "But the general verdict of time has largely removed the suspicion of deliberate falsehood. Tacitus' standing in the Rome of his day, his reputation for high integrity, makes such a charge almost absurd, and infinite effort has failed to produce evidence of false statements beyond those occasional mistakes which no mere human can hope to escape. This is not, however, to say that the total result of Tacitus' presentation can be accepted with confidence as the final and just interpretation of first-century Roman history. . . . If his presentation gives a biased impression . . . , as it undoubtedly does, it is not by falsification of the facts nor because of a failure to apply the best standards of scholarship known to his day. . . . He interprets the facts in the light of his own convictions and by means of his own artistic methods. He interprets them also under the influence of his own personal interests. . . . The modern historian must reinterpret the facts as he finds them in Tacitus in the light of accumulated understanding of these convictions and methods and interests but with confidence in the integrity of this brilliant partisan" (pp. 220-2).

The novice student of Tacitus will need much more qualification than appears here of the unquestionableness of the historian's statement of facts. He will be gravely in need of Mrs. Ryberg's "Taci-

tus' Art of Innuendo" (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII [1942], pp. 383-404) and its concluding dictum: "As an historian Tacitus would not suppress or misstate the facts, but as an artist he could present them in such a way as to make the reader draw the inferences which the historian refrained from drawing." But Mendell's bibliography will not lead him to that important article. It will, however, refer him to B. Walker, *The Annals of Tacitus* (Manchester, 1952), where he will not omit to read (p. 158): "There [in *Annals* I-VI], the elaborate narrative style is used to obscure facts, not to heighten them; and it is precisely where facts contradict the non-factual material that Tacitus' style becomes most sensational. The dramatic tension is sharpest, the rhetorical and poetic colouring most brilliant, the evocation of allusive associations most strong, where they have least relation to the events they are thought to describe."

In the area covered by Part II the reviewer has next to no competence whatever. He does note the omission from Sulpicius Severus' use of Tacitus (p. 228) of II, 30, 3 and 6, which are usually considered to be drawn from the *Histories*. By a curious slip Jordanes is dated "perhaps a hundred years or less after Cassiodorus" (p. 232); he appears as "Jordanes" there and on p. 234, but as "Jornandes" on pp. 215, 345, and 361; and both forms stand in the index, with a single page reference for each.

The proof-reading has been very ill done and the volume is much marred by almost innumerable typographical errors. Most of those in English text are mere irritation, though "Burrus" on p. 148 should be "Thræsea"; but some of the Latin quotations are badly garbled, e. g., "ex quis magnarum saepe rerum oriuntur" (p. 192) lacks "motus" following "rerum," and, extreme case, "qui sit Bebricum vicum a Cremona" (p. 233) should read "qui ait Bebricum vicum esse a Cremona."

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JOHN MAXWELL EDMONDS. *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, after Meineke, Bergk, and Kock. Augmented, Newly Edited with their Contexts, Annotated and Completely Translated into English Verse. Volume I. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1957. Pp. 1028. 98 Guilders.

For over a hundred years the standard collection of Greek comic fragments has been the work of Meineke, Bergk, and Jacobi. Later attempts to supplement this collection and bring it up to date have always been incomplete and relatively unsatisfactory. Kock's well-known work *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (1880—), although more recent than Meineke, lacks much of the necessary data (testimonia, ancient comments, and contexts, etc.), which are sadly needed to interpret these puzzling fragments. Kaibel's excellent attempt to bring the work up to date did not progress beyond the first volume (the fragments of Doric Comedy, which appeared

in 1899); a more recent attempt to handle this same material has been made by A. Olivieri (*Frammenti della commedia greca e del mimo nella Sicilia e nella Magna Graecia*, I, 1947). But the basic material for the study of ancient Greek comedy, which is, in the main, the Attic fragments, has remained unedited since 1880, although the past eighty years have seen many additions both to the material itself and to our knowledge of it. Scholars, therefore, can have only gratitude and praise for Professor Edmonds, who in the later years of a long and busy life has devoted his considerable talents and energies to bringing Kock up to date. Edmonds acknowledges his debt to Demianczuk's *Supplementum Comicum*, to various articles in Pauly-Wissowa, and to the many reports of papyrus fragments. All this leads us to hope for a definitive edition of the Attic Comic Fragments. Whether we have been given this or not still remains to be seen.

The first point that must strike a reviewer, or any reader, of this work is the immense amount of learning and labor that must have gone into the process of editing. To quote just a few relevant figures: 57 names of separate poets of the Old Comedy are listed and treated in the volume; one of the indices lists 300 or more known titles of plays. In addition, we have nearly 100 anonymous fragments and numerous citations of named authors but from unnamed plays. The period treated ranges from 487/6, the presumed date of Chionides' first comic victory, to ca. 360-5, the last plays of Theopompus. The volume includes about 3,500 separate fragments (including citations of single words): the largest number comes, naturally enough, from Aristophanes (969), with Eupolis (460) and Cratinus (457) in close competition for second place. Any reviewer may well quail before the task of evaluating all this. But prompted by the example of the still more arduous labors of the editor, let us make an attempt, although it must be remembered that no final evaluation of the work can be given at present: this is the sort of book which must be used by interested scholars for a least ten years before we will know whether Edmonds has done his work well or not.

Readers will not expect (nor would any editor in his right mind print) a full and detailed review of such a work. It must be enough to indicate briefly what Edmonds has done. The name of each author (excepting Aristophanes) is accompanied by the relevant ancient testimonia on his life and works, including inscriptional evidence; all testimonies are also translated into English, making for easier reference. With the fragments are given an English translation, and critical and brief explanatory notes. In many cases the explanatory notes include a brief conjectural restoration of the plot of the lost play. Many suggestions are made for the attribution of fragments of unknown plays to known titles. Wherever Edmonds' numbering differs from Kock's, Kock's numbering is given in parentheses. However, the work lacks what seems an essential aid: a comprehensive conspectus of numbering in Meineke, Kock, and Edmonds. This omission is surprising, considering the imposing number of other useful lists and indices, which include: (1) dated and conjecturally datable plays of Old Comedy (and of the Middle, to 362 B. C.); (2) poets of the Old Comedy in alphabetical order, with page numbering in Meineke, Kock, and Edmonds; (3) Greek

and (4) English titles of the lost plays of Old Comedy; and finally (5) a General Index, mainly of proper names. This summary will show what is offered in the work, and should impress prospective readers with the tremendous amount of labor which has gone into the volume.

Still, without wishing to detract from Edmond's substantial achievement, this reviewer has a few criticisms to make. In the first place, although the date given on the title page is 1957, the Preface is dated July 1946. This seems to indicate that there was an 11-year interval between the time when Edmonds finished his work on the manuscript and final publication of the work; and so, apparently, none of the considerable work done on Comedy since the war (by Webster, Dover, Kranz, *et al.*) has been used in the work. (A search of the notes reveals nothing later than this date.) While sympathizing with the great difficulties in printing a volume of this magnitude (in fact, it is remarkable that the work got printed at all), this reviewer cannot help feeling some disappointment that a new work should be so "dated" as soon as it appears. We can only hope that Edmonds will be given an opportunity for last-minute additions and revisions in future volumes, especially in the area of Middle Comedy, where a great deal of valuable work has recently been done.

Another disappointing feature is found in the translations of the fragments into English. At first glance, the idea of presenting English versions of all fragments seemed one of the most laudable aspects of the work. Who of us, in tracking down allusions and looking for usable material in the comic fragments, has not groaned over the amount of lexicon-thumbing necessary before we could even decide what was useful for our particular purposes? Indeed, the novice in this field is almost bound to conclude that half the comic vocabulary consists of *hapax legomena* for rare and implausible fish. We all would welcome a scholar who proposed to tell us the plain meaning of these obscure passages, so that we could pick and choose items of use with less searching in the dictionary. Alas! Edmonds' translations will disappoint such expectations: instead of the plain, literal meaning in readable prose, we find a somewhat labored attempt at English blank verse, which distorts the meaning of Greek. Aristophanes, fr. 220 is a case in point: Edmonds' version:

Think what our predecessors made
 the objects of expense
 Instead of building ships of war
 and walls for their defence!

seems to give the exact opposite of the literal meaning: "(We?) ought to spend this on triremes and the walls, on which our predecessors spent the revenues." The poetry would be excusable, even with distortions, if these comic passages were great pieces of imaginative poetry, like (say) Aeschylus or Pindar, and only a poetic version could reproduce some of the elevation of the original. But such is not the case: nine out of ten, at least, of the fragments would not suffer a bit by translation into unvarnished, literal English prose versions. And one may be pardoned a slight doubt as to the value of these pieces as English poetry: take, for example, one of the finest bits of Eupolis (fr. 94K=98E), which describes the

effects of Pericles' oratory on his hearers; since the passage is familiar to most scholars, I quote Edmonds' English version alone:

- (A) That was the greatest speaker in the world.
Whenever he rose to speak, like a crack sprinter
He had the others beat by three good yards.
- (B) You call him swift, but swiftness wasn't all.
His lips enthroned a kind of suaveness—
He cast a spell on us; and when he stung,
Like no one else, he left his sting behind.

Particularly weak are lines 5 and 7: a plain, prose version would have been more effective: e. g., "Persuasion sat upon his lips," and "Alone of all the orators, he left his sting in (the minds of) his hearers."

Also questionable are some of Edmonds frequent emendations; we often find a new reading, with no explanation, when the traditional text is sound enough. Thus, in line 4 of the fragment of pseudo-Susarion, a perfectly understandable text is changed from: οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖν οἰκίαν ἀνευ κακοῦ to: οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖν οἰκίαν ἀνευ, κακόν, without any comment.

The explanatory notes are rather brief and often cryptic. Since the work does not contain a list of sigla or abbreviations, it is annoying to find many of Edmonds' predecessors quoted with just an initial or an abbreviation. Without any such aids, it is going to be hard for beginners to discover that B means Bergk in Meineke's *F. C. G.* Although it is shameless to ask for more, when we have received so much, it does appear that the work sadly needs a bibliography of scholars whose works are cited in the notes.

In a special Appendix, Edmonds gives a sample of a full reconstruction of a lost comedy, in "The Plot of the *Demes* of Eupolis," which he originally read as a paper to the Oxford Classical Association in 1934. This imaginative and detailed reconstruction seems out of place in a work such as this, which should be devoted to providing all the data for other scholars to use. Further, the restoration of the plot does not seem (at least, to this reviewer) either satisfactory or the least bit funny; it is too complicated to follow, even in a close reading; the Agon, or debate, does not come until almost the last episode in the drama (and even there it seems forcibly dragged in), so that no real conflict emerges earlier in the play. One doubts if the critical Athenian audience would have sat through this version. On the whole, the book would have been improved by the omission of this appendix.

There are a number of misprints, mostly in the English, as is natural in a work printed in Holland; it is to be hoped that these can be corrected if there are reprintings, since obviously this work is going to be in use for many years to come.

Despite these criticisms and misgivings, your reviewer must stress in closing the great contribution to scholarly progress which this edition represents. No comparable work is now available for intensive study of Old Greek Comedy, and we look forward eagerly to the anticipated future volumes.

CHARLES T. MURPHY.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE. *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. Pp. 157.

The present volume, which comprises six lectures delivered on the Percy Turnbull Memorial Lectureship at Johns Hopkins, comes like a fresh sea-breeze over the parched landscape of classical scholarship. For all throughout his discussions of nine Greek plays, Lattimore wears his academic mantle lightly, treating us to samples of his finest poetic translations while he puts forward some delightfully new interpretations from a somewhat novel point of view. Lattimore protests, however, that he is not endeavoring to establish any theory of his own. Indeed, he is definitely opposed to the critic who, by the necessity of his trade, is "inclined to be a monist, who tries to find the one key to all the meanings in a complex of art or literature. . . . There is no one exclusive approach to Athenian tragedy, or even to any one tragic poet, but many, and, always within the definite structure of theatrical form, the inner form is alive and various" (pp. 147-8). This, however, in some circles amounts almost to a declaration of war; it recalls the scholar-critic dichotomy set up by H. D. F. Kitto. But with this enlightened approach I find myself in complete agreement—even though it may be condemned in the higher courts as heretical—because this is the only area in which substantial progress, on the meaning of Greek tragedy at least, can now be made. Lattimore's professed aim is to explore some of the neglected poetic dimensions of Greek tragedy, and "to suggest ways of enlarging, and further vitalizing, our appreciation of what we are given" (p. 9). For the time has indeed come for us to make a sharp distinction between the ancient *document* and the *poem*; and the difference suggests two entirely different techniques in our approach to ancient literature. The two techniques, however, the historico-philological and the poetical, should be complementary and not antagonistic—and this is adequately demonstrated by Lattimore's study. It is only that each type of analysis may come up with a different answer, a different evaluation of what we have traditionally been given. In any case, as Lattimore seems to suggest, the area of poetic analysis is one which deserves our immediate concern; it is one in which traditional scholarship has not bequeathed a secure testament.

His suggestion is "that we look for the special contribution of the poetry" in the case of each of the tragic poets. In what does their poetry consist? It is a difficult question. But for Aeschylus, he suggests, it will consist in "enlargement," a kind of grand-scale poetic projection of a fundamentally meagre plot and limited characterization. For Sophocles Lattimore suggests "anomaly," a difficult term taken over from Plutarch, to describe that peculiar tension that exists between Sophocles' dramatic and poetic imagination. And, finally, for Euripides, it is "in relief or idealization," predominantly in the non-dramatic sections, insofar as he finds Euripides' poetry chiefly in those lyric passages which act as a thematic counterpoint to the drama.

Not all scholars will, of course, agree with Lattimore's point of view, but everyone should admire his courage and critically examine what he has to say. His analyses of the nine plays (four of

Aeschylus, two of Sophocles and three of Euripides) are everywhere subtly perceptive. In contrast with his originality in the area of poetic criticism, the author reflects a remarkable conservatism in his discussion of the origins of Greek tragedy (pp. 1-6), the ending of the *Seven* (p. 40), the authenticity of the *Prometheus* (p. 45), and the sincerity of Euripides' religious beliefs (pp. 128 ff.). More weight should perhaps have been given to the evidence of Sophocles' own characterization of his style as preserved in Plutarch (p. 60), as well as to the modern attempts to date the plays stylometrically (as, for example, by Earp). There is a curious passage where Lattimore says that the chorus of Ajax's shipmates enter "singing their desperate concern in lines so blithely versed, that they must almost be forced to skip as they sing" (pp. 60-1). But whether a musical line could be accompanied by skipping or "hippity-hops" would not, of course, depend upon the underlying iambic rhythm, but rather on the *tempo* of the music, and the relative time allowed in a particular song to the longs and shorts. Analysis of our extant fragments of Greek music suggests that quite different moods (a lament, a gay tune, a hymn) might be tied to the same rhythmic or metrical patterns. But until more is known about the exact relationship between Greek music and metric, we should be cautious of speaking of metrical lapses of taste.

But these are, indeed, minor matters, and of the sort that should arouse friendly discussion. Lattimore's book is one which all students of Greek tragedy will value highly; and his fine, poetic insights should be a healthy stimulus to help us reappraise some of our traditional points of view. For criticism is, to a large extent, a dialogue. As the author disarmingly writes: "We shall not come to one fixed, final conclusion. As Euripides put it, or as I think he did:

I have no quarrel with wisdom.
I am happy to track it down. Yet there is something else,
something big, something manifest, that directs life toward
good" (p. 148).

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S. M. ADAMS. *Sophocles the Playwright*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 182. (*The Phoenix, Journal of the Classical Association of Canada, Supplementary Volume III.*)

There seems to be a presumption among scholars that Sophocles should be demonstrated as a figure serene, austere but benevolent, and above all pious. Since he is thought to have "made men as they ought to be," his heroes and heroines should be stately, generous, noble; in fact, they seem to be tough and bitter, sometimes bloody, almost always opinionated, obstinate, and, if so vile a term may be used, ornery. Since Sophocles was a religious, positively ecclesi-

astical man, "defender of the faith" (Adams, p. 135), his gods should be wise, just, and if stern yet ultimately beneficent, or at least good; actually they appear heartless and sometimes mean and vindictive. There comes then a feeling that the appearances which lead me (at least) to such adjectives *must* be somehow forced back into the reality which is Sophocles. He leaves an opening for this by declining to state an explicit theological position as Aeschylus and Euripides sometimes do. This, perhaps, is why there have been so many books about Sophocles, and why, though they so often begin as studies of "Sophocles the dramatist," they end by being more concerned with "Sophocles the moralist."

Professor Adams' new study of Sophocles seems to be directed toward this approach and controlled by the presuppositions which go with it. Instances of presuppositions and consequences follow. "The gods are good and just." They cannot then be and are not deceitful. Therefore, when in *Ajax* Athene calls herself the *σύμμαχος* of the hero, she must mean it; she is guaranteeing his heroization at the end, which she effects through her agent, Odysseus (pp. 24-6). The trouble is, for me, that nothing is said about heroization at the end of the play, and nothing is said about Athene either. Adams is reminded of the end of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*; I am not; for in the latter play, Athene is there and made to speak for herself. If a downright falsehood is not acceptable, for what the gods say elsewhere in Sophocles is true, then let us say that *σύμμαχος* is technically correct; Athene "cooperates with his fighting" (the flocks and herdsmen); she offered to help him before, and he tried to refuse, but since no man can reject the gifts of the gods, she has helped him anyway willy nilly, and not as he could have wished.

"Sophoclean people are better than real people are." So Oedipus, preparing for sanctification, must be good, and right; therefore, Polyneices, who was sent away unforgiven and blasted by a curse as Oedipus' last administrative act on earth, must be a hypocrite, his speech full of duplicity (pp. 173-5). Each student must read such passages for himself; I find no evidence of hypocrisy, and I think Sophocles was perfectly capable of making a character talk like a hypocrite if he wanted that plainly understood (as with Creon in this play). Taken at face value, the lines are moving and dramatic; is moral excuse for Oedipus, after all, the poet's main concern? In this regard, Adams falls into the habit of treating the dramatic character as if he were a real person whose historical career Sophocles would then be defending. Strange combinations sometimes emerge, as, on *Oed. Col.* 1211-49: "We, the audience, know, with Sophocles, what the elders, within the play, have not grasped: in the old age of this man before us, beyond the full powers of manhood in its prime, reside purpose and function, strength and dignity" (p. 173). But I know nothing of the sort which the chorus does not know, and in such a line-up I am simply bewildered.

"Sophocles was a flawless artist who never made a mistake." Therefore, since *The Trachiniae* contains mistakes, Sophocles probably did not write it (pp. 124-6). Adams actually says: (Introd., p. v): "Every line, if not every word, has its significance." Well; but *factual* significance? To make much of, for instance, such marginal matters as the ultimate fate of the armor of Achilles

(*Phil.* 359-84, see Adams p. 137) seems superfluous, unless we are to go thoroughly into the variants of the tradition.

In a long and patient study of the seven tragedies, Adams has, despite the above strictures, shown much penetration in detail. My objection is that he seems to be working from, not toward, conclusions. Granted the wish to establish sympathy for his heroes and respect (scarcely love!) for his gods, might Sophocles not have been working for other effects as well? This kind of careful study, made with less preconception, might find new answers.

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Papers Presented to Hugh Macilwain Last. *The Journal of Roman Studies*, XLVII (1957), Part I. Pp. 154; frontispiece; 1 pl.

Hugh Last died on October 25, 1957, several weeks before the appearance of this volume, which was to have been presented to him on his sixty-third birthday. Fortunately, he had seen the page proof, and had taken pleasure in this lasting testimonial offered to him by his friends and students. Most of the papers are in the field of Roman History, ranging, as Professor Last's work did, from the kingship to the late empire, but there are also articles on juristic, literary, and archaeological subjects, all within the scope of Professor Last's wide interests. With British colleagues, students, and friends, American, Belgian, and Italian scholars are among the contributors.

Plinio Fraccaro, in refuting Pareti's view that the *annales maximi* included ancient records restored immediately after the sack of Rome by the Gauls, stresses constructively the reliable elements in the traditions of kingship. On Niebuhr's ballad theory Fraccaro is somewhat more skeptical than Arnaldo Momigliano, who has contributed a fascinating history of the theory from the Dutch scholar Perizonius (1651-1715) to De Sanctis and Pareti. The *carmina* in Momigliano's view existed, but their influence has been exaggerated, and the effort to separate poetry and annalistic tradition "is bound to be speculative and frivolous." Sir Frank Adcock, in his analysis of the chief magistrates of Rome from 444 to 284, provides strong support for his conclusion that their choice was determined by "the instinctive political sagacity" of the leaders of the senate. Gianfranco Tibiletti shows that even without the evidence for the consular date 129 B. C., the *Acta de agro Pergameno* would have to be assigned to a time "before the law by which C. Gracchus subjected the Greek or Hellenized cities in Asia to taxation." J. P. D. V. Balsdon, in discussing three Ciceronian problems of the years 58-56, makes an attractive suggestion for the meaning of *frequens senatus* in Cicero's account (*Ad Fam.*, I, 9, 8) of the senatorial meeting on May 15, 56 B. C.

There are two papers on Mark Antony, P. M. Fraser's interpretation, with a new reading, of an inscription on a basalt statue base in the Cairo Museum, and John Crook's discussion of Antony's will. The view that the will was a forgery, Crook argues, is strengthened

by the fact that children of Cleopatra, a *peregrina* without *ius conubii*, could not have shared in inheritance under Roman law. But can we be sure that Cleopatra or perhaps her father, Ptolemy Auletes, had not been granted Roman citizenship? M. I. Henderson, in a learned and allusive article entitled "Potestas Regia," concludes (if I understand the argument correctly) that the republic that Augustus thought he was restoring was based on "ideas imbibed by the impressionable Octavian" in his brief experience with constitutional forms in 44 B. C. Stefan Weinstock, writing on "The Image and Chair of Germanicus," has a convincing emendation of line 3 in the *Tabula Hebana* (*facundi* for *fecundi*), and makes the very probable suggestion that the chairs of Mark Antony and Germanicus in the theater were connected with the flaminiate; the suggestion that Caesar's golden chair was carried into the theater only when Caesar was absent seems less likely.

On the army in politics from 68 to 70 A. D., G. E. F. Chilver, considering Vespasian's treatment of the army and the new evidence for the recruitment of the legions, concludes that the measures adopted were "appropriate to the victor of a faction fight, not to one who had been pushed by a rebellious soldiery" into securing advantages for them. F. A. Lepper explains the idea of the *quinquennium Neronis* as an invention perhaps of the Antonine period that was fathered upon Trajan. A. N. Sherwin-White supports Mommsen's date, 93, for the younger Pliny's praetorship against Otto's date, 95, and stresses the importance of the date in fixing the duration of the Domitianic terror. Ronald Syme discusses the career of Tacitus' friend, L. Fabius Justus, and suggests that the *Dialogus*, dedicated to Justus, should be dated soon after Justus had been designated suffect consul for 102. Mason Hammond analyzes the place of origin of senators from 68 to 235, and concludes that the increase of senators from the provinces was the result not of "deliberate imperial policy," but of "deep-seated social and economic trends."

On the late empire A. H. M. Jones has a detailed discussion of "Capitatio and Iugatio," which he interprets as a system of assessment that, where applied, was based on the sum of animals and persons registered on the land. A. J. Festugière holds that the six lonely years that Julian spent in his youth at Macellum in Capadocia led to the abandonment of Christianity. A. D. Nock, writing on "Julian and Deification," cites a surprising amount of evidence against the view which he has often stated and apparently still holds, that men lacked faith in the divine emperor as a god who could answer prayer.

There are three papers on literary subjects. C. M. Bowra traces the traditions of Greek poetry in Melinno's *Hymn to Rome*, discounting Roman influences even when Rome is described as a daughter of Ares. C. H. Roberts finds on the verso of *Pap. Mich.*, VII, 457, not, as H. A. Sanders had suggested, a legal document, but a fragment of a fable of Aesop. Eduard Fraenkel, writing of the style of Cicero's letters to Trebatius, has some delightful comments on the "grand style" in *Ad Atticum*, I, 16.

Legal studies are represented by David Daube's exhaustive treatment of *finium demonstratio*. The program of field Archaeology

lately undertaken by the British School in Rome, an investigation of Etruscan and Roman roads, is the subject of a preliminary report by John Ward Perkins. His comments on the old roads of the Veientane region are illuminating for the relation between the Etruscan and Roman systems of roads.

The bibliography of Professor Last's writings was prepared by Miss M. V. Taylor, long Editor and now also the President of the Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies. It is particularly fitting that the Society should honor a scholar who, in his writing in the *Journal* and in his counsel, has contributed so much to Roman studies. One cannot help regretting that Professor Last's arduous and devoted service as teacher and administrator prevented him from writing a History of Rome, for the magnificent chapters in Volumes VII, IX, and X of the *Cambridge Ancient History* prove that he was a great historian.

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E. KOESTERMANN. P. Cornelii Taciti Libri Qui Supersunt. Tom. II, Fasc. 1: Historiae. Ed. VIII. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1958. Pp. 260.

E. KOESTERMANN. P. Cornelii Taciti Libri Qui Supersunt. Tom. II, Fasc. 2: Germania, Agricola, Dialogus de Oratoribus. Ed. VIII. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1957. Pp. xxxix + 128.

This eighth edition of the Teubner Histories is very little more than a reprint of the seventh. There is no new discussion of the manuscripts or of the text tradition; the index is entirely unchanged; the pagination of the text is identical. This last fact is to this extent misleading: Koestermann has added four words in pointed brackets to the text. These are p. 4, *eversa*; p. 80, *strepitu*; p. 176, *iterum*; p. 218, *inventum*. None of them are essential or, to me, convincing. Marginal notes are added to mark the loss of the Medicean folia at the junction of Books I and II. Beyond these innovations the changes in the present edition are all minor ones in the textual notes. They consist of about seventy-five short omissions almost all of them minor emendations which have been made and rejected over the past years and about thirty-five additions which are either short suggested emendations not used in the text or references in support or in refutation of older emendations. No reference is made to the manuscript used by Ryck and once owned by Rudolph Agricola and turned up at Leiden since Koestermann's seventh edition (cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXXII [1951], pp. 337 ff.; LXXV [1954], pp. 250 ff.). Over twenty of its readings are, however, still given as emendations by Agricola and others as emendations by Rhenanus and Puteolanus. On p. 182 the old note on IV, 46 is repeated: *verum ordinem praeceunte Put. restituit Agricola*. It was the Leiden MS, cited without full appreciation by Agricola, which restored the true order and the Leiden MS antedated Puteolanus. One need not believe as

I do that this MS represents a line of tradition independent of the Medicean to do justice to its readings. In numerous places the present text might have profited by a consideration of Leidensis. Two examples out of many: III, 13, *militibus principem auferre principi militem*; V, 8, *alienigenis templum interius clausum*.

Part 2, the Minor Works, has a twenty-page preface which discusses the manuscript tradition. Koestermann rejects Robinson's unique valuation of Vind. 711 and defends (successfully, it seems to me) the more generally accepted theory of three families all descended from the so-called Hersfeld manuscript. The origin of this manuscript he still holds to be Hersfeld rather than Fulda in spite of Pralle's research into the annals of Fulda which he cites in his bibliography. The preface concludes with a warning that the editor's duty is to determine what Tacitus wrote and that this determination should be based on a knowledge of Tacitus' style and on the "innere Kritik" rather than on a scrupulous examination of the manuscripts. Fortunately the present editor applies this principle with admirable discretion. A welcome innovation is the inclusion of a bibliography embracing editions, books, and articles on the MSS and their tradition and books and articles of commentary. There is also the usual index of names. All of this matter supplementary to the text is adequate, clear, and concise. Koestermann's mastery of the material is thorough. There is one disturbing factor. No mention outside the bibliography which cites Bloch's article on the subject is made of the knowledge of the *Agricola* at Monte Casino in the twelfth century. Whatever one's conclusion about the significance of this knowledge, it is surely an important piece of evidence in relation to the source and value of the Jesi manuscript.

The text of the Minor Works, like that of the Histories, is conservative, as is most desirable in a Teubner edition which will be widely used as the basic text for citation. In *Germania* 2, it seems unnecessary after Norden's discussion of the interpretation and Robinson's to add the sign of textual corruption. In c. 10, the confirmed conservative would like to have seen the controversial *sed* restored and in cc. 15 and 16 the same critic would prefer not to accept the purely conjectural and unnecessary *magnifica* for *magna* and *hiemis* for *hiemi*. The change from *ceteris* to *ceterum* in c. 25, while widely adopted, still seems unnecessary. On the other hand, Koestermann rightly sticks to the MSS in c. 31 in spite of Robinson's brave but futile argument for a lacuna. The bracketing of *iugumque* in c. 43 may seem a little arbitrary in view of the fact that Tacitus shows in *Agricola* 10 his feeling for the distinction brought out in the following line of the present passage.

In the *Agricola* too there is little to be questioned even by a meticulous conservative. *Aulii* has at last disappeared from the textual notes on the title and the brackets from *legionis* in c. 9. The transposition of *ut* in c. 14 still seems to me mistaken, the result of editorial inertia since the time of Rhenanus. The transposition of *crebrae eruptiones* in c. 22 is, as Furneaux says, "a violent remedy" but the general approval of this change is based on logical grounds. I should not myself feel justified in bracketing *in melius* in c. 24 but it has the appearance of a gloss and Koestermann has probably chosen the best solution. The same can hardly be said for the obelisk

in c. 28. *Uno remigante* has been satisfactorily interpreted; the really baffling part of the sentence follows and the editor has selected the least violent of the traditional emendations. At the end of c. 46, the MSS cannot be followed. Either we must omit *veterum* (with Decembrio) or change *obruet* to *obruit*. It is a matter of personal judgment and the text of Koestermann now that he has changed to *obruit* is logical. To me the meaning of the sentence and the force of the peroration demand the deletion of *veterum* as a mistaken gloss and the retention of the future tense.

In the *Dialogus* it is hard to see why in c. 5 the editor still abandons the *non contigit* of an earlier edition and gives up the text as hopelessly corrupt. The ease with which a scribe could slip from the first *non* to the second explains the omission of the verb which of course may or may not have been *contigit*. The end of c. 37 might well be indicated as corrupt. If it is to be doctored, Koestermann's doctoring can hardly be bettered.

As can be seen from these selected instances, there is nothing revolutionary in this edition. It is the work of a mature and sound scholar which can be used with confidence.

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ALFRED ERNOUT. *Philologica*, II. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1957. Pp. 256.

The first volume of *Philologica*, which appeared in 1946, was a selection of articles which Alfred Ernout had previously published in a number of journals over the preceding quarter-century, with a single article which had not been printed before, but had been delivered as an inaugural lecture.

The second volume is similar in general character; the selection was made by Ernout himself from among the articles published by him during the preceding ten years, but contains one article not previously published. The article, entitled *Metus-timor*, is actually devoted in large part to nouns of the morphological type of *timor*, whose general frequency and whose suitability for use at the end of a hexameter were partly responsible for the gradual increase of *timor* at the expense of *metus*. The article is provided with a statistical table showing the relative frequency of *metus*, *metuo*, *timor*, *timeo* from Plautus to the Vulgate, and with adequate evidence to show that in meaning itself the two nouns did not differ essentially.

The second article, *Les noms des parties du corps en latin*, deals with the distribution of anatomical terms among the three genders, with *os*, *ōris*, *os*, *ossis*, and other archaisms of the Latin vocabulary shared in some instances only with Indo-Iranian and Celtic; with the importance of the *r/n*-stems in the Indo-European vocabulary of anatomy; and with the replacement of old words by Greek borrowings or stems with diminutive suffixes.—The third article, *Le vocabulaire poétique*, is in part a criticism of several items in Axelson's *Unpoetische Wörter*, the great general value of which, however, Ernout fully recognizes. He is here concerned especially with the

reconsideration of several words which Axelson and others have sought to assign to the more vulgar stratum of the Latin vocabulary.—The fourth article, *Venus, venia, cupido*, treats several aspects of the history of words of the family of *venus*, including the semantic evolution of *venēnum* (<**venes-no-m*) from 'love-philtre' to 'poison' and the development of *venerari* through the etymological figure *venerari venerem*. It also points out the contrast between *Venus*, where the abstract sense preceded the concrete sense, and Ἀφροδίτη, where the development was the reverse.—The article *Vis-vires-vis* is a detailed treatment of the usage of the defective singular *vis* and its heteroclite plural *vires* and the distinction in meaning whereby *vires* is specialized in the sense 'physical strength,' which provides the means of exercising force (*vis*) without itself constituting force. The second *vis* in the title of the article refers to those rare plural forms occurring in Lucretius, II, 585, III, 265, Sallust *apud* Prisc., *Gramm. Lat.*, II, 249 Keil, and Messala *apud* Macr., I, 9, 14. These are shown to be used deliberately for the purpose of pluralizing the sense of *vis* as 'properties, virtues' for which *vires* could not serve. With these passages as support Ernout proposes to restore the corrupt passage Lucr., VI, 370, to read: . . . *quare pugnare necessest / dissimilis <vis> inter se turbareque mixtas*.—The short article *Colaphus-percolopare* treats the Latin derivatives of Gk. κόλαφος, which, despite their avoidance by classical authors, persisted through the late Empire into the Romance languages. The form *percolopabant* in Petronius, viewed in connection with the south Italian scene of the action of the *Satyricon*, is explained as having received its second *o* through anaptyxis of the kind seen in Oscan *Urufis, aragetud*.

Even the briefest summary of all of the twenty-four articles cannot be attempted here, but through the majority of them, apart from the first half dozen, a certain unifying principle can be seen. Students familiar with the first volume of *Philologica* and with the *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* know that Ernout has a particular interest and has shown a particular ingenuity in tracing the processes by which two etymologically unrelated words eventually become contaminated. The causes may be partly loss of phonetic distinctions, partly extension of meanings, partly a tendency to replace nouns of rare types by others containing more productive suffixes. Thus the history of *condicio* and *conditio* was affected by the late Latin confusion between *-ci-* and *-ti-* before vowels, but also by the gradual extension of the meaning of *condicio* toward 'position, situation,' which brought it into the semantic sphere of *condo*, and by the tendency to favor nouns in *-tio* at the expense of the relatively small and unproductive class in which *-io(n)* was added directly to the verbal root.—The derivatives of the phonetically similar *cor* and *chorda* became blended through the notion of unanimity in *concors* and of musical harmony in *chorda*, while the replacement of *concordare* by *accordare* was assisted by the equivalence of *adsentio* with *consentio*.—*Dictāturiō*: this form, which is cited by Priscian (*Inst. Gramm.*, 8, 74, = *Gramm. Lat.*, II, 429, 10 Keil) in the phrase *a dictatu dictaturio* is not to be emended to *dicturio* as suggested by Wölfflin, but Priscian's explanation of it is to be rejected and it is to be taken instead as a denominative

to *dictator*. Here the whole question of the origin of desiderative verbs in *-turio* and their possible relation to nouns in *-tor* and *-tura* comes to mind, but in this article, which is a single page in length, Ernout does not enter into it.—*Dilātiō-dilātō-prōlātō*: the derivatives of *lātus*, participle of *fero*, and of *lātus* 'broad,' although the two forms were etymologically unrelated, became confused, especially in certain compounds with *dis-* and *pro-*, the similarity in form being assisted by similarity in the meanings 'delay, postponement,' and 'extension, prolongation.'—*Farfarus et Marmar*: just as the river-name *Fabaris* in Verg., *Aen.*, VII, 715, *qui Tiberim Fabarimque bibunt* is a later form of the dialectal *Farfarus* preserved in Ov., *Met.*, XIV, 330, so *Mamers* is derived with the same dissimilatory loss of the first *r* from *Marmar*, known from the *Carmen Arvale*, which is therefore an especially early form of the name of the god Mars, but the relation of *Mavors*, *Maurs*, *Mars* to *Mamers* is still unexplained.—*Frutex-fruticō*: *frutico*, the denominative to *frutex*, with the sense 'put forth shoots,' and *fructifico* 'bear fruit' are close in meaning and both were frequently employed by Christian writers in figurative uses. This kinship of meaning, along with the weakening of the etymological sense of the second element of compounds in *-ficare*, and also the assimilation of the group *-ct-* to *-t(t)-*, led to extensive confusion between *fruticare* and *fructificare*, a confusion reflected in many manuscript variants in texts of the later Empire.—(*H*)*abundō-habeō*: *abundo*, having weakened its meaning from 'overflow, be full to excess' to 'possess in quantity,' came to be felt as an augmentative to *habeo* and to be sometimes used as a transitive verb with an accusative object. The process was assisted by the disappearance of the sound of *h* in *habeo* and was at the same time reflected by the introduction of an unetymological *h* in *habundo*.—*Tyrrhenus* chez *Virgile* is on the probable Etruscan origin of the word *tuba* in association with which Vergil uses the epithet *Tyrrhenus* (*Aen.*, VIII, 526, *Tyrrhenusque tubae mugire per aethera clangor*), and also of *lituus* and *calceus*, all of which had, at least originally, meanings which belonged especially to religious ritual.

On page 66, note 1, the reference to *Revue de Philologie* should be to the year 1947 instead of 1945. On page 83, tenth line, for *homos mas* read *homo mas*. On page 89 in the passage from the *Georgics* read *Napaeas* for *Nymphas*. On page 92, note 2, the reference to the *Georgics* should be IV, 39. On page 209 in Verg., *Aen.*, VII, 707, for *nominis instar* read *agminis instar*; in 708 *Claudia nunc* for *Claudiaque nunc*; in 709 *data Roma* for *Roma data*. Except for this last error the passage was correctly printed in the original version in *Studi etruschi*, XXIV (1956), p. 311.

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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ON THE DATE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE *BELLUM CIVILE*.

I.

In a fundamental article in *Rheinisches Museum* nearly fifty years ago, A. Klotz,¹ summing up the evidence and earlier discussion and adding solid arguments of his own, showed with great probability that the *Bellum Civile* was not published in the lifetime of Caesar, nor from any finally revised copy, but was superficially edited and published shortly after his death by Aulus Hirtius, who had as his text the unfinished and unpolished manuscript from Caesar's literary remains. The view thus nailed down by Klotz, though attacked in the following decades by E. Kalinka² and others, may be considered the received doctrine on the matter down to 1938, when K. Barwick published his elaborate study, *Caesars Commentarii und das Corpus Caesarianum*.³ In 1951 Barwick again took up the problem in his *Caesars Bellum Civile. Tendenz, Abfassungszeit und Stil*, and with further argument based on intensive linguistic analysis and historical reconstruction, attempted to make good the thesis that the *B. C.* was written and published as part of Caesar's propaganda campaign during the war, and that it appeared in two parts, Books 1-2 as a unit at the end of the year 49, and Book 3

¹ "Zu Caesars Bellum Civile," *Rh. M.*, 1911, pp. 80 ff. Cf. *R.-E.*, X, col. 270.

² "Die Herausgabe des Bellum Civile," *Wien. Stud.*, 1912, pp. 203 ff. Cf. *Bursian Jahresberichte*, CCXXIV (1927); CCLXIV (1939), with citation of additional literature.

³ *Philol., Suppl.*, XXXI, 2 (1938).

at the end of 48 or early in 47. Klotz had in the meantime published his *Editio altera* of the *B. C.*,⁴ and in his *Praefatio* had answered Barwick's 1938 arguments and further fortified his own earlier position. Although Barwick has convinced some scholars,⁵ I believe the general view of Klotz still commands a majority agreement.⁶

The main arguments for Klotz' theory may be briefly summarized: (1) the "rough-draft" or "skizzenhafter Zustand" of the work as a whole, especially as compared with the balanced organization and artistic finish of the *Bellum Gallicum*; (2) the abrupt break-off at the end, indicating that it is unfinished; (3) the silence of Cicero, who never alludes to the *B. C.*;⁷ (4) the criticism of Asinius Pollio cited by Suetonius (*Caes.*, 56, 4): *parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se, vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit; existimatque rescripturum et correcturum fuisse*, which is apparently to be completed by the thought, "if he had lived to do it";⁸ (5) the express words of Hirtius (*B. G.*, VIII, *Praef.* 2): *novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci*, since *novissimum imperfectum* ap-

⁴ Teubner edition, Leipzig, 1950.

⁵ Lloyd W. Daly, *A. J. P.*, 1953, p. 195; F. E. Adcock, *Caesar as Man of Letters* (Cambridge, 1958), is doubtful; see note 40 below.

⁶ U. Knoche, "Caesars Commentarii, ihr Gegenstand und ihre Absicht," *Gymnasium*, 1951, Heft 2; P. Fabre, *Bellum Civile* (3rd Budé edition, Paris, 1947), pp. xxiii-xxiv; M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César* (Paris, 1953). I have myself tried to show the insufficiency of some of Barwick's arguments in an appendix to my Frankfurt dissertation, *Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumptions in Caesar's Writings* (1952).

⁷ The passage of *Brut.*, 262 has since Nipperdey been generally recognized as applying only to the *B. G.*, and Barwick has not shaken this *res iudicata*; the attempt to find echoes of the *B. C.* in Cicero's *Pro Ligario*, 18 is also unsuccessful, in that the catch-words (*dignitas*, *contumelia*) and arguments by which Caesar justified his war-making were in common circulation long before the *B. C.* Cicero was already complaining of Caesar's sensitive *dignitas* in January 49 (*Att.*, VII, 11, 1).

⁸ Cf. Knoche, *op. cit.* (note 6 above), p. 155, n. 30: "Das stärkste Argument für die postume Edition des BC sind m. E. die worte des Asinius Pollio."

parently refers to *B. C.*, III.⁹ It should perhaps be added that the older arguments, based on the phrases *bello confecto* (*B. C.*, III, 57, 5; 60, 4) and *bello perfecto* (*B. C.*, III, 18, 5) have long been discounted as of no weight.

The cumulative force of this evidence is overwhelming, nor have the counter arguments of Kalinka and Barwick been able to weaken it significantly. Barwick's case is built mainly upon his concept of the *B. C.* as timely propaganda requiring immediate publication for its effectiveness, but his strongest arguments indicate only that the *B. C.* was *written* during the progress of the war, or directly after Pharsalus, and prove nothing regarding the time of publication.¹⁰ Kalinka was even driven to the astonishing theory of an *unauthorized* or pirated publication in his attempt to meet Klotz' arguments based on the unevenness of the text.

In 1952 I reasoned¹¹ that it was incredible that Caesar should have written the *B. C.* in, say, 48 or 47, and then let it lie for years without completing or publishing it. Believing further that posthumous publication had been proved by Klotz, I concluded that the work was written in the last months of Caesar's life, after the return from Spain in the late summer of 45, and was left incomplete at his death. Further reflection on the whole problem in the last few years has convinced me that this view is incorrect, and I now believe with P. Fabre¹² that the *B. C.* was written in late 48 or early 47 in Egypt at odd intervals during the so-called Alexandrian War, that it was laid aside incomplete for reasons which are speculative but which I hope to make plausible, and that it was found among Caesar's papers after his death in approximately the condition in which we now have it.

⁹ Cf. Klotz, *Cäsarstudien* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 155-6; Rice Holmes, *Caesar de Bello Gallico* (Oxford, 1914), p. 362, n. 2.

¹⁰ F. Lossmann, "Zur literarischen Kritik Suetons," *Hermes*, LXXXV (1957), pp. 47-58, analyzes the meaning of Suetonius' version of Pollio's criticism (it is important to note that we do not have Pollio's exact words), and its bearing on the problem of date, with great sharpness and detail. His final conclusion supports Klotz' theory of posthumous publication. See also his careful review of Barwick, *Anomon*, 1956, pp. 355-62.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 55-6.

¹² Budé edition, p. xxi. Fabre believes the *B. C.* was written before Thapsus. See citation at note 30 below.

In other words, I believe that Barwick is correct in fixing an early date of composition, and that Klotz is correct in fixing a posthumous date of publication. I wish here to set this view forth with such evidence as I can bring, and to indicate certain wider consequences bearing on the historical interpretation and credibility of the work itself.

II.

What ultimate plans for the organization of the Roman *Imperium* Caesar may have formed or entertained in his last months will doubtless always be discussed and can never be satisfactorily settled.¹³ But there can be no doubt about one thing—he had no intention of imitating Sulla by resigning the dictatorship. His own words as reported by Titus Ampius in Suetonius' account (*Caes.*, 77): *nihil esse rem publicam, appellationem modo sine corpore ac specie. Sullam nescisse litteras, qui dictatorem deposuerit* fit together with his acts and omissions to act, and leave no doubt of his determination to maintain his despotic position. That he consciously intended to found a Hellenistic God-kingdom on the model of Alexander has been powerfully argued by Meyer and others;¹⁴ that he had the slightest intention of "re-establishing the republic" as Cicero publicly called upon him to do (*Pro Marc.*, 26-7), and as Sallust also urged (*Ep. ad Caes.*, I, 6, 3), or even of re-establishing some sort of shadow republic as Augustus later found expedient, is believed, as far as I am aware, by no one. His government after Thapsus was a humane but quite naked absolutism, conducted with conspicuous contempt for the *mos maiorum*,¹⁵ and the assumption of the lifetime dictatorship in early 44, against the whole weight of constitutional tradition, was an open declaration that he had done, finally and deliberately, with the old republican ideology.

¹³ Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), p. 53.

¹⁴ Ed. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius* (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1918); W. Steidle, *Sueton und die antike Biographie, Zetemata*, Heft 1 (Munich, 1951), pp. 60 ff.

¹⁵ In "Caesar and the Corruption of Power," *Historia*, 1955, pp. 445-65, I have tried to show this contempt in some detail; here I may summarily refer to chapters 76-80 of Suetonius' *Caesar*, recalling their importance as a Roman moral judgment recently stressed by Steidle, *op. cit.* (note 14).

With this post-Thapsus, monarchical Caesar clearly in mind (it matters little whether he laid great stress on the title *Rex*; his regal bearing and arrogation of royal power made mere titles of minor importance), let us turn to the *B. C.*, and ask how well it fits the character of its author as that character reveals itself in its last phase. We shall find, I think, that the *B. C.* does not fit at all; that it is a work *republican* through and through; that it neither contains the spirit nor the foreshadowing of the "monarchical" or "imperial" idea; that even interpreted as propaganda, it is not propaganda for monarchy nor for any projected reform or re-organization of the Roman governmental system. As a product of the mind of the "late" Caesar, known to us from Suetonius, from Cicero's correspondence of the years 45-44, and from the miscellaneous anecdotes in Plutarch, Dio Cassius, Appian, and other writers, of the Caesar driving for the possession of absolute power, and in visible ways corrupted by power in the sense of Lord Acton's aphorism, the republican *Gedankenwelt* of the *B. C.* is hardly thinkable.

Since the above statements will appear radical to many, and have indeed been specifically denied,¹⁶ it is necessary to support them here by a somewhat detailed collection of the evidence.

That the *B. C.* does not contain any clear political "slogan" or announcement of the "imperial idea" has often been noted. U. Knoche writes:¹⁷ "Sieht man Caesars Schriften durch . . . so ist es bemerkenswert, wie häufig von der *Fortuna* die Rede ist und wie der Gedanke an ein römisches Schicksal ganz zurücktritt. Geradezu erstaunlich und erschreckend ist es aber, eine wie geringe Rolle dort überhaupt in Wirklichkeit der Reichsgedanke spielt; und es ist sonderbar, dass Caesar, der Meister der Propaganda, sich diese Parole hat entgehn lassen." The sole instance in the *B. C.* of an expression that may be thought in some sense to announce a "program" or overall political plan is a phrase in a letter to Metellus Scipio urging as objectives to be sought, *quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperi*

¹⁶ Among better company, by me, who thought I could find evidence in the *B. C.* of Caesar's desire to appear as the *patronus* of the Roman state, *op. cit.* (note 6), p. 76; cf. citation from L. Wickert, note 20 below.

¹⁷ "Die geistige Vorbereitung der augusteischen Epoche," in *Das neue Bild der Antike*, ed. H. Berve (Leipzig, 1942), II, p. 213.

(*B. C.*, III, 57, 4). These words do sum up, with remarkable accuracy and insight, the great needs of the Roman world, and Gelzer¹⁸ has repeatedly cited them to show Caesar's statesmanly grasp of the problems before him, and his vision beyond the limited horizon of the old *res publica* incorporating merely the city-state of Rome, or at most, the citizen body of Italy. But these words in their actual context cannot be taken as a program or even as a slogan, whatever may be their value as proof of Caesar's understanding and statesman's concern. The message in which they occur is an offer of peace on the principle of return to the *status quo ante bellum*, that is, re-establishment of the senatorial oligarchy and the rest of the legal and customary *res publica*.

At no time in the *B. C.* does Caesar indicate a desire or intention of altering or reforming, to say nothing of revolutionizing, the old constitution. The propaganda of the work has, in fact, the exactly opposite tendency of emphasizing Caesar's defense of the old constitution. His expressed reasons for invading Italy are (1) to support the rights of the tribunes (*B. C.*, I, 5, 1-2; 22, 5; 32, 6); (2) to free the Roman people from the *factio paucorum* (I, 22, 5; 85, 4); (3) to preserve his personal *dignitas* against the *iniuriae* and *contumeliae* of his *inimici* (I, 7, 1; 7-8; 22, 5; 32, 2; cf. Cic., *Att.*, VII, 11, 1). His conditions of peace, as stated in the *B. C.*, never require any constitutional change, but stress on the contrary his constant desire and willingness to submit to the republican laws. He is prepared to suffer all for the good of the state (I, 9, 3; 5). He asks only free elections and personal security (I, 9, 5; 85, 11; III, 10, 8-10). This picture of his demands and intentions is supplemented but not altered by the strictly contemporary evidence of the Ciceronian correspondence (note especially, *Att.*, VIII, 9, 4: *aiebat* (Balbus the Younger) *nihil malle Caesarem quam ut Pompeium adsequeretur . . . et rediret in gratiam; . . . Balbus quidem maior ad me scribit nihil malle Caesarem quam principe Pompeio sine metu vivere*). It is the Pompeians who are accused of innovation: *novum in rem publicam introductum exemplum* (*B. C.*, I, 7, 2); *in se* (i. e., Caesar) *novi generis imperia constitui* (I, 85, 8). Still more specifically the Pompeians are

¹⁸ *Caesar, der Politiker und Staatsmann* (4th ed., Munich, 1942), p. 262; *Vom römischen Staat* (Leipzig, 1943), I, p. 137; II, p. 178.

charged with contemptuous disregard for law and custom: *Consules, quod ante id tempus accidit numquam, ex urbe profisciscuntur . . . contra omnia vetustatis exempla . . . omnia divina humanaque iura permiscentur* (I, 6, 7-8).

The question of the sincerity or truth of this presentation is at the moment irrelevant; the point to be noted is that Caesar is at pains to appear as the loyal son of the republic, forced to take arms in the republic's defense, and wishing nothing as reward but the restoration of the old state of things, *otium* (I, 5, 5), and peace. There is not a sentence in the *B.C.* the *political tendency* of which could not be approved by Cicero, or for that matter, by Cato; there is no threat of innovation (those of Caesar's followers who entertained radical hopes of confiscation and *novae tabulae* were quickly disillusioned; cf. Caelius Rufus, *Fam.*, VIII, 17, 2; *hic nunc praeter faeneratores paucos nec homo nec ordo quisquam est nisi Pompeianus*), and no expression of dissatisfaction with the former condition of the *res publica* except that the selfishness and ambition of a few men, of the *factio paucorum*, was preventing the system from functioning. Caesar reduces the whole political question to the level of a personal quarrel in which Pompey, supported and egged on by Caesar's *inimici*, preferred to throw the state into a turmoil rather than permit Caesar his well-earned place of equal *dignitas* (*B.C.*, I, 4, 4. Lucan's well-known *nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem / Pompeiusve parem* does not misrepresent Caesar's own statement). The modern idea that there was a general crisis, economic and political, in the Mediterranean world that could be resolved only by a fundamental change in the governmental organization, with one-man rule replacing the old rivalry of the *potentes*¹⁹ for money and *honores*, is not remotely suggested, not even darkly hinted by Caesar.

We find this so hard to believe that we read into Caesar what we cannot find explicit in his work. L. Wickert writes of the peace propaganda of the *B.C.* thus:²⁰ "Caesars Absicht war, nachzuweisen, nicht nur, dass er den Frieden gewollt habe, sondern auch, dass er im Kampfe mit den Pompeianern und im Gegensatz zu ihnen alles getan habe, um die alte *res publica* zu retten" (a correct and excellent statement); "dass aber das

¹⁹ *certamina potentium*, Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 2.

²⁰ "Zu Caesars Reichspolitik," *Klio*, 1937, pp. 232 ff.

Verhalten der Gegner und die Ereignisse selbst es ihm unmöglich gemacht hätten, diese Plan durchzuführen" (partly correct, but one sees here the beginning of subjective addition); "dass er Schritt für Schritt gegen seinen ursprünglichen Willen mit zwingender Notwendigkeit dazu geführt worden sei, die Verfassung in der Weise umzugestalten, dass die Monarchie und—können wir hinzufügen—der Reichsstaat das Ergebnis sein mussten" (for this last view there is in the *B. C.* no trace; it is a modern and wholly subjective interpretation based on knowledge of the actual later imperial development). The only passage in the *B. C.* that gives the slightest color to the last part of Wickert's sentence is that of Caesar's speech to his rump senate of 1 April 49 (*B. C.*, I, 32, 7): *Pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat, ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una secum administrarent. Sin timore defugiant, illis se oneri non futurum et per se rem publicam administraturum.* There is no announcement here of a coming Reichsstaat, or of any general constitutional reform; there is, as Gelzer²¹ has pointed out, a threat to act independently, and thus an attempt to force co-operation by the reluctant senate, but again there is nothing that a Cicero or a Cato could not have approved in principle. The idea of a temporary dictatorship to deal with a public emergency, whether formally tendered by a vote of the senate or taken in hand *de facto* by a strong consul, was one of the oldest traditions of the Roman constitution. In Caesar's words there is no break with the *res publica*, but rather the use of the *res publica* as a slogan.

In conformity with his striving to appear as the *bonus civis, rei publicae natus*, Caesar continually implies that his march into Italy in 49 (the touchiest point of his case: note Mommsen's struggle to justify it in the *Rechtsfrage*) was supported by almost universal consent. Towns and soldiers are again and again represented as eager to yield themselves, and as submitting with great impatience to control by Pompeians. A monotonous parade of surrenderers and collaborationists is set forth in *B. C.*, I, 12-18. At Iguvium, *Caesar certior factus . . . omnium esse . . . optimam erga se voluntatem.* Thermus, who was holding the town for the Pompeians, flees, and *militēs in itinere ab eo discedunt . . . Curio summa omnium voluntate Iguvium recipit*

²¹ "Caesar," in *Das neue Bild der Antike*, II, p. 188 = *Vom römischen Staat*, I, p. 126.

(I, 12, 1-3; note the tendentious *recipit* for *capit* or *occupat*). Practically the same formula describes the seizure of Auximum, with the addition of an honorary citation: *neque se neque reliquos municipes pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi* (I, 13, 1). In Picenum, Pompey's special stronghold, *cunctae earum regionum praefecturae libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exercitumque eius omnibus rebus iuvant* (I, 15, 1; a cynic may wonder how many peremptory requisitions helped the help); *Etiam Cingulo, quod oppidum Labienus constituerat . . . ad eum legati veniunt quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime facturos pollicentur* (I, 15, 2). Never was conquering army so enthusiastically greeted. If there was a sullen citizen or two who with Cicero was wondering *utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur* (Att., VII, 11, 1), we should never learn the fact from Caesar.

This "bandwagon propaganda" is extended and emphasized throughout the *B. C.*²² In some passages it is given a definite political, even legal connotation. At Oricum *L. Torquatus . . . conatus portis clausis oppidum defendere cum Graecos murum ascendere atque arma capere iuberet, illi autem se contra imperium populi Romani pugnatueros esse negarent* (*B. C.*, III, 11, 3-4). Again at Apollonia, where L. Staberius attempted like Torquatus to defend the town and secure hostages from the inhabitants, *illi vero daturos se negare, neque portas consuli praeclusuros, neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia populusque Romanus iudicavisset* (III, 12, 2). In Syria the soldiers of Metellus Scipio threatened mutiny, *ac non nullae militum voces . . . sese contra civem et consulem arma non laturos* (III, 31, 4). Caesar urged the Massilians: *debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam unius hominis voluntati obtemperare* (I, 35, 1). As factual reports of words actually spoken these passages are obviously strongly colored and "stylized," but they prove beyond cavil Caesar's keen wish to *legitimate* his victory in conformity with republican principles. Of similar tendency is the ostentatious deference to the *comitia* advertised in III, 1, 5: *Statuerat enim prius hos* (those exiled during Pompey's domination) *iudicio populi debere restitui*

²² A full citation of passages with sharply critical discussion is given by Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 277-83.

quam suo beneficio videri receptos, ne aut ingratus in referenda gratia aut arrogans in praecripiendo populi beneficio videretur. In his last months Caesar treated the *comitia* with sovereign contempt, ordering mock elections at his personal pleasure, and outraging republican feelings: *Incredibile est quam turpiter mihi facere videar, qui his rebus intersim*, wrote Cicero to Curius. *Ille autem* (i. e., Caesar), *qui comitiis tributis esset auspicatus, centuriata habuit, consulem hora septima renuntiavit, qui usque ad K. Ian. esset quae erant futurae mane postridie. Ita Caninio consule scito neminem prandisse* (*Fam.*, VII, 30, 1, January 44).²³

Caesar's anxiety to placate republican opinion is shown less conspicuously, but none the less significantly, in his omissions. Rambaud²⁴ has with great plausibility suggested that the reason the name of Cicero does not appear in the *B. C.* is that it was precisely Caesar's failure to win Cicero to his side that made his claim to represent the old republic look thin. "D'un côté, elle [i. e., the unsuccessful sollicitation of Cicero] aide à comprendre que le *Bellum Civile* n'ait pas nommé Cicéron à qui César accordait tant d'importance en 49; l'abstention prudente de ce politique, son absence au sénat le premier avril, démentaient l'argumentation césarienne." Cicero's defiance of Caesar at the interview of 28 March 49 (*Att.*, IX, 18) was unquestionably a serious setback for Caesar's policy, and all the more painful that it was unexpected. "Menschlich gesehen ist es vielleicht die erstaunlichste Niederlage, die Caesar erlitten hat."²⁵ Caesar passed it over in silence in the *B. C.* not only because it was a psychological defeat, but because it damaged the picture of republicanism he was striving to paint. There was perhaps not another man in Italy whose judgment of the political rightness of his conduct Caesar so much valued, or whose approval would in fact have been more valuable to him.

No phase of Caesar's conduct in the civil war impressed his contemporaries (and indeed posterity) more strongly than his

²³ Cf. further discussion of the "Legalitätstendenz" in Barwick, *Caesars Bellum Civile*, pp. 109-114. The preceding two paragraphs have been adapted with minor revision from my dissertation, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 78-80.

²⁴ *Op. cit.* (note 6), p. 151.

²⁵ O. Seel, *Cicero* (Stuttgart, 1953), p. 199.

clementia. In the *B. C.* this policy is given a very prominent place and is unquestionably one of the major strands of the Caesarian propaganda. But it has often been noted that Caesar, though he rings the changes on the idea so tirelessly that a modern scholar has facetiously suggested that the book should be titled *Bellum Civile, sive de Caesaris clementia*,²⁶ deliberately avoids the word; he speaks instead of *lenitas*, and of *incolumes dimittere* or *incolumes conservare*; his supporters speak of *temperantia* and *humanitas* (Caelius, *Fam.*, VIII, 15, 1; Dolabella, *Fam.*, IX, 9, 3). The reason is not far to seek. *Clementia* is the virtue of the legitimate monarch, not of the *primus inter pares*.²⁷ It was exactly because he was unwilling to accept Caesar's *clementia*, unwilling to recognize any right of Caesar to exercise *clementia*, that Cato preferred death, and Caesar's avoidance of the word shows in striking fashion his care to stay inside the republican tradition of equality. He similarly avoids the word in his famous letter on the capitulation of Corfinium (*Att.*, IX, 7-c), but speaks of *misericordia* and *liberalitas*, and it is his opponent Cicero who writes bitterly of *insidiosa clementia* (*Att.*, VIII, 16, 2).²⁸

All this conspicuous, not to say ostentatious republicanism of the *B. C.* is incompatible with the Caesar of 46-44, "the crony of Quirinus stepping down from his place among the gods" (*Quid? tu hunc de pompa Quirini contubernalem his nostris moderatis epistulis laetaturum putas?* Cic., *Att.*, XIII, 28, 2). It is

²⁶ P. Fabre, Budé edition, p. xxx.

²⁷ Seneca, *De Clem.*, II, 3, 1: *Clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi vel lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem in constituendis poenis*. Cf. Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 289-93.

²⁸ M. Treu, "Zur Clementia Caesaris," *M.H.*, 1948, pp. 197 ff., and Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 289 ff., have strongly attacked the sincerity of Caesar's professions, and have developed the view given contemporary expression by young Curio: *ipsum autem non voluntate aut natura non esse crudelem, sed quod popularem putaret esse clementiam* (*Att.*, X, 4, 8). It would require a second article to give in detail my reasons for disagreeing with this view; briefly, I may remark that Cicero, although he wrote of *insidiosa clementia* at the time, did not later doubt its genuineness, despite the hatred he felt for Caesar. But the question of sincerity is quite secondary here to the estimate of Caesar's "republicanism" in the *B. C.* Sincere or Machiavellian, Caesar presents his *clementia* or *liberalitas* as the good will of a republican *nobilis*, not as the condescension of a monarch.

equally discordant and unfitting whether read as apologetic or as preparatory propaganda. As apologetic, it is too grossly contradicted by the events of 46-44, too easily turned to ridicule, to be effective; as preparatory propaganda, it prepares for the wrong thing. When one considers the deep-cutting change that took place in Caesar's character and outlook in his last phase,²⁹ the conclusion is strongly suggested that the *B. C.* is a product of his earlier period.

The argument of Barwick, based on considerations of the timely character of the propaganda and *tendance*, and on the time-conditioned judgments of men (note especially the rather severe criticism of M. Varro, *B. C.*, II, 17-20), reinforces the above line of thought, and points to late 48 or early 47 as the date of composition. To Barwick's evidence may be added the remarks of P. Fabre,³⁰ who cites the fine saying of Louis XII: "Le roi de France ne venge pas les injures du duc d'Orléans," and asks whether Caesar would have carried on his quarrel with the dead: "Après la guerre d'Espagne, et déjà même après la guerre d'Afrique, quel intérêt eût trouvé le maître absolu de Rome, le tout-puissant dicateur . . . à dessiner en traits satiriques et mordants des ennemis que la mort ou la soumission avait réduits à l'impuissance?" We know, indeed, that he did pursue Cato beyond the grave, but this is to be explained by Cato's special position as a symbol of continuing resistance. Is it not more likely that the persiflage with Metellus Scipio (*His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appellaverat*, *B. C.*, III, 31, 1) was written while this contemptible Pompeian leader was still in active opposition? The disparaging observations on Afranius (*B. C.*, I, 84, 4; 85, 1) and Petreius (I, 75, 2) are also more fitting if written before Thapsus and the deaths of these men.

One of the remarks of Caesar quoted earlier, *omnia divina humanaque iura permiscentur* (*B. C.*, I, 6, 8), inspired a comment by Eduard Meyer:³¹ "Caesar hat sich die schöne Schlussphrase nicht entgehen lassen" (he used it again, *B. C.*, I, 32, 51) "die er ebensogut auf seine eignen, ganz gleichartigen Massregeln

²⁹ Cf. my "Caesar and the Corruption of Power."

³⁰ Budé edition, 1947, p. xxi. Fabre, however, agrees with Klotz in assigning a posthumous date of publication.

³¹ *Op. cit.* (note 14), p. 289, n. 1.

als Monarch hätte anwenden können." Meyer might have added that Cicero actually did apply virtually this formula to Caesar's conduct: *omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum quem sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum* (*De Off.*, I, 26). I suggest that what was obvious to Cicero and Meyer was probably obvious also to Caesar, and that it is unlikely that he would have allowed "die schöne Schlussphrase" to appear had he been writing at a date when it could so easily and effectively be turned to scorn.

None of these indications of the time of writing of the *B. C.* is decisive, but the ease with which they may be individually discounted must not be permitted to obscure the fact that they are parallel, not linked indications, so that their cumulative force is not to be despised. But it may well be asked why, if Caesar wrote the *B. C.* in 48-47 for political ends, did he not publish it at once? This question seemed to me unanswerable when I first considered the problem, and led me to suppose that the work could only have been written toward the end of Caesar's life, at the earliest after Thapsus. But if it can be shown that events interrupted the writing and made the original purpose obsolete, the natural objection to a widely separated date of writing and publication disappears, and the arguments of Barwick and Klotz are no longer opposed, but point together to the same conclusion: *writing* in 48-47; *publication* in 44-43.

III.

When Caesar arrived at Alexandria some seven weeks after Pharsalus, and was shown the head of Pompey, who had been murdered a few days before, he very probably believed, with that sanguine temperament that had led him to write of the condition of Gaul at the end of 56, *omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret* (*B. G.*, III, 7, 1), that the civil war was virtually over, and that he needed but show himself in Italy to find all opposition broken: *Caesar confisus fama rerum gestarum infirmis auxiliis proficisci non dubitaverat aequè omnem sibi locum tutum fore existimans* (*B. C.*, III, 106, 3). The objects for which he had fought the civil war were attained; he had recovered his *dignitas*, and his soldiers might now expect to recover their *libertas* (*B. C.*, III, 91, 2). In this spirit of

optimistic self-satisfaction he had marched around the Aegean to the Hellespont, and had sailed thence to Ephesus and Rhodes, hearing and recording, with harmless pride, the stories of prodigies that circulated through the East in the wake of his victory (*B. C.*, III, 105). From Rhodes he had crossed the Mediterranean to Alexandria. It is quite possible that he dictated part if not most of the *B. C.* at intervals of this journey, as we know was his custom in traveling (cf. the *De Analogia* and the *Iter*, Sueton., *Caes.*, 56, 5). He was nominally in pursuit of Pompey, but he did not press the matter with Caesarian *celeritas*. For a Pompeius Magnus was hardly a fit subject for *liberalitas sive misericordia*.

Immediately after his arrival at Alexandria on approximately 2 October 48 (27 July by the corrected calendar), two unforeseen developments combined to turn his adventurous life to a new course: he met Cleopatra and he became involved in the dangerous struggle for the control of Egypt known as the Alexandrian war.

Our firm knowledge of the events at Alexandria rests mainly on the account of Hirtius, who was not, however, present himself, but put together his narrative from Caesar's private conversations (*quae bella . . . ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota*, *B. G.*, VIII, *Praef.* 8) supplemented no doubt by other reports written or oral. He tells us nothing of Caesar's personal life, prudently suppressing, in deference to Roman "Victorianism" and xenophobia, what he knew of Caesar's liaison with the woman he had recognized as the legitimate Egyptian queen. To eke out the purely military history of Hirtius we have some 500 lines of the tenth book of Lucan's *Pharsalia*, based in all probability on Livy, but of course heavily loaded with poetical invention, exaggeration, and bitter anti-Caesar partisanship. At a hardly higher level of reliability stand the brief and contradictory notices in Suetonius, Plutarch, Dio Cassius, and Appian. In the nature of the case, rumor and speculation must have embroidered the known facts. Yet there can be no question whatever that Cleopatra gained a powerful influence over Caesar, or that she continued for the rest of Caesar's life to hold a place of major importance in his plans. The failure of our main source to discuss the psychological and moral background of the Alexandrian war must not lead us to ignore, or treat as trivial

gossip, the decisive importance of the Egyptian period in Caesar's personal development. With good reason has Cleopatra been called "die genialste Frau der Weltgeschichte,"³² and with good reason did the Romans fear her "as they had feared no other but Hannibal."³³

Caesar remained in Egypt some eight months, the last two of which were spent in a pleasure-trip up the Nile with Cleopatra.³⁴ He then departed to take up again the affairs of empire, which had assumed a seriously threatening form during his period of neglect. But a year later we find Cleopatra in Rome, living in Caesar's own sumptuous residence across the Tiber, where she remained until after the murder of the dictator, caring for Caesar's son Caesarion and "playing the queen" to the rage of republican Romans (Cicero, *Att.*, XV, 15, 2). Caesar had her statue publicly set up next to that of Venus Victrix (Genetrix), his own patron goddess, and much of the intrigue and scheming of the last months of his life—the plan to assume the title *Rex* outside Italy, the rumor that he intended to remove the seat of government to Alexandria, and the astonishing law which Helvius Cinna was charged with introducing to enable Caesar to marry *uxores liberorum quaerendorum causa quas et quot vellet* (Suet., *Caes.*, 52, 3)—is unquestionably closely connected with his serious involvement with the Egyptian enchantress.³⁵

³² Title of book by Otto van Wertheimer (1930). Cf. also Th. Birt, *Frauen der Antike* (Leipzig, 1932), and F. Stähelin's *R.-M.* article (1921).

³³ W. W. Tarn, *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1949), article "Cleopatra."

³⁴ Louis E. Lord, "The Date of Julius Caesar's Departure from Alexandria," *J. R. S.*, 1938, pp. 19-40, discredits, perhaps correctly, the alleged pleasure-trip. The point is not essential to the matter of this article.

³⁵ Full citation of sources and of the most important modern literature in Stähelin, *R.-M.*, XI, col. 755. F. E. Adcock, *C. A. H.*, IX, p. 724, n. 1, rejects, without good reason, the account of the proposed law to permit polygamy. Correct view in Meyer, *op. cit.* (note 14), p. 518. From an obscure reference in Cicero (*Att.*, XIV, 20, 3) it may reasonably be inferred that Cleopatra was pregnant with Caesar's second child at the date of the assassination. Cf. J. Carcopino, *Cicero: the Secrets of his Correspondence* (London, 1951), II, pp. 314-17, who believes, however, that the reference is to the birth of Caesarion. No one else that I know doubts that Caesarion was born in 47.

It is of course impossible to know the precise manner in which the fabulous luxury and display, the excesses of power and pleasure that Caesar found at the Alexandrian court worked upon his mind, but there are many proofs that the post-Alexandrian, post-Cleopatra Caesar is a very different man from the Caesar of Corfinium and Ilerda.⁸⁶ The imagination of Lucan has painted the scene in florid rhetoric, and a greater than Lucan was inspired by his description⁸⁷ to write:

High on a throne of royal state, which far
Outshone the wealth of Ormus and of Ind,
Or where the gorgeous East, with richest hand,
Showers on her kings barbaric pearl and gold,
Satan exalted sat.

All circumstances united to turn the Roman *Imperator* into the oriental *Rex*, to harden his contempt for the stupid oligarchy that had rejected him, and to fill his soul with that *superbia* and delusion of grandeur which three years later made him so hateful that his old friends and camp comrades combined to murder him.

If, as has been suggested, Caesar wrote the *B. C.* in the period immediately following Pharsalus, partly during his leisurely journey to Egypt and partly during intervals in the palace at Alexandria (when one considers that the so-called "Alexandrian war" lasted some six months, but that the actual fighting took up only a few days, it is clear that many free intervals must have been available), it is easy to understand both the republican tone and ideology of the work and its propaganda of self-justification. It is Caesar's *apologia* for his conduct of the civil war, addressed to Romans; to Romans first of all of the aristocracy that had fought against him (other than the irreconcilable leaders). Its *tendance* is open and straightforward: to clear Caesar of any charge of attacking the republic, to set forth his deeds in the best light, to destroy the moral credit of his adversaries, to be admired, to triumph. One may see in it not unjustly a certain spirit of self-satisfied exuberance, a tempered repetition of the *fiducia* of 59: *Quo gaudio elatus non temperavit, quin paucos post dies frequenti curia iactaret, invitis et gementibus adversariis adeptum se quae concupisset, proinde ex*

⁸⁶ Cf. my "Caesar and the Corruption of Power."

⁸⁷ Of course I do not *know* this; let Milton scholars speak.

eo insultaturum omnium capitibus (Suet., *Caes.*, 22, 2). It contains no subtle double-talk looking toward monarchy; the ideals and standards of conduct to which it appeals are the ideals and standards of the old republic, of Cicero and of Cato. It contains no "Caesarism" in the sense which that word has assumed in modern times, but is throughout the work of a Roman republican aristocrat, successful in the lawful game that the Roman aristocracy played, the game of competition for honors and position. Having swept the board in this game, Caesar might well say *Satis diu vel naturae vixi vel gloriae*.

In Egypt, however, falling increasingly under the influence of Cleopatra and of the atmosphere of oriental despotism and oriental luxury, Caesar gradually lost interest in the Roman ideal of aristocratic *libertas*, and became convinced that Sulla had been a simpleton when he resigned the dictatorship. When he finally returned to Italy from the East at the end of 47, he came determined to hold power in perpetuity, and to increase the pomp and splendor of his position in ways that would have seemed frivolous to the Caesar who had given his bed to Oppius and had slept on the ground.

But it was not alone the corrupting influence of refined and exotic luxury that worked upon Caesar's character during the Egyptian interlude. He visited the tomb of the great Macedonian conqueror, whose career had stimulated his imagination since his youth, and he saw in active operation the most complex and developed administrative bureaucracy of the ancient world. "Ganz gewiss hat Caesar seinen Aufenthalt in Ägypten nach der glücklichen Beendigung des Alexandrinischen Krieges nicht bloss zum Tändeln mit Kleopatra benutzt, sondern ausser anderm auch zum Studium einer Verwaltung, von der die römische unendlich viel lernen konnte."⁸⁸ A new Caesar developed in Egypt, perhaps for both better and worse, for it was in Egypt that Caesar decided not only on personal monarchy, but on many of those schemes of reform and re-organization to which his modern admirers have appealed as evidence of his statesmanship. We know that the calendar reform came from Egypt, and we may guess that many another project (one thinks of the dream of piercing the Isthmus of Corinth with a canal in imitation of the

⁸⁸ H. Willrich, "Caligula," *Klio*, 1903, p. 89.

great Pharaoh) was likewise the product of the fertile Nile and its ripe civilization.

In Dio Cassius' history (XLIII, 15-18) stands a speech allegedly delivered *ad Quirites* on the occasion of Caesar's victorious return from Africa (and his visit to his Sardinian "farm," *Fam.*, IX, 7, 2). Dio's habit of manufacturing rhetorical speeches is too well known to permit anyone to accept this piece as representing with accuracy an original documentary source, but it is not probable that it is fabricated out of hand. In it Caesar announces a program of general reform under the principle that the eighteenth century called "enlightened despotism." For what it may be worth, this doubtless garbled speech may be taken as the herald of the new Caesar, the Caesar who has given his name to "Caesarism."

By this time the manuscript of the *Bellum Civile* was a forgotten paper of the past. It no longer corresponded to the psychology of its author. It remained untouched in Caesar's archives until the summer of 44, when it was resurrected by Hir-tius and given over to the copyists.³⁹ Thus the arguments of both Barwick and Klotz have their respective validity. We need assume neither that Caesar published a work in a "skizzenhafter Zustand," nor that he pursued propaganda objectives that were long obsolete.⁴⁰

IV.

If the foregoing discussion is correct in its main outlines and conclusion, consequences of no small importance to the understanding of the events of 50-49 must be reckoned with. First of all, we must not attribute to Caesar the fixed intention at the beginning of the civil war, or even after the struggle at Dyr-

³⁹ Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), p. 367, supposes that the *B. C.* was published after Caesar's death by Antony and Faberius.

⁴⁰ F. E. Adcock, *Caesar as Man of Letters*, declines to commit himself definitely, but follows Barwick's general argument. His most interesting remark in connection with this paper is his suggestion that, after Pharsalus, "though Caesar did not cease to be a man of letters, he had come to care less for self-justification once he had the supreme justification of success. He seems to have become willing to leave to others the narratives of his victories. And the less he came to care for the conventions of the republic, the less he was anxious to maintain that he had preserved them."

rachium and the victory of Pharsalus, of destroying the republic and establishing a personal *regnum*. We must take more seriously than recent scholarship has done his comparatively modest professions of objectives as stated in the conditions given to L. Roscius and L. Caesar (*B. C.*, I, 9, 5-6).⁴¹ We must not give a Machiavellian or even a Hitlerian twist to his claims of peaceful intentions, or to his announcement of a *nova ratio vincendi, ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus* (*Att.*, IX, 7-c, 1).⁴² His letters in the Ciceronian collection (*Att.*, IX, 6-a; 7-c; 16, 2), and the letters of his agents Balbus and Oppius (*Att.*, VIII, 15-a; IX, 7-a; 13-a) must be taken as more sincere and more "republican" than they have frequently been judged. We must not re-interpret the plain words of our sources with modern diplomatic subtlety, or in the light of modern knowledge of an imperial development that no man could foresee in 49 B. C. When Caesar held his famous interview with Cicero at Formiae on 28 March 49, he really meant what he said: *Veni igitur et age de pace* (*Att.*, IX, 18, 1). He wanted civil peace, *dignitas* and *otium*, and he did not demand dictatorial powers for himself as their price.

The large-scale plans of reform (*lex Iulia municipalis*), of colonization, of vast engineering projects, and of personal government, with the striving for excessive honors and semi-divine titles, are all products of the later Caesar, and cannot be safely appealed to as evidence for his purposes in 49, to say nothing of his purposes in 59 or 60.⁴³ One may guess that had he been granted his second consulship for the year 48, he would not have attempted to revolutionize the state, but would have been content with a proconsulship thereafter to take vengeance on the Parthian for Carrhae.

It was the stubbornness, suspiciousness, and vindictiveness of

⁴¹ K. von Fritz, "The Mission of L. Caesar and Roscius," *T. A. P. A.*, 1941, pp. 125 ff., refuses to take these proposals as offering a serious basis of peaceful compromise.

⁴² As M. Treu, *op. cit.* (note 28).

⁴³ As is well known, Mommsen's brilliant portrait attributes to Caesar a conscious aiming, from his earliest youth, at the goal of statesmanly reform through the establishment of monarchy. Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 116, says of Caesar *multos annos regnare meditatus*, but this, and similar attributions by opponents, need not be taken too seriously.

the Pompeian-Catonian opposition—Marcus Bibulus, Lucius Domitius, Metellus Scipio, Faustus Sulla, Lentulus Crus, and their *amici*—unwilling and temperamentally unable to believe in a moderate Caesar, a Caesar *bonus civis*—that drove matters to civil war, and brought to naught the peace efforts of Cicero and other reasonable men. Pompey himself, as Cicero expressly says (*Victa est auctoritas mea non tam a Pompeio [nam is movebatur] quam ab iis qui duce Pompeio freti peropportunam et rebus domesticis et cupiditatibus suis illius belli victoriam fore putabant*, to A. Caecina, *Fam.*, VI, 6, 6), and as Caesar implies (*Ipse Pompeius, ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus*, *B. C.*, I, 4, 4), could probably have been brought to a second Luca agreement, which would by no means necessarily have involved a despotic or “unrepublican” rule by Caesar. There was room within the constitution for orderly reform, and it is a tragedy of world history that Rome could not use for orderly reform the services of her greatest son. Through civil war the way led to military dictatorship and totalitarianism. It was the way chosen by a stiff-necked aristocracy unable to forget and unable to learn. As Caesar truly said as he gazed at the desolation of Pharsalus: *Hoc voluerunt; tantis rebus gestis Gaius Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem* (Suet., *Caes.*, 30, 4). Perhaps after all, if we could really look into the wheels and levers of history, we should find that it was not Caesar, but Cato and Cleopatra, who founded the Roman empire!

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ADDENDUM: After this article was submitted, there came into my hands an article by Karlhans Abel, “Zur Datierung von Cäsars Bellum Civile,” *Museum Helveticum*, XV (1958), pp. 56-74, who argues sharply that the so-called “Legalitätstendenz” of the *B. C.* cannot be used as evidence of the date of composition. His entire article should be read in connection with the line of argument offered in section II above.

THE SUPERSTITIONS ABOUT THE *NUNDINAE*.

Mommsen's publication¹ of the imperial calendars and later on Mancini's reconstruction of the Fasti of Antium² have given us abundant epigraphic evidence for study of the Roman calendar; and the earlier calculations of Niebuhr³ and others, based only on arithmetic and literary evidence, have naturally fallen into neglect or even disrepute. At the same time we have learned from Sir James Frazer and his disciples to take seriously certain irrationalities attested by our literary sources and normally unapparent in the epigraphic material. Prehistorically—and sometimes historically—man is an irrational animal whose infatuations reveal, as they conceal, a certain rationale in his behavior. Using the empirical evidence now available but without scorning the authority of ancient texts, I propose to re-examine largely by statistical methods—which still seem appropriate in a subject of this kind—those notorious superstitions about the *nundinae* or Roman market-days recorded by Macrobius.⁴

Macrobius tells us that the Romans took steps to avoid the coincidence of *nundinae* with the first Kalends of any year and with the Nones of any month, because each concurrence of this nature was thought *perniciosum rei publicae*. The whole year was *luctuosus*, he says, if the first Kalends fell on a market-day—a belief strengthened *tumultu Lepidiano* in the year 78 B. C.; while the market-day falling on any Nones created a revolutionary situation by bringing out the whole populace on a day always celebrated as the birthday of king Servius Tullius: the day, but not the month of his birth was known, continues Macrobius, so his *dies natalis* was observed on every Nones. He had been a popular monarch, and well-attended ceremonies in his honor contained the seeds of revolution *ob desiderium regis*. Now the first superstition is not really explained at all; while our author's explanation of the second superstition, though con-

¹ *C. I. L.*, I^a.

² G. Mancini, *Not. Scav.* (1921), pp. 10-141.

³ See W. Smith and C. Anthon, *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, s. v. "calendar" for a good resumé.

⁴ *Saturnalia*, I, 13, 16-19.

taining hints of its great antiquity, involves legendary elements which it is difficult to accept as facts. But I would suggest that these authenticated superstitions reflect both change and fear of change in the Roman calendar; moreover, they yield two implications about the concurrences in question: (1) that occasionally the *nundinae* did fall *primis Kalendis* or on some Nones—a fact for which we have other evidence;⁵ and (2) that at one time the *nundinae* did not coincide with either one of these days—a contingency thus far unexamined for its bearing on the origin and development of the Roman calendar. It is to such an examination that I shall address myself in the course of this paper.

To begin with, I cannot accept Nilsson's view⁶ that the "market-week" has no real connection with the Roman calendar: the superstitions cited are themselves evidence of some connection; and there is abundant evidence in the published calendars:⁷ the year is divided into eight-day weeks, with the letters A to H carefully inscribed against the appropriate days, on a fixed system which always makes January 1 a day marked A. The inscriptions are late, of course, and do not prove the antiquity of this system; but they certainly establish a well-developed connection between the eight-day week and the calendar by the end of the first century B. C. Mommsen⁸ argued against the antiquity of nundinal letters on the ground that G was not introduced into the Roman alphabet until the third century B. C.; but Gellius⁹ clearly indicates that *nundinae* were mentioned in the XII Tables; and the course of my argument¹⁰ will reveal another objection to Mommsen's reasoning in this

⁵ Dio Cassius, XL, 47; XLVIII, 33 records *nundinae* falling on Jan. 1, 52 B. C., and intercalation to avoid a similar coincidence on Jan. 1, 40 B. C.

⁶ Martin P. Nilsson, *Primitive Time Reckoning* (Lund, Gleerup, 1920), p. 329.

⁷ C. I. L., I² and Mancini, *op. cit.*

⁸ See article by M. Besnier, in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, s. v. "*nundinae*"; also W. Kroll in *R.-E.*, XVII, 2, s. v. *nundinae*.

⁹ XX, 1, 49.

¹⁰ Until the market-day shifted, there was no need for lettering any other day of the week; and the nundinal letter, as I shall suggest, was fixed for some time.

matter. In any case, the eight-day market-week is a recorded fact and, as such, integrated with the calendar in historical times. Assuming, therefore, that it must somehow "mesh" with the number of days in a year, one of two things is required: a year of total days divisible by 8, with a *fixed* nundinal letter; or a year of total days not divisible by 8, with a *shifting* nundinal letter.

Now the only Roman year mentioned by our authorities¹¹ as having a number of days divisible by 8 is the so-called calendar of Romulus, which is said to consist of 304 days constituting 4 months of 31 days (March, May, July, and October) and 6 months of 30 days (April, June, August, September, November, and December). Scholars¹² have been prone to regard this calendar as a fiction since it corresponds neither with a lunar nor with a solar year; but more than three hundred years ago a Dutch scholar, Hendrik van Put, noticed¹³ that 304 was an exact multiple of 8, suggesting that the year of Romulus consisted of 38 eight-day market-weeks. But why 38? Why not 37 or 45, numbers which would have brought this calendar into closer conformity either with ten moons or with a solar year? The answer is to be found, I think, in what anthropologists¹⁴ call a permutation cycle of 8-day weeks and 30-day lunations covering, as Ovid guessed,¹⁵ the gestation period in cows and human beings: to fill out the last week of such a year, 4 days were added to the sum of 10 lunations, and in such a way that only March, the first month, begins with A. (Consult Table I for an abridgement of the calculations used throughout the following argument.) This last fact—not hitherto discerned, I think—is highly important for two reasons: (1) it proves the calendar of Romulus consistent with the tradition of always beginning a year with A—confirming the age of that tradition and, conversely, the plausibility of this 10-month calendar; (2) it brings out the real meaning of the Roman word for year, *annus*,

¹¹ Macrobius, *op. cit.*, I, 12 and Censorinus, *De Die Natali*, 20.

¹² Cf. W. Fowler, *Roman Festivals* (Macmillan, 1899), p. 2, and J. G. Frazer, *Fasti of Ovid* (Macmillan, 1929), II, p. 10.

¹³ See Frazer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 11-12.

¹⁴ E. g. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (Harcourt, Brace, 1948), pp. 485-6; 548-50.

¹⁵ *Fasti*, III, 121-33.

which properly signifies a cycle¹⁶ and nothing more: a new year begins whenever a month starts with A, and that is always March in the calendar of Romulus. This in turn suggests that, as the calendar was perpetual,¹⁷ the year was continuous—a fact celebrated in the interesting festival of Anna Perenna, the “circling ring” of lunations, on the Ides of March. There was no “gap” of uncounted days¹⁸ in the winter; and seasonal festivals fell in various months depending on the relation of calendar to sun’s course—something indicated by their duplication in later calendars.¹⁹

If we accept this calendar as authentic and examine the superstitions about the *nundinae* in relation to it, we discover, reckoning the Nones as 3 Roman weeks from the last day in each month—a principle inherent in the later calendars—that *only days marked C and F do not coincide with the Nones of some month in Romulus’ calendar.*

Our authorities agree that the calendar of Romulus was superseded by the so-called calendar of Numa,²⁰ which was intended to be a true lunar calendar of 354 days; but an extra day was added, they say, either through ignorance or through superstition against even numbers. Censorinus²¹ describes the mistake as occurring at once; Macrobius²² regards the mistake as a development, so in his account we can distinguish two phases of Numa’s calendar. First, says Macrobius, Numa added 50 days to the

¹⁶ Macrobius, *op. cit.*, I, 14, 4-5.

¹⁷ See Besnier, *loc. cit.*, and Smith-Anthon, *Dictionary, loc. cit.*

¹⁸ The “gap” theory is well stated by H. J. Rose, *Primitive Culture in Italy* (Methuen, 1926), pp. 91 ff., and by Frazer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 15 ff. But even Rose in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s. v. “calendar,” admits that such a theory does not fit the Mediterranean climate, and speculates that the 10-month calendar was brought into Italy by northern invaders. For his derivation of Anna Perenna, see *Ancient Roman Religion* (Hutchinson’s University Library, 1948), p. 83.

¹⁹ Note especially the repetition of the Tubilustrium on March 23 and May 23, and incidence of the associated ceremonies, Fordicidia and October Horse on April 15 and October 15: in a 10-month calendar seasonal festivities would occur in cycles of odd-numbered or even-numbered months.

²⁰ Or Tarquin: see Censorinus, *loc. cit.*

²¹ *Loc. cit.*

²² *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 1-4.

304 days of Romulus' year; then he subtracted 1 day from each of the six 30-day months, added these 6 days to the new period of 50 days, and divided the sum, 56, into 2 additional months of 28 days each, viz. January and February. Now this is interesting because 56 is a multiple of 8 and makes possible a very neat transition from the last December of Romulus' calendar to the first March of Numa's calendar: in this transitional year, both the first of January and the first of March will be lettered A²³ in the nundinal scheme. For later years, however, difficulties would ensue since 354 is not divisible by 8: unless some precaution were taken, a 4-year cycle of nundinal letters, HFDB, would result. *If the year of Numa begins with January, only F NUNDINAE will not fall on some Nones; if the year begins with March, each of the four possible nundinal letters, HFDB, will strike some Nones, but it is noteworthy that F does so only in January.*

It is therefore this superstition, I think—and not the one about even numbers—which added a day to the calendar and produced the second phase of Numa's calendar, i. e. a year of 355 days. Macrobius, in fact, supports this suggestion by contradicting himself: after telling²⁴ us of Numa's attempts to preserve the *impar numerus*, he proceeds²⁵ to discuss the superstitions about the *nundinae*, states that an intercalary day was added in February to avoid the coincidence of market-day and Nones, then identifies²⁶ this intercalary day with "*dies ille quo abundare annum diximus*," i. e. January 29! An intercalary day in February would accomplish nothing in the way of correction, but *adding a day to January moves the Nones from January 4 to January 5, and a nundinal F no longer strikes the Nones of any month.*

But something else happens: adding an extra day to the year changes the 4-year cycle to an 8-year cycle of nundinal letters, HEBGDAFC, so that March 1 is nundinal in year VI and January 1 in year VII of such a cycle. One can only suppose that "Numa" intended his year to begin with January and run for 354 days, but not daring to offend tradition, he yielded to sentiments about March 1, allowed January and February to

²³ This introduces for the first time a real uncertainty in regard to the beginning of the year, since July and November also start with A.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 5.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 16-19.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 19.

follow December, then added a day to January to prevent a nundinal Nones in that month. This interpretation also implies that he took measures²⁷ to fix the *nundinae* and to forestall either a 4-year or an 8-year cycle of nundinal letters. These methods were perhaps inadequate, as we shall see.

Now the Republican calendar differs from this second phase of Numa's calendar in only one²⁸ respect: in keeping with "Numa's" first intention, it begins with January. Unless measures are taken, it produces the same 8-year cycle of nundinal letters, with *nundinae* on January 1 in year VI and on March 1 in year III. *G is the only letter which does not strike a Nones; but again it is interesting that F does so only in November.*

Caesar's reformed calendar of 365 days produces an 8-year cycle of nundinal letters, HCFADGBE, with *nundinae* falling on January 1 in year IV; March 1, of course, had ceased to be regarded as New Year's Day. *The only nundinal letter which avoids a Nones is F.*

There is then in all the calendars known to us abundant evidence for regarding F as the original nundinal letter, if the superstitions about the *nundinae* have any historical value. Huschke and Soltau thought it was H: Mommsen, to begin with, thought it was A.²⁹ Marquardt³⁰ first introduced the notion of a shifting letter, and we have seen how this would come about in years with a total number of days not divisible by 8, unless precautions were taken against it. It appears to me, however, that F was at least meant to be the nundinal letter, and that measures, however inadequate, were taken to fix it.

The Roman year always ended either in December or in February, and the two festivals most conspicuous near the end of these months are, respectively, the Saturnalia and the Terminalia—in fact, Varro³¹ says that the Terminalia marked the end of a year, and the Fasti of Antium support this statement by putting the Regifugium (commonly dated February 24) in

²⁷ See below, pp. 138-40.

²⁸ Except for the intercalary month which was a later development; see below, p. 140.

²⁹ See Besnier, *loc. cit.*

³⁰ J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung* (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 289 ff.

³¹ *De Lingua Latina*, VI, 13.

the intercalary month of Mercedonius. Frazer³² noted analogies between the Saturnalia and the Regifugium: the mock kings³³ associated with both festivals may be sacerdotal monarchs who were driven from the market-place at the end of an intercalary period. Plutarch³⁴ and Verrius Flaccus³⁵ support this interpretation of the Regifugium; and a close inspection of the two phases of Numa's calendar provides pretty good mathematical evidence that the Saturnalia and the Terminalia-Regifugium had similar functions.

In the first phase of Numa's calendar, with the year beginning on January 1, the first day of the Saturnalia, i. e. December 17, coincides with an F. In the displaced calendar of Romulus, the associated festival of the Opalia (December 20 in the calendar of Romulus, December 19 in the calendar of Numa) had been marked F. Augustus eventually limited the Saturnalia to 3 days³⁶ on the grounds of ancient precedent; and I would suggest that this refers to a period when December 17, 18, and 19 were all designated F, constituting a sort of 3-day fair which integrated the Saturnalia and Opalia, and postponed December 29, the ultimate day of such a year, to one marked H. January 1 of the new year then coincides with A, and F is retained as the fixed nundinal letter. This conjecture may explain the odd statement of Plutarch³⁷ that the *nundinae* were sacred to Saturn.³⁸ This method of meshing Roman weeks with a 354-day year was unsuccessful, I imagine, because people still refused to accept January 1 as the beginning of a new year, and extended the Saturnalia to their eventual 7 days,³⁹ thus confounding Numa's intentions. It would not be unnatural to prolong festivities which yielded both joy and profit.

In the second phase of Numa's calendar, where we have an

³² *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 501-2; cf. pp. 41 ff.

³³ Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIII, 15; Lucian, *Saturae*, 4 and 9.

³⁴ *Quaestiones Romanae*, 63.

³⁵ Paulus, 279.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, I, 10, 4.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, 42.

³⁸ The *nundinae* were sacred to Jupiter (Macrobius, I, 16, 30). However, Macrobius (I, 11, 49) mentions *venalia* at the Saturnalia, and the situation of Saturn's altar and temple in the forum may indicate some old connection between Saturn and the market.

³⁹ Cf. Macrobius, I, 10, 1-6.

extra day in January and a year beginning with March 1, December 17 no longer coincides with F; but February 23, the day of the Terminalia, does so, a fact which may establish the true origin of intercalation in the Roman calendar. The later practice of not counting the last five days of February when an intercalary month intervened before March may well be the vestige of intercalating five days between the Terminalia and the Regifugium (all lettered in the normal way as days of a week but not counted as days of a month), thus postponing February 28, the ultimate day of such a year, to one marked H and starting another true *annus* or cycle with March 1 as A. The mock king would flee on the seventh day of such a period, exactly as he may have done at the end of the corrupted 7-day Saturnalia, making possible an easy transition from the first to the second phase of Numa's calendar. It is my belief, therefore, that intercalation originated as a permutation device of this sort, and not as an effort to make the lunar fit the solar year—a problem of no concern to the primitive mind.⁴⁰

Once more, of course, the device did not work, this time because March eventually (153 B. C.?) gave way to January as the first month in the Republican calendar, and because Roman priests, learning the subtleties of Greek astronomy, used the intercalary period for scientific purposes. These alterations put an F on the Nones in November or introduced a shifting nundinal letter which fell on some Nones seven times in eight years, on the first Kalends once every eight years, and removed the possibility of regular corrections to prevent such coincidences.

It is interesting to observe that in Caesar's reformed calendar, with the intercalary period (if we may call it that) reduced to one day in every four years, February 23, the day of the Terminalia, is again marked F. Is this an accident or the reminiscence of an old tradition going back to the second phase of Numa's calendar? In any case, a shifting nundinal system had come to stay, for the Romans were plagued by these same superstitions after 46 B. C.; and in Caesar's calendar there is no permutation device unless the reformer envisaged a long week at the end of the year. But few would, and no one did, apparently, accept

⁴⁰ Cf. Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

the economic consequences of that, viz. the deletion of a market-day.

According to this reconstruction of the evidence, then, *nundinae* fell on F-days or were so intended to fall in the early calendars; and permutation devices, eventually corrupted for other uses, were invented to achieve this. But a serious question arises: why the awkward incidence of a market-day on the sixth day of a Roman week, if there was no other purpose in lettering the eight days? The word *nundinae* itself refers to something which happens on the ninth day, i. e. the eighth day in our method of reckoning, so that only A or H would appear to satisfy the real sense of the term. But once more an answer may be found, I think, in one of the superstitions about the *nundinae*, viz. that they were not to fall on the Nones: this suggests, as we have seen, that they never did in the earliest calendars; but it suggests also that some deliberate effort was made to distinguish Nones from *nundinae*. Why was this necessary?

Let us return to the problem of meshing an 8-day week with a 30-day lunation: the simplest way to do it is not the way of "Romulus," but the creation of a 4-month year with 30 days in each month, yielding a total of 120 days or exactly 15 Roman weeks. This sounds like a bold hypothesis, but there may be traces of such a calendar in the fact that, before the addition of January and February, we have, down to Imperial times, only four named months, March, April, May, and June; the rest were simply numbered from fifth to tenth. There is also good reason⁴¹ for regarding the Vestalia and related ceremonies of June 7-15 as year-terminating festivities; while the four-sided shape of the rural calendars, the *Menologia rustica*,⁴² suggests antecedents in the calendar of a quadripartite year.

Now in such a calendar there is no need for the Kalends-Nones-Ides system of dating, since each month has the same number of days and a Kalends or "calling" of the Nones as fifth, sixth,⁴³ or seventh of the month would have no purpose. The Nones, therefore, even if they exist to mark the moon's first quarter, do not have their later function in the calendar. I suggest, moreover, that *nundinae*—a word which has much the

⁴¹ See Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-4.

⁴² *O. I. L.*, I², 282.

⁴³ In 30-day months of pre-Caesarian calendars.

same meaning as Nones—were, to begin with, reckoned like the Nones in reference to a full moon which Ovid ⁴⁴ indicates was prominent in the early calendar. One suspects, however, that *nundinae*, unlike Nones, were reckoned progressively from the Ides, since Nundina, ⁴⁵ a goddess connected with the lustration and naming of infants, was worshipped on the ninth day after the birth of a male child. We have some indication of progressive dating from the Ides at least in the month of March, for the festival of Quinquatrus occurs five days after the Ides of that month, and Varro ⁴⁶ tells us that such was the significance of the word. Furthermore, Caesar's retention of the *ordo feriarum* after the Ides of each month ⁴⁷ indicates respect for an old tradition of dating *post Idus*.

Now the Ides of March is the date of the first great festival of the early Roman year, viz. that of Anna Perenna, which celebrates the conclusion of one cycle or *annus* and the beginning of another—in other words, it is the *dies natalis* of a Roman year. It is plausible, therefore, that the first *nundinae* of a Roman year should come eight days after the Ides of March as a sort of *dies lustricus* for the year itself; and it is no accident, I think, that this is the day of the first Tubilustrum, a festival which needs re-examination from this point of view. By normal reckoning ⁴⁸ the Ides would fall on March 14 and the Tubilustrum on March 22 of a 30-day month, i. e. on the sixth day of a Roman week; and all *nundinae* calculated from the Ides would likewise fall on the sixth day of every week in this 4-month year. Since 15 weeks mesh exactly with 4 lunations, March 6, the normal day for a Nones, is nundinal; but in this calendar there is no conflict since Nones, even if they exist, are invariable and meaningless for dating. But the introduction of Romulus' calendar, with its 304 days distributed over 10 months of unequal length, would require a "calling" of the Nones ⁴⁹ and some attempt to

⁴⁴ *Fasti*, III, 121.

⁴⁵ Macrobius, I, 16, 36.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, VI, 14; cf. Festus, 254.

⁴⁷ Macrobius, I, 14, 9-12.

⁴⁸ I. e. with a *trinundinum* between the Ides and the last day of the month.

⁴⁹ Macrobius (I, 15, 12-13) states that the people assembled on the Nones to learn the *feriae* of that month, and adds that the Etruscans observed several Nones in a month because they saluted their king on

distinguish *nundinae* from Nones. This is accomplished by adding one day to March, thereby promoting the Nones from the sixth to the seventh day of the month. The *nundinae*, however, remain fixed as the sixth day of the first month and the sixth day of each week thereafter, and they are successfully distinguished from Nones of all later months by adding three more days to the year, two in alternate months, May and July, and one in October—not in September, the next alternate month, because doing so would create a nundinal Nones in that month! Once the distinction between Nones and *nundinae* has been so firmly established, it is natural that a superstition should arise against their coincidence in later calendars.

The market-day aspect of *nundinae* may well go back to the festival of Feronia⁵⁰ which fell on the Ides of November in later calendars, but, in a projection of this 4-month year, exactly on the Ides of March, i. e. contemporary with the festival of Anna Perenna, the starting-point of nundinal reckoning in such a calendar.⁵¹

One should also note what appears to be a significant coincidence of *nundinae* and *feriae* in this hypothetical calendar: not only the important festivals of Anna Perenna, Feronia,⁵² and Tubilustrium, but nine other festivals, all marked in the later

this day. Later on (I, 16, 33) he may be confusing Nones with *nundinae* when he says that people sacrificed to king Servius Tullius on the *nundinae*. All this, plus the statement about celebrating Servius Tullius' birthday on the Nones, may mean that the Kalends-Nones-Ides system of reckoning, along with the calendar of Romulus, was actually introduced from Etruria at the time of the Etruscan dynasty.

⁵⁰ Livy, I, 30.

⁵¹ The Etruscan connections of Feronia (see F. Altheim, *History of Roman Religion* [Dutton, New York, 1937], pp. 255-62), the Etruscan form of Junius (see H. J. Rose, *Ancient Roman Religion*, p. 70), the consecration of *nundinae feriae* to Jupiter, and the probable Latinity of Anna and Tubilustrium suggest a fusion of Etruscan and Latin elements, i. e. an Etruscan market-week and a Latin lunar month, to produce this 4-month calendar. This hypothesis would support the view that Rome had Etruscan as well as Latin beginnings.

⁵² It is interesting that neither the festival of Anna Perenna nor the festival of Feronia is recorded in capital letters in the published calendars: this only supports what we already knew, viz. that the so-called *fasti antiquissimi* were very ancient festivals still observed in later times; other festivals whose functions were obsolete, forgotten, or corrupted may have been just as old or older.

calendars with capital letters, would fall on F-days in this 4-month calendar if projected over a solar year. (See Table II.) In addition, more than half of all the *fasti* "*antiquissimi*" would fall on F-days in some calendar or other. (See Table III.)⁵³ This certainly suggests that F stood originally for something more than the sixth day of the week or something different from it, probably for *feriae*, or even for *fasti*,⁵⁴ just as F stands for *fastus* in the other set of symbols which we find on the Roman calendars. The word *nundinae* is, of course, a substantive, indicating its earlier use as a modifier, perhaps in the phrase used by Macrobius, viz. *nundinae feriae*. There is a real possibility, it seems to me, that F was simply an abbreviation for this phrase in the earliest stages of Roman chronology. If F is a ferial as well as a nundinal letter, it is plausible too that festivals in general are as old as the calendar in which they first fall on F-days; so here we may have a new clue to the relative antiquity of Roman *feriae*.

In summary, the nundinal system, soberly considered, yields some interesting propositions; a coherent reconstruction of the evidence, statistical, literary, and epigraphic, gives us some reason to believe that:

1. the nundinal letter was originally fixed as F; this was also a ferial letter;
2. we must postulate a 4-month year older than the year of Romulus;
3. the Saturnalia, like the period following the Terminalia, was intercalary in origin;
4. intercalation, in the beginning, was a permutation device adding days to the market-week, not days to the year;
5. early Roman chronology was dominated by a cyclic year; an awareness of this may increase our knowledge of Roman festivals and improve our understanding of Roman religion.

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⁵³ It is interesting that many such festivals fall on even-numbered days in the earlier calendars, suggesting that the prejudice for odd numbers was of later origin.

⁵⁴ Is this the source of the old dispute (see Macrobius, I, 16, 28-36) as to whether *nundinae* are *feriae* or *fastae*? Gellius (XX, 1, 42) indicates that *nundinae* were originally *dies fasti*.

TABLE I

CALENDAR	MONTH	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
4-Month	March	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		25	26	27	28	29	30		
	June	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Romulus	March	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
	December	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Numa I	January	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	February	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
	March	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	December	12	13	14	15	16	17	20	21
							18		
							19		
Numa Ia	January	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
Numa II	January			1	2	3	4	5	6
		23	24	25	26	27	28		
	February								1
		18	19	20	21	22	23	*	*
		*	*	*	24	25	26	27	28
Republican	January	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	February	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
	November		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Caesar	January	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
	February	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

TABLE II
NUNDINAE FERIAE
4-Month Calendar

MARTIUS		PROJECTED	
March		July	November
Nonis	Vediovī	Nonae Caprotinae Palibus duobus Sacrificium Conso	
Idibus	Annae Perennae		Feroniae in Campo Feriae Iovi Iovi Epulum
X Kal.	Tubilustrium	Neptunalia	
APRILIS		PROJECTED	
April		August	December
XVI Kal.	Fordicidia		Consualia
VIII Kal.	Vinalia	Volcanalia	Larentalia
MAIUS		PROJECTED	
May		September	January
V Idus	Lemuria II		Agonia
JUNIUS		PROJECTED	
June		October	February
III Nonas	Bellonae in Circo Flaminio	Mundus patet	
III Idus	Matralia	Fontinalia	

NOTE: This table shows all important festivals which would fall on F-days in the 4-month calendar: the inclusion of some may prove to be accidental, but for the most part the festivals in March proper must have been contemporaneous with or even related to the festivals of March in projection, etc.

TABLE III
FASTI "ANTIQUISSIMI"

				On F-Days	On Non-F-Days
				Calendar	
4-Month	Romulus	Numa I	Numa II	Republican	Caesar
March					
	EQUIRBIA I	EQUIRBIA I	EQUIRBIA I		LIBERALIA AGONTA I
TUBILUSTRIUM I				QUINQUATRUS	
April					
FORIDICIDIA		FORIDICIDIA	FORIDICIDIA		CEREAIA PARILIA
VINALIA I		VINALIA I	VINALIA I		ROBIGALIA
May					
LEMURIA II	LEMURIA I			LEMURIA I	LEMURIA III AGONTA II TUBILUSTRIUM II

TABLE III—Continued.

On F-Days				On Non-F-Days	
Calendar					
4-Month	Romulus	Numa I	Numa II	Republican	Caesar
June					
MATRALIA	VESTALIA				
	MATRALIA	MATRALIA			
July					
NEPTUNALIA			POPULIFUGIA		LUCARIA I
			LUCARIA II		
FURINALIA					
August					
VOLCANALIA			VOLCANALIA		POETUNALIA
	VOLCANALIA				VINALIA II
CONSUALIA I					
OPICONSIVIA					
VOLTURNALIA					
September					
October					
FONTINALIA					MEDITRINALIA
	FONTINALIA		FONTINALIA		FONTINALIA
ARMILUSTRIUM					

On F-Days				On Non-F-Days	
Calendar					
4-Month	Romulus	Numa I	Numa II	Republican	Caesar
November					
December					
AGONIA III					
CONSUALIA II		SATURNALIA	SATURNALIA		
	OPALIA				
LARENTALIA					DIVALIA
January					
AGONIA IV					
		CARMENTALIA II			CARMENTALIA I
February					
		LUPERCALIA	QUIRINALIA	LUPERCALIA	
FERALIA		TERMINALIA	TERMINALIA	TERMINALIA	
					REFUGIUM EQUIRIA II

Note how "Numa's" calendar in five cases restores F-day celebrations of 4-month-calendar festivals, while the calendar of "Romulus" never does so. This would lead me to regard the latter as an intruding calendar; see note 49.

THE SPIRITUAL ITINERARY OF VIRGIL'S AENEAS.

The *Aeneid* is not only a great legendary and political epic. It is also a great religious poem and Aeneas is a religious hero. For "the character of Aeneas is pivoted on religion; religion is the one sanction of his conduct. There is no appeal in the *Aeneid* to knowledge or reason or pleasure—always to the will of God."¹ To Aeneas the mission with which he is charged appears first and foremost as a religious mission: *sacra deosque dabo* (XII, 192). "Énée," says J. Perret, "est bien un héros religieux au sens où l'entendra plus tard le christianisme."²

But what is a religious hero? He is a man who senses, beyond earthly things, a Being or Power on whom he depends, to whom he is bound, and without whom he feels lonely and afraid in the world. He is a man who desires to enter into intimate contact with this Being. He is devout (*pious*), for devotion is the will to do promptly and lovingly the will of God. And this devotion shows itself outwardly in prayer and sacrifice, inwardly in the resolution to conform one's entire life to the known will of God.³ A religious hero is a man who is all this to a heroic degree.

Does Virgil's Aeneas conform to this ideal? And if so, is his personal religion static, or does it grow and deepen in the course of the poem? And if this be true, as I believe, what are the chief stages of his spiritual itinerary? The purpose of this essay is not to make of Aeneas a Christian saint, but rather to show him as a pre-Christian religious hero. For there are heights and depths in the Christian religious experience which even Virgil did not divine.

There can be no doubt that Aeneas is a religious hero of great stature. True, in some respects he is like a Homeric hero. He is a mighty warrior and leader of men, and the aura of heroic prowess encircles him. But the differences between the two types are more profound. To perform his task (*Romanam condere gentem*), to carry his *moles*, Aeneas needed spiritual

¹ W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London, 1922), p. 412.

² J. Perret, *Virgile, l'homme et l'œuvre* (Paris, 1952), p. 136.

³ Cf. A. J. Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), pp. 1 f.

qualities of a high order, especially *pietas*, the steady fulfillment of his duty to god and man. So he is *pius* Aeneas, *Troius Aeneas, pietate insignis et armis* (VI, 403). He is not a Stoic, though at times his words have a Stoic ring. To quote Perret again, "La pensée des dieux pénètre infiniment plus profond dans l'âme d'Enée; une affection positive le lie à eux."⁴ Without the god's (or gods') help he feels perplexed in the extreme; with his aid, he gains new light and feels new power for future ordeals.

Virgil is careful from the outset to set his hero in a different order of experience from that of Homer's heroes (I, 8-11):

Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine laeso
quidve dolens regina deum tot volvere casus
insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores
impulerit. Tantaene animis caelestibus irae?

This is the mystery at the heart of things—and in the heart of Aeneas—the mystery of the suffering which falls on good, god-fearing men engaged in a Heaven-blessed task. *Sum pius Aeneas* is "not a piece of smug complacency" but "a poignant cry wrung from a tortured heart."⁵ As Austin finely says, commenting on IV, 393: "*Pius* is a complex word, a sensitive symbol of adherence to a personal ideal of devotion, which may nevertheless bring pain and sorrow . . . the epithet is eloquent of struggle and bewilderment and submission."⁶ *Mens immota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes* (IV, 449) perhaps best sum up this struggle and submission in the heart of Aeneas. All through the poem Aeneas is shown as a man of prayer, an *Orans*, with hands uplifted to Heaven, and offering sacrifice to supplicate or thank the gods.

But Aeneas is no mere puppet of the gods. He is intensely human in his greatness and his frailty. Until he returns from the Underworld he doubts and hesitates and almost loses hope, as in Sicily (V, 700 ff.); at Carthage he even falls from grace. But his conscience gives him no rest, and he obeys the god's command *dulcis relinquere terras*. Duty overmasters desire, and once again he is *pius* Aeneas.

⁴ *Op. cit.* (note 2), p. 136.

⁵ W. B. Anderson, *O. R.*, XLIV (1930), p. 4.

⁶ *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Oxford, 1955), p. 122.

In the first half of the poem Aeneas is a man of memories, a homeless man, haunted by the tragic past.⁷ He has indeed, by the gods' help, found a new faith in his destiny and a new hope, but his faith is often clouded and his hope dashed by new trials which ever beset his path. He has no cloud by day or pillar of fire by night to guide him, but only occasional omens and prophecies at decisive moments. Through most of the *Aeneid* his character is in a constant state of tension, involved in a tug of war between his heroic sense of duty to the gods and his human sensibilities. He believes in a Providence which shapes his ends, rough hew them how he will, but the cost in human suffering to himself and others is always before his eyes, to be exorcised only by renewed faith and hope, with the grace of Heaven. The nimbus he wears was bought only at a great price.

Aeneas is then a religious hero. But was he so from the beginning, or does his personal religion, his *pietas*, deepen as the poem moves on? In other terms, was Aeneas always close to his gods, always in the attitude of one who says, like St. Paul: "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?", or, like Cleanthes: "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou my Destiny, to that one post which you will have me fill. I will follow gladly."⁸ Book II shows us the Aeneas that was, before he shoulders his burden of destiny. It is a drama of conversion. But from what to what? For the most part, we see only a soldier like Achilles, with a lust for fighting and a thirst for vengeance.⁹ He is at the mercy of his natural temperament and his fiery disposition, driven along by blind *furor* and *ira* like a savage wolf (II, 355 ff.). *Quid furis?* asks his mother of him, as he makes ready to slay Helen. And all this despite Hector's warning in a dream, despite the sight of Troy in flames, and even, for a while, despite his mother's words of revelation.

What is wrong with this Aeneas of Book II?¹⁰ His *pietas*

⁷ V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Innsbruck-Wien, 1950), pp. 57 f.

⁸ *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.*, I, No. 527. The verses quoted will also be found in *The Oxford Book of Greek Verse* (Oxford, 1930), No. 484.

⁹ Virgil was anxious to show that Aeneas, the ancestor of the Romans, was no traitor to his country, as some old stories had said, but a fighter who resisted to the last.

¹⁰ Cf. R. Allain, "Le merveilleux dans un épisode crucial de l'Énéide" in *Les Études Classiques*, XVII (1949), pp. 321 ff.; *idem*, "Une nuit spirituelle d'Énée" in *R. E. L.*, XXIV (1946), pp. 189 ff.

towards the gods seems eclipsed by *furor*; his *pietas* towards his family is forgotten, and only for his *patria*, now doomed and in flames, does he show any thought. It is magnificent in its own way, but what does it achieve? If character is the sum total of a man's moral virtues, grouped round the axis of will; if, for great achievement, what is most needed is not so much a strong will as a good will, guided by right reason, then Aeneas is here flawed in character and a plaything of his natural temperament and disposition. Blind instincts and hot passions run riot in him; prudence and temperance are notably absent. But happily he has other natural gifts; he is a piece of raw marble out of which the gods, with Aeneas' cooperation, will hew a beautiful character, once the scales fall from his eyes and a calmer mood prevails. Blind *furor* must give way to a new faith, despair to a new hope before he can become a vessel of election for the great task ahead. And this is the work of the gods who alone can unveil the future and inspire hope in a crushed heart. How is it accomplished?

The night of Troy's fall was for Aeneas a spiritual dark night of the soul. He sorely needed light with which to pierce beyond appearances to the truth of things. So first the gods send him a dream in which Hector—*lux Dardaniae*—appears and enlightens him: Troy is doomed; Aeneas must save his penates and find them a new city beyond the seas. But when he is awakened by the din of battle and sees the fires, he thinks only of fighting: *arma amens capio, nec sat rationis in armis* (II, 314). He knows now that Troy's cause is hopeless, but nonetheless he plunges on: *moriatur et in media arma ruamus* (II, 353). But what he knows he must see and feel to the depths of his being; what he realizes dimly or not at all—his future destiny—must be revealed to him. So Venus appears to him and plucks away the veil which dulls his mortal vision: the gods, yes even *ipse pater*, are overthrowing Troy: *eripe nate fugam finemque impone labori*. His own task is not finished but only beginning. But where and how? Aeneas bows to the inevitable and goes home. There the refusal of Anchises to flee brings on another access of despair: *arma viri, ferte arma; vocat lux ultima victos*. Aeneas is once again kicking against the goad, a prey to his feelings. Then Jupiter sends a sign, a comet with fiery tail (*multa cum luce*), marking the way he is to go: *signan-*

temque vias . . . dat lucem. It is a symbol of enlightenment for Aeneas and his father. They depart with the penates but meanwhile Creusa is lost. At last she appears to Aeneas and reveals the secret: *non haec sine numine divum eveniunt.* Exile awaits him, Hesperia, a new kingdom and wife—and in the end happiness. Back he goes to his father and finds there a band of fugitives, *miserabile vulgus.* The morning star appears, his mother's star, a symbol of hope. Troy is smoking and beyond all saving. *Cessi et sublato montis genitore petivi.* At long last he gives in to Fate and quits Troy for the hills of hope.

For Aeneas it has been a titanic interior struggle between his instincts as a fighter and his *pietas* in all its fullness, between his natural self and his higher self in all its reaches. He has suffered a staggering psychological shock which shakes him to the roots of his being. And what does he reap after his submission? A new faith and a new hope in the future; a new sense of his own inadequacy which we call humility. And all this has come from the gods whose will is law, those gods who alone can write straight with crooked lines, and who in the end fulfill their will: *fata viam invenient.*

Of St. Paul's conversion, Daniel-Rops writes thus: "His transformation was radical and complete. . . . In a single second on the desert trail God had conquered his adversary and bound him to Himself forever."¹¹ Can we say the same of Aeneas at the end of Book II? Has he really put off the old man and put on the new? Books III to V will show him tested like gold in a furnace of trials. And when, at the beginning of Book III, he leaves the shores *ubi Troia fuit*, his spiritual itinerary has begun.

Speaking of Christian perfection, ascetical writers lay down the principle that God, as a rule, leads souls to perfection only gradually, and that by three ways, not parallel but successive. A man must first walk the Purgative Way by purifying himself of past sins and faults; then, reformed, he must walk the Illuminative Way by practising virtue and imitating Christ, the Light of the World; finally, and always with God's grace, he arrives at the Unitive Way, the way of union with God through love. *Mutatis mutandis*, we may apply this doctrine to Aeneas' spiritual itinerarium.

¹¹ *Saint Paul* (English translation by J. Martin [Chicago, 1953]), p. 31.

He is *fato profugus* and what he most needs now is light. For this he constantly prays, at Delos, in Crete, at Buthrotum: *quem sequimur? quove ire iubet? ubi ponere sedes* (III, 88)? And his *pietas* is rewarded by the gods; their light shines more and more clearly in the darkness of his soul. Book III is a book of farewells to the past and looking towards the future—but still with many a backward glance and lingering doubt: *si quando Thybrim vicinaque Hybridis arva intraro* (III, 500-1). All through the book Aeneas and his comrades are weary, *fessi*, of pulling the oar, landing, building, and putting to sea again, with frustration gnawing at their hearts. No wonder Aeneas tells Andromache: *vivo equidem vitamque extrema per omnia duco* (III, 215). But, despite discouragement, his faith and fortitude are strong enough to carry him to Sicily.

On leaving Sicily for Italy, he and his men are assailed by the storm described in Book I and finally cast ashore on Africa. Aeneas consoles his dispirited men (I, 204-7):

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi fata quietas
ostendunt; illic fas regna resurgere Troiae.
Durate et vosmet rebus servate secundis.

It is a fine speech, full of apparent faith and hopefulness, but his real feelings belie the confident words (I, 208-9):

Talia voce refert curisque ingentibus aeger
spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.

Troy still fills his mind with its bitter-sweet memories and his heart with spasms of homesickness. Somewhere ahead lie the promised shores of Italy and a home for him and his penates—if only faith and hope hold out. But Aeneas' faith is sagging, as his speech to his goddess mother shows (I, 378 ff.): *sum pius Aeneas*. . . Following the *fata*, he is in search of a home in Italy and yet Heaven and earth and sea seem to conspire against him. Venus cheers him and directs him to Carthage. Jupiter meanwhile has seen to it that Dido is filled with peaceful thoughts, while Venus weaves her wiles in favor of her son.

The stage is now set for Book IV and Aeneas' greatest temptation. Carthage offers a homeless man all that his heart yearns for: a beautiful, masterly woman as wife, a home after his wanderings, peace and quiet after the storm. He yields to its

appeal. Mercury finds him *fundantem arces ac tecta novantem*—at Carthage! His rebuke strikes home: *heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum!* In the heart and conscience of Aeneas a sharp struggle has been going on between desire and duty, that same tension between his human emotions and *pietas* which had begun the night of Troy's fall. He obeys, but his victory over his desires is hardly won and leaves deep scars. Virgil's words, *at pius Aeneas*, says Austin, "contain all the anguish of his resignation to the unexplained and unexplainable bidding of God."¹² Now, more acutely than ever, Aeneas is face to face with the problem of pain and suffering, not merely the pain he suffers but even more the pain he inflicts on others by following the path of duty marked out by the gods. And this new realization puzzles and torments him. He has fallen from grace and allowed his faith in his destiny to be forgotten. But in the end, *pietas* reasserts itself and something like peace of heart visits him again: *Aeneas celsa in puppi iam certus eundi/ carpebat somnos. . . .* (IV, 554-5).

Driven back to Sicily by the winds, he celebrates there the anniversary of Anchises' death with games. The spiritual atmosphere in which he moves is one of joy (*laetitia*) after the traumatic experience at Carthage. Faith and hope seem revived again. But the sudden burning of the ships shows how unsteady is his faith, how frail his hope. He prays an agonized prayer to Jupiter and his prayer is answered by a downpour of rain. Nonetheless, Aeneas tosses on a great tide of doubt: *Siculisne resideret arvis / oblitus fatorum, Italasne capesseret oras* (V, 702-3). The "Cloud of Unknowing," spoken of by the medieval writer, threatens to close round him and engulf him in its darkness. But Jupiter does not forget his charge; he sends the wraith of Anchises to comfort and counsel his son, comfort which Aeneas has merited by his *pietas* to his father and his prayer to Jupiter. He then makes for Italy, much chastened in heart.

As we look back over the route thus far traversed by Aeneas—his Purgative Way—let us size up his spiritual stature. Virgil might have made of him another Achilles or Odysseus, or a dashing conquistador carrying all before him. Instead, he made

¹² *Op. cit.* (note 6), p. xv.

of him a tired, dust-covered pilgrim, a hero by the sole adhesion of his will to the commands of the gods, but otherwise one much like ourselves. His *pietas* to the gods has been sorely tried and sometimes found wanting. But he always picks himself up and pushes on. He still needs a *second* conversion; he needs more light and hope to nerve him for the task ahead, more interior force to say, as did St. Paul: "Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forward to those that are before, I press towards the goal . . ." (*Phil.* 3, 13-14). And the gods will help him to reach his goal in their appointed times.

At Cumae he reaches the Promised Land and the Way of Light through a dark Underworld. As MacKay has written: "the primary importance of the journey is that it represents a spiritual purification and illumination that fit him for his mighty task."¹³ But before he is enlightened he must be purified; he must recall and then dismiss the searing experiences which most haunt his memory. So the persons he meets in the Underworld are also symbols: Palinurus recalls the sorrows of the recent voyage, Dido his fall from grace at Carthage, Deiphobus the horrors of the last night at Troy. The sense of guilt and inadequacy which at times lies heavy on his spirit is exorcised, as MacKay says, by something like confession and absolution. His purgation is now well nigh complete and he is ready to walk the Way of Light.

Arrived at Elysium, Aeneas deposits the Golden Bough on the threshold and enters the region of light: *largior hic campos aether et lumine vestit/ purpureo* . . . Anchises awaits him there and tells him of the *Anima Mundi*. They mount the Hill of Vision and, at long last, Aeneas learns the full meaning of his mission: *te tua fata docebo*. After the Alban Kings comes Rome: *hanc aspice gentem / Romanosque tuos*. Now finally the great "Cloud of Unknowing" which had clung to him so long is dispelled; now he sees. And with light come enthusiasm and courage unfelt before: *incenditque animum famae venientis amore*. Leaving the Underworld, he makes upshore towards his goal. He is ready, or almost ready, for all contingencies.

¹³ "Three Levels of Meaning in *Aeneid* VI" in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVI (1955), pp. 180 ff.

In Latium the gods have made all ready for him. King Latinus gives him a kindly welcome. The Trojan envoys return from their visit to the king *pacemque reportant*. But then, at the bidding of Juno, the awful powers of Hell break upon Aeneas in the shape of Allecto. She does her fiendish work all too well: peace is no more, only *scelerata insania belli*. As Pöschl remarks: "Wollte Virgil seine Auffassung des Krieges als eines Höllenwerks, eines gottlosen Frevels und verbrecherischen Wahnsinns symbolisch darstellen."¹⁴ And, at the head of the Latin allies, marches the ominous figure of Mezentius, *contemptor divum*.

When, at Cumae, the Sibyl had uttered her sombre prediction of *bella, horrida bella*, Aeneas had answered, undismayed: *omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi* (VI, 105). But the fearful reality is too much for him: *Aeneas, tristi turbatus pectora bello, / procubuit seramque dedit per membra quietem* (VIII, 29-30). But Heaven does not fail him in this crisis. The god of the Tiber appears to him and promises his guidance and aid. So Aeneas journeys up the Tiber to Pallanteum and makes his first personal contact with Roman soil and the Roman spirit. His Unitive Way has begun.¹⁵

At Carthage, Aeneas had been surrounded by oriental comforts and luxury, and he had yielded to their spell (I, 695 ff.; IV, 261 ff.). At Pallanteum, he will be initiated into lessons of poverty and simplicity by *pauper* Evander. Aeneas is a prince from the East and his foes taunt him with being a soft, effeminate oriental (IV, 215 ff.; IX, 614 ff., XII, 97). He must be purified of the taint of his eastern origin and filled with a Roman contempt for *luxuria*. But more than this awaits him: vital contact with the living memory and cult of Hercules, the toiling benefactor of mankind. Hercules, it was said, had made his choice between the Way of Pleasure and the Way of Virtue, and he had received a reward exceeding great (VIII, 301). He had become the ideal symbol of human energy operating in the cause of suffering humanity. And he had delivered Pallanteum of Cacus, a monster of darkness. So Aeneas takes part in the cult at the *Ara Maxima* and hears the praises of Hercules sung.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* (note 7), p. 51.

¹⁵ Cf. A. M. Guillemin, *Virgile, poète, artiste et penseur* (Paris, 1951), pp. 274 ff.; Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 7), pp. 97 f.

At sundown, Evander leads him to his humble palace on the Palatine and invites him to enter, in words which unite the two themes of simplicity and Herculean virtue (VIII, 361-5):

haec inquit limina victor
Alcides subiit, haec illum regia cepit.
Aude, hospes, contemnere opes et te quoque dignum
finge deo, rebusque veni non asper egenis.

And yet, on the morrow, even after Evander's promise of aid, Aeneas' heart is again flooded with despondent thoughts of the wars to come: *multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant* (VIII, 522). Virgil well knew, as Miss Guillemin observes, that the élan of conversion does not come from without merely, but from within the heart, and every genuine conversion supposes the miracle of a divine intervention.¹⁶ A sign comes from Heaven, given by Jupiter at the request of Venus: lightning and thunder, trumpet blasts, and armor glancing amid a miraculous cloud. *Of a sudden*, Aeneas is inwardly transformed: *ego poscor Olympo*, and now he sees the wars to come in the perspective of final victory. He is like one lifted out of and above his former self. By the grace of Heaven he has become in spirit a great Roman. To make all plain, Virgil ends the book with a symbolic gesture. Aeneas stands admiring the shield on which are pictured prophetic scenes of Roman history, culminating in the triumph of Augustus. Then he shoulders the shield, *attollens umero famamque et fata nepotum*. Now at last he is spiritually mature and, as it were, confirmed in grace.

In the light of this analysis, it is hardly true (as some have thought) that Aeneas' *spiritual* formation is completed by the end of Book VI.¹⁷ It is true that, when he leaves the Underworld, his *moral* character is firmly settled; he has achieved unity within himself. Moreover, he feels renewed faith and hope in his mission. On the surface, nothing more is wanting to him; he is now a heroic character who, by heroic deeds, will lay the foundations of eternal Rome. And yet Book VIII shows that Virgil felt that something *was* still wanting to Aeneas to make him a *religious* hero, endowed with *spiritual* energy equal

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* (note 15), p. 279.

¹⁷ This is more or less the opinion of C. M. Bowra, *From Virgil to Milton* (London, 1945), p. 63, and of Fowler, *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 422 ff.

to his destined task. Despite the help of Heaven vouchsafed him up to now, he still feels at times terribly alone in a world that seems leagued against him (cf. VIII, 26 ff.); despite the example of Hercules and the assistance of Evander, he feels despondent in the face of perils ahead (VIII, 520 ff.). And what he needs he now receives from Heaven as a reward for his *pietas*: he is endued with power from above, filled with a spiritual élan which suddenly transforms him into a new man, a *nova creatura*, a Roman Hercules. Now, but not before, he can say: "When I am weak, I am strong," but only with a strength given him from on high. This new spiritual energy St. Paul will call *grace* ("By the grace of God I am what I am"), the power of the Spirit, dwelling and working *within* man. Virgil lacked a precise word for this new power and a precise idea of its workings, but in Book VIII he seems to be groping towards it. For centuries men had been feeling the need of God, the desire to be united with Him and to sense His presence and His power in their lives. Some had sought this union with the divine through the mystery cults, others through philosophy. Virgil, too, while writing the *Aeneid*, had evidently pondered long on this question of the relation between man and the divine, and, as Miss Guillemin says, "c'est merveille que Virgile ait fait preuve en ces matières délicates d'une telle sûreté. Son prechristianisme est encore pauvre, incomplet, mais rien n'y détonne; s'il manque quelque chose, il n'y a rien à en éliminer."¹⁸

During the rest of the poem Aeneas never fails in his task. His *pietas* and *humanitas* are sorely tried in the crucible of war; the old tension between his human feelings and sense of duty reappears momentarily at the deaths of the young Lausus and Pallas. But, after he bids a sad farewell to the corpse of Pallas, he turns his face to warfare again: *nos alias hinc ad lacrimas eadem horrida belli / fata vocant; . . . nec plura effatus ad altos / tendebat muros . . .* (XI, 96 ff.). Even when the truce is broken and he is wounded and all seems lost, he is *lacrimis immobilis*. Cured by the aid of Venus, he sets out for battle with a few last, sad words which sum up his life: *Disce puer virtutem ex me verumque laborem / fortunam ex aliis* (XII, 435-6), words which show, perhaps, to quote Perret, "du coeur

¹⁸ *Op. cit.* (note 15), p. 282.

humain la connaissance la plus profonde, l'existence de ces niveaux intérieurs, à peine communiquant, par où la certitude la plus radieuse n'exclut pas que règne aussi chez le même homme la confusion et les ténèbres."¹⁹

We may regret that Virgil had not behind him some centuries of Christian religious experience to give him a deeper knowledge of the *vie intérieure* of the spirit of man and a surer grasp of divine operations. The gods of Virgil are not the Christ of the New Testament, nor is *pious* Aeneas a Christian saint. But we may well be grateful for what we have from him: a profound and moving study, in magnificent poetry, of the mysteries of man's conscience and the labyrinthine ways of the human heart.

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¹⁹ *Op. cit.* (note 2), p. 139.

Two and three generations ago the orations of Isaeus were widely studied by philologists as leading examples of a down-to-earth Attic style, and diligently combed by historians for their wealth of mundane data on Athenian legal and political institutions. If Isaeus is no longer in the forefront of classical studies,² the probable reasons for this neglect are not far to seek. In the first place, these wrangles over inheritances are too drearily materialistic to appeal to today's belletristic literary tastes; secondly, their intricacies and complexities are forbidding;³ and finally there is, I suspect, something of a feeling—a mixture of awe and relief—that Wyse's massive edition with its minute text criticism and exhaustive commentary has left little more to be done. This last feeling is reinforced when one observes how completely the subsequent editions of Isaeus are based upon Wyse.

Thus Wyse remains after more than half a century the standard edition of Isaeus, the starting point of all further discussion. That further discussion will sometimes lead to conclusions

¹ This paper is a by-product of a study undertaken with financial assistance from the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society, which is here acknowledged with gratitude.

The following abbreviations will be used: Wyse = W. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus* (Cambridge University Press, 1904). Roussel = P. Roussel, *Isée: Discours* (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1922). Forster = E. S. Forster, *Isaeus, with an English Translation* (London, Heinemann, 1927 [Loeb Classical Library]).

² *L'année philologique* shows only five articles on Isaeus and a word-list of his orations in the last ten years.

³ For example, a basic issue in disputes over inheritances is, of course, nearness of kin. A glance at the ramose genealogical charts for Orations 5 and 11 in Wyse and Forster is enough to impress the reader with the complexity of the family relationships involved. In Oration 11 "twenty-three members of the family are referred to by name, and it is necessary to trace the family's ramifications through a large number of second cousins whose nearness of consanguinity is in some cases affected by the intermarriage of first cousins. The facts of the case are not easy to follow even on paper, and it appears that the judges on this occasion were puzzled into giving a wrong verdict"—J. F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators*, p. 107.

different from Wyse's inheres in the nature of the case: *humanum est errare*. As M. I. Finley, for example, appositely remarks in his recent monograph on land and credit in Athens, "The classic demonstration of the technique of argumentation in the orators is still Wyse, *Isaeus*, though one may question his firm belief that Isaeus never had a client who was in the right."⁴

Wyse makes his attitude on this point clear in the opening words of his Preface: "The character of Isaeus was regarded with suspicion in antiquity. . . . in the Augustan age the judgment of orthodox criticism was summed up by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in these words: *πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀντίδικον διαπονηρεύεται, τοὺς δὲ δικαστὰς καταστρατηγεῖ, τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ παντὸς πειρᾶται βοηθεῖν*."⁵ The leading purpose of this edition is to show by analysis of the extant speeches that ancient scholars had a [just] appreciation of the orator's art. . . ." Wyse has carried out that purpose brilliantly, laying bare on page after page the orator's unscrupulousness, insincerity, fraud.⁶ But in his concentration on detecting every evidence of Isaeic deceit, his suspicious skepticism becomes so all-pervasive that he sometimes sees trickery or deception where none is involved.

An instance of this kind occurs at § 50 of the speech *On the Estate of Hagnias* (Oration 11). The speaker says *ἐλγούργουν*, "I performed liturgies." Wyse argues in a lengthy footnote that "this is nothing but a *usus verborum*."⁷ The editions of Rousset and of Forster, though they indulge in relatively few footnotes, both include one-sentence digests of Wyse's note.⁸ The point is thus regarded as one of some importance, and as settled. But a reexamination of the facts and of Wyse's arguments will, I think, lead to the opposite conclusion, viz. that *ἐλγούργουν* is here a guileless statement of fact, to be taken at face value.

⁴ M. I. Finley, *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 B.C.*, p. 211, n. 34. Another kind of flaw in Wyse's approach is signalized *ibid.*, p. 237, n. 16.

⁵ "He deals unfairly with his opponent, outwits the jurors, and tries every means to help the business with which the speech deals." The quotation is from *De Isaeo* 3.

⁶ See Wyse, *passim*, especially pp. 276, 396, 406, 453, 673-74.

⁷ Wyse, pp. 712-13.

⁸ Forster's and Rousset's notes are quoted below, pp. 166-7 and note 18.

The speeches of the Attic orators reveal a number of stock pleas that they used in appealing for the favor and sympathy of the juries. One of those was for the speaker to cite the liturgies (if any) performed for the state by himself and his family. Where the list of such public services was long and impressive, the speaker would enumerate, often in great detail; where the record of such services was so modest that enumeration would be anti-climactic, the speaker made do with a brief assertion of the performance of liturgies, without further specification.⁹ This being the case, when the speaker says *ἐλγτούργουν* in Isaeus, 11, 50, the burden of proof surely falls upon the modern commentator who would argue the invalidity or insincerity of the assertion.

The setting for the text under examination is this: The speaker is one Theopompus, who in a previous lawsuit had been the victor among several claimants to the estate of Hagnias. As defendant in the present proceedings he has been reviewing the extent and value of his property, to impress the jury with its modesty compared with his opponent's. Now Theopompus' wife had had two brothers, Chaereleos and Macartatus, both childless. First the one, then the other had died, leaving a property at Prospalta. The text then continues (§§ 49-50):

καταλειφθέντος δὲ τοῦ Προσπαλτοῦ χωρίου καὶ γιγνομένου τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδελφῆς, ἐμῆς δὲ γυναικός, ἐπέισθην ὑπ' ἐκείνης εἰσποιῆσαι Μακαρτάτῳ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν παίδων· οὐχ ἵνα μὴ¹⁰ λητουργοίην, εἰ προσγένειτό μοι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον. ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ εἰσποιήσαντος τοῦτό γ' ὑπῆρχεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐλγτούργουν διὰ τοῦτό γ' ἤττον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰσφερόντων ἦν καὶ τῶν τὰ προσταττόμενα ὑμῖν ἅπαντα ποιούντων.

⁹ A parallel passage to 11, 50 in the concluding section of Oration 4 occasions this apt comment from Wyse (p. 396): "Athenian pleaders, aware of the frailties of their audience, knew that extraneous considerations of this sort were not to be neglected, especially in a peroration. What in this case is notable is the orator's moderation; probably his material was meagre, Thrasippus' family not having distinguished themselves by lavish expenditure on choruses and triremes. With what exuberance Isaeus can amplify this topic, even when most irrelevant to the issue, will appear in v. 35 sqq., vii. 37 sqq."

¹⁰ The sense, as all modern editors agree, requires the *μή* to be placed here, instead of in the next sentence (before *εἰσποιήσαντος*), where the MSS have it.

I translate as follows, attempting to keep the flavor of the original:

The property at Prospalta being left and devolving to their sister, my wife, I was persuaded by her to give one of our sons in adoption to Macartatus¹¹—not lest I have to perform liturgies if this property should accrue to me. For this was just the same even after I arranged the adoption:¹² I performed liturgies none the less on this account certainly—indeed¹³ I was among the payers of the property-tax and the performers of all your mandates.

Let us now examine Wyse's arguments in order.¹⁴ First, his statement of the problem: "Theopompus has said in § 40 that the property he inherited from his father did not render him liable to *λειτουργία*, and in § 44 has reckoned the value of his land and house at 1 t. 10 m., an amount which is universally considered less than the minimum census for these public burdens. What then can he mean by saying 'even without the estate of Macartatus, transferred to my son, I still had to perform public services' (*τοῦτό γ' ἐπ' ἔρχεν* sc. *λειτουργεῖν*)?"

Wyse's answer to the question falls into two parts.

I. "Schoemann meets the difficulty by adding in the estate of Hagnias, said in § 44 not to be worth more than 2 t., thus bringing up the property of Theopompus to a sum which certainly constituted an *οὐσία* *λειτουργοῦσα*.¹⁵ But the estate of

¹¹ On such adoption to continue the otherwise extinct family of a dead man, see e.g. P. Cide and E. Caillemer in Daremberg-Saglio, I, p. 77; T. Thalheim in Pauly-Wissowa, I, col. 397; K. F. Hermann-T. Thalheim, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Rechtsaltertümer*, pp. 68-9; M. H. E. Meier-G. F. Schömann-J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, pp. 508-9.

¹² Or does he mean "For this (property) continued to belong to me just the same even after I gave (my son) in adoption"? In that case we should expect to find *μοι* with *ἐπ' ἔρχεν*. But the double reiteration of *τοῦτο* makes one wonder whether there is a *double entendre* here. It may be noted that in §§ 44-6 Theopompus emphasizes (twice) that the Prospalta property is his son's, yet he lists it as part of his own *οὐσία*.

¹³ The "progressive" use of *ἀλλά* is instanced in J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*², pp. 21-2.

¹⁴ Wyse, pp. 712-13, the essential parts of which are quoted hereafter.

¹⁵ Wyse cross-refers here to his note to § 40, 5-6. The older studies and handbooks, to which he there refers, concluded that an Athenian

Hagnias is a recent acquisition, and, as Theopompus says (§ 45), 'not yet secure.'"

Wyse's objection to Schoemann is surely without foundation in fact or logic. In §§ 45-6 Theopompus injects the remark that his possession of Hagnias' estate "is not yet safe" because lawsuits are still pending against him which, if successful, will have the effect of throwing the award of Hagnias' estate back into court for reconsideration. Since Theopompus is attempting here to minimize the total of his property, this is a skilful piece of rhetoric. But its legal significance is nil: Wyse has here himself fallen victim to Isaeus' innuendo. For the fact is that, whatever the future may bring, Theopompus is now the legal possessor of the estate of Hagnias and as such he includes it when itemizing his property (§ 44, cf. 46).¹⁶ Moreover, disputes over inheritances were often revived in Athens for years on end—sometimes even into a second generation, as in the case of this estate of Hagnias.¹⁷ Under these conditions Wyse's assumption that the successor to an estate could not exercise possessory rights so long as challenges to his title subsisted is a patent absurdity against which fiscal as well as private interests cry out.

It is worth noting in passing that Forster, in adopting Wyse's position, compounds the error. "Theopompus," he writes, "has already stated that his fortune did not render him liable to

was liable to liturgic service if his total wealth (*οβολα*) exceeded a certain minimum. On the basis of this oration and Demosthenes, 27, 64, the minimum has been variously calculated as

2 talents: V. Thumser, *De civium Atheniensium muneribus*, p. 54
ca. 3 talents: A. Boeckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*³, I,
pp. 145, 537, 561; II, p. 111, n. 756 (by M. Fränkel)

more than 3 talents: G. F. Schömann-J. H. Lipsius, *Griechische
Alterthümer*, I, p. 502; L. Whibley, *Companion to Greek
Studies*, p. 495; G. Busolt-H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staats-
kunde*, p. 839, n. 1.

More recent studies have emphasized that, at least for the major liturgies such as the trierarchy, the liturgists were selected from a fixed number of the richest citizens, without regard to any minimum fortune: cf. U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen*, p. 218, nn. 2, 3; H. Strasburger in Pauly-Wissowa, XIII A, col. 112.

¹⁶ At the time of the speech Theopompus had been in possession of the estate for at least a year or two (cf. Wyse, p. 677), and possibly for a very much longer period: cf. Finley, *op. cit.* (note 4), p. 249, n. 28.

¹⁷ Cf. Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, and 249, n. 28.

perform any λειτουργίαι . . . he is, therefore, here using the term in the wider sense of the duties of a citizen (*e.g.*, the payment of the war-tax and service in the army)."¹⁸ But in that earlier statement (§ 40) to which Forster refers Theopompus was talking about the small estate that he and his brother had inherited from their father (τὰ ὑπάρξαντα πατρῷα); since that time both brothers had increased their financial worth most substantially (§§ 40-50).

II. Wyse continues: "The fact is that Isaeus is fudging. He goes on to say οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐλειτουργοῦν διὰ τοῦτό γ' οὐδὲν ἤττον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰσφερόντων ἦν καὶ τῶν τὰ προσταττόμενα ὑμῖν ἅπαντα ποιούντων. This is nothing but a *lusus verborum*. Payment of the war-tax (εἰσφορά) may be called performance of a public duty (λειτουργεῖν), but it was not a λειτουργία in the technical sense, which the argument requires [*my italics*]. . . . The verb λειτουργεῖν is sometimes applied rhetorically even to military service, which was the duty of every able-bodied male citizen."

By his own admission, then, Wyse wants to reverse the sense that the text requires. There is no doubt that *leitourgia* and its related terms are sometimes used rather loosely. Originally *termini technici* for a group of public functions that wealthy Athenians were required to perform at their own expense, these terms came in the fourth century B. C. to be used increasingly in a more generalized sense, designating first *any* service to the community and eventually a service for *anyone's* benefit.¹⁹ A good example of this generalized sense can be quoted from Isaeus himself: ἡγοῦμαι μεγίστην εἶναι τῶν λειτουργιῶν τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν βίον κόσμον καὶ σώφρονα παρῆχεν.²⁰

The difficulty, then, is not that Isaeus does not use *leitourgia*

¹⁸ Forster, p. 424, n. b. Roussel's note, p. 205, n. 3, gives an accurate summary of Wyse's position: "Isée paraît jouer sur les mots et désigner par *λειτουργεῖν* non pas les liturgies selon le sens ordinaire du mot (triérarchie, chorégies, auxquelles Théopompos ne semble pas avoir été astreint (cf. §§ 40 et 41); mais simplement le paiement des contributions de guerre et le service militaire."

¹⁹ The general semantic history of *λειτουργία* κτλ. is a subject with which I propose to deal in a separate article.

²⁰ "The greatest of public services is, in my opinion, leading an orderly and temperate daily life." This is fragment 30 in Thalheim's edition, 131 in Sauppe's, 35 in Forster's. Cf. also 4, 29, quoted in note 21.

in the generalized sense. But Wyse's attempt to apply that sense to the text under discussion begs the question. It is true that the *eisphora*, a tax based on capital, was not a *leitourgia*. But Isaeus does not here treat it as if it was; the juxtaposition of the two terms does not equate them.²¹ What Theopompus says in outline, is: "I continued to serve in liturgies, pay *eisphora*, and perform all *prostattomena*." This last is, as Wyse himself states in another place, "a technical term of Athenian politics for 'duties' laid on the rich, especially the war-tax, the trierarchy, and the normal public services (*αἱ ἐγκύκλιοι λειτουργίαι*)."²² Moreover, the same combination of *leitourgia*, *eisphora*, and *prostattomena* is used by Isaeus to summarize the speaker's civic services also in 4, 27 and 7, 39-40, and in the latter instance, at least, he leaves no doubt that genuine liturgy is involved. The parallelism of these texts is too striking to be ignored.

My conclusion from the foregoing considerations²³ is that Wyse's judgment (concurred in by Roussel and Forster) on the liturgies of Theopompus must be reversed, and Isaeus' Eleventh Speech restored to the roster of legitimate evidence on the history and conditions of compulsory public service in the Athenian city-state.

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²¹ The mention of *eisphora* and *leitourgiai* side by side as evidences of civic virtue is a commonplace in the Attic orators: see e.g. Antiphon, *First Tetr.*, 2, 12 and 3, 8; Lysias, 7, 31; 19, 29; 20, 23; Isocrates, 15, 145; Isaeus, 5, 45; Demosthenes, 8, 70; 18, 257; 27, 64; 42, 3. The generalized sense of *leitourgia* (cf. note 20) can, of course, include *eisphora*; there is such an instance in Isaeus, 4, 29: οὔτε στρατεῖαν οὐδεμίαν ἐστράτευται οὔτε εἰσφορὰν οὐδεμίαν εἰσενήνοχε . . . οὐτ' ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ὑμῖν λεητοῦργηκεν.

²² Wyse, p. 398.

²³ An additional consideration may occur to the reader, namely that, since the performance of liturgies was a matter of public record (e.g. *I. G.*, II², 1604-32, 2318, 3025-72), it would have been suicidal for Theopompus to make a claim of liturgic service that could be revealed in rebuttal to be a flat lie or a deliberate deception. This would indeed be a telling argument in favor of the position I have taken in this paper, if it could be substantiated. The difficulty is that most types of public (as distinguished from private) actions, to which class Isaeus' Eleventh Speech belongs, appear to have been conducted without rebuttal speeches: cf. E. Caillemier in Daremberg-Saglio, II, p. 1656; Meier-Schömann-Lipsius, *op. cit.* (note 11), pp. 910-11.

THE EARLIEST RHETORICAL HANDBOOKS.

We generally think of Greek rhetorical theory as having been begun in Sicily by two shadowy figures named Corax and Tisias to fill some practical need of the new democracy and as developed by sophists at Athens during the last few decades of the fifth century. Gorgias serves as a convenient link between the practical rhetoric of Sicily and the sophistry of Athens, though we know that many features of formal rhetoric, both logical and stylistic, were known in Athens before the arrival of Gorgias in 427 B. C. Still, Protagoras and Prodicus, for all their interest in words, are not thought of as rhetoricians and Gorgias, for all his interest in epistemology, is. Succeeding sophists like Thrasymachus, Theodorus, Polus, and Alcidas mostly continued the interest in rhetoric.

Although some of the sophists made use of the question and answer method of instruction adopted by Socrates¹ their more characteristic educational device, whatever the subject at hand, was the speech, often flamboyant, long or short, in which the sophist undertook to demonstrate his point artistically. Sometimes a myth would be used, sometimes the technique was an indirect one in which all possibilities were enumerated, all but one disposed of, and the last accepted as necessarily valid. Sometimes the audience was asked to choose the form of the sophist's demonstration.² The subject might be literally anything. Examples of sophistic orations are the one in Plato's *Protagoras*, the two extant complete speeches of Gorgias: *Helen* and *Palamedes*, the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* of Antisthenes, and the *Odysseus* of Alcidas. All of them illustrate methods of speech and make use of logical and stylistic devices of interest to the student of rhetoric, and most of them even pretend to be addressed to a jury in a court of law. Sophistic instruction was largely oral, but such speeches could be copied down and serve as examples of oratory to be studied or imitated or quarried for commonplaces by the sophist's pupils who thus acquired not only the master's

¹ Cf. John H. Finley, Jr., "Euripides and Thucydides," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIX (1938), p. 56.

² Types of sophistic discourse can be seen in Socrates' encounters with sophists, cf. especially *Protagoras* 320 C.

theory of oratorical partition, but of the development of ideas, of style, and perhaps of delivery and memorization, thus including all of the parts of later rhetoric. We see this system of education in operation in the opening pages of Plato's *Phaedrus*. Lysias has delivered a sophistic oration which Phaedrus has heard and of which he has apparently secured the autograph (228 A 5 ff.) to study with the hope of improving his own technique of speech.

In many speeches of this type—the two by Gorgias, for example—the subject matter was apparently of only incidental importance—a fact which awakened the opposition of Socrates. The technique was the thing: the sophist is purely rhetorician, and his speech is a declamation not unlike those in vogue later at Rome. Speeches of this type are to be distinguished from serious expositions of an idea like Protagoras' speech or the pamphlets in oratorical form by Isocrates. In these latter the subject matter definitely counted very much; in the former it was subordinate to the method of demonstration and expression.

In the corpus of the ten Attic orators only the three tetralogies of Antiphon are certainly to be regarded as having been written to furnish models of oratory.³ They clearly do not refer to specific occasions and are excellent illustrations of argument. In actual court room use they would be considerably developed, partly by introduction of specific facts, partly by development of commonplaces, and probably an orator would prefer to choose material from more than one model in composing an actual speech. There was, thus, no reason why the collection of examples should be a collection of complete speeches. We know that collections of introductions and conclusions were made by Antiphon,⁴ Critias,⁵ Cephalus,⁶ and Thrasymachus,⁷ and the

³ Perhaps this is because with the appearance of judicial handbooks, as described below, the need for complete speeches to illustrate *topoi* and arrangement was past. The speech against the stepmother (Antiphon, I) as well as Lysias VI and IX and the forensic orations of Isocrates have sometimes been regarded as exercises rather than as real speeches, cf. R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators* (London, 1893), I, pp. 65, 229, and 281 and II, p. 7.

⁴ Cf. Ludwig Radermacher, "Artium Scriptores," *Wien. Sitzb., CCXXVII*, 3 (1951), B X 13-15.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, B XVII 1.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, B XVIII 1.

⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, B IX 1.

Demosthenic corpus⁸ contains a collection of prooemia for political speeches. The last is important, for the collections were by no means restricted to judicial oratory. One of the sources of appeal of such instruction was its applicability to all types of oratory and to political or philosophical discussions. The wealthy pupils of the sophists regarded themselves as the future governors and philosophers of the state and demanded a set of commonplaces appropriate for their manifold interests.

Three passages in ancient authors are important for an understanding of the place of sophistic specimen speeches in Greek intellectual history. The first is the very end of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*. Aristotle compares (183 b 36) the educational technique of Gorgias with the training given by teachers of eristic up until his time. The student was, he says, assigned ready-made speeches to memorize, as though a shoemaker were to try to teach his art by presenting his student with an assortment of shoes. Such a teacher communicates not art but the product of art. Aristotle is trying to create a systematic art of eristic to replace this unscientific approach; the beginning is difficult, he says (183 b 23), but once started the theory of the art will grow in bulk. This is what has happened in rhetoric. Opposed to the unscientific techniques of Gorgias is the theory of rhetoric which has been developed gradually by Tisias, Thrasymachus, Theodorus, and numerous others. Aristotle is here speaking solely of the existence of the theory; he is not saying anything about its exposition in written form.

A second passage treating of the beginnings of rhetorical theory is that in Cicero's *Brutus* 46 ff., which claims to be drawn from Aristotle, presumably from the *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν*, the lost summary of early rhetorical theory.⁹ Cicero here says "artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse," that is, they wrote down an account of their theory, if we can trust the verb which apparently represents a Greek *συγγράφειν*. Cicero continues:

scriptasque fuiss. et paratas a Protagora rerum illustrium disputationes, qui nunc communes appellantur loci;

⁸ Cf. A. Rupprecht, "Die demosthenische Prooemiensammlung," *Philol.*, LXXXII (1927), pp. 365 ff.

⁹ Cf. A. E. Douglas, "The Aristotelian *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν* after Cicero, *Brutus*, 46-48," *Latomus*, XLV (1955), pp. 536 ff.

quod idem fecisse Gorgiam, quem singularum rerum laudes vituperationesque conscripsisse, quod iudicaret hoc oratoris esse maxime proprium, rem augere posse laudando vituperandoque rursus affligere; huic Antiphontem Rhamnusiū similia quaedam habuisse conscripta. . . .

These collections of commonplaces are clearly not to be described as *ars* or *praecepta*, and they are thus not, as Gercke thought,¹⁰ the only form of rhetorical handbook. Cicero resumes "nam (but) Lysiam primo (in Athens or else after Corax and Tisias) profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi; deinde, quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus autem ieiunior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse, se arte¹¹ removisse." *Ars* (τέχνη) therefore means two things: in general the theory of the rhetoricians, whether expounded orally or in writing, and specifically a written exposition thereof. There are, moreover, two traditions among the early rhetoricians: the theoretical, according to both the above accounts including Tisias and Theodorus, and the tradition of the exemplar or collection of commonplaces, according to both accounts including Gorgias. There was, of course, some overlapping. Antiphon had a τέχνη, oral and written, as well as writing exemplars, both whole speeches and collections of commonplaces.¹²

The separate traditions are even more clearly distinguished in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*. Isocrates, who disapproves of all educators except himself, divides his opponents into three types: the first (§§ 1-8) are the teachers of disputation, the sophists in the usual modern sense of the word. The second (9-13) are the teachers of political discourse. Section twelve makes it clear that these men taught by means of commonplaces or "elements" as Isocrates calls them. The third type (19-20) are "those who lived before our time and dared to write the

¹⁰ Cf. A. Gercke, "Die alte τέχνη ῥητορική und ihre Gegner," *Hermes*, XXXII (1897), p. 348. In reply cf. Peter Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition in der alten τέχνη ῥητορική* (Paderborn, 1914); Stanley Wilcox, "The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction," *H. S. O. P.*, LIII (1942), pp. 137 f.; and Friedrich Solmsen, rev. of Radermacher, *Gnomon*, XXVI (1954), pp. 214 f.

¹¹ Adopting the textual suggestion of A. E. Douglas, "A Further Note on Cicero, *Brutus*, 48," *Latomus*, XVI (1957), p. 461.

¹² Cf. Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4), B X.

so called arts." These men taught how to conduct law suits and apparently nothing more.

It seems probably that one of the more remarkable features of Isocrates' own school was the way he combined theoretical exposition, the study of examples, and continual practice.¹³ The best picture of the pure theoretical tradition is the passage in the *Phaedrus* of Plato (267 D. 5 ff.) in which Phaedrus reminds Socrates of the content of the "books on the art of words." Socrates then begins with the contents of the prooemium and passes through the traditional parts of the *judicial* speech: the narration, the separate parts of the proof or refutation, and the epilogue. Since many later treatises follow this organization in at least part of their contents, it seems clear that we are to think of these handbooks as consisting of a discussion of each of the parts of the speech in turn. Under proof was discussed the argument from probability and, since Plato inserts here mention of means of amplification, perhaps we are to think of these too as included in the handbooks of this type at this point. Plato's summary is confirmed by Aristotle's statement (*Rhetoric* 1354 b 18 ff.) that handbook writers before his time were concerned with the parts of the speech.

These handbooks were moreover, devoted entirely to judicial oratory. Stanley Wilcox was perfectly correct in insisting in an article in the *Harvard Studies*¹⁴ that instruction in rhetoric in the fifth and early fourth centuries could not have been restricted to judicial oratory, as had generally been thought; we have seen that the specimen speeches prepared the student for all kinds of oratory, but this does not mean that the rhetorical *τέχναι*, oral or written, had to be so general. That they were not is clear from the explicit testimony of Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1354 b 26 ff.) and Isocrates (*Adv. Soph.* 19) and from the fact that the parts of the oration as described by Plato are the parts of the judicial speech.

The passages in Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates seem to me to indicate that written handbooks of rhetorical theory were fairly numerous, though not necessarily that there were many different copies of each different one. Publication in the late fifth century

¹³ Cf. *Antidosis* 180-8, *Epistula*, VI, 7-10, and Jebb, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 3), II, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10), pp. 121 ff.

was not a mass production process, and perhaps such a term should only be used of strictly literary works like dramas or histories or polished orations which were bought and read by the general public for entertainment. Both the collections of exemplars and the theoretical handbooks were produced to fill a practical need and proved ephemeral. They are compared by Professor Jaeger¹⁵ to the Peripatetic writings and probably one could add that they resembled medical and sophistic treatises. All of these belong to the class of *ὑπομνήματα*—writings composed to record a train of thought by a teacher or one of his pupils. If we regard the rhetorical handbooks in this way the judicial orientation of the outlines of theory points clearly to their function. Those who could afford a liberal education for public life attached themselves to a sophist, practiced his commonplaces, and learned almost incidentally the techniques of court oratory. But Greek law required that every citizen should speak in his own behalf in prosecution or defense. A knowledge of judicial oratory might therefore be a real need to anyone among the litigious Athenians. One did not, after all, *have* to speak in the Ecclesia, and no doubt only those who felt capable of self-expression did so. On the other hand, countless circumstances could catch even the innocent in the toils of the law. Where was an inexperienced person to turn? One way was to a logographer, a speech writer like Lysias, whose published orations advertised his wares. But this must have been expensive; Lysias' customers, even probably the invalid in oration twenty-four, seem prosperous. If the prospective litigant could not buy a whole speech and could not afford or had not the time to study with a sophist, he could turn to a rhetorician and learn from him in a single lecture, or by reading a written summary of his lecture, the necessary parts of a speech and the chief features of each part. Such instruction was necessarily cheap. When Lysias gave up theoretical exposition for writing speeches he continued to fulfill a similar function in supplying judicial oratory to those lacking the knack, but in a different and no doubt more profitable fashion. I do not suppose that great sophists like Protagoras or Hippias or Gorgias concerned themselves with this sort of thing; the rhetoricians were people like

¹⁵ Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of his Policy* (Berkeley, 1938), p. 31 and n. 21 thereto.

Tisias, Theodorus, Lyēas, and Polus, the second-rate intellectuals of the day. The public for the τέχνη of a rhetorician would, in a more general way, include present and prospective jurymen, and thus most Athenian citizens, who were interested in what was being put over on them in the courts. I have elsewhere argued¹⁶ that the orator Andocides in his earliest speeches shows only a crude knowledge of oratorical techniques. Because of his extensive exile from Athens and perhaps his aristocratic sentiments he was presumably unfamiliar with the conventions and tried to pick up the devices by looking over a handbook which summarized the theory of some rhetorician. The results were not altogether successful.

The various τέχναι varied slightly as one author added to the work of his predecessor.¹⁷ We can say a little about three of the steps in this development on the basis of surviving references.

First would come the theory of Corax and Tisias, the traditional founders of rhetoric in Sicily.¹⁸ Three principal problems exist in connexion with their place in the history of rhetoric: what was the relationship of one to the other; was their work confined to one field of oratory; and of the many oratorical partitions attributed to them which are genuine? Conflicting answers to all of these questions can be found in ancient sources, and the task is mostly one of choosing which authority to follow. The sources¹⁹ are: (1) passing references in good Greek writers

¹⁶ "The Oratory of Andocides," *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), pp. 32 ff.

¹⁷ Thus Aristotle entitled his work (or the work of his research assistants) *Συναγωγή Τεχνών*: "A Collection of Arts," meaning that it was necessary to collect the theory of each individual out of the total corpus of writings.

¹⁸ On Corax and Tisias, cf. Aulitzky in *R.-B.*, s. v. "Korax 3" and Stegemann in *R.-B.*, s. v. "Tisias"; Karl Barwick, "Die Gliederung der rhetorischen Τέχνη," *Hermes*, LVII (1922), pp. 1 ff.; Hamberger, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10); D. A. E. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," *C. Q.*, XXX (1936), pp. 170 ff., and "Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," *C. Q.*, XXXIV (1940), pp. 61 ff.; W. Kroll, "Randbemerkungen XVIII," *Rh. M.*, LXXVI (1911), pp. 164 ff. and *R.-B.*, Suppl. VII, s. v. "Rhetorik," cols. 1041 f.; Octave Navarre, *Essai sur la rhétorique grecque avant Aristote* (Paris, 1900); Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4), B II; Solmsen, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10); A. W. Verrall, "Korax and Tisias," *J. P.*, IX (1880), pp. 197 ff.; Wilcox, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10) and "Corax and the *Prolegomena*," *A. J. P.*, LXIV (1943), pp. 1 ff.

¹⁹ Cf. Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4), B II.

and especially in Plato and Aristotle; (2) quotations from Aristotle's lost *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν*, especially in Cicero; (3) remarks in later Greek and Latin writers which may or may not come from Aristotle; (4) much more detailed material to be found in the *Prolegomena* of the *Rhetores Graeci*, composed between the third and thirteenth centuries A. D. The latter fall into two classes. One contains a longer historical account, represented by Sopater and numbers 6A and 13 in the Teubner edition by Hugo Rabe. These are clearly late reconstructions based on little if any original source material.²⁰ The second tradition, though it contains considerable variety, is best represented by number four in Rabe's collection and probably goes back to the Sicilian historian Timaeus (ca. 356-260 B. C.).²¹ Number four, briefly summarized, in its historical survey says that Corax was active in Syracuse at the time it became a democracy. He developed a tripartite scheme of oratory to help the citizens learn to speak in the assembly. Tisias was one of Corax' pupils who, to avoid paying for lessons, argued that if he won the dispute with his teacher he need not pay by that decision; if he lost, however, payment would be unjust, since the lessons would be proved worthless. Corax, in reply, reversed the argument.

With this account we must compare what Cicero says (*Brutus* 46), immediately before the words quoted above:

itaque ait Aristoteles, cum sublati in Sicilia tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis repeterentur, tum primum, quod esset acuto illa gens et controversa natura, artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse. . . .

Whom do we believe, Aristotle or Timaeus, both at second hand?

Aristotle knows nothing about the rhetorical theories of Corax except that they involved argument from probability. The only passage in which he mentions him by name is *Rhetoric* 1402 a 17 where the traditional example of probability which Plato (*Phaedrus* 273 A 7 ff.) had attributed to Tisias is said to constitute the art of Corax. It is further significant that the *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν* is said by Cicero (*De Inv.*, II, 6) to have begun with Tisias.²² Neither Plato nor Isocrates ever mentions Corax by

²⁰ Cf. Wilcox, "Corax and the *Prolegomena*" (*supra*, n. 18), p. 10.

²¹ Cf. Ludwig Radermacher, "Timäus und die Ueberlieferung über die Ursprung der Rhetorik," *Rh. M.*, LII (1897), pp. 412 ff.

²² In *Brutus*, 46, therefore, Cicero is perhaps coupling Corax and

name. On the other hand, the Timaeus tradition shows little interest in Tisias; he is simply a pupil of Corax. We may conjecture that Corax did play a political role and thus was of interest to the Sicilian historian. Apparently no written work of Corax survived, if he ever composed one.²³ Tisias, on the other hand, taught a theory of which a written summary was known to Plato and Aristotle. Everything that we know about this theory points to the fact that its concern was with judicial oratory. In *Phaedrus* 267 B 6 Plato inserts mention of it into the middle of the outline of a judicial handbook and in 273 A 7 ff. gives an example of Tisias' method which is clearly drawn from a discussion of judicial arguments. Finally, there is one reference to show that Tisias followed the allied profession of a *λογογράφος*, a paid writer of court speeches, for Pausanias (VI, 17, 8) speaks of a speech which he wrote for a Syracusan woman.

To go back now to the three problems about Corax and Tisias, we may conclude that the relationship between them was not necessarily very close. The story of the trial might show that, and it is emphasized by their differing interests. Corax was probably concerned with speaking in the assembly. Tisias was perhaps influenced by Corax' conception of oratory and his use of argument from probability. He constructed a theory which stands at the head of the long tradition of works with a judicial emphasis and probably was mostly intended to help those called upon to speak in court. As for the divisions of the oration, Rabe's fourth *Prolegomenon* (cf. Walz, VI, p. 18) attributes to Corax a threefold division: introduction, *ἀγών*, conclusion. This is quite suitable for deliberative oratory where a narration is rarely needed.²⁴ The great characteristic of judicial oratory and of the system of organization described by Plato in the *Phaedrus*

Tisias in his own mind, as he does in *De Oratore*, I, 91, and thus misquoting Aristotle. Perhaps Aristotle coupled the two.

²³ There is a puzzling reference to Corax at the end of the dedicatory epistle of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, which I take to mean, at most, that the author of the epistle, who is not the author of the treatise, thought that the treatise made use of material from a pre-Aristotelian source. There appears to be no real knowledge of Corax here. Quintilian refers to Corax twice (II, 17, 7 and III, 1, 8), always coupled with Tisias. Even in the *Prolegomena* Corax is mostly regarded as an oral teacher.

²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1417 b 11.

(266-7) is this very narrative. Therefore, because of his judicial emphasis I think it certain that Tisias recognized at least a four-part division.

It is logical to expect that a system of distribution which had progressed from a threefold to a fourfold division might meet with attempts at further extension. And so it was, apparently. The passage from the *Phaedrus* (266 E 5 ff.) refers to subdivisions of the proof made by Theodorus of Byzantium.²⁵ Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1414 b 13 ff.) refers to similar subdivisions of the narration and speaks of "those around Theodorus," apparently to indicate that he had pupils. He is, in fact, the type of the professional rhetorician whose interests did not extend beyond judicial oratory. It will be remembered that Cicero couples Theodorus with Lysias (*Brutus*, 48). Theodorus was more successful at teaching, Lysias at speech writing.

The earlier theoretical handbooks contained only a discussion of invention and distribution, and the arrangement shown in Plato's description in the *Phaedrus* implies that invention was treated under proof, rather than in a separate section. During the fourth century a discussion of style and an introductory discussion of invention were added, and Aristotle suggests the further addition of delivery (1403 b 19 ff.). The end of the *Rhetoric* and also of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, usually attributed to Anaximenes, thus represents expanded fifth-century handbooks. The prefixed material, and probably also the concern with more than judicial oratory, is distinctive of the fourth century.

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²⁵ On Theodorus, cf. Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4) B XII and Engelbert Drerup, "Die Anfänge der rhetorischen Kunstprosa," *Jahr. f. Philol.*, Suppl. XXVII (1901), pp. 219 ff., especially 332 ff.

VENETIC ISOGLOSSES.

In assessing the diagnostic value of isoglosses for the purpose of determining genetic affinity amongst languages, those presumably resulting from common innovation by structural replacement or addition are the only isoglosses that may be safely and seriously considered.¹ Those resulting from innovation by loss or from common retention are of no value for such decisions. This principle implies a circularity: We must discover genetic affinities in order to reconstruct sensitively the intervening earlier linguistic stages, and hence the precise nature and shape of the proto-language; we must determine common innovations in order to discover genetic affinities; we must assume a shape for the proto-language in order to declare which features are common innovations. Since this circularity is not vicious, there is no harm in it; much of scientific reasoning is circular. We must, however, have a clear realization of this aspect of our task.

In a recent paper² M. S. Beeler has discussed very compactly and informatively important isoglosses shared by Venetic with other language groups, particularly with conventional Italic and with Germanic. The purpose of the present brief note is to assay these isoglosses in accordance with the above principle. Since this note is a sort of addendum to Beeler's paper, repetitious discussion of the items may be dispensed with; as a convenience, Beeler's numbering of the items will be retained.

A. Retentions.

Beeler regards (7), the *-r* verbal ending, and (17), the *-to* 3rd sg. middle, as retained; I agree. I also regard the following as of early, and probably common IE, date: (9) *per*; (10) *dono·m*; (13) *-s-* preterite/aorist; and the constructs represented by (21) *doto*, (22) *magetlo·n·*, and (23) *vebele·i·*. These types are discussed over and over in the handbooks, and scarcely require recapitulation here.

(8) *op* is surely old, and is now attested in Mycenaean Greek *o-pi*, apart from the preverb vestiges long attested in later Greek.

¹ See also E. P. Hamp, *The Journal of Celtic Studies*, II (1953), pp. 7-9; *I. J. A. L.*, XXIV (19-8), pp. 150-3.

² "Venetic and Italic," *Hommages à Max Niedermann* (Bruxelles, 1956), pp. 38-48.

(18) *tole-* 'give' may be regarded as reflecting a traditional syllabic **l* before a vowel; in laryngeal terms this would be an **l* which syllabified in position before a prevocalic laryngeal (**X*). In this fashion, we may regard **tlX-V* as a retained sequence. The semantics are too delicate and brittle to judge on.

(20) *kara-(mno-s)*: The suffixation is of course broadly attested. The lexical base is at least Italo-Keltic and Germanic (?), and is therefore a retention of some date at least.

(16) *ke* 'and' is of uncertain background: If the initial goes back to a palatal, there is possibly a cognate in Lycian, which would make the form a retention. If we have a reflex of enclitic **-k^we* or of **-k*,⁸ we have a widely attested retention. This item, though interesting, seems not to be diagnostic for our purpose.

(24) *-m ~ -n* is ambiguous both in its IE origin and in result. Moreover, it is likely that final position was a position of neutralization for nasals in IE; if so, no conclusion can be drawn from this item.

The equation *e·kvon* = *equom* shows a retained /kw/ < **k_w*.

B. Diagnostic innovations.

The following items are innovations, to be sure, but for one reason or another, specified in each case, they are not so conclusive for the placement of Venetic as we might wish.

(6), the nominal plural suffix *-bos*, has the virtue of being a morphological item, a category which seems to be of particular value in making the type of decision in question; but the nature of the structure from which it is derived is such that the result is not free of the suspicion of chance convergence. It is true that Italic alone clearly shares this feature: Keltic shows both forms with palatal vocalism (Gaulish *gobedbi* and Irish) and *-bo(s)* (Gaulish *-bo* and Iberian Keltic *-bos*, on the bronze of Luzaga; see M. Lejeune, *Celtiberica* [Salamanca, 1955]); the picture is further complicated by the fragmentary attestation of both Gaulish and Venetic. Moreover, the fragmentary Messapic *-bas* may also be pertinent; see my remarks on Albanian and Messapic, *Studies presented to Joshua Whatmough*, p. 85. Indo-Iranian shows *-bhiṣ* and *-bhyas*; Armenian has **-bh-*, but the vocalism in the plural is ambiguous. Greek *-φι* was indifferent

⁸ See E. P. Hamp, "IE Enclitic **-k*," *K. Z.*, LXXIV (1956), pp. 236-8.

to number; Mycenaean *-pi* was likewise independent of number, although it seems to have been favored in the plural (see M. Lejeune, *B. S. L.*, LI [1956], pp. 187-218). Germanic and Balto-Slavic, of course, share endings in *-m-*. It seems, then, that in later IE (and consequently in the parent of Italo-Keltic) there were two endings for the plural, **-bhi(s)* and **-bhos*; whether these were alternates or two contrastive case-endings is a question that is not easily resolved. Therefore, even if we admitted (ignoring the perhaps fatal *argumenta ex silentio*) that in some sense Venetic, Italic, Keltic, and Messapic shared this item as an innovation, it is still not possible to declare whether the innovation is by replacement or by loss. If it is by loss, it is not diagnostic; if by replacement, such an isolated alternate form could easily show agreements by chance convergence. This feature, then, supports no serious argument.

(11) genitive singular in *-i*. This isogloss would seem to place Venetic squarely within Italo-Keltic, but the affinity cannot be refined beyond that on the evidence of this item alone.

(12), the change of **eu* to *ou*, is a weak phonological link with Italic. The same change happened independently in Keltic, and in Continental Keltic independently of Insular. The phenomena of Balto-Slavic and Indo-Iranian are not relevant, since they involve other structural features and events. Yet since this change is far from unique, it is not decisive.

(15), the change of syllabic **l* to *ol*, is indeed an innovation shared with Italic, and may in fact be significant. But since Germanic and, in part, Balto-Slavic show somewhat similar results (*ul*, etc.) whereby known differences between the overall phonemic structure of the respective vowel systems might readily explain the apparent disagreement as a later restructuring, we do well not to consider this isogloss too seriously. Moreover, bearing in mind the diverse fate of these syllabics in the IE languages and in view of the very circumscribed quantity and nature of our corpus, we may not even have a representative descriptive picture for this structure-point in Venetic.

(14) *fak-* is a lexical-morphological (allomorphic) isogloss which includes Italic, to be sure, but also Phrygian and perhaps Greek. It seems likely, then, that such a formation was, at least for a time in IE, productive in a very limited way. The details are perhaps too difficult to recover to make our decision sure.

The assibilation (19) shown in *iūva·n·tśa·i·* is a minor innovation that does not link Venetic distinctively with the early period of any of the other IE subgroups.

Having thus removed from consideration certain innovations which are unsatisfactory for our purposes, we may now turn to the *conclusive innovations*:

(2) **dh-*, **bh-* > *f-*. This pervasive phonological change is shared with Italic alone. Furthermore, the different medial treatment is significant for the relationship of Venetic to Latin. Beeler remarks (pp. 46-7) that the voiced stops in medial position in Latin and Venetic may well be independent. The stop feature must certainly be independent, as is clearly shown by *louderobos: līberī*. That is to say, the Latin *-b-* presupposes an earlier (bi)labial spirant, the latter in turn from an interdental spirant which gave the Venetic dental; in other words, we cannot avoid positing an intervening stage in the history of Latin at which time the sound in question was still a spirant. But what does *not* seem to be independent, and hence is significant, is the voicing in this position. I have dealt with this feature elsewhere⁴ and need not here repeat my reasoning. I have also given in that place my reasons for not seeing the need to divorce Faliscan from Latin and Venetic on this score, as Beeler suggests (pp. 47, 48).

(5) **gh-* > *h-* is a phonological isogloss shared, like the last, with Italic, and is no doubt a part of the same general phenomenon.⁵

(1) *dona-* is a denominative verb with a base-plus-suffix lexical combination that is shared notably with Italic.

⁴ *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 183-6. It may perhaps be argued that, while Oscan-Umbrian show a medial phoneme /-f/, in this position the phoneme had a voiced allophone and that therefore they in fact agree with the Latin-Venetic treatment; this argument is strengthened by the observation that medial *-s-* shows voicing characteristics in these dialects. The evidence, however, points clearly the other way in the case of Oscan, which was removed from later contacts, in which Umbrian increasingly found itself, with other Italic diffusional sources. In the north Calabrian Oscan loans attested in the modern dialects (see G. Rohlfs, *Dizionario dialettale delle Tre Calabrie* [Halle/Milano, puntata I, 1932], pp. 30-1) we find a clear continuation of voiceless medial *-f-*.

⁵ This development has, however, been recently doubted by E. Polomé ("Germanisch und Venetisch," *MNHMHZ XAPIN*, II [1957], pp. 86-98), who concludes "Hieraus geht deutlich hervor, dass die Frage der Vertretung des idg. **gh/ĝh* im Venetischen offen bleibt."

(3) *a·i·su-* 'god' ≡ a lexical item shared with Italic, though there are strong suspicions of an Etruscan or other extraneous origin; on Volsc. *esac̄istrom* 'sacrificium' see now J. Untermann, *I. F.*, LXII (1956), p. 134.

(4) *louderobos* 'liberis' is a lexical item shared specifically with Latin.

(25) *sselboisselboi* is a lexical isogloss shared clearly with Germanic.⁶ (26) *meg* is an isolated (weakly structured) morphological innovation shared likewise with Germanic.⁷

C. *Assay of diagnostic innovations.*

Not all innovations are of equal weight for the determination of genetic affinity: We know that isolated lexical forms and derivational affixes are readily borrowed by languages whose contact is even rather casual; if such borrowings affect matters whose cultural content is not very specific, we assume that the nature of the contact was in some sense fairly intense.

Thus, of the distinctive innovations rehearsed above, (3) *a·i·su-* might reflect a borrowing (even of very early date) arising from relatively fleeting contacts on Italian soil. (1) *dona-* could likewise be a borrowing, though it is hard to specify to what precise cultural realm it might have referred.

(4) *louderobos* as a lexical item is open to the suspicion of

⁶ E. Polomé (n. 4 in the above-mentioned article) has furnished an excellent discussion of the etymological connexions of this form. As for the initial *ss-*, it may be remarked that even if the initial sibilant was in fact "stark artikulierend," it is unlikely that an allophone would be so expressed in writing; perhaps we must see in this feature more orthographic than linguistic (phonemic/allophonic) significance.

Surely Polomé is right in analyzing **selbho-* as *-bho-* (OPruss. *subs*) affixed to **sel-*, which in turn would match the Hittite pronominal genitive *-l* and the particle *-ē(a)* 'ipse' (and ultimately Lat. *tālis, quālis*). Thus the elements involved in this isogloss would really be those of retention, and only the morphological combination would be a shared innovation. Moreover, as Polomé reminds us, the syntax of OHG *selb selbo* shows different case forms juxtaposed.

The more one inspects this isogloss the less cogent it becomes.

⁷ Polomé discusses this briefly in his note 3. It should be pointed out, however, that the agreement with Hittite is incomplete since *uk*, *amuk*, *zik*, and *tuk* ('ego, me, -u, te') all show the *-k* element. As between Hittite, Greek *-ye*, Slavic (*jego*), Lithuanian (*-ga, -gi*), Germanic and Venetic, it seems that we have, in detail, features that are not necessarily shared, nor clearly innovating.

borrowing in principle, but the highly important further consideration of dissimilarity in phonemic substance between the Latin and Venetic forms places the putative time of borrowing well back in time—to a time when on other grounds we must consider the two languages converging as structures. In this instance we thus approach the tautology of a language “borrowing” from itself. This isogloss is thus much more important than most lexical isoglosses.

(25) *sselboisselboi* and (26) *mezo* are lexical and morphological particularities of the sort that we have observed better known languages to have borrowed quite readily. On the other hand, these relatively non-cultural and quasi-idiomatic constructions point to a fairly intimate degree of contact and considerable bilingualism. They represent the sort of phenomena that we see in quantity in the Balkans, in the eastern Baltic, and in Brittany between Breton and French.

(2) and (5) are the sort of fine-grained phonological detail that is diffused only as a result of long and intimate symbiosis. Even under such conditions, we can point to many instances where such phonological (allophonic) patterns fail to diffuse until bilingualism finally turns into the death of a language.

D. Conclusion.

Of the isoglosses passed in review, thanks to the valuable preparation furnished by Beeler, the following significant items emerge:

(2), (5), and (4) point unambiguously to the genetic membership of Venetic in the Italic family; (2) and perhaps (4) bind Venetic with Latin-Faliscan.

(25) and (26) point to considerable more recent bilingual contacts between Venetic and Germanic speakers.⁸

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⁸ Since writing this note, after reading Polomé's arguments reproduced and discussed above, I consider, upon reflexion, that these two apparent points of contact may prove to be illusory. It is at any rate gratifying that Polomé concludes that Venetic “keine genügendes Material darbietet um auf eine engere Verwandtschaft zwischen Germanisch und Venetisch zu schliessen.”

WHAT WAS THE *LINEA DIVES*

(MARTIAL, VIII, 78, 7)?

What was the nature of the contrivance by which at Roman shows the distribution of presents among the assembly was effected? Friedländer, on Martial, VIII, 78, 7, suggested that the people perhaps caught the presents from the *linea* by jumping for them ("die etwa im Sprunge erhascht werden konnten"). This suggestion does not, however, accord with the word *cadit* of line 8, or with Statius, *Silvae*, I, 6, 16 and 20 (*cadit* . . . ; *cadunt*), or with *pluebant* (*ibid.* 10); and was rightly rejected by Fabia¹ on this ground (add Seneca, *Ep. Mor.*, 74, 7-10, *inciderunt* . . . ; *desuper iactat* . . . ; *cadentibus*; Josephus, *Ant. Jud.*, XIX, 1, 12, πολλῆς δ' ὀπίρας ἐπιχεομένης τοῖς θεωροῖς; Suetonius, *Dom.*, 4, *deziderat*). Fabia, however, while rejecting Friedländer's suggestion, had no alternative explanation: "à un moment donné on imagina un appareil qui s'appelait *linea*, et dont l'existence nous est révélée par deux témoins contemporains de Domitien [Martial, VIII, 78, 7; Statius, *Silvae*, I, 6, 9] . . . Qu'était-ce au juste que cet appareil? Il faut avouer que nous l'ignorons." Vollmer's commentary on the *Silvae* had no explanation of this point ("die Näschereien fielen von einem über das Amphitheater gespannten Seile unter das Volk"); and Frère² could only refer back to the aforementioned article by Fabia, and remark: "le dispositif reste obscur."

I believe an idea of the contrivance is to be found in a picture from Pompeii, included in Maiuri's *Roman Painting* (Skira, 1953, p. 126), and itself regarded as an enigma. On p. 130, Maiuri refers to it as "a picture of a remarkable and somewhat intriguing order." Apart from a suggestion that it might have represented the flowers and gifts that a hospitable host sometimes let fall on his guests through an opening in the ceiling, he is content to say that "there is little point in looking for an 'explanation' of this curious picture; we do better simply to admire the artist's fine decorative sense" etc.

¹ Daremberg-Saglio, III, ii, s. v. 'missilia.'

² In the Budé edition of the *Silvae* (1944), Vol. I, *Notes complémentaires* to pp. 46 and 49.

I suggest that this picture from Pompeii represents a veritable *linea* of the kind referred to by Statius and Martial. That such *lineae* will have been in use in Pompeii there seems no good reason to doubt. The games-advertisements from there³ refer to *sparsiones*, the word used by Statius, I, 6, 66, in connection with presents (cf. Seneca, *Ep. Mor.*, 74, 6; Suetonius, *Cal.*, 18 and *Dom.*, 4 for the use of *spargere* in this connection); and there seems no reason for thinking that, as hinted by Vollmer (*Silvae*, I, 6, 66), *sparsiones* in those advertisements may have meant *sparsiones odorum*. The fact that *sparsiones* of presents formed a regular part of an aedile's bounty in provincial centres much further afield than Pompeii⁴ leaves little doubt that the *sparsiones* advertised in Pompeii meant what Statius meant by the word;⁵ or that the custom was availed of as a subject by artists, as in the case of so many other items from the public spectacles.⁶

The contrivance, a sort of hammock which could be drawn forwards or backwards by its cords on rings along the two containing side-ropes, corresponds well, it seems to me, with the need for refilling the hammock⁷ after each shaking-out of the *bellaria* had been effected (cf. Seneca, *Ep. Mor.*, 74, 7, *excutere*) by agitation of the side-ropes or tension and relaxation of the cords of the hammock. By means, perhaps, of the kind of windlasses, a part of one of which was discovered in Pompeii,⁸ a number of hammocks, filled and replenished from time to time at conveniently-arranged filling-points, could be drawn along pairs of ropes running between sets of *mali* fixed at suitable points among the seats;⁹ and it is difficult to imagine any other method, consistent with such hints as the literature gives us, by which a mass of objects might be so conveniently distributed over the heads of an audience in a large unroofed building.

The "more or less indeterminate objects" (Maiuri) falling

³ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1179, 1181, 1184.

⁴ Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, II, p. 17, note 5, with the inscriptions there cited from Africa.

⁵ So Sergejenko, *Pompeji*², p. 234.

⁶ Friedländer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 53.

⁷ Cf. Statius, I, 6, 80, *dum nova lucra comparantur*, with Vollmer's note; Martial, VIII, 78, 7-8, *nec linea dives/Cessat*.

⁸ Neuburger, *Technik des Altertums*, English tr., p. 209.

⁹ Cf. Schreiber-Anderson, *Atlas of Classical Antiquities*, p. 57 (middle).

out of the hammock¹⁰ include fruit, corresponding to *Silvae*, I, 6, 12 ff. The correspondence with these lines extends to the inclusion of dates and walnuts and the picture shows a piece of fruit cut in half so that the kernel shows. One may also see what, from their shape, might be cakes, pastries, or 'pains de fruits comprimés.'¹¹ As to the dark object in the lower right corner of the picture, I suggest that, in view of the commonness of napkins as Saturnalia-presents, this may be a purple *mappa*. Its shape recalls the embroidered napkin (cf. Petronius, 32, 2-3) from the Pompeian still-life reproduced in Seyffert-Sandys' *Dictionary of Classical Antiquities*, p. 445. The use of purple in *mappae* is indicated in Petronius, *loc. cit.*; Martial, IV, 46, 17 (with Friedländer's note), and, negatively, in Lampridius, *Alex. Sev.*, 37, 2, where Alexander's moderation in using only white *mantelia* suggests the use by others of purple ones (cf. *ibid.*, 40, 10, where *pura* is contrasted with *purpura*).¹²

I have consulted expert opinion as to the birds perching on the ropes,¹³ and am told that the one on the extreme right is "unmistakably a Guinea Fowl"; that the one in the centre "has the appearance of a Turtle Dove"; and that the bird on the left "looks like a Domestic Pigeon." In the third case, however, the Editors of this Journal consider that the bird is a duck, as do sportsmen to whom I have showed the picture. The guinea fowl among the kinds of birds distributed appears in *Silvae*, I, 6, 78; and considering the great popularity of pigeons (Plin., *N. H.*, X, 110), which might be kept *animi causa*, or (Columella, *De R. R.*, VIII, 8) for fattening and eating, their inclusion among birds for distribution as presents would not be surprising, any more than would that of ducks, mentioned as appearing in pontifical banquets in Republican times (Macrobius, III, 13, 12). Just how the masses of birds were let loose among the spectators¹⁴ in the times before the introduction of throwing *tesserae* for them saved the birds from being torn to pieces by the contending recipients (Martial, VIII, 78, 11 f.; Josephus, *loc. cit.*),

¹⁰ Maiuri, curiously, appears not to have connected the two.

¹¹ Statius, *loc. cit.*, 17-20, with Frère's notes.

¹² Cf., also, Daremberg-Saglio, III, ii, p. 1580.

¹³ Mr. J. D. Macdonald, Principal Scientific Officer, Bird Section, British Museum (Natural History).

¹⁴ Statius, *loc. cit.*, 75 f., with Vollmer's note; Suetonius, *Nero*, 11.

does not appear; but if, from a high part of the building,¹⁵ they were released from shoots with their wings clipped to ensure that, while providing sport, they could actually be captured (as in the case of the curious pigeon-chase mentioned by Strabo, VI, 259), it would be natural that some of them, in their descent, would alight on the ropes, as shown in the picture; for we must suppose that the *linea* was placed lower than the highest rows of seats, where, at Pompeii, as at Rome, the women sat;¹⁶ and that the tumult-provoking *sparsio* naturally did not pertain to them.

The difficulty of conceiving the mechanism of the *linea* in detail may not be small; but is no greater, I submit, than that in which a full understanding of the working of the *velaria* is known to be involved;¹⁷ and I believe that its essential features were as set out above.

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¹⁵ *Per astra*, Statius; 'von Himmel herab,' Vollmer.

¹⁶ Maiuri, *Pompeii*^o, p. 28; Della Corte, *Pompeii* (1944), p. 107.

¹⁷ Daremberg-Saglio, V, p. 677.

THE NAME OF SOPHOKLES.

David Lewis has made a good case for taking the normal demotic of the deme Kolonos in Athens in the Fifth Century as ἐκ Κολωνού.¹ Yet the tribute list of the year 443/2 gives the fact that Sophokles was hellenotamias in these words, as restored: [Σ]οφοκλῆς Κολο[νέθεν] ἡλληνοταμί[ας] ἐν.² In the light of Lewis' argument I should now restore the demotic not as Κολο[νέθεν] but as Κολο[νόθεν]: [Σ]οφοκλῆς Κολο[νόθεν] ἡλληνοταμί[ας] ἐν.

Lewis thought the name of Sophokles not quite sure because of the damaged state of the stone: "The *phi* now rests on Rangabe's word alone, since no trace of a chisel remains, but since he restored [Σ]οφοκλῆς Κολο[φόνιος], he had no axe to grind in the matter." There is no doubt that the second preserved letter is phi. Wade-Gery, McGregor, and I were sure of it when we published *The Athenian Tribute Lists*. Having read Lewis' comment I again examined the stone in 1958. Every stroke of the letter phi is certain, some of the rounding still showing the original cut of the chisel. There is no evidence of any change in the surface since Rangabé; the water-weathering had done its damage before his time. But, while water-weathering may corrode away the original surface it sometimes intensifies and deepens the original strokes. This is what happened here. One sees the complete circle, most of it deeply marked, and across it the upright which extends above the circle at the top, and only the bottom of which has been corroded away.

No letter in the text stands in less doubt; so speculation about possible restorations of Θ[ε]οκλῆς or [X]ο[ρ]οκλῆς is idle.³ Concerning Sophokles we are left the choice of taking the hellenotamias to be the poet or another man of the same name.

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¹ David Malcolm Lewis, *B. S. A.*, L (1955), pp. 12-17.

² Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, II (1949), p. 18 (List 12, line 36).

³ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

REVIEWS.

ERIC A. HAVELOCK. *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 443. \$6.00.

In this book Professor Havelock has devoted himself to a difficult "task of restitution," of a "group of forgotten men," the Greek liberals, in an attempt to show the intellectual ancestry of a way of thought independent of Plato and Aristotle, a liberal view, free of moral absolutism, arguing "that political and even moral convictions were negotiable, that the path of duty does not run counter to self interest, and that in cases of doubt it is better to prefer amity above justice" (p. 9). He sees the intellectual conflict of the classical period in a broad perspective that includes all of Western civilization, so that his analysis is relevant not only to historical understanding but to the understanding of contemporary problems as well.

It is not a new idea that the frame of reference for ancient political and social thought, from the fourth century, was very largely the construction of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, nor that the overwhelming influence of these men makes it difficult to keep in proper perspective the efforts of earlier or contemporary thinkers who differed from them in assumptions, methods, and conclusions. Social historians have often been troubled that there is so little documentary evidence as to this earlier social theory, against which Plato and Aristotle were reacting. In this book Havelock has tried to reconstruct in some detail the ideas of their "liberal" adversaries and to show precisely how and why the problems, methods, and solutions of the "liberals" were supplanted, concealed, and absorbed by Plato and Aristotle.

As indicated by the title of his book, Havelock does not set out to show the liberals as members of a school or movement with a single well-integrated program or set of doctrines. In fact, he sees rather broad differences among some of them; Antiphon and Democritus, for example, "represent within the liberal camp diametrically opposed positions" (p. 255). The variety in their opinions is of course a factor which increases the difficulty of defining very precisely the liberals' common ground. They were not revolutionaries, so their position does not have the simple clarity of a rebel manifesto. Indeed, so far as they moved within the Athenian orbit, during the heyday of democracy, they would be swimming with the tide of social opinion. Democritus speaks of democratic society as "the shape (of society) presently prevailing" (fr. 266), and the custom-law which men like Democritus and Protagoras see as growing up naturally as a response to emergent social needs means in Athens the institutions of the *patrios politeia*, fashioned in the tradition of Solon and Cleisthenes. Thus it may be doubted that the liberals of the fifth century were as consciously arrayed against idealism, teleology, or natural law doctrines as Havelock sometimes seems to imply. Though he is fully aware of the necessity of historical perspective and makes a heroic effort to maintain it, he is led to

say, for example, of some lines in Aeschylus, that they are enough "to destroy at a blow the whole Hesiodic perspective and the Platonic metaphysic of history" (p. 58).

Perhaps, despite his apparent wish to avoid this error, Havelock does yield too much to the temptation to treat the various ideas of the liberals as a cohesive "system" and to suggest that it was against this "system" that the efforts of Plato and Aristotle were directed. The liberals are probably "unknown" less because of conspiracy or a deliberate effort to suppress than because of their own heterogeneity and versatility. To be sure, Plato's hostile treatment of the Sophists and his failure to mention Democritus or Antisthenes cannot be regarded as fortuitous. There must have been at least some deliberate suppression. But at the same time the rejection is not so explicit and complete as one would expect in the deliberate attempt to refute a well-defined opposing position. The reason Aristotle, in particular, can gain in sympathy for liberal ideas as he grows older, is that they emerged not from a doctrine or school, but from what Havelock's title itself calls a "temper."

One of the difficulties that stands in the way of agreement with this book springs from the use of the term "liberal" as a central point of reference. Havelock handles the term cautiously and modestly, but not unexceptionably, and on the matter of terminology and technique he seems caught between two fundamental attacks. There are those, pragmatically oriented, who may object that he has gone too far toward making a "school" out of what should be regarded as a "temper" related to specific situations and problems, while others may object that his "liberalism" comprehends too much, that in his zeal to document his case he includes as ingredients of the "temper" ideas that are not basically consistent with the main lines of liberal thought.

Greek liberalism as described by Havelock is at bottom marked by a pragmatic and empirical approach to knowledge, a "historical" (i. e. evolutionary) view of society, a contract theory of the state, a measured commitment to equalitarianism, and a claim for "philanthropy and good will as instinctual principles of social order." These criteria, possibly excepting the last, seem fully satisfactory as applied to ancient or modern liberalism. It is in the particular analysis of some of the liberals' positions that doubts may begin to set in. Thus the author suggests that the Sophistic argument posits a "common mind" or "common judgment" (pp. 201, 247), that liberal democracy implies a "meeting of minds" on the substance of public policy (pp. 236, 313), that liberalism views society as "natural" (p. 401), that it emphasizes fundamental goodwill among men (pp. 343, 349). An interpretation of liberalism that encompasses such notions as these may dismay those students of political theory who view the tradition, from Hobbes and Locke forward, as being based on an interpretation of society and government as artificial creations of men established to fulfill certain functions, as finding the locus of rationality in the individual, and as accepting conflict as the inevitable reason for the existence of the institutions of political authority. The author does not seem always to appreciate that as a political theory liberalism is a theory of authority as well as a theory of freedom. Likewise, some may be disturbed by a use of the liberal

label which must be satisfied to define it as "at least . . . a word of challenge, a banner of faith in the common man, and a plea for hope and philanthropy; a word which has drawn battle lines, rallying friends and identifying enemies." The basic problem obviously lies with the concept and the tradition, and not with the author of a single commentary. However, the present work might be more convincing either if a different term had been devised or if a clearer definition and a more rigid principle of exclusion had been used. Perhaps the author's uncertainty about liberalism and his own bondage to the classical masters can be illustrated in a small way in what appears to be a "teleological slip" in his last-chapter summary of the liberals' attacks on metaphysics. Here he remarks that the liberal position cannot accept any social form as "theoretically final, complete, or correct" because "if such existed, it would represent the completion of man's hedonist drives; but these are *still* evolving" (p. 379, emphasis added).

In the first chapters Havelock analyzes the application of two basically different attitudes to the origin and development of human society. One is the "religious-metaphysical," according to which

there is no history, properly speaking, of civilization, no developmental progress in technology and morals. One looks back to a Golden Age now lost, in which man in his unspoiled nature lived in close company with God, in a Greek version of Eden (p. 31).

On the other hand, the "biological-historical" or "liberal-historical" view was that justice and law are evolved by trial and error as a response to "all-too-human" needs, and

the kind of knowledge required to make political and moral choices cannot be derived from *a priori* forms or changeless principles; it must be drawn empirically from an historical process which is always changing, and applied pragmatically and partially in given situations as they arise (p. 32).

The crucial point of divergence is in viewing man as a product of evolution with moral codes and social institutions which he builds himself as a result of his needs, rather than as a unique creature with a timeless "nature," subject from the beginning to the laws of that nature or of the God who created him. Exemplars of the conception of "History as Regress" (Ch. II) are Hesiod and Plato. Both follow the "Eden myth" in supposing that man was originally innocent and happy, and that technological progress has been accompanied by moral decline. There is only the difference that Plato, in the myth of the *Statesman* and in two accounts of early man in *Laws* III and IV, departs from Hesiod to accept the view that the early life of man was primitive and dangerous. It is not, however, on that account, less innocent morally or less preferable to the modern age in which technological skills (gifts of the gods rather than of human invention) have been turned to evil uses.

A view of "History as Progress" (Ch. III) is seen in the *Prometheus Bound*, Sophocles' *Antigone*, and in the section on prehistory

in Diodorus, Book I. Plato's *Protagoras* and *Republic* II, and Aristotle, *Politics* I show "History as Compromise"—that is, material from the "scientific anthropology" of the day is used but is subjected to alterations and adaptations which bring it into line with the presuppositions (metaphysical, teleological, theistic) of the Athenian philosophers. The myth of the *Protagoras* is interpreted as based on genuine Protagorean material, altered in that "man ceases to be an animal," and his social institutions cease to be seen as emerging in a continuous evolutionary process; both are the outcome of a separate and special creation.

A central group of chapters discusses "The Fragments of the Greek Anthropologists" (Anaximander, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, and Democritus), "The Political Theory of Democritus," and what the author regards as the principal social doctrines of the major Sophists (deduced mainly from Plato), with a separate chapter on Antiphon.

The name of Euripides may seem to some a curious omission from the ranks of Havelock's Liberals. Though his friend Anaxagoras is present, the dramatist is represented only by a brief analysis (pp. 70-3) of Theseus' remarks on the basis of civilization in *Suppliants* 196-218, characterized as "a lecture on the role of providence in human life" (p. 70). Expressions like lines 201-2, "That god who took our planless brutish life and regulated it—'tis him I praise," are taken to show a pietistic editing of an anthropological account of human life in which man's advances are seen as the product of historical growth rather than divine gift. It is equally possible, however, to interpret this passage (in the wider context, which Havelock ignores) as emphasizing the importance of man's devotion to social and moral law, to civilized standards. This would of course involve maintaining a right relationship with the gods. Such an interpretation is certainly in harmony with Havelock's treatment of the "pious" close of the *Antigone* ode, and with his treatment of Aeschylus' *Prometheus*. Indeed, who is the god of the lines quoted, if not Prometheus?

Perhaps Havelock shies away from Euripides partly because of the mythical clothing of his thought; and in general he seems to assume too sharp a break between religious-mythical and secular-scientific thought in this epoch. To comprehend sympathetically the attitude to religion in the early classical period we have to set ourselves back of the modern "warfare between science and religion," and even back of the impiety trials of wartime Athens. It seems accurate and useful to think of early Greek philosophy as a progress from mythical to rational thinking, but the character of Greek religion was such that many conventional ideas could be called into question without the questioner or his audience feeling that religion itself was under attack. Prometheus, as Aeschylus conceives him, rebelled against Zeus and set mankind on its road of self-improvement, but one of his most important gifts was that of divination. Sophocles in the *Antigone* chorus (353 ff.) celebrates man's accomplishments in an essentially humanistic spirit, but the climax is the construction of a civil society in which law and the oath are sanctioned by the gods. So Euripides, while often critical of unthinking religiosity, still holds to the customary mythical framework of

Athenian tragedy, and feels no impulsion always to be on the offensive against religion. In this passage of the *Suppliants*, the tone is humanistic and optimistic, and we need not feel that Theseus' attribution of human progress to a god's gift either was merely conventional and insincere or represented a theistic distortion of a scientific original.

Chapters XI and XII are entitled "The Emasculation of Liberalism in Aristotle's *Ethics*" and "The Rejection of Liberalism in Aristotle's *Politics*." These two books form "the leading source for our knowledge of the liberal doctrines of the fourth century" (p. 296). The discussion of the *Ethics* is devoted almost entirely to the eighth and ninth books, on the topic of friendship. Aristotle felt challenged, according to the author's hypothesis, by the "doctrine of human equality and philanthropy" developed by the liberals, and set out to give a "report" which would seem to embrace it into his own system, but which would so emend and distort it as to remove the uncomfortable overtones of democracy and equalitarian implication. He translates *φιλία* by "amity" when he considers the term a reflection of liberal doctrine; "friendship" has too many of the overtones of the personal attachments of aristocratic society. The natural amity of man with his fellows formed for the liberals a principle of social cohesion. This doctrine has as its basis the ultimate biological relationship of all men, and it naturally opposes all the ideas centering round the natural differences of man and the inherited hierarchical structure of social organization. Though *φιλία* is important in Aristotle's social doctrine, the forms of human attachment which are most significant are those proper to the patriarchal, hierarchical society which he regarded as ideal. Further, since in Aristotle's view man reaches his highest form only in the good man, it is only the good who can experience real friendship, and there is no place for that broad sympathy with mankind as a species made up of one's kindred, which Havelock sees as characteristic of the liberals.

In general, this analysis of Aristotle's reaction to liberal thought is persuasive. It has long seemed remarkable to students of Greek social thought, that coming as late as he did Aristotle still regarded the city-state as the natural and normal highest form of society, and that he shows hardly a glimmer of that ideal of world-brotherhood espoused by his royal pupil Alexander. In the detailed analysis of passages of the *Ethics* and *Politics*, too, there is much that is valuable and challenging. Still, one can see here very clearly the weakness, alluded to above, inherent in the attempt to make Plato and Aristotle testify to the positive content of works of their predecessors and opponents which they never cite explicitly and in fact scarcely refer to at all except obliquely. Havelock weakens his case by claiming too much; this may be illustrated by one simple example. *E.N.*, VIII, i, 6 is headed and translated as follows (p. 301):

Report denatured and reduced to level of commonplace

1. Several controversies have arisen over the topic of amity.
2. One [school] posits it as a similitude, so to speak, and posits that the amicable are 'similars'

3. which is why they say that like is as like and 'birds of a feather' and so on
4. while another [school] says that potters are the opposite with other potters, etc.

Here "one [school]" represents *οἱ μὲν*, "another [school]" is for *οἱ δέ*. After a paragraph of comment, the quotation continues at VIII, i, 7:

Report disguised as a question mark and disposed of dialectically

1. Problems about *εἶδος* raised in a physical or cosmic context are not relevant.
2. Anthropological problems are relevant, for they are referable to human character and emotions (p. 302).

"Anthropological," for *ανθρωπικά* ("human" in Ross) might perhaps seem a rather technical term. The comment on this passage begins:

The preamble (items 1 and 2) to this analysis is noteworthy for the hint it gives that aside from the pre-Socratic speculations about physics (i. e., metaphysics of matter, etc.) there was also a field of anthropological speculation, which came into Aristotle's purview (pp. 302 f.).

This "hint" is hard to detect in the Greek text, or in a different translation. Ross, for example, has

The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling.

Even such a small point makes the reader wary of Havelock's further conjecture:

This puts us in a position to guess, if we choose (and a later testimony will support the guess), that the philanthropic school was not content simply to identify a loose, generic, instinctive emotion in human beings but was prepared to describe its modes of realization in different degrees of intensity: Diverse forms of association, ranging from the loose and unconscious to the close and co-operative, could be brought under a single formula controlled by a single calculus; such would reconcile our basic common humanity with our evident variety of social and personal preferences (p. 303)

In these chapters the author finds many explicit references to doctrines of the liberals in sentences which have usually been taken to express either Aristotle's own view or that of uncritical common sense, sentences which Aristotle frequently analyzes further, often correcting or modifying them before reaching his conclusion. In some cases Aristotle is clearly referring to others than himself, and the vagueness is only in their identity (*δοκεῖ τοῖσι, φασί, οἴονται, οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δέ, κτλ.*), but in others he seems more likely to be giving

views which he also shares. To take, once more, a single example, Aristotle writes on the relation of man and wife, ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν . . . διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρησίμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ (VIII, xii, 7). Taken in the context, which cannot be quoted in full here, δοκεῖ in both sentences seems to express the author's view, but Havelock makes this into a liberal doctrine, inserted into his argument by Aristotle because of "a last desperate honesty" (p. 325); he translates (pp. 316 f.),

Male and female, 'it is held,' enjoy an amity according to nature . . . whence, 'it is held,' in this type of amity there inheres both utility and pleasure.

(It may be added that Havelock's interpretation of this passage is artificially strengthened somewhat by the fact that omission of a clause has led him to mistranslate *κοινότερον*, at 1162a 19.)

The author is so confident of being able to distinguish Aristotle's own words from those of the liberals whose views he is "reporting" that he prints one passage from *E.N.* V in parallel columns (pp. 332-7), going through the text to assign bits—clauses, sentences, or sections—alternately to Aristotle and to "the liberals." To many the assignment will appear arbitrary, quite apart from the fact that the text is somewhat altered and jumbled.

The last chapter, somewhat grandiosely entitled "Greek Liberalism: The Full Flower," offers nothing really new, but an exposition in consecutive form of the doctrines the author has found Aristotle reflecting in the *Ethics* and *Politics*.

Havelock specifically disclaims any part in the "warfare abroad . . . against the Greek idealists and their influence on social thinking," most strikingly exemplified, in recent years, by the attack of Popper and the defenses published by Levinson and others. While recognizing Plato and Aristotle as strongly anti-liberal and even authoritarian in their views, he gives them great credit for "a social discovery of immense importance, . . . the perception that a system of university education had now become socially indispensable for the progress of western culture" (p. 20). This is not a book about Plato and Aristotle, primarily, nor about education, and this theme is not developed in any detail. Nevertheless, some may doubt whether the service of the "masters of the Greek idealist tradition" in insisting on the necessity for training as a prerequisite to effective governmental operation can so far outweigh the disservice of their crystallization or reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies, especially if Havelock's own argument is right, as to justify the refusal of "a negative estimate of their over-all contribution to the science of society" (p. 20). But in any case, in spite of his efforts to be fair to them, it is doubtful whether many of their modern partisans will welcome warmly a book which so often speaks of their distortion, disguising, denaturing, logical corruption, trivialization, piecemeal dismemberment, cutting to size, interpolation, dilution, emendation, interpenetration, bringing under teleological control, misapplication, or theft of the theories of their liberal opponents. There seems to be a certain intemperance or exaggeration, which does not add to the

persuasiveness of the book, in speaking of "language lifted bodily from the true anthropologists" (p. 48), or of the "emasculatation of liberalism" (title of chapter XI). It is difficult to catch a culprit red-handed in distortion or perversion of works which themselves no longer survive, and this is the main weakness of Havelock's method. Since he is unable to offer many names or titles, there must be a rather uncomfortable vagueness in an expression like "the anthropologists," especially when it is not explicitly stated that the term refers to what might be called an anthropological approach to social theory. Havelock speaks of "the scientific source on which the dramatist is drawing," when describing Prometheus' account of man's progress (p. 61). There is of course no real evidence at all that Aeschylus had a specific scientific source, and we remember uncomfortably that an accumulation of zeros is still zero. One would not doubt that, to use another phrase from the same page, there was "anthropological speculation current" in Aeschylus' day, but Havelock does not attempt to say precisely to what degree it was formulated into an articulate system. This is not meant to deny, however, that Havelock's cumulative case is a strong one. How else, for example, are we to explain the relation of Platonic to Protagorean material in the *Protagoras* myth? There is also a strong presumption in the fact, which few would contest, that Plato, especially, is consciously taking a position in reaction against some of the ideas of his predecessors, pre-Socratic philosophers and Sophists. He was alarmed and apprehensive about the dangerous influence of their doctrines on the health of society.

In citing passages from ancient writers, Havelock usually breaks them up into the thought-units of which they are composed, "spelling them out," as he says, into their "items." The process makes prose writings look like free verse (often with individually numbered lines), and this is at first somewhat distracting. But in spite of some inconsistencies in the division of "items," in punctuation, and in capitalization, the device is convenient for detailed analysis.

The translation of the many passages cited is on the whole clear, lively, and accurate, though the language chosen often is somewhat tendentious. The fire of Prometheus is "a technological flame" (*παντέχνου πυρός σέλας*, 7), it is "the great resource that taught technology" (*διδάσκαλος τέχνης . . . καὶ μέγας πόρος*, 110 f.), "'twill teach [man] all technologies" (p. 254); in Popian summary,

One sentence short proclaims the truth unique:

Prometheus gave, what man received, *technique*. (pp. 505-6)

Prometheus' πάντα προῖξίσταμαι σκεθρῶς τὰ μέλλοντ' is "of things that are to come my science is exact" (pp. 101 f.). Democritus says (fr. 144) that music is *ωφέλιμον*; why translate "a deferred technique" (p. 116)? He says, as cited by Cicero (*Vors.*, 68 A 138), that the ancients were wise in instituting (*sapienter instituisse*) divination; this becomes "Men of an earlier period showed technical skill. . . ." (Our italics throughout.)

Along with his tendency to slant his translations in the direction of his general interpretation goes a tendency to exaggerate the likelihood that extant passages are referring explicitly to, or are

derived from, lost originals in the literature of the liberal tradition. He very frequently uses the word "report" in contexts where it surely cannot be taken quite in its usual specific sense.

A few small points may be added: P. 67: It is odd to omit the first antistrophe of Sophocles' ode on man. P. 108: item 16 (Anaxagoras 59 A 101) is given in abbreviated form, and the translation is based on an editorial conjecture. P. 109: "grow things and herd things and stockpile" misses the idiom in *φέρομεν καὶ ἄγομεν συλλαμβάνοντες*. P. 112: The last two sentences in item 21 (Arche-laus 60 A 4) are transposed; the page-and-line references to Diels-Kranz are misleading; the words *τὸ μὲν βραδυτέρως, τὸ δὲ ταχυτέρως* may or may not mean "in varying degrees of mobility." P. 116, item 30: two words are omitted, and a necessary comma. P. 142 (Dem., fr. 255): Can *προτελεῖν* mean "pay toll to"? "Make loans (or contributions) to" seems more likely. P. 143, Dem., fr. 251: *δυνάστησι*, applied to a form of government distinguished from democracy, is more likely to mean "tyrants" than "an oligarchy."

In spite of the interest of the topic and the enthusiasm of the author, this book is often rather hard to read. On his exposition, especially in the passages of text-analysis, one is tempted to quote the phrase he aptly uses in describing the fragments of Antiphon: "a style oddly compounded of pedantry and passion" (p. 256). This is something of a handicap in a book which is, and must be, mainly an essay in persuasion. With all its shortcomings, however, the book does provide a very stimulating background for the analysis of modern and contemporary liberalism. In addition, it deals interestingly with materials seldom treated seriously for their political implications, and contains good discussions of many particular texts, as well as special points like the concept of *nomos* ("custom-law") or the importance of the gnomie method.

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R. E. WYCHERLEY. *Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia. Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. III. Princeton, American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1957. Pp. x + 260; 4 pls. \$10.00.

In the final publication of the Agora, three distinguished volumes, (I) E. B. Harrison's *Portrait Sculpture*, (II) M. Thompson's *Roman-Venetian Coins*, and now (IV) R. H. Howland's *Greek Lamps*, have appeared. R. E. Wycherley's *Testimonia* is the first historical-literary volume in the series. It will be opened with high expectations.

The preface was signed in December 1956, but there are six addenda on p. 225 which cover items, including two new unpublished inscriptions, through the summer of 1957. References to all the

addenda have been duly entered in the text. The title is not intended to imply that papyri are excluded, but they are few and of course literary; the only reference to a papyrus as such in any of the indexes is one to Philonon (T[estimonium] 679, p. 237). Contrastingly, inscriptions are present in hordes: there are more than 650, and they are indexed, as they should be, both by Agora inventory number and by publication (pp. 242-6). It is chiefly from inscriptions, of course, that new knowledge was to be expected, and it is in adding the evidence of inscriptions to what was known before that the volume makes its largest contribution.

The area is the Greek Agora, including parts not excavated, to the north e.g. the Stoa Poikile, to the south the Prytaneion. The Eleusinion has only been touched. These are the three most important unexcavated buildings in Athens. Of the two (undiscovered) Hellenistic gymnasia, the Diogeneion is omitted, the Ptolemaion included, pp. 142-4. So much has been found in the Agora that one easily forgets there are these five structures still undone.

The book is generous, on the whole, in its inclusiveness. The Prytaneion, still unlocated, may be outside the Agora altogether, and both gymnasia. (The uncertainty about what to include affected the Index: the Ptolemaion, partially restored in T456 and T461, but present complete in T450 and mentioned under T463, is omitted from the Index altogether. It can be got at under "Gymnasium," but under Gymnasium T456-463 are not referred to except as 'p. 214,' nor under Ptolemy.—Ptolemy Euergetes is omitted altogether under T458 and in the Index, though present under T245.) The Roman Agora is included only incidentally, but the compiler does not hesitate to discuss it in an interesting page (190) on the area as a whole; and he goes far afield for an inscription about the Mother of the Gods, T513. Years of wide searching have gone into the gathering of the material, and I doubt whether much is omitted. J. H. Oliver, *A. J. A.*, LXII (1958), p. 335, adds a reference to the Prytaneion in Herodotus VI, 103. The Nymphaion somehow slipped out: *Hesperia*, X (1941), p. 58; XXIV (1955), p. 59.

The compiler is candid about the arbitrariness of the decisions, but no sensible person will criticize him for what the volume as a whole does or does not include. The fact is, in any case, that in the main the exact boundaries of the Agora have not been determined, or even whether under the designation *ἀγορά* the area always continued to have official boundaries; or what its precise legal status was at any time. In the late sixth century B. C. there was a systematic demarcation, part of the survey that fixed as a center the altar of the Twelve Gods. H. A. Thompson, *Hesp.*, Suppl. IV (1940), pp. 107-11 and addenda, p. 7, first made this out; apparently it follows the survey and herms of Hipparchus, T305. From this period in any case come three boundary-stones, one of them found *in situ*; and they all use the term *ἀγορά* (T713). The Index, s. v. Agora (!), gives no help.

In the fourth century B. C. the term used in a series of boundary stones, which I suppose represent a new period of surveying, is *Κεραμεικός*. Wycherley has an essay on this subject, pp. 221-4, but it is not systematic and does not follow a chronological order. A third entity, and one which doubtless had definite boundaries, was the deme called

officially *Κεραμεῖς* (demotic, ἐκ *Κεραμείων*). As a deme, it was of medium size, to judge by the number of demesmen known, and by its bouleutic representation, which in the late third century B.C. was at least six. The tribe was Akamantis. Whether the deme Kerameis included what was loosely called 'the Agora' is unknown. Part at least of Kolonos Agoraios was evidently in the deme Melite (T246). There may also have been a trittys *Κεραμείων*. The usual term for the whole region, undoubtedly including the Agora and much if not all of the deme Kerameis, was *Κεραμεικός*. A closer study of all this is needed.

Topography is the objective of the volume, not, primarily, archaeology nor history nor anything else; only brief synthetic accounts of buildings, giving mainly summaries of the testimonia, preface the successive collections of texts. In judging whether or not to include a given item of which the content is of doubtful value, Wycherley has sensibly preferred to err on the side of generosity, and to let the reader judge. Later Classical works which misinterpret earlier are occasionally present, sometimes with only cautious qualifications of their value; but a great many are excluded. Being often earlier, inscriptional should have preceded, not followed, the literary testimonia. Literary sources of all periods are usually treated with tenderness. The Aristotelian *Const. Ath.* is rejected, but only gently, where actually it is grievously wrong (but cf. pp. 5-6). "It is ironical" that Thucydides on Enneakrounos "gives more trouble than any other passage on Athenian topography," but "one can trust Thucydides to have ascertained the truth as far as possible" (p. 2).

Wherever the facts are plain the statement ought to be sharp. To write e.g. of the Altar of the Twelve Gods that the identification is "almost certain" (my italics), when the inscription T378 was actually found *in situ*, so that according to E. Vanderpool the identification is "now securely fixed" (*Hesperia*, XVIII [1949], p. 132—a reference not cited under T378)—is not good scholarship; and moreover it gives a toe-hold to the next theorist who comes along with a desire to astound everyone by a "brilliant" theory which makes something into something else.

With the real, complex, hard problems, it is not quite the same. Nearly all problems are helped by having the evidence laid out, although none is solved: the alleged absence of archives until the fourth century (pp. 3, 17); Royal Stoa vs. Stoa of Zeus; *axones* and *kyrbeis*; Enneakrounos; the Stoa of the Herms; the *dikasteria* (testimonia on the courts are not formally collected but are reserved for a future publication; but there are excellent up-to-date essays on pp. 144-9). In this matter the compiler's hesitations made him wise. It was not Wycherley's place to formulate theories, but only to provide references and a word of summary. This he has done. If toward sick theories he is sometimes generous to a fault, still pre-exeavation conjectures are rigidly excluded ("it is a sobering experience to observe how fundamentally mistaken most of them were" [p. vi]).

As a whole the Introduction, which surveys the entire body of the sources from the earliest to the latest, is learned and sound. It is neither spiced nor spoiled by the author's own theories. The pages

(15-19) on the topographical value of the *Fundorte* of inscriptions are the most original; having worked some on the data, I can report that Wycherley's usual open good sense shows at its best. When more detailed studies are made, they will begin here.

It is the fashion now to think much, or at least to say much, about "organization." How should hundreds of references, dealing with all the variety of matters germane to a Greek agora, be organized? One shudders at what the "organizers" would do. Wycherley has really let the material organize itself (p. v), i. e. he chose to do the obvious. (I) The Stoa, (II) Shrines, (III) Public Buildings and Offices, (IV) Market, (V) Honorary Statues, plus only a little (VI) Miscellaneous: these are all the chapters. The scheme is utterly simple, intelligible without effort, a masterpiece in the ordering of masses of items. There is no grand and bothersome logic, no elaborate progress from one chapter to the next. Ample repetitions and cross-references take care of items with multiple relevances.

Within the chapters, Wycherley is again rationally irrational. Without regard to chronology or anything else, he follows the alphabetic order in the chapters on Shrines, on 'Public Buildings,' and on Statues. Almost always the reader can turn quickly to what he wants in these chapters. But for IV, the testimonia on the Market, the order, nowhere stated, is: General, Foods, Flowers and Wreaths, Wearing Materials, Women (Agora of), Kerkopes (Agora of), Perfumes, Artefacts, Books, Horses, and Persons. These are my own headings; the book has nothing but 40 specific topics, Flour, Bread, Opson, etc.

A consequence of all this is that the one writing of unique value is much split up. Pausanias is still supreme. In a sense the book is really Pausanias in the midst of a cloud of less informative items; and the passages of Pausanias are scattered throughout all the chapters. In the Index of Authors (p. 236), however, and in a special Plate (IV), the order of Pausanias' route through the Agora is traced. Moreover Wycherley adds a little to the classic Vanderpool article (*Hesperia*, XVII [1949], pp. 129-37) in T245 and T378, and his Introduction has two valuable critical pages (pp. 10-12).

About the arrangement of the material, there is one complaint. The Table of Contents has only a few big broad headings. Thus "II. Shrines" is the only guidance for 78 pages containing 284 testimonia on 18 main cults with 54 headings (counting each epithet) in all. The order of cults is alphabetical, but a list would be helpful in the Table of Contents, because e.g. the Phosphoroi are under Artemis with no cross-reference under P, so that they can be found only through the Index of Subjects. Worse is "III. Public Buildings and Offices," also in alphabetical order, where the reader has to guess that the Dikasteria are not under that title, or under Courts, or under Heliastic, but under Law Courts; worse still, the Desmoterion (under that title) is tucked in with them; worst of all, there is no entry "Desmoterion" in the Index of Subjects (although "Prison" is there). Running heads help the floundering reader a little, but anyone who plans to use the volume much will make and insert his own table of contents, much expanded.

There is a second reason for a detailed table of contents. Unless it is done here, the full contents of the volume cannot be laid out

anywhere so as to be seen at a glance. The cults of the Agora, for instance, make up a list which is important and interesting in itself, from Athena and Zeus, who have the most epithets and connections, through Theseus and Eleos, who got much attention, to such little people as the Hero on the Roof. It is notable that a conjecture of Wilamowitz made in 1880 is confirmed: the altar of the Twelve Gods became the altar of Pity. When, as here, an area has been definitively published, the book ought to say so: M. Crosby, *Hesperia*, Suppl. VIII (1949), pp. 82-103 (the Twelve Gods); H. A. Thompson, *Hesperia*, XXI (1952), pp. 47-82 (Eleos). Discussion of the cult and the reconstruction: G. Zuntz, *Cl. Med.*, XIV (1953), pp. 71-85 (topography not altogether sound); R. E. Wycherley, *C. Q.*, N. S., IV (1954), pp. 143-50.

A student of cults could wish that the chapter itself, "II. Shrines," though it includes mere statues of gods and of heroes, might have included even more, so as to make up a systematic and inclusive list of the cults in the Agora, all in the one chapter. There should be entries for cross-references not just to certain deities but to every one of them, e.g. to Agathe Tyche, T376, T542; Ajax and the Aianteion, pp. 90-3; Demokratia, T696, T248; Enyo T117; Epitegios, Hero, T147, T150; Herakles T117; Iatros, Hero, p. 113 (not in Index), T340, T347, T498; Pherrephatte, pp. 85, 113, T923; other cults in the Eleusinion and/or associated with Demeter and Kore; Roma, T131; Strategos, Hero, T579; and whatever altars there were in the dikasteria. On the other hand, surely Harmodios and Aristogeiton (pp. 93-8) belong among "Statues," not among "Shrines"; they receive only *ἐναισχροτά*. Of the two later pairs of statues permitted to be set up near them, Antigonos and Demetrios were at least temporarily deified (T696); then came Brutus and Cassius. The epithet Agoraios was given to only two deities, Zeus and Hermes; perhaps it was "civic" and relatively late in origin. On the other hand, Kourotropchos (add to Index, which has Kourotropchos only under Ge), a deity who according to the State Calendar received (small) sacrifices so regularly that for this reason alone she would seem ancient, is not known to have had a place of cult in the Agora; doubtless she was taken care of properly in her precinct higher up, near the foot of the Akropolis. The sacrifice in the State Calendar to the Charites which is cited as T132 (add that the price shows they received a goat), is not for the Charites of the sanctuary belonging to the Demos and Charites, T125-131, but was offered rather with a different group of deities, listed for sacrifices at the Eleusinia. T132 should therefore be omitted. But add sacrifices to Demokratia on 12 Boedromion: (*I. G.*, II², 1496, line 131; Plut., *De Gloria Ath.*, 7; L. Deubner, *Att. Feste*, p. 39; W. S. Ferguson, *Studies Capps*, p. 150, n. 26), which surely would be offered in the Agora as well as on the Akropolis.

Non-verbal testimonia are excluded, so that a few structures get no mention. It is worse with Honorary Statues. The dates and the persons selected are of both archaeological and historical interest. In the book as a whole, Wycherley mentions about 57 historical persons as receiving honorary statues, but again, on his own principles, some who lack headings in Ch. V ought to have them, with cross-references: Gorgippos T700; Iphicrates 173, T693, T702;

Satyros, King of Thrace T700. The distribution of these in periods is of some interest. Honorary portrait statues are uncommon before the fourth century, but that is the century in which the largest number of persons portrayed actually flourished: there are 17. For the third century, 14. The rest are scattered with no more than five to any one century, from Epimenides to Ulpian Eubiotus with his children. The periods when the statues were made are another subject, the times the statues lasted are yet a third. But the book does not give the whole story. Of course the statues unattested by verbal testimonia are omitted. Thus *Agora* I (Harrison), No. 1, an Herodotos of Roman date and unknown *Standort*, is not in. But none of the Harrison portrait statues are included, in fact *Agora* I is not even mentioned. Harrison, p. 7, discusses the various subjects of portraits. There was a herm, Roman, of Anakreon; in Athens somewhere, three statues of Dexippos, three of his father. Demetrios of Phaleron once had many statues. Harrison publishes no fewer than 55 heads (of whom 15 are women, whereas Wycherley has only two). And so from *Agora* III all these—mostly dozens of *kosmetai*, priests, and other officials of the Roman period—are left out, Moiragenes (No. 25, pp. 35-7; in her Index s. v., for 735-37 read 7, 35-37) and the rest, verbal testimonia and all. It was a hardy policy to adopt, and probably sensible, even if it meant the abandonment of the idea of a true corpus of literary and epigraphical testimonia.

There was enough to do. The sheer accumulation of material is tremendous. There are in all no fewer than 731 testimonia. Most are presented fully, in the original. It is important for the reader to know exactly what the compiler thinks the original means: a capital feature of the book is therefore the translation of all the Testimonia into English. The work seems careful and exact. In T679 there is no "thief," only *τῷ*; and for T710 the Index, s. v. Solon, laws of, has Solon's "laws" on bronze, whereas the Greek shows it is a statue of Solon himself which is bronze (cf. T80). The translation is correct, but the indexing was hasty. Similarly the Index s. v. Alexander speaks of "statues" of him, but there is no evidence of more than one (T521): the plural comes from "statues of Philip and Alexander," i. e. one of each. Elsewhere I shall try to show that the *kyrbeis-axones* problem is capable of solution; in any case *κόρβας* should not be "pillars." Under T248 for 996 read 696. On p. 203 (T611) a comma, elevated, is misleading.

Wycherley is scrupulous about the exact provenience of every inscribed fragment. The scheme of reference in Plate II, however, is not that of the old (lettered) section, or 'sector,' with its own coördinates, but a superior map of the entire area, with a grid that includes all in one scheme. Some map with the old scheme overlaid is needed.

In a relevant sense, the Agora was the heart of Athens, and matters of interest, both familiar and unfamiliar, crowd these pages. For one reader at least, what emerges as of most interest is the still largely unexcavated Eleusinion: pp. 16 (add to Index), 74-85; 222 (p. 122, given in Index, seems to be a mistake for 222); and add now *C. P.*, LIII (1958), pp. 174-5. For the identification, E. Vanderpool, *Hesperia*, XVIII (1949), p. 134. The Eleusinion was a region in itself, large and well-fenced—rather than walled, since it seems

to have had its own boundary stones (p. 84). The Boule of 500 or of 600 could meet in it. Yet it contained also two temples, altars, a kitchen, sacristy (?) or temple, treasury (?), tombs (Immarados, and doubtless others), inscribed stelai, dozens of inscribed dedications, statues, and great numbers of the characteristic *kernoi*, of which five deposits have been found. On the other hand, the Agora as a market (Ch. IV), whatever way it is looked at, appears in this book to be secondary: the comparatively few Testimonia, although several are exciting, leave that impression.

All in all, the defects are comparatively slight, and it comes close to being a superb book, indispensable and useful for a wide range of interests. The printer, J. J. Augustin of Glückstadt, has a beautiful rounded Greek font; the paper (though not the binding) is light and behaves well; the two-columned pages are clean, easy to read; and the three detailed Plates are by J. Travlos. The donor (J. D. Rockefeller, Jr.), the officials of the Agora Excavations, the many who helped (p. vii), and most of all R. E. Wycherley, deserve praise and thanks.

Fifty years ago, Mitchell Carroll urged the need for a medium-sized handbook in this field (*C. W.*, III [1909], p. 23). We have had one and, practically, lost it. Ida Thallon Hill's *Ancient City of Athens* has gone out of print, I am told, "indefinitely." A revised edition would be welcome. Among the dozen reviews I have seen, only the following have content: *A. J. A.*, LVIII (1954), p. 345; *C. J.*, XLIX (1953/4), pp. 285-6; *Gnomon*, XXVI (1954), pp. 132-4; *J. H. S.*, LXXV (1955), pp. 186-7—although H. Plommer seems to have printed only the querulous half of his review—; *Phoenix*, IX (1955), pp. 35-8. Among corrections which ought to be made, but seem to have gone unnoticed, are the perplexing numbers of some of the notes on Ch. XV, "The Parthenon and Propylaia" (pp. 152-66), which contain important unpublished material. The numbers of the notes on pp. 240-2 should be changed as follows: P. 240: change the number of note '5' to 9, note '6' to 5; p. 241: change the number of note '7' to 6, note '8' to 7; p. 242: change the number of note '9' to 8. And Pausanias should get an entry in the Index.

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GAETANO DE SANCTIS. *Storia dei Romani*. Volume IV: *La Fondazione dell'Impero*. Parte II: *Vita e pensiero nell'età delle grandi conquiste*, Tomo II. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1957. Pp. viii + 125. 1300 lire.

The present fascicle was published in December, 1957, fifty years after the first volume and eight months after the author's death at the age of eighty-six. Volume IV, Part 3 will follow, containing an account of the period from Pydna to the capture of Numantia. Miss Taylor has already described in this Journal (LXXXVI [1955], p. 86) the circumstances in which De Sanctis set aside and then after a

long interval resumed his *Storia dei Romani*, and the various difficulties under which these last sections were completed. The obstacles and handicaps which were overcome may increase our respect and gratitude, but there is not the slightest need for making allowances or for indulgent piety. This is a vigorous, original, and highly valuable piece of work, fluently and vividly written.

The fascicle deals with private law in the period of the great conquests, roughly down to 133. The sections on finance and economics, which were to be included, evidently were not completed and will not appear; it is scarcely necessary to say that this is a considerable loss and disappointment. There are five chapters: the law of actions, family law, the will and succession, property, and obligations. These headings are of course quite familiar to anyone who has ever studied Roman Law, and the topics taken up under each are equally so. This might not seem to promise much that was new, and novelty in expounding and interpreting law is not the author's chief concern. It is, rather, to present private law as an integral and important part of the general cultural development of the third and especially second centuries, and in this De Sanctis has few direct predecessors among either historians or students of law. In fact, he hardly ever has occasion to refer to one of his fellow-historians. Few of them, even those who following Mommsen stress and demonstrate the importance of law, incorporate much private law in their reconstructions of any period; the early Republic is somewhat an exception, partly because dearth of other materials stimulates interest in all sections of the Twelve Tables. One may recall that in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, where collaboration made possible an unusually comprehensive survey, the chapter on Roman Law in the Republic is the last in the last volume devoted to that period (IX, ch. 21), though doubtless it would be wrong to conclude that it was an afterthought or that the editors did not know what else to do with it; in any event, it was written by a distinguished Professor of Civil Law, not by a historian. As for the jurists, though their approach increasingly tends to be historical, they quite reasonably concern themselves primarily with the internal development of law without assuming responsibility for cultural, social, and economic history as a whole. Finally, the sources for the law of the third and second centuries are so meagre that the period is usually combined with the preceding or with that which follows, as in M. Kaser's excellent account in the *Handbuch* (1955). For all these reasons De Sanctis was undertaking a formidable task and one which he could have avoided without violating precedent. Few will doubt that he did right to include private law in his *Storia dei Romani*, and in this section of it, for certainly it is one of the most imposing and original cultural achievements of the Romans, reflecting directly their life and mentality.

In outline De Sanctis' reconstruction is naturally similar to that found in other recent works. The period covered, the mid-second century in particular, was one of accelerated change and marks the transition from the increasingly inadequate, archaic law of agrarian Rome to classical or at any rate pre-classical law. The basic causes for the developments in law lay in the conquests of Rome, in the rapid and profound transformation of Roman society and economy,

and in the closer and more extensive contacts with other peoples, above all with the Greeks and Greek civilization. The principal instrument of change was the formulary procedure now extended to civil law, with the increased freedom this gave to the praetor and jurists.

The sketch would be valuable simply as a concise, up-to-date summary which has no counterpart for this period. Its value is increased by the generous citation of sources and of modern works up to about 1955. But its chief contribution and interest of course are found in the perspective from which De Sanctis views legal institutions and forms and in his judgments and observations on particular points. A few examples may be noted. Comparing literature, art, and religion he concludes that private law, along with the empire itself, was the greatest and most enduring achievement of the Romans in this period (p. 125); this will astonish no one. Though he emphasized the influence of Greek thought on Roman in other areas and refers to it on occasion in connection with law, he regards the development of private law as essentially autonomous and organic with little direct, specific borrowing. The lucid treatment of the family (pp. 36-50) touches on many matters of wide historical importance. Perhaps something more might have been said about the consequences of the proprietary incapacity of a *filius familias* (p. 60); in general the survival of *patria potestas* gives rise to reservations about Roman practical sense and the resourcefulness of their jurists. De Sanctis is convincing in choosing to emphasize *patria potestas* rather than individualistic liberalism in the freedom of the Roman testator to dispose of his estate (p. 56). Many would regard the transformation of patriarchal marriage into a free, dissoluble union of equals, with the resultant greater freedom and independence of women, as among the most impressive and congenial accomplishments of Roman jurisprudence. De Sanctis is troubled by the dissolution of family ties (pp. 44-6, 50). His sketch of slavery (pp. 83-97) does not gloss over its repellent features or the failure of Republican law to provide any protection for slaves. He joins those who in antiquity and in modern times have seen unfortunate results arising from the large-scale integration of freedmen in the citizen-body (p. 97).

Despite the solidity and excellence of this reconstruction, our evidence for private law in the third and second centuries makes any reconstruction often hazardous and insecure; it is one of the contributions of such a work as this to give form and significance to the problems that exist. The sources are scanty and relatively late, and the information they provide is disconnected and imprecise. For example, the exact content and dates of several *leges* which are cited in our sources as modifying private law remain uncertain. Even the *lex Aebutia*, which introduced the formulary procedure, is only approximately dated (it may not be as early as De Sanctis believes, p. 28), and we have less information than we should like about its background and effects. Chronology is a constant problem. It is doubtful, for instance, whether the *color insaniae* was employed in the second century (p. 67). Such questions are of little concern to those investigating developed classical law of the empire, but for an historical account of the preceding period they are obviously

essential. Further study of existing sources will doubtless provide substantial results, along with much speculation, but new evidence such as the tablets from Herculaneum are furnishing for a later period would be even more helpful.

In summary, this important contribution to the cultural history of the Republic is worthy of its author and of the work of which it is a part.

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WILLIAM BEARE. *Latin Verse and European Song. A Study in Accent and Rhythm.* London, Methuen, 1957. Pp. 296.

Beare undertakes to treat two large subjects, but we should hasten to add that he does not limit himself either to verse or to Europe. One of his twenty-six chapters considers accent and ictus in rhythmic Latin prose, another, Hebrew verse. There are various references to Syriac, Arabic, Hindu, Sanskrit, Iranian, Indian, Chinese, Oriental music, Akkadian (p. 109; from the *Radio Times*), and Babylonian (pp. 112, 222). The various subjects of this vast galaxy have little in common except a most universal uncertainty. They add little or no enlightenment to the problems of Latin verse. Under "Acknowledgements" he states:

This book was begun as an attempt to answer the argument of Professor Philip Whaley Harsh . . . the central question, however, is one which has perplexed me during most of my working life. The statistical method seems to me to yield no clear conclusion, depending as it does on the outlook of the author.

In general, Beare briefly discusses a few of the vital questions of Early Latin metrics, but his book consists primarily of statements of views. His own are summarized as follows (p. 167):

I will now state my own views concerning Plautine metre. It was a free adaptation of Greek metre which strictly obeyed quantity in the sense that a short is never substituted for a long, and that the final foot in many types of verse is kept pure. But the treatment of all feet (except the last) as alike by frequent substitution of a long (or two shorts) where the Dipody Law demanded a single short, coupled with the care to distinguish the second last from the last foot and the careful handling of the caesura and the diaeresis, indicates in my opinion that the Latin writer was particularly concerned to get the number of feet right. Brevis Breuians seems to me to have been essentially a metrical convenience, used by the Republican dramatists but not employed elsewhere, even by 'popular' writers like Phaedrus. It may have begun with the metrical 'rise' which was allowed to begin with a short, obviously demanding to be taken with the following syllable, which was

therefore deemed short as well. This licence was then extended to the 'dip.'

The most fundamental weakness of this work lies in its lack of clarity on basic concepts, especially accent. Beare says (p. 44; cf. p. 37): "The word 'accent' is used in English to include both the pitch-accent and the stress-accent; but whatever the connection between these two, they are conceptually at any rate, quite distinct . . ." No. Accent involves pitch, stress, and duration. For living languages this has been proved by objective recordings.¹ The relative importance of these factors varies greatly from one language to another. In ancient Greek, pitch was dominant. In English, although stress is dominant, pitch and duration are also present. It is convenient to refer to Greek verse as quantitative and to English as accentual. This does not necessarily mean that quantity plays no role in English rhythm, for accent in English normally governs quantity. Again Beare (p. 28; cf. pp. 40-1) assumes that language is accented in verse as it is in ordinary speech. As far as quantity is concerned the opposite can be demonstrated: That the second syllable of *tace* was exactly twice as long as the first in ordinary speech is not likely, and it is obviously not true that the second syllable of *tace* was exactly the same length as the first syllable of *iunctus*, or that *coniunx* in normal speech was pronounced in exactly the same length of time as *tace*. Natural quantities are modified in the enunciation of verse. Accent too may be.

In regard to accent in English verse Beare (p. 17) says: "Though in delivery of English verse much liberty is left to the reciter, he is by no means free to distort the accentuation of a word of more than one syllable; if the verse is such that it forces him to do so, then it is bad verse." Somewhat reluctantly, however, Beare (p. 41) may accept "a slight secondary stress" on the final syllable of "accentually dactylic" English words. Again (p. 26, cf. pp. 58, 108), Beare states: "Nevertheless clash is not altogether avoidable; and when it occurs, the music wins." Beare (p. 99) also recognizes some divergence from prose enunciation in that in French verse mute *e* is usually counted.

Beare (p. 28) misquotes the first line of Milton's *Paradise Lost*:

Of that first disobedience, and the fruit . . .

He then says that a natural stress falls on "first" ("an emphatic monosyllable"), and intimates that [the false] "that" is unstressed. Such cavalier treatment of the very difficult problem of emphasis yields no sound result.

Beare (p. 134) says of Seneca ". . . and if he ends the line with a cretic word, he precedes it by elision. . . ." This is not correct. The matter is complicated; one authority says ". . . the final cretic that begins with a consonant is rare in Seneca except in verses which have a monosyllable before the cretic. . . ." ²

¹ In general, see L. Laurand, *Rev. Phil.*, XII (1938), pp. 133-48.

² Michael Coffey ("Seneca Tragedies . . . 1922-1955," *Lustrum* 1957/2, p. 171) in his summary of the work of Strzelecki, *De Senecae trimetro iambico quaestiones selectae* (Cracow, 1938).

Beare (p. 157) says: "Quintilian tells us that the accent of a Latin word *never* falls on the final syllable." But Beare knows very well that it does, for he has cited numerous examples (p. 54). Quintilian is laying down general rules; there are various exceptions, and just a few lines above (I, 5, 28) he has said "*evenit ut metri quoque condicio mutet accentum.*"³ Beare (p. 56; cf. p. 196) cites this statement and makes short shrift of it. But there it remains.

Almost half of the book deals with Late and Medieval Latin. In his chapter, "The Verse of the People," he writes (p. 184):

... numerous cases where the word-accent, if allowed to affect the rhythm, would be a positive embarrassment. Thus in B. [= C. E. L.] 103 5:

parentes amavit, n[ost]ram duxit coniugem,

the first word has apparently to be scanned as an anapaest, ~ ~ -, although the second syllable is both long and accented. In B. 108.5:

rerum bonarum fuit haec ornata suis,

the fifth foot was apparently *-nata*, the final syllable *-ta* being treated as long though naturally short and adjacent to the accented syllable. In B. 130.2:

id illi di faciunt semper vivo et mortuo,

the first foot is apparently *id illi*, with shortening of the long (and accented) first syllable of *illi*.

Now if we must scan these lines, in the first example Buecheler's suggestion (emend to *parentem*) seems the most plausible one—indeed, from the rest of the inscription, the obvious one. In the third example, naturally Beare is embarrassed by the shortening of the first syllable of *illi*; he has already told us that Brevis Brevians was a metrical phenomenon and that it disappeared early (p. 167). By the way, why was it ever used? Words with iambic scansion are extremely convenient in iambic and trochaic verse. And if Brevis Brevians was wholly metrical and if *ille* was always accented on the first syllable, how are we to explain the development of *ille*, *iste*, etc., in the Romance Languages?

Again, Beare quotes from Bede (p. 207; cf. p. 12, 225): "... the iambic metre is the model on which is formed that admirable hymn

ex aeternae domine,
reum creator omnium,
qui eras ante saecula
semper cum patre filius."

Beare then inserts the word "o" in the first line and arranges the verses after a metrical pattern (iambic). He assumes that the second

³ See also Sacerdos, VI, 148, 20 ff. Keil (cited by Beare, pp. 60-1, 65). In spite of this, Beare later (p. 175) states: "No Roman seems conscious that words might be differently pronounced according to the metre in which they were written, or their position in the line, or whether they were in verse or in prose."

and fourth lines (and by emendation the first line) have an "iambic" first foot (spondees, as in iambic dimeter). So Beare finds a great deal of "clash" in popular and medieval poetry because he foists upon it the precise metrical analysis proper to Early and Classical Latin; and since he finds clash, he concludes that accent was not a governing principle even in Medieval Latin. He says (p. 288):⁴ "Thus in medieval, as in classical, verse we are mocked by the dilemma that, if metre is a guide to pronunciation, in the sense that the movement of the verse is founded on and therefore reflects the accent of actual speech, then Latin had no fixed accent." The alternative must be considered: that Medieval Latin verse had no fixed meter (or at least did not follow the exact laws of Classical Latin verse).

Beare scoffs at secondary accent even in Late Latin where Romance philologists accept it (pp. 216-18). Again, he seems to reject certain philological dicta when he states (p. 233): "... Greek never ceased to be a living language; it is spoken to the present day ... Latin, on the other hand, ceased at quite an early period to be a living language, spoken by the ordinary people; perhaps by A. D. 500. ..."

In general Beare is unsympathetic with philological problems and insensitive to nice linguistic distinctions. Not only does he use the single alternative of pitch or stress. Clash for him is clash, with no general distinction between clash on short syllables and clash on long (although of course he knows that Plautus and Terence do not allow *genere* with clash [on the penult] but frequently use *argentum* with clash). So he treats all the meters of Plautus alike in regard to clash, insisting on its frequency in anapests. So he treats Seneca with Plautus and Terence. He tends to find special characteristics in the language of those living in Africa (p. 245, etc.). He is inaccurate when he states (p. 211): "The majority of German, English and American scholars prefer the second view. According to this, Latin had had from earliest times a strong stress-accent, and consequently a natural tendency to accentual verse." Concerning Latin of the third century B.C. and later, few if any of these scholars believe Latin had a *strong* stress-accent; they do believe that the element of stress during this period was more conspicuous than it was in Classical Greek. In dealing with his opponents, Beare does not distinguish between objectively established facts (statistics) and attempts—often admittedly desperate—to explain these facts.

Again and again Beare (p. 159, cf. pp. 89, 116, 212, 241, 289) complains bitterly of "our instinctive desire to find in Latin verse a rhythm which seems intelligible." The desire of the reviewer, how-

⁴ Cf. p. 250: "As the quantitative structure weakens—at least in the types of composition intended for the people—it is replaced not by accentual verse but by mere syllable-counting, the line ending with a cadence which might often be regarded as either quantitative or accentual."

For a more satisfactory approach to the very complicated problems of medieval versification, see now: Dag Norberg, *Introduction à l'étude de la versification latine médiévale* (Acta Univ. Stock., Studia Lat. Stock., V [Stockholm, 1958]), especially pp. 5, 186.

ever, is not for this, which seems to the reviewer very easily achieved, but for an explanation of the marked divergencies of dialogue Latin meters from the Greek originals: the complete absence of lines like *Epitrepontes* 50 K³, the exclusion of the pyrrhic caesura of a tribrach foot in iambic verse, the avoidance of clash on proceleusmatic feet, the elimination of clash on the penult of a tribrach word, the marked reduction of clash on iambic words,⁵ and the stricter regard for caesura in Latin and the almost complete absence of lines in senarii having a spondaic or iambic word occupying the third foot. In the third foot, Plautus uses the same types of words which Menander uses, even those which preclude the penthemimeral caesura or the hephthemimeral or both at once, except those combinations which in Latin would involve clash of ictus and accent. These and these only are normally avoided. They are common in Menander. A sample hundred verses from the *Epitrepontes* show fifteen or twenty such combinations; a sample hundred from Plautus, one. We know from published statistics that these samples are typical.⁶

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GEORGES MÉAUTIS. *Sophocle: Essai sur le héros tragique*. Paris, Éditions Albin Michel, 1957. Pp. 295.

The principal thesis may be stated as follows: The Sophoclean tragedy is the story of the *pathos* of a hero (or heroine). This hero is a superior person, whose services to others have been great. He encounters their ingratitude, is hurt or destroyed in the most cruel circumstances of derision and misunderstanding, goes through the dark night of loneliness and an agonizing phase of self-doubt, but is at last true to himself and qualifies for the quasi-immortality which Greek belief bestowed on its heroes and heroines.

Such a thesis, which I hope has been fairly stated, does not in truth constitute the whole content of the monograph, but is a unifying theme for seven chapters, in each of which one of the extant tragedies is retold by way of paraphrase from beginning to end. The analogy with the story of the passion of Christ is acknowledged, indeed emphasized. There is also an obvious analogy with what might for convenience be called the *eniautos-daimon* theory of Murray, but there is a difference too, in that there is emphasis not only on the routine of suffering endured by the spirit, but also on the secular character of the hero, his superiority in mind, heart, and every kind of stature. Thus Méautis, though anticipated on one side by Murray, on the other by Whitman, can still claim originality for his thesis; a thesis which, it may be said at once, is valuable, and adds to our

⁵ Beare (p. 163) says that the great majority of iambic words retain their final long syllables. In initial or interior positions in the verse, exactly the opposite is true.

⁶ Cf. Drexler, *Gnomon*, XXIII (1951), p. 169.

understanding of Sophocles; but one which also demands its sacrifices in the way of omission and exaggeration, which oversimplifies, and, like other original theories, can not be accepted entire.

To begin with the thesis: The hero has great exploits to his credit. Often, this is not true. It is not true of either *Antigone* or *Electra*. It is not the whole truth about Ajax, either, whose tragedy consists in part at least in the fact that for all his great endowments he has failed where his father succeeded. Is it not, rather, that all these heroes, even Ajax, even Heracles and Deianeira, pass their final *peira* and demonstrate triumphantly that they are true to themselves? Sometimes, this seems to be what Méautis means. It is a question of high or heroic character. And it is here that in the full analysis Méautis has achieved an intimate and difficult *rapprochement* with his author. Briefly, he seems to accept the following: In the world of Sophoclean persons (which Méautis too often thinks of as the real world) there are some people who are simply superior to the bulk of mankind (this less noble bulk being divided into the well-meaning and the ill-meaning). Regardless of the record, these superior people are entitled to expect better treatment than the ignoble. Only so can one explain the persistent effort to "sell" Ajax to the reader while degrading Tecmessa. There is, then, a freemasonry of the elect—if this sounds too much like the Baron de Charlus, I regret it—and they are choice souls who recognize choice souls: Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, Oedipus and Theseus, Teucer and Odysseus when the latter "makes the grade." To me, the reviewer, all this is much less attractive than it seems to be to Méautis. By the same token, he is in this way probably closer to Sophocles than I. For it is best to admit that Sophocles was a good bit of a Bourbon; only thus can one account for some of the ethical implications in his plots.

Yet this moral and political aspect is only one aspect of Sophocles. Even here, there are limitations. Méautis tries, as so many critics of Sophocles do, to confine Sophoclean tragedy within a single formula. Odysseus, for instance, with his common sense and *sophrosyne*, can not be a hero of Sophoclean tragedy (p. 46). Excellent. Others (including myself) have said this. The only thing wrong with it is, it doesn't work. Sophocles did in fact write at least four tragedies about Odysseus (early Sophocles is still Sophocles) and this not only shows that Méautis has ignored the bulky though distracted evidence of the fragments; it also shows that he has drawn the lines of definition too tight. In truth, the pattern-story he outlines (his "thesis") is only one way of elaborating the sequence of deception and recognition, which could be done quite differently, whether as in *Electra*, which is briefly dealt with perhaps because it does not altogether fit into the monograph, or as in some of the more romantic lost plays, *The Kamikoi*, for instance, or *Tyro*.

Méautis writes so handsomely, so persuasively, that the reader is likely to go along with him too far—until he looks again at the Greek text. Then, sometimes, what's absent is seen to be assumed, what's there is ignored. I will give two instances where congenial propositions encounter some trouble in the text. The hero is rewarded in the end with cult amounting to resurrection. Where, then, in *The Women of Trachis*, is Heracles so rewarded? Why, in Pindar's

First Nemean, to be sure, which the audience knew well and remembered (?—see pp. 290-1). This is supposed to offset Hyllus' last word of nihilism—which, by the way, does not in turn have to represent the considered or permanent belief of Sophocles. Or again; the hero is mocked. Méautis sees the Chorus of Elders who stand by while Antigone is led to entombment as a derisive gang of ghouls (pp. 210-11) comparable to the Roman soldiers who mocked Christ. This is striking, original, above all, refreshing. The general concept is perhaps a stroke of genius, and for its detail he has Antigone's οἶμοι γελῶμαι (Σ39) to lean on. But all will not quite serve to bear out his complete picture in the detail he wishes. The Chorus began this scene with tears they could not stop (802-3, noted, pp. 209-10, but overpassed). They are, they avow, swept away from their own principles (καὶ τὸς θεσμῶν / ἔξω φέρομαι, 801-2). Swept by what? Pity, surely. It will not do for sneers and derision (p. 211). The Elders are merely made to do so poor a job as consolers (this, I think, Méautis rightly means in the almost parallel case in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, see p. 128) that they might as well be mocking her, and so the mockery subsists as a *theme* (which should suffice) though the will to it is absent.

Méautis has little to say about the poetry of Sophocles, except to commend a well-chosen word here and there. He does not seem interested in rhetoric as structure, and virtually ignores the stasimons, alike in the implications of their imagery and the excruciating problems of sense they pose. His valuable contribution is mostly confined to a study of the Sophoclean hero and his story in the seven extant plays; a significant area, though by no means the whole of Sophocles; but to this aspect he has applied much understanding and invention, and all can learn from him with profit.

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DONALD LEMEN CLARK. *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*. New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 285.

Professor Clark has here skilfully gathered together the essential materials from the pertinent sources; the result is a clear and lively account of the doctrinal principles and educational methods employed by the ancient teachers in the schools of grammar and rhetoric. He tells us also which of those precepts and methods he has from his own long and successful experience found to be valid for the present-day teacher of rhetoric and composition, and this gives the book special value. It was written for *teachers*, and does not profess to extend the bounds of our knowledge of ancient rhetoric, or to provide a historical treatment of the subject. Its concern with education is in spirit Isocratean, and so is Clark's view of the function of rhetoric in a liberal training, as a discipline that can "organize and systematize acquired learning" and "vitalize and fructify the human spirit." Rhetoric is defined broadly as the art of discourse, including

all the arts of prose, whether written or spoken. Teachers of Public Speaking in this country in growing number likewise draw inspiration from classical rhetoric; the witness they bear to the vitality of many of the ancient precepts regarding the spoken word is here impressively supplemented by testimony as well in the sphere of English composition and creative writing. Although critical of certain aspects of ancient oratory, rhetoric, and education, Clark maintains the ancient ideal of the service oratory can render in achieving the ends of justice, and of the place rhetoric deserves to hold in education for honorable living. And he would have the teacher of rhetoric lead the fight for freedom of thought and discussion in the quest for informed opinion in a democratic society.

The book comprises seven chapters and a Conclusion. Chapter I considers the views of the ancient writers on whether the art of discourse can be taught, and includes a section, "Who Taught the Poets?" "What the Ancients Meant by Rhetoric" (Ch. II) deals with the ethical theory of Plato, the scientific outlook of Aristotle, and the educational-practical view of Isocrates. Chapter III describes the stages of instruction in the schools, and IV studies the five departments of rhetoric (under Style, the Theophrastian "virtues"—purity, clarity, ornamentation, and appropriateness—and the three traditional Types), the speech and its divisions, and "The Speech Situation," this involving the three *genera dicendi*. Chapter V treats Imitation, its value, the questions whom to imitate and how, and the exercises—paraphrase, translation, and learning by heart. Chapter VI is concerned with the *progymnasmata*—fable, narrative, moral essay, proverb, and the rest. "Declamation" (Ch. VII) takes up the *suasoriae* and *controversiae*, and the Epilogue is a brief essay on the place and function of rhetoric in school and society.

The present reviewer found the chapter on Imitation particularly rewarding—and also the sundry observations arising out of Clark's special knowledge of the Renaissance. He regrets, however, that wit and laughter receive no treatment in the book, and that Memory and Delivery are dealt with only sketchily. An opinion on the *prescriptive* nature of the ancient rules on voice and gesture would have been welcome in the light of present theory; an influential school today teaches that "full realization of the content of the words at the moment of delivery" (*Rem tene*), attended by a "lively sense of communication" (J. A. Winans) will, without recourse to mechanical methods, do most to ensure the appropriate manifestation of the thought in voice and gesture.

Out of Clark's experience come certain interesting opinions relative to the teaching of rhetoric and composition. He favors school deliberations on themes in American history; greater use by teachers of the exercises of imitation, and of the prelection (recommended by Quintilian) as groundwork for imitation; (like H. H. Hudson and others) a revived use of the traditional theory of Invention, and (like W. S. Howell and others) of the *status*-system; wider and fuller instruction in logic in our schools; the selection of teachers in foreign-language departments who would employ translation as a tool for the mastery of *English*; and imitation of the teaching methods of Socrates, as exemplified in Plato's *Phaedrus*, a model lesson in rhetoric. On the other hand, he believes that the

controversiae are less well suited than the *progymnasmata* to modern educational procedures; that the precepts of classical rhetoric offer little or no help in classes in playwriting and storywriting; and that it is inadvisable to use Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, though the most important of philosophical treatises, as a *practical* textbook in college classes—a judgment with which we must link his choice of Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* (though it had no great influence on later rhetoric) as the ancient treatise most useful for the instruction of young students in this field.

A few details: "Flaminius" (pp. 244, 261, 280) should read "Flamininus"; *memoria* was already of interest to the sophists, but we cannot assume that Aristotle would have made it one of the departments of rhetoric (p. 69); the three *suasoriae* referred to at the bottom of p. 220 are to be found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* at 3.2.2 and 3.5.8, not 3.2.8—and three additional *suasoriae* from Roman history are given in 3.2.2; the first and last of the three Types of Issue described in the last-named treatise (at 1.11.18, not 1.11.13) are not "general" and "judicial" (p. 73), but "conjectural" and "juridical"—and I do not agree that its *status*-system is unduly complicated; on investigation it will perhaps prove more accurate to say (see p. 89) that not alone Quintilian, but also the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Bk. IV, has dominated subsequent theories of the figures of speech, and that the influence of Cicero, the minor rhetoricians, and the grammarians has not been inconsiderable—certainly the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* exerted the greater influence during the later Middle Ages; "Dionysius" [Cato] (pp. 61, 279) first intruded into the title of the *Disticha Catonis* in the sixteenth century—see the edition by Marcus Boas (Amsterdam, 1952), pp. liii f. and his articles listed on p. lxxxii; on Longinus' analysis of Sappho, Frag. 31 (p. 160), the reader may wish to see the comments by Denys Page, *Alcaeus and Sappho*, p. 27; along with the effects, good and bad, wrought by the schools on Silver Latin literature (pp. 21 f.), the part they played in forming the great literature of the Golden Age might have been indicated; Clark considers the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* "dull" (p. 10), an impeachment I find unacceptable—and indeed he himself cites the book often and from it excerpts interesting material; the title *De rhetori* (pp. 180, 279) of the Aldine collection (1523) of Greek treatises on rhetoric translated into Latin is surely a typographical error; a number of useful books and articles could be added to the section of the Bibliography entitled "Secondary Works." Finally, with the commendable purpose of passing fair and constructive judgment on declamation (pp. 250 ff.), Clark, even while devoting several pages to the exposition of absurdities which characterized this school-exercise in operation, vigorously takes to task certain critics to whom he attributes a one-sided position. The least of these would demur to the charge; he, too, took cognizance of certain benefits that did indeed derive from declamation as practiced in the first century; see *Studies in Speech and Drama in Honor of A. M. Drummond*, p. 299.

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LOUIS HARMAND. *Le patronat sur les collectivités publiques des origines au Bas-Empire: un aspect social et politique du monde romain.* Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957. Pp. 552. 2000 fr. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Clermont, deuxième série, fasc. 2.*)

The important subject here discussed has never before received an extensive treatment. Harmand omits patronage over *collegia* as covered by Waltzing, but for the rest his analysis of the epigraphic and literary evidence is full and generally persuasive.

In the Republic (pp. 13-148) Harmand essays to define the enrichment of *patrocinium* by borrowings from *hospitium* in Italy and from *proxenia* in Greece. Particularly where a conquering general became a patron of a conquered people, the relationship was an important force in consolidating Roman expansion; in the Late Republic this type of bond was a potent vehicle for ambitious leaders. Here Premerstein has served as guide, but Syme is ignored; on Cicero, Harmand might well have consulted Lepore's recent study.

The treatment of the Early Empire (pp. 151-417) is the heart of the book. Harmand begins by worrying unduly the problem why the emperors, after Augustus, were rarely patrons; he eventually determines that for the ruler the title *pater patriae* was as useful and that the subjects preferred an aggressive spokesman before the emperor and central administration. Then come a most useful catalog of patrons for both Early and Late Empire (pp. 188-284), an analysis of the reasons why a city chose a particular man as patron, and a discussion of the advantages which it drew from its patron—financial aid, buildings, games, judicial assistance, etc. On the Late Empire (pp. 421-84) Harmand is much briefer, in part because his complementary thesis, a commentary on Libanius *On the Patronages*, concentrates on the fourth century; I have noted this work recently in the *American Historical Review*.

The present study is careful, clear, and if anything too discursive; its principal defect is a tendency to formal cataloging rather than penetrating analysis. As the author justly comments at both beginning and end, patronage was a relationship of men, not an abstract political theorem, and as a personal tie between the more and the less powerful it played a considerable part in making the Roman system of government operate successfully. This aspect is not much treated in Harmand's pages. The tie, too, was not as purely humanitarian as the author makes it in the Early Empire, "un merveilleux régulateur de l'équilibre social" (p. 385); and I much doubt that "le patron devient littéralement l'esclave de ses clients" (p. 361). When a city chose in the golden age of the Empire a patron, often of local origin, we can see clearly the benefits it derived; on the other hand the advantages gained by the patron are not so obvious. They were, however, surely not always limited to pure marks of honor such as statues, seats in the theater, and so on. One needs to keep in mind Verres in the Late Republic and the patrons of the *vici* in the Late Empire; as Abbott and Johnson observed, the glowing testimonials to local leaders in the Early Empire often disguise records of personal profit at public expense.

The bibliography (pp. 489-98) is well selected, but the works cited in the notes themselves are chiefly French and at some points not the best or the most modern treatments. A list of *errata* is far from correcting all the misprints and transpositions of whole lines. Two indices cover persons and places. Among minor observations I may note: to date the beginning of the Late Empire in A.D. 280 is curiously imprecise (p. 421); that a community chose a resident exile as patron to spite the emperor is unbelievable (p. 290); Harmand merely notes the apparent absence of patrons in Egypt down to the fourth century (p. 293); his interpretation of the early emperors as loosening the ties between central and local governments (p. 152) goes too far.

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HATTO H. SCHMITT. *Rom und Rhodos. Geschichte ihrer politischen Beziehungen seit der ersten Berührung bis zum Aufgehen des Inselstaates im römischen Weltreich.* Munich, C. H. Beck, 1957. Pp. xv + 223. (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, Heft 40.)

This work describes the relations between Rome and Rhodes during the period when those relations were a matter of really great consequence to the Mediterranean world, that is, in the period before 164 B. C.: thereafter their significance paled and that, of course, is the reason why Schmitt's final, sixth, chapter gives little more than a summary of the dealings between the two states in the Late Republic and Early Empire. It may be said at once that Schmitt's is a conscientious and workmanlike effort, and moreover an effort which was well worth undertaking since, as all readers of *Parola del Pasato* (to mention no other periodical) will be aware, a good deal of research has been done on Rhodes in recent years and no connected history or synthesis of the widely scattered material has been attempted since Hiller von Gaertringen's article on *Rhodos* appeared in the fifth Supplementband of Pauly Wissowa almost thirty years ago.

Any study of this subject must start from the much questioned assertion of Polybius (XXX, 5, 6, = 167 B. C.): "The policy of the Rhodians was of so practical a sort that they had not signed an alliance with the Romans although they had participated in their most illustrious and finest deeds for almost one hundred and forty years." In other words, Polybius is saying that from ca. 305 B. C. (cf. G. De Sanctis in *Riv. di Fil.*, XIII [1935], p. 72) the Rhodians cooperated closely with the Romans, but were reluctant to sign a formal alliance with them until 167 B. C. Polybius' assertion has, of course, been seriously challenged, notably by Holleaux over half a century ago, who insisted that in fact the association of Rhodes with Rome did not begin until ca. 200 B. C. (201 B. C. is the date of the first embassy from Rhodes to Rome recorded in the extant text of Livy: XXXI, 2, 1). Accordingly Holleaux proposed

to emend Polybius' text to read forty years instead of one hundred and forty, and most scholars since then have been content to follow his lead. Schmitt contests this, arguing that what Polybius really means is that *amicitia*, even though no formal alliance, existed between Rhodes and Rome from 305 B. C. on, as in fact Livy (XLV, 25, 9) and Dio (fr. 68, 3 Boiss.; cf. Zon., IX, 24, 6) imply. Polybius does indeed exaggerate when he says that the Rhodians participated in Rome's finest and most illustrious deeds, but Polybius himself is not responsible for this exaggeration: he derived it from his source Zenon (p. 14). Although sceptical of this essay in *Quellenforschung*, the present reviewer agrees that Schmitt is right in accepting Polybius' text as it stands. On *a priori* grounds Rhodian relations with Rome as early as 340 B. C. seem entirely likely, as even Beloch, a convinced advocate of the lower dating, was obliged to admit (*Gr. Gesch.*, IV, 1, p. 290, n. 2). True, Roman contacts with the Greek world before 340 B. C. may have been recently exaggerated (e. g. by Pareti), but such contacts unquestionably did exist: in this connection Schmitt's remarks on pp. 42 f. are worth noting, even if not everyone will accept his view that the terms of the Carthaginian Treaty of 348 B. C. presuppose the existence of a Roman navy. Moreover discoveries since the war have proved that Parthenope (= Pizzofalcone at Naples) was a very early foundation, even though the alleged Rhodian role in the colony (Strabo, XIV, 2, 10, p. 654; cf. *Step. Byz.*, s. v. "Parthenope") cannot be demonstrated from the archaeological finds.

The subsequent course of Roman-Rhodian relations, passing as they did through phases of close friendship, then coolness and even worse, is described by Schmitt with careful citation of the evidence, which for the third century B. C. particularly is very jejune and scattered. It is most convenient to have all this material between two covers, and if there are few novelties, there is an abundance of good sense. His account is naturally better on some things than on others: e. g. the parts dealing with Rhodian intervention in Lycian affairs are not as incisive as those dealing with Rhodian mediation in the First Macedonian War. But as a whole the work is very well balanced and sane. The narrative style is a little pedestrian perhaps, the change from Rhodian friendship to enmity with Rome being related in the same even, matter-of-fact way as everything else. Some readers might have preferred the contrast to be painted in sharper colours. Schmitt could no doubt retort that *peripeteia* belongs to Greek tragedy rather than to a monograph which aims, and can fairly claim, to be *wissenschaftlich*. Certainly no reader can complain that the relevant facts are not given, and given objectively. The reasons why Rhodes fell in Roman esteem emerge clearly enough.

One small cavil: it is difficult to see on what principle works are included in the *Literaturverzeichnis* on pp. xiii-xv. Recent publications by Walbank and Oost are omitted from it (although not from the footnotes throughout the volume). One would have thought them as worthy of inclusion as, say, Gelzer's *Über die Arbeitsweise des Polybius*. De Sanetis' *Storia dei Romani* appears as *Storia di Roma* on p. 40: otherwise, however, the book is refreshingly free from slips.

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L. A. MORITZ. *Grain-Mills and Flour in Classical Antiquity*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Pp. xxvii + 230; 16 pls. 50 s.

The author presents a clear though still conjectural scheme of development of grain-mills from elementary crushing appliances to the introduction of water-driven machinery. On the line of progress two main points emerge. First, the application of leverage. It was probably in sixth-century Greece that a mill was invented where the upper stone was pushed to and fro by the operator by means of a handle. Later the rotary mill was invented which made possible the use of animal force. A donkey (or a horse), harnessed to the rod of the appliance and walking round and round, drew the upper stone around. The earliest reference to a donkey-mill is in Plautus (*Asin.*, 708). The author rightly opposes the popular idea that revolving mills were worked by slaves.

The most important invention, however, was the water-mill, which made both human and animal effort unnecessary. The author is sketchy on this topic. His free rendering of the famous epigram of Antipater of Thessalonica (*Anth. Pal.*, IX, 418) does not do justice to the technical exactness of the piece: Water moves a wheel which turns a shaft. The latter by means of "radiating cogs turns round hollow weights of millstones." The gear thus transfers a vertical rotation into the horizontal motion of the perforated millstones.

Antipater describes a newly installed piece of machinery. The invention itself may have preceded this installation by centuries. A millstone in the Tiflis Museum is said to be from an Uratran site. Cf. G. Tsereteli, *The Uratran Monuments in the Georgian Museum* (1939), p. 63 and pl. xxii. This dating, however, is far from certain. Cf. B. P. Piotrovski, *Istoria i kultura Uratru* (1944), p. 196. Yet, the hydrographic conditions of the Mediterranean countries make it probable that the water-mill was invented in the Anatolian region.

It seems that this new motive force, though increasingly favored in the Roman Empire, began to be generally used only in the fourth century. The volume of the Mediterranean rivers was, of course, low, and the water of aqueducts was needed for the population of cities. Further, a water-mill was preferably mounted on anchored boats, in a stream. This installation saved on construction costs, and the mobility of the boats made it possible to use the strongest current of the low-velocity rivers. (I do not know why B. Gille, in the *Oxford History of Technology*, II, p. 607, ascribes the invention of floating mills to Belisarius and his engineers.) But such mills impeded navigation and obstructed the general use of the river. Classical Roman law stressed the primacy of public interests with regard to waterways. The creation of "feudal" privileges and, thus, of private properties on water channels changed the legal situation. Cf. the very instructive observations of C. Sicard, *Les Moulins de Toulouse au Moyen-Âge* (1953), pp. 38 and 55.

The second part of the book deals with flour. It bears upon the quality of bread, the staple food of the Mediterranean peoples. The author well explains the nutritional and economic advantages of "white" wheaten bread. A study of wheat and barley consumption in classical antiquity would be instructive. Everybody knows that

the Five Thousand were fed by five barley loaves as the Fourth Gospel (6:9) states. Palestine, however, was a poor country. For this reason it is interesting that a Greek novelist considered the "wheaten bread" in an Egyptian inn worthy of mention (*Heliod., Aeth.*, II, 22).

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H. MICHELL. *The Economics of Ancient Greece*. Second edition. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1957. Pp. xi + 427. \$8.50.

This book (appearing now in a second edition), by the Professor Emeritus of Political Economy in McMaster University, is not an economic history of ancient Greece. Rather, it is a useful and enlightening discussion of various aspects of the economy of Greece, fortunately by a scholar who, while a specialist in another field of study, possesses competence in and enthusiasm for classical studies. It is good to have a second edition of this book, for it makes its contribution to one valuable aspect of that wider knowledge of the Greeks which is essential, if we are really to understand them. Lest anyone think that Greek economics are crude and undeveloped as compared with the discipline of contemporary economics—and, therefore, not worthy of our interest—I mention at random a very few of the "modern" notes in Greek economics which are to be found in Professor Michell's book: convoys; "means test"; settlement of international balances of trade; sickness, accident, and old-age pensions.

The second edition of the book differs from the first mainly in that nine pages of Appendices (pp. 416-24) and three pages of Supplementary Bibliography (pp. 425-7) have been added to the work. The Appendices contain notes on a variety of matters of interest, but do not add appreciably to the value of the book. Likewise, the Supplementary Bibliography contains a useful collection of titles, from which, however, so far as I can find, very little, if anything at all, has been incorporated in the notes which appear in the Appendices. Nor, again, have more than very slight changes been made in the 415 pages of the book which appeared in the first edition.

It is not inappropriate that this review of a book on economic matters should close with an observation concerning a matter of economics. The first edition of this book, appearing in 1940, contained 415 pages and sold for \$4.00. The second edition, appearing in 1957, contains 427 pages—of which 415 pages are reproduced from the plates of the first edition by "photographic reprint, corrected," hence without the labor costs that would have been entailed by fresh composition of the text—and is priced at \$8.50. To this reviewer the price seems excessive.

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WILHELM HENGESBERG. *De ornatu rhetorico quem Basilus Magnus in diversis homiliarum generibus adhibuit.* Bonn, 1957. Pp. 320. (*Dissertatio inauguralis Universitatis Fridericiae Guillelmiae Rhenanae.*)

The theme of this dissertation is contained in the words of the title "in diversis homiliarum generibus." Briefly stated it is that Basil's use of rhetorical ornament varies with the subject of his homily and the audience to which it is addressed. Hengenberg groups the homilies in five classes, of which Class I shows the least use of ornament, and Class V the most. As might have been expected, the exegetical homilies show the fewest figures of rhetoric and the encomia of the martyrs and the exhortations show the largest number. If there is nothing startling in this conclusion, it at least may serve to correct a common opinion that Basil was wholly under the influence of contemporary stylistic trends. It is true, he can turn as neat a jingle as any orator of the Second Sophistic, but he does have a feeling for propriety, and on occasion his discourse can be simple, straightforward, and lucid.

The arrangement of the homilies in five classes depends largely on Hengenberg's feeling for "vis rhetorica" in a given oration. He deliberately avoids statistics such as were provided by Campbell in his dissertation on *The Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Style of the Sermons of St. Basil the Great* (Washington, D. C., 1922). He is right in distrusting statistics alone as a measure of style, but when the force of his argument depends, for example, on the relative frequency of rhetorical questions in several homilies, a more liberal use of Campbell's statistical method would have made his conclusions more persuasive.

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FRIEDHELM LEFHERZ. *Studien zu Gregor von Nazianz: Mythologie, Überlieferung, Scholiasten.* Bonn, 1958. Pp. 311; 3 folding tables. Paper, DM. 4.50. To be ordered from the author, Richrath Str. 9, Düsseldorf-Wersten.

This Bonn dissertation grew out of a study of the use of classical mythology in Gregory of Nazianzen's prose and poetry. Finding that the condition of the published texts of Gregory's works made a comprehensive study impossible at the present time—the only available editions are sometimes inadequate—the author confined himself to a study of certain legends, and devoted the major part of his work to critical bibliographical and textual studies which will be of great service to all future students of Gregory's works and to classical and patristic scholars concerned with the use of Greek rhetoric and literary motifs by the patristic writers.

Study of a selection of mythological passages (on the invention of shipbuilding, and on Melampus, Komaitho, Iambe, Zamolxis, and Abaris) shows how Gregory employed mythology for ethical and

didactic purposes, using classical motifs and biblical material for similar ends. Gregory had an extraordinarily wide knowledge of Greek mythology, and employed it skilfully in a variety of ways.

The remainder of the dissertation offers practical aids which are not available elsewhere in one volume: a detailed bibliography of modern works on Gregory and on related topics; a critical account of the published editions of Gregory's works (including a list of the writings not published in the *Patrologia Graeca*), with a summary of the investigations by various scholars which are currently in progress; a descriptive study of the scholiasts who commented on Gregory's orations and letters; and an account of the commentaries on Gregory's poems, from the sixth to the eighteenth centuries. There are indices of the manuscripts cited, of the incipits of Gregory's works which are discussed, and of the scholiasts and other ancient writers who are mentioned.

For financial reasons only a third of the original dissertation could be published. It is to be hoped that the author will find means to make available the remainder of his important researches.

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VERGIL'S *GEORGICS* AND THE *LAUDES GALLI*.

Vergil in composing the *Georgics* was indebted for technical information to many earlier works, both Greek and Roman, prose as well as poetry. His sources include Aristotle's *History of Animals* and Theophrastus' *History of Plants*, Hellenistic poems such as the extant *Phaenomena* of Aratus and the lost *Georgica* and *Melissurgica* of Nicander, and Roman treatises on farming by the elder Cato and by Varro, whose *Res Rusticae* was published in 37 B. C. Numerous attempts have been made to show his close dependence upon these and other sources,¹ and such dependence cannot be denied. On the other hand, since many works have been lost, we are in the dark concerning the exact relationships; for instance, Varro used Greek sources also, and it is difficult to be certain that Vergil on occasion is taking material from Varro directly rather than from the same earlier author or authors who had supplied Varro with similar information. The important thing, as Rand points out, is not the tracking down of sources and the establishing of "deadly parallels," but "the act of magic . . . that has combined the discordant and the prosaic into harmonious poetry."²

¹ Cf. the works cited by J. Perret, *Virgile, l'homme et l'oeuvre* (Paris, 1952), pp. 174 f.; K. Büchner, *P. Vergilius Maro, der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart, 1956), cols. 306 f. See also L. A. S. Jermyn, "Virgil's Agricultural Lore," *G. & R.*, XVIII (1949), pp. 49-69.

² E. K. Rand, *The Magical Art of Virgil* (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), p. 196. Rand's use of the word "magic" for the creation of new poetry from earlier material is not unlike the term "integration" favored by W. F. J. Knight; cf. *Roman Vergil* (2nd ed., London, 1944), pp. 76 ff.

It was probably enthusiastic love of Italy as the mother country rather than pressure from Maecenas or an early "back to the land" policy fostered by Octavian that led Vergil to compose the *Georgics*.³ He wished to combine the learned material of earlier writers in an artistic creation which would portray the beauties and charm of Italy as well as dignify and ennoble the labor of the Italian farmer. Although there is some uncertainty about the exact technical sources from which he derived his information, we are in no doubt concerning his literary models; these are two in number, Hesiod's *Works and Days* and Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*.

Hesiod's work, a mixture of myth and fable, of technical advice on agriculture and maxims on life in general, was the ancestor and prototype of all later didactic poetry, and Vergil therefore claims that he is singing the song of Ascræa throughout Roman towns: cf. II, 176:

Ascræumque cano Romana per oppida carmen.

As in the *Eclogues* he was the "Roman Theocritus," so now he becomes the "Roman Hesiod," but actually his indebtedness to Hesiod is limited to specific passages in the first book, which deals both with "Works" (43-203) and with "Days" (259-463a, with an introductory section on astronomy, 204-258), thus corresponding loosely to the sections in Hesiod's poem on "Works" (383-617) and "Days" (765-825). Vergil, by referring to his first book as "the tillage of the fields and the stars of heaven,"⁴ indicates that this part of his poem is most closely related to Hesiod's *Works and Days*. His treatment of the "Days," how-

H. W. Prescott, *The Development of Virgil's Art* (Chicago, 1927), p. 122, says that "the same quick association of sound and sense that led to the fusion of various Theocritean idyls into one eclogue, in the *Georgics* issued in the artistic blending of a vastly greater store of material into a whole that moved and inspired the reader as the weaker composition of the pastorals never could."

³ Cf. Prescott, *op. cit.*, pp. 118, 133; L. P. Wilkinson, "The Intention of Virgil's *Georgics*," *G. & R.*, XIX (1950), pp. 19-28.

⁴ II, 1: *arvorum cultus et sidera caeli*; cf. I, 1: *segetes, quo sidere*. In I, 27, Octavian is described as the giver of crops and lord of the seasons (*auctorem frugum tempestatumque potentem*); here we have the same combination of "Works" and "Days."

ever, is based on astronomy and meteorology, whereas Hesiod had merely listed lucky and unlucky days.

As a whole the *Georgics* bear little resemblance in form or substance to the Greek poem, and the motives of the two poets were very different: Hesiod wrote from indignation at his brother's conduct and desired to recall him from greed and injustice, while Vergil, bitterly opposed to war and civil strife, praised the simplicity and peace of rural life and stressed the dignity of the farmer's toil. For Hesiod toil and sorrow were sent by the gods to men of the Iron Age as a punishment (176-8, cf. 397 f.); Vergil looks upon labor as sent by Jupiter to be a blessing in disguise; it sharpens men's wits, enables them to develop inventive techniques, and leads them up the ladder of civilization (I, 121 ff.); cf. I, 145 f.:

tum variae venere artes. labor omnia vicit
improbis et duris urgens in rebus egestas.⁵

Labor is the basic theme of the *Georgics* as *amor* may be said to be the theme of the *Eclogues* (cf. *Ecl.*, X, 69: *omnia vincit Amor*).

When Vergil began the *Georgics*, the great didactic poem of Roman literature was the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius on the atomic theory and the Epicurean ideal, and Vergil was profoundly influenced in thought, language, and structure by the work of his predecessor. The two poets had much in common—love of Nature, love of ancient poetry, devotion to science and philosophy, dislike of the pomp and luxury of city life, and an abhorrence of the crimes and violence of civil war. But there are many striking differences as well. Vergil was less interested in individual happiness or contentment than in the active performance of duty and the welfare of the state; Lucretius had looked upon man as subordinate to the material universe, Vergil

⁵ S. P. Bovie, *Virgil's Georgics* (Chicago, 1956), p. xiv, aptly says: "Like Hesiod, Virgil saw that the farming life had its pains, but Virgil also saw that it clearly had its gains, and he took account of both sides." H. Altevogt, *Labor improbus. Eine Vergilstudie* (Münster, 1952 [= *Orbis Antiquus*, Heft 8]), pp. 5 ff., opposes the usual interpretation of *improbis* as "persistent," "unremitting," and, comparing *Aen.*, VI, 276 f., looks upon *labor* as evil along with *egestas*; cf. Büchner, *op. cit.*, cols. 250, 314 f.

viewed the hard-working farmer as duty-bound to conquer the forces of nature and become the master of his environment. Vergil's attitude towards the gods was very different from that of the earlier poet; "revere the gods first of all," he says (I, 338: *in primis venerare deos*), and he believed in immortality, stating that even for bees "there is no place for death" (IV, 226: *nec morti esse locum*). Vergil had studied Epicureanism, but he had too much piety and religious faith to accept Lucretius' arguments against immortality and a Divine Providence.⁶

The four books of the *Georgics* are devoted to the following subjects: I: plowing, sowing, harvesting, and the weather; II: trees and vines; III: herds and flocks; IV: the care and keeping of bees; for this fourfold arrangement Vergil is perhaps indebted to the glowing praise of country life which Cicero attributes to the elder Cato (*Cato Maior*, 15, 54).⁷ The poem is, as Rand says, "an intensely practical work,"⁸ which agriculturists even in modern times have found of value. But there is truth in the statement of Seneca the Younger (*Epist.*, 86, 15) that Vergil aimed not to teach the farmer as much as to please his reader; that is, he was writing for a larger audience, one which he wished to perceive the dignity and importance of agriculture in Italy. The poem is far more than a technical treatise on farming; its scene extends from Italy to Libya and Scythia, the bounds of the known world (III, 339 ff.), from the earth below to the sun, moon, and stars (I, 204-58). Such passages on geography and astronomy are only a part of the broader content of the poem.

The prologues and epilogues of the books and the many episodes of a descriptive nature—often called "digressions" but not truly so as they usually develop naturally from the context—lift the poem to themes of social and national interest, to even higher realms of religion and philosophy. Knight says of these passages that they are "like the choric odes of Greek tragedy, partly giving relief and escape, and partly showing the realities of the

⁶ Cf. also Rand, *op. cit.*, pp. 255 f., 322 f.; A. M. Guillemin, *Virgile, poète, artiste et penseur* (Paris, 1951), pp. 121 ff.; E. Paratore, *Virgilio* (2nd ed., Firenze, 1954), pp. 255 ff.; Bovie, *op. cit.*, pp. xvi ff.

⁷ Cf. E. de Saint-Denis, "Une source de Virgile dans les *Géorgiques*," *R. E. L.*, XVI (1938), pp. 297-317; *Virgile, Géorgiques* (Paris, 1956), pp. xx f.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

wider world, in which the action is set."⁹ The poem is thus an epic of man's relation to the world about him, "eine Symphonie in Worten als Bild des Kosmos,"¹⁰ and presents a comprehensive picture of nature, country life, Italy, Octavian, and Roman destiny.

Four passages, one in each book, are called "natural laws"; these are the following:

- I, 125-46: the law of work by the order of Jupiter;
- II, 319-45: Spring, the time of awakening and growth;
- III, 242-83: Love, the great law of existence;
- IV, 149-86: Law, the great force of society.¹¹

Of these four passages, Richardson says: "Each book has implicit in it and contributing to the unity of the four constituents, one of the fundamentals of living: labor, life, love, and law . . . [Vergil's] correlation of the four aspects of the farm, ploughing, planting, herding, and bee-keeping, in accordance with four natural impulses, work, the life-urge, love, and law, is complex and intellectual."¹² How much more complex and intellectual the poem actually is becomes apparent as soon as we examine its content more closely in relation to its structure.

Vergil has arranged the four books of the *Georgics* in units of two books each, I-II, on inanimate nature (fields, trees, and vines), and III-IV, on living creatures (herds, flocks, and bees); Servius (*in Georg.*, III, 1) comments that III and IV are pastoral, as opposed to the georgic themes of I and II, and in a strict sense this is true, as III and IV are not concerned with the tillage of the soil. In spite of the differences in the subject


⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹⁰ Büchner, *op. cit.*, col. 305; cf. W. Y. Sellar, *The Roman Poets of the Augustan Age: Virgil* (3rd ed., Oxford, 1908), p. 210: "The speculative idea of the *Georgics* is thus rather a theological than a philosophical idea. The ultimate fact which Virgil endeavours to set forth and justify is the relation of man to Nature, under a Divine dispensation."


¹¹ This final passage is, strictly speaking, not a descriptive passage like the other three but a part of Vergil's account of the life of the bees.

¹² L. Richardson, Jr., *Poetical Theory in Republican Rome* (New Haven, 1944), pp. 152, 172.

matter of the two halves, there exist many similarities and contrasts between I and III and between II and IV:



and at the same time there are certain links between I and IV and II and III; the arrangement thus becomes more intricate:



Several scholars have suggested that Vergil adopted for the *Georgics* the same method which, according to the Donatus-Suetonius Life (23), he used for the *Aeneid*, first making a prose outline and then writing different parts of the work as he saw fit;¹³ in this way he could have composed the similar or contrasting passages at the same time. I consider the prose draft probable, as he was working with technical material drawn from many sources and the outline would help to explain the very complicated structure of the poem; whether the corresponding or contrasting passages were composed together is less certain. The important thing is the existence of the parallels and contrasts, and I shall point out the more significant of these.¹⁴

Books I and III have extended prologues, in each of which Octavian plays a major role: in I, 24-42, he is described as a god; in III, 10-48, Vergil will erect in his honor a temple of song, an allusion to the poet's original intention to praise Octavian in an historical epic. Books II and IV have short prefaces of

¹³ Cf., e. g., K. Witte, *Die Geschichte der römischen Dichtung im Zeitalter des Augustus*. I, 2: *Vergils Georgica* (Erlangen, 1927), pp. 172 f.; P. van de Woestijne, "Notes sur la chronologie des Géorgiques de Virgile," *R. B. Ph.*, X (1931), p. 50; E. Norden, "Orpheus und Eurydice. Ein nachträgliches Gedenkblatt für Vergil," *Berl. Sitzb.*, phil.-hist. Kl., XXII (1934), p. 672.

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion, see D. L. Drew, "The Structure of Vergil's *Georgics*," *A. J. P.*, L (1929), pp. 242-54; Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 132 ff.; Perret, *op. cit.*, pp. 69 ff. Some parallels are forced; Drew seems wrong in viewing the conclusion of III as dealing with contemporary history (to balance the conclusion of I); cf. Richardson, pp. 147 f.

eight and seven verses respectively, that in II invoking Bacchus, that in IV invoking Apollo; the shorter prefaces are appropriate here, as each book forms the second half of a larger unit. The conclusions of I and III are gloomy—in I portents after Caesar's death, the dangers of civil war, and the need of Octavian to save the Roman people; in III pestilence and death. The conclusions of II and IV present a happier picture—praise of country life in II, and in IV the regeneration of the bees (including a tribute to Rome in II, 534 ff., and to Octavian in IV, 560 ff.). The passage on astronomy, or "geography of the heavens," in I, 231-58, is balanced by that on geography (Libya and Scythia) in III, 339-83, with the references to Scythia and Libya in I, 240 f., as a connecting link, and each passage is carefully woven into its context; the description of Libya and Scythia in III, 339-83, for instance, is subtly integrated in a chiasmic order with the preceding passages on winter (295-321) and summer (322-38). In II, 136-76, we have the glowing tribute to the majesty of Italy, and in IV, 116-46, the simple charms of Italy.

Drew is inaccurate when he says that there are no correspondences between I and IV or II and III.¹⁵ Just as *labor* is stressed in I, 125-246, so in IV we have an emphasis on the *labor durus* of the beekeeper (cf. 114) and the *labor* of the bees themselves (cf. 184: *labor omnibus unus*); also, in IV, 125-46, an exact numerical correspondence to I, 125-46, the labors of the old gardener of Tarentum are described; this passage is far more significant for the poem as a whole than is often realized, as the *senex* symbolizes the industrious but happy life of the poor man who "lived the life of kings" (132: *regum aequabat opes animis*).¹⁶ Aristaeus, to whose story the second half of IV is devoted, is invoked in I, 14 f.—an interesting link between the

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

¹⁶ On the significance of this passage for the *Georgics* as a whole, see E. Burck, "Der korykische Greis in Vergils Georgica (IV 116-148)," in *Navicula Chiloniensis. Studia Philologica Felici Jacoby . . . oblata* (Leiden, 1956), pp. 156-72; cf. also P. Grimal, *Les jardins romains à la fin de la république et aux deux premiers siècles de l'empire* (Paris, 1943), pp. 412 ff., who believes that the old man of Tarentum symbolizes Pythagoras; see Saint-Denis, *Virgile, Géorgiques*, p. 114 (on IV, 130): Vergil, opposed to large gardens and estates, describes a modest but productive garden. Cf. *Georg.*, II, 412 f.: *laudato ingentia rura, exiguum colito*, a precept which Servius derives from Cato.

beginning and the end of the poem. Perret sees a symbolic relation between the conclusions of I and IV;¹⁷ as Octavian, the *iuvenis* of I, 500, is to restore the Roman people, so Aristaeus, the *iuvenis* of IV, 445 (= Octavian), regenerates his swarm of bees (= Romans); each acts under divine guidance and to each divine honors are promised (I, 503 f.; IV, 325). I shall return shortly to the problem of the second half of IV, but if Perret's theory is accepted, the essential unity of the *Georgics* in its present form is appreciably strengthened. Another possible link between I and IV, this time of a numerical nature, is the fact that Maecenas is addressed in line 2 in both books, whereas the mention of his name in II and III occurs in line 41 and brings together these two books in the same mechanical but unobtrusive fashion.

Vergil composed his four books of *Georgics* in units of two books each. Lucretius, to whom he was indebted in so many other respects, had a similar structural arrangement for the *De Rerum Natura*; three units of two books each: I-II, the nature and properties of the atoms; III-IV, the soul and the senses; V-VI, celestial and terrestrial phenomena; and it is important to note that Lucretius concluded each of the major sections on a gloomy note: II, 1131 ff., on the decay of the world; IV, 1058 ff., on the evils and pains of love; and VI, 1090 ff., on plague and death, the passage which inspired the conclusion of *Georgics* III. But Vergil's outlook was far less pessimistic than that of his predecessor, and he ends each major unit on a happier note. The praise of country life at the end of II is also a picture of a new Golden Age, an age of peace;¹⁸ cf. 460: *iustissima tellus*, i. e., Justice, who lived on earth in the Golden Age, has now returned, and life in Italy is now the life of *aureus Saturnus* (538); IV has two conclusions: immortality for the bees (219-27) and the happy ending for Aristaeus of the regeneration of the bees (548-58). Vergil paints his darker pictures at the endings of I and III, the midpoints of each two-book unit. When we view the *Georgics* as a whole, we can see more clearly what he has planned with his four conclusions, in the twofold arrangement I-II and III-IV; the emphasis at the end of each

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 84 f. If we reject this symbolism, the conclusions of I and IV are still linked by references to the later divinity of Octavian (I, 503 f., IV, 562).

¹⁸ Cf. Rand, *op. cit.*, pp. 264 ff.

book is as follows: I, War; II, Peace; III, Death; IV, Resurrection. This reveals the extent to which Vergil has elevated the *Georgics* from the level of a poetical treatise on farming to an epic with universal significance.

This amazing unity of structure and meaning throws new light upon what is perhaps the most discussed problem of the *Georgics*—the second edition with a new ending to replace the praise of Cornelius Gallus which, we are told, originally stood in Book IV and was removed after the disgrace and suicide of Gallus in 26 B. C. The second half of Book IV, which provides the conclusion to the entire poem, is most unusual in that it is an epyllion with a story within a story in the manner of Catullus LXIV; just as the wedding of Peleus and Thetis encloses the unhappy tale of Theseus and Ariadne, so the episode of Aristaeus is the framework for the beautiful and tragic story of Orpheus and Eurydice (453-527); both the Aristaeus story and that of Orpheus reveal a framework or recessed panel construction similar to that of Catullus LXIV.¹⁹ The *Georgics* is the only poem of its type which ends in such an epyllion, and most scholars believe that the original conclusion of the poem was very different and contained the *laudes Galli*.

Our information for the change comes from Servius who gives two conflicting versions: (1) in *Buc.* X, 1: the praise of Gallus extended from the middle to the end of IV (*a medio usque ad finem*) and Vergil substituted the story of Aristaeus;²⁰ (2) in *Georg.* IV, 1: the *laudes Galli* stood in the passage which now contains the story of Orpheus. Most modern scholars have

¹⁹ Cf. Prescott, *op. cit.*, pp. 132 f.; Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 f., 163; and especially Saint-Denis, *Virgile, Géorgiques*, p. xxxix. For a somewhat different analysis of the Orpheus-Eurydice tale, see G. Norwood, "Vergil, *Georgics* IV, 453-527," *C. J.*, XXXVI (1940-41), pp. 354 f. (a concentric pattern around 481-503). On the structure of Catullus LXIV, see C. Murley, "The Structure and Proportion of Catullus LXIV," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVIII (1937), pp. 305-17. The central portion on Ariadne may itself be analyzed as a series of balancing panels framing Ariadne's lament (132-201) as the focal point; cf. C. W. Mendell, "The Influence of the Epyllion on the *Aeneid*," *Yale Class. Stud.*, XII (1951), p. 212. See also Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-65, 71 f.

²⁰ This version appears also in the expanded *Vita* of Donatus known as Donatus-Auctus, in almost the same words and obviously copied from Servius.

accepted one or the other of these two statements and have supported their views by arguing that the Aristaeus story is most inappropriate as a conclusion to IV, or that the Orpheus myth is not an integral part of the story of Aristaeus.

Those who believe that Vergil in a second edition substituted the Orpheus and Eurydice story for an original section praising Cornelius Gallus include Cartault, Rand, and Paratore.²¹ Cartault considers it impossible that the entire second half of Book IV would be devoted to Gallus, and he sees no reason for the Orpheus and Eurydice story except that Vergil was working on the underworld scenes of *Aeneid* VI at the time when he had to make the substitution; Rand and Paratore prefer, of the two statements of Servius, the one which he wrote with the *Georgics* before him.

Among the many scholars who accept the tradition that the entire Aristaeus story is a later addition are Sellar, Letters, Guillemin, Saint-Denis, and Büchner.²² Sellar sees no national significance in the tale of Aristaeus and considers it "an undoubted blot on the artistic perfection of the work." Guillemin looks upon it as an early epyllion, written perhaps before the *Eclogues*, which Vergil added as a conclusion when he had to remove the original portion about Gallus. Büchner, however, arguing from parallel verses and expressions which appear in the Aristaeus story and in *Aeneid* I, dates the second half of *Georgics* IV in 26 or 25 B. C.; the passages are more meaningful in their context in *Aeneid* I, which is therefore earlier. This argument I am unable to accept, for of two similar passages the better might well be the later.

If we accept the tradition, what did the second half of IV originally contain? Praise of the political activity of Cornelius Gallus in Egypt extending to almost 300 verses would seem most inappropriate at the conclusion of a poem in which Octavian had been honored as a ruler, as a savior of his people, and as a god. Such an ending seems highly unsuitable, if not impossible.²³

²¹ A. Cartault, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* (Paris, 1926), pp. 18 ff.; Rand, *op. cit.*, pp. 340 ff.; Paratore, *op. cit.*, pp. 263 ff.

²² Sellar, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff.; F. J. H. Letters, *Virgil* (New York, 1946), pp. 81 ff.; Guillemin, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 ff.; Saint-Denis, *Virgile, Géorgiques*, pp. xxxvi ff.; Büchner, *op. cit.*, cols. 293 ff.

²³ Büchner, *op. cit.*, col. 294, calls it "Ungemässes und Lächerliches."

If the praise of Gallus was incidental, what other material appeared in the conclusion? Letters has suggested a number of plausible topics: the genius of Rome as revealed in her Egyptian conquest, the defeat and death of Cleopatra, the religions and monuments of ancient Egypt, and perhaps a final scene in which the Roman plow extended its conquests in the wake of the Roman sword.²⁴ These are all attractive possibilities, but why then would it be necessary to remove the entire second half of the book, rather than merely incidental references to Gallus? And such an ending would not be the *laudes Galli* mentioned by Servius. Büchner, rejecting a conclusion devoted to Gallus' political activity, argues that the story of Aristaeus replaced a passage which praised Gallus not as prefect of Egypt but as writer of elegy. This also seems unlikely; why should Vergil devote one-eighth of his *Georgics* to a topic already treated in *Eclogue X* (and, in passing, in *Eclogue VI*)?

The difficulties in Servius' story of the second edition are thus so great that several scholars (Norden, Anderson, etc.) have rejected it completely.²⁵ I now accept this as the correct view; the story may be pure invention or the result of a slip of the pen; the historian Ammianus Marcellinus (XVII, 4, 5) says that Vergil praised Gallus in the last part of the *Bucolics* (*in postrema Bucolicorum parte*), and if Servius had found a similar statement in some earlier writer, with *Georgicorum* wrongly written for *Bucolicorum*, he could easily have developed the explanation which we find in his commentary. A vague phrase such as *postrema parte* might account also for his uncertainty whether the passage stood in place of the Orpheus story or the entire Aristaeus epyllion.

My own conviction that neither of Servius' versions is possible is based in large part upon the analysis of the structure of the *Georgics* as given above. The myth of Orpheus and Eurydice

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 82 f.

²⁵ See W. B. Anderson, "Gallus and the Fourth *Georgic*," *C. Q.*, XXVII (1933), pp. 36-45, 73; Norden, *op. cit.*, pp. 626-31; A. Oltramare, "Horace et la religion de Virgile," *R. E. L.*, XIII (1935), pp. 308 f.; Perret, *op. cit.*, pp. 49 ff. A. Klotz, "Die Umarbeitung von Vergils *Georgica*," *W. J. A.*, II (1947), pp. 140-7, rejects Servius only in part; he retains the Aristaeus story as belonging to the original book, but believes that a short passage (perhaps 60 lines) containing praise of Gallus stood at the end of the book and was later removed.

cannot be a later addition, as it is an integral part of the epyllion of Aristaeus; we have here the same technique of a story within a story that we find in Catullus LXIV. There the unhappy love story of Theseus and Ariadne balances the happy love of Peleus and Thetis; in *Georgics* IV we find the same effective contrast—the tragic tale of Orpheus, unsuccessful in his attempt to conquer death, framed by the story of Aristaeus' victory over death. Orpheus as the divine singer and the teacher of the arts of agriculture fits most appropriately into the larger context of a poem devoted to nature and farming.²⁶

Likewise, it is wrong to view the story of Aristaeus as a Greek myth which strikes a discordant note in a poem glorifying rural life in Italy. Aristaeus is not only a keeper of bees but also a protector of agriculture noted for his "skilful tending of crops and cattle" (IV, 327: *frugum et pecudum custodia sollers*), and as such he is invoked in I, 14 f.²⁷ If we accept the Aristaeus-Octavian symbolism mentioned above, the story of Aristaeus becomes a more integral part of the poem as a whole; but even without this, the role of Aristaeus is necessary to the basic structure of the *Georgics*. Each of the four books ends on a major theme in an impressive sequence: War, Peace, Death, Rebirth. Here again we have a complex and intellectual relationship and one which necessarily must have been in Vergil's mind from the beginning. In such a plan there was no place for a lengthy *laudes Galli*, and we are therefore fully justified in rejecting the tradition of a second edition. The story of Aristaeus and the regeneration of the bees is a necessary part of the poem and must not be viewed as an addition after the death of Cornelius Gallus.²⁸

²⁶ Cf. M. Desport, *L'incantation Virgilienne, Virgile et Orphée* (Paris, 1952), pp. 335 ff.; Paratore, *op. cit.*, pp. 270 f. (although Paratore believes that the Orpheus myth replaced the original praise of Gallus); S. P. Bovie, "The Imagery of Ascent-Descent in Vergil's *Georgics*," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 355 f.

²⁷ Aristaeus, son of Apollo and Cyrene, also knew the arts of healing and prophecy and was able to ward off pestilence; cf. Apoll. Rh., *Argon.*, II, 506 ff.

²⁸ This is, of course, the exact opposite of the theory of Drew, *op. cit.*, pp. 244 f.; he sees a complete lack of correspondence between the latter half of IV and the concluding portion of II and cites this as proof of

The *Georgics* as a poem of nature and Italy stress themes appearing originally in the *Eclogues*—the evils of war, the Golden Age, the praise of Octavian—and these will appear again in the *Aeneid*. The emphasis upon *labor* and *pietas*, however, is something new and these will become basic themes of the still more ambitious work which Vergil is planning as he completes the *Georgics*. In the development of the poet's art, the *Georgics* stand between his more youthful and Alexandrian pastorals and the more severe and lofty style of national epic, but in content and significance much nearer the latter. It is in itself an epic dealing with all aspects of life—political and social, religious and philosophical—and its comprehensive nature is seen in the endings of the four books on the themes of War, Peace, Death, and Rebirth. In its magnificent correlation of structure and content, of science and poetry, of tradition and invention, the *Georgics* are not only a great work of literary art but, by general agreement, the most perfect Roman poem in existence.²⁹ Perhaps it was the very perfection achieved in the *Georgics* which made Vergil despair of the unfinished *Aeneid* when he realized that he would not live to give to it the final revision which he considered necessary.

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a second edition, when the story of Aristaeus was "grafted on to the mutilated body of the *Georgics*."

²⁹ Cf. K. Büchner, *Römische Literaturgeschichte. Ihre Grundzüge in interpretierender Darstellung* (Stuttgart, 1957), p. 300: "Die *Georgica* sind das schönste römische grosse Dichtwerk und zugleich das erste klassische Gedicht der Welt." See also F. Klingner, *Römische Geisteswelt* (3rd ed., München, 1956), pp. 232 ff. Klingner points out that the *Georgics* has no model with which it can be compared, in the sense that the *Eclogues* can be compared with Theocritus' *Idyls*, or the *Aeneid* can be compared with the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. This, too, is a mark of the greatness of Vergil's achievement.

TWO BRANCHES OF THE LATE ROMAN SECRET SERVICE.

During the Late Roman Empire the imperial administration made a constant effort to maintain its control, both at court and in the provinces, over a far-flung and complicated bureaucracy. In such a highly organized and authoritarian state, imperial commissioners of almost every kind could be sent out to look after the interests of the central government and to act as spies and informers. Late Roman government institutionalized its information services and espionage agencies to an extent unknown during the Principate. Modern scholarship has rightly called attention to the many and important functions of one of these agencies, the corps (*schola*) of the *agentes in rebus*, an organization which approximated a modern secret service or internal security police force.¹

However, the *schola agentum in rebus* was not the only institution upon which the central government relied to perform such functions. The attention of a student of late Roman administration is arrested by the activities of another agency, the corps of imperial secretaries or *schola notariorum*, which were similar to those of the *agentes*. That similarity has all but passed unnoticed,² even though it deserves detailed attention, since it further emphasizes the desire for administrative control on the part of the central government. In organization, functions, and personnel, it can be shown that the two corps were so closely

¹ See Seeck, "Agentes in Rebus," *R.-E.*, I (1894), cols. 776-9; O. Hirschfeld, "Die Agentes in Rebus," *Kleine Schriften* (1913), pp. 624-45; A. E. R. Boak, *The Master of the Offices in the Later Roman and Byzantine Empires* (New York, 1924), pp. 68-74.

² Scholars occasionally have spoken of the two corps in similar terms. Seeck, *R.-E.*, I, p. 779, speaking of the *agentes* could say: "Das Feld ihrer Tätigkeit, und damit ihr Einfluss, ist ganz unbegrenzt." Lengle, "Tribunus," *R.-E.*, VI A (1937), col. 2454, remarked on the *schola notariorum*: "(Die Verwendungsmöglichkeit der *tribuni et notarii*) ist so unbeschränkt wie die kaiserliche Gewalt selbst." Ch. Lécrivain, "Notarius," *D.-S.*, IV, col. 106, in treating the *notarii* explicitly has compared them with the *agentes*: "... les empereurs leur confient en outre les missions les plus diverses, concurremment avec les *agentes in rebus*..."

related as to warrant recognition of the *notarii* as a secret service agency in the same sense as the *agentes in rebus*.

The *agentes in rebus* developed from a purely military organization of the Principate into one which had both quasi-military and administrative attributes in the Late Empire. Organized, probably by Diocletian,³ to replace the military procurement officers (*frumentarii*) used as informers under the Principate,⁴ their corps was granted military privileges and immunities. The five ranks within their *schola* corresponded to those of the cavalry, since they were frequently used as mounted couriers.⁵ They were placed by Constantine I under the supervision of the Master of the Officers at court, whence they were given the alternate appellation *magistriani*.⁶ Beginning with the reign of Constantine I the sources attest to their many responsibilities, all of which were intended to insure the loyalty of the administrative machine and its proper functioning.

Since a detailed description of their duties must await comparison with those of the *notarii*, it will be sufficient at this point to sketch briefly their character as secret service agents. Their suitability as spies derive from their duties as supervisors of the state postal system, in which capacity they were called *curiosi*.⁷ Because they were constantly travelling in the provinces, they had an excellent opportunity to observe and to report back to court on events and situations of interest to the government. As internal security police officers they could arrest criminals, and Libanius reports that they were the best means to detect and convict men guilty of treason.⁸ The active senior members of the corps, as well as *agentes* retired from service, were made chiefs of staff (*principes officii*) and potential spies in the ministries of prefects and vicars.⁹ The system of control

³ For a recent statement of this view, see W. Ensslin, "Valerius (Diocletianus)," *R.-M.*, VII A (1948), col. 2455.

⁴ For a thorough study of the military background of the security police system of the Principate, see G. Lopuszanski, "La police romaine et les chrétiens," *L'Ant. Cl.*, XX (1951), pp. 5-46.

⁵ See Hirschfeld, *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 626 f.

⁶ See Boak, *Master of Offices*, pp. 68 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 74 ff.

⁸ Libanius (ed. Förster), *Or.* 18, 136 f.

⁹ See Ernst Stein, "Untersuchungen zum Staatsrecht des Bas-Empire," *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung*, XLI (1920), pp. 195 ff., 218 ff.; *Unter-*

and espionage which they enforced has been described as "unbearable,"¹⁰ yet it seems likely that in many instances they coöperated with, rather than spied upon, the great ministers who could control their advancement.¹¹ Both edicts and literary sources attest to their corruption.¹²

The *agentes in rebus* were not, however, merely police agents capable of acting in a quasi-military capacity. By overemphasizing their role as members of the secret service, one tends to overlook the fact that they were also bureaucrats. The Master of the Offices drew his entire office staff from the *agentes*, which should indicate that the corps, as a whole, possessed a reasonable degree of literacy.¹³ Edicts applicable to the Eastern Empire in the later fifth and early sixth centuries indicate that *agentes* could also hold appointments simultaneously in the central clerical bureaux (*sacra scrinia*) of the imperial court.¹⁴ When promoted as chiefs of staff over ministries in the first and second echelons of prefectural government away from court, they supervised every clerical act of administration while continuing to act as security police.¹⁵ They could look forward to promotion, after their term as *princeps officii*, to provincial governorships rather than to military posts.¹⁶

Like the *agentes in rebus*, the *notarii* developed from a military organization of the Principate, were institutionalized in the period of reforms which ushered in the Late Empire, and, as a secret service agency, performed functions which were quasi-military and purely bureaucratic. The *notarii* were originally drawn both from the elite palace guard of the late third century

suchungen über das Officium der Prätorianerpräfektur seit Diokletian (Vienna, 1922), pp. 54 ff. W. Sinnigen, *The Officium of the Urban Prefecture during the Later Roman Empire* (*Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome*, XVII [Rome, 1957]), pp. 14-32.

¹⁰ See Seeck, *R.-E.*, I, col. 779.

¹¹ See Sinnigen, *Officium*, p. 22.

¹² Libanius, *loc. cit.*, states, for example, that the *agentes* could be bribed to permit counterfeiting. See also Amm. Marc., XVI, 8, 3-6; *Cod. Theod.*, VI, 29, 11; *Nov. Val.*, 13, 7.

¹³ See Boak, *Master of Offices*, pp. 100 ff.

¹⁴ *Cod. Iust.*, XII, 20, 5, 1; 6, 1.

¹⁵ See Stein, "Untersuchungen," pp. 195 ff., 218 ff.; Sinnigen, *Officium*, pp. 14-32.

¹⁶ *Cod. Theod.*, VI, 27, 13; 28, 2. Symmachus (ed. Seeck), III, 87.

(*protectores*) and from *tribuni* in attendance at the imperial headquarters (*praetorium*). There they were employed as clerical personnel in the military chancellery.¹⁷ Because of their clerical duties, they were familiar with the policies initiated by the emperor and his chief ministers and, hence, were excellent potential agents to see that those policies were carried out in the various branches of government.

It seems probable that Constantine I increased their importance in the central ministries by detaching them from the jurisdiction of the praetorian prefect and by organizing them in a permanent *schola* of their own.¹⁸ After the reform of Constantine, the *schola notariorum* was directly responsible to the Emperor himself and was under the immediate supervision of a senior secretary (*primicerius*).¹⁹ The internal organization of the corps, like that of the *agentes in rebus*, was the responsibility of the Master of the Offices, who kept their rolls (*matricula*), regulated their advancement, and saw to it that they received the proper honors and exemptions upon retirement.²⁰

While the activities of the *agentes in rebus* as spies, special agents, and informers grew out of their responsibilities as *curiosi* in the postal system, those of the *notarii* derived from their intimate acquaintance with decisions made in the consistory and with the office-holders in both the civil and military branches of the government. The *primicerius* of the corps of secretaries kept the *notitia dignitatum*, the official list of all the administrators, and it was natural that his subordinates should have had

¹⁷ See O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, II (Stuttgart, 1921), pp. 93 f. E. Stein, *Geschichte des spätrömischen Reiches*, I (Vienna, 1928), p. 56. Lenglé, *R.-E.*, VI A, col. 2447. E.-Ch. Babut, "Recherches sur la garde impériale et les corps d'officiers de l'armée romaine," *Rev. Hist.*, CXVI (1914), pp. 225-93.

¹⁸ Babut, *op. cit.*, p. 258, thought that Constantius II organized their *schola*. *Notarii* are mentioned in the sources before Constantius, and although there is no absolute proof that they were then members of the *schola notariorum* in its later sense, Constantine is a more likely candidate for the foundation of the organization, since formation of the *schola* involved administrative changes within the praetorian prefecture. See E. Stein, *Officium*, p. 45.

¹⁹ *Not. dign. or.*, 18; *occ.*, 16 (ed. Seeck). See also W. Ensslin, "Primicerius," *R.-E.*, Supp. VIII (1956), cols. 617-19.

²⁰ *Cod. Iust.*, XII, 7, 2. See Boak, *Master of Offices*, p. 65.

detailed knowledge of bureaucratic careers and responsibilities throughout the empire.²¹

Although the original purposes for which the two corps were founded differed, their activities inevitably tended to converge. As will be seen shortly, the *notarii* had the quasi-military responsibilities of an internal police force. Like the *agentes*, they were also called upon to perform important executive and clerical functions. The *primicerius notariorum* drew his clerks from his *schola*, and *notarii* could simultaneously hold positions in the *sacra scrinia*.²² The subsequent development of the corps down to the sixth century illustrates the continued importance of their administrative responsibilities at court.²³ A select number of *notarii* specialized in referring legal petitions to the emperor and in transmitting unwritten imperial orders to provincial judges. These specialists, known as *referendarii*, first appear in the sources at the time of the Emperor Julian.²⁴ They achieved special prominence in the fifth and sixth centuries.²⁵ In Ostrogothic Italy the *referendarii* and the Quaestor of the Sacred Palace eventually exercised the functions formerly performed by the *schola notariorum* as a whole, and the corps was in decay at the time of Cassiodorus.²⁶ In the East the *referendarii* competed for confidential missions at least from the middle of the fifth century with an even newer and fast-rising class of *notarii* known as *a secretis*.²⁷ By the end of the sixth century the a

²¹ *Not. dign. or.*, 18; *occ.*, 16. See A. Piganiol, *L'empire chrétien* (Paris, 1947), p. 314.

²² *Not. dign. or.*, 18: (*primicerius notariorum*) *officium autem non habet sed adiutorem de schola notariorum*, *occ.*, 16: *officium autem non habet sed adiutores*. *Cod. Iust.*, I, 23, 7, 2; XII, 20, 5, 1; 33, 5, 4.

²³ See in general J. B. Bury, "Magistri Scriniorum ἀρχιγραφῆς and ῥεφερενδάρτοι," *H. S. C. P.*, XXI (1910), pp. 23-29. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, II (Paris, 1949), pp. 736-9. For the use of *notarii* at a barbarian court, see R. Heuberger, "Vandalische Reichskanzlei und Königsurkunden im Vergleich mit verwandten Einrichtungen und Erscheinungen," *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung*, XI (1929), pp. 76-113.

²⁴ *Chron. pasch.*, sub 363 a. d.

²⁵ E. Stein, *Histoire*, pp. 736-9.

²⁶ Cassiod., *Var.*, VI, 16-17; I, 4, 10: *Pater enim candidati sub Valentiniano principe gessit tribuni et notarii laudabiliter dignitatem: honor qui tunc dabatur egregiis*. . . . See Stein, *Histoire*, II, p. 256; Ensslin, *Theoderich der Grosse* (Munich, 1947), pp. 168 ff.

²⁷ First mention of *secretarii* (*a secretis*) is found at the Council of

secretis had all but replaced the *referendarii* as the most important class of *notarii*, and in Byzantine times the senior *a secretis* (*proto a secretis*) took over the position formerly occupied by the *primicerius notariorum* as head of the corps of imperial secretaries.²⁸

It has been maintained occasionally that because the *notarii* could act as military or police agents, they must be regarded even after Constantine as active officers of the *protectores domestici* detached for service in the *schola notariorum* as part of their military career.²⁹ The view that they were actually officials with fictitious military rank seems closer to the truth.³⁰ The terminology of late Roman civil bureaucracy was, in general, rooted in a military past, and it should not be surprising that *notarii* having the rank of *protectores*, *domestici*, or *tribuni* within the *schola* even in the fourth century, should have had no prior military training or any real connection with the *protectores domestici*, as they had had in the period before the reforms of Constantine.³¹ We know very little about the careers of *notarii* before they entered the *schola*, but it would seem that they were recruited from the civil elements of the population. In no case do we know of a *notarius* who had military experience before entering the corps, and the further careers of those who left it seem all to have been exclusively civil.³² Ammianus often

Chalcedon in 451. See Ed. Schwartz, *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum*, II, 6, 149, and in general E. Stein, *Histoire*, II, pp. 737-9, and *Officium*, pp. 46 ff.

²⁸ Stein, *Officium*, pp. 50 f.

²⁹ See Babut, *Rev. Hist.*, CXVI, p. 259.

³⁰ See Ernst Stein's comments on Babut's article in *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, I (1920), p. 179.

³¹ See Lopuszanski, *L'Ant. Cl.*, XX, pp. 45 f. for a recent statement concerning military terminology in the civil bureaucracy.

³² E. Demougeot, *De l'unité à la division de l'empire romain* (Paris, 1951), p. 131, with note 72, follows Babut in emphasizing the alleged military nature of the *schola notariorum*. In so doing, on the basis of *C. I. L.*, VI, 1730, Demougeot makes Stilico *tribunus et notarius* in 384. The inscription does, in fact, show that Stilico was a *tribunus praetorianus*, which could mean that he was a member of the *schola notariorum*. See *C. I. L.*, VI, 1761 = Dessau, 1285. However, in Stilico's case it means that he was *tribunus (comes) sacri stabuli*. See Seeck, "Comites," *R.-E.*, IV (1901), cols. 677 f. Similarly, on the basis of Greg. Tour., *Hist. Fr.*, II, 8, Babut, *Rev. Hist.*, CXVI, p. 261 makes Aetius,

emphasizes their generally administrative rather than quasi-military responsibilities by calling them simply *notarii* without giving their customary military title within the *schola*,³³ and this is reflected by Greek sources which refer to them as *hypo-graphois* or *tachygraphoi*.³⁴ Furthermore, Libanius states that a knowledge of shorthand was necessary for entrance into the corps.³⁵

In the fourth century such men as the sons of fullers and bath attendants could hope for admission,³⁶ while at the same time the offspring of important senatorial families were admitted in increasing numbers, sometimes when they were little more than children.³⁷ We know of one *primicerius notariorum* in the fifth century who was of barbarian descent.³⁸ On the whole, the corps presents a composite picture of able and literate men from many walks of life, some of whom must have been recruited because of their potential capacities for dealing with difficult and delicate situations. We shall see later that some, or perhaps many, *notarii* had prior training in the *agentes in rebus*. If anything, the corps of *notarii* had much greater prestige than the *schola agentum in rebus*. Three senior secretaries are known to have aimed unsuccessfully for the throne in the late fourth and early fifth centuries.³⁹ One former *notarius*, Petronius

general and king-maker of the fifth century, a secretary in his youth, since this source states that he was a *puero praetorianus*. This means only that he had served in the *officium* of the praetorian prefect. See Seeck, "Aetius," *R.-M.*, I (1894), col. 701.

³³ Amm., XIV, 5, 6; 9, 3; 11, 23; XV, 3, 4; XVII, 9, 7; XXII, 11, 1; XXVIII, 1, 12; XXIX, 2, 5.

³⁴ Zosimus, III, 22; V, 44. Soerates, VII, 23. Sozomenus, II, 26.

³⁵ Libanius, *Or.* 42, 25.

³⁶ *Or.* 42, 24.

³⁷ See Seeck, *Geschichte*, II, pp. 93 f. Although this is not intended to be a prosopographical study, a few examples may be cited to show how young aristocrats, or youths with claims to gentility, penetrated the corps. The following served among the *notarii*: Procopius, a relative of Julian Augustus, Amm., XXVI, 6, 1; Bassianus *praeclaro genere natus*, Amm., XXIX, 2, 5; Claudian the poet, *C. I. L.*, VI, 1710; the young aristocrat Rufius Praetextatus Postumianus, *C. I. L.*, VI, 1761 = Dessau, 1285; members of the circle of Sidonius Apollinaris. In general, see Sundwall, *Weströmische Studien* (Berlin, 1915), pp. 33 f.

³⁸ See Sundwall, *Studien*, p. 90 (No. 242, Johannes).

³⁹ The *notarii* Jovian, Procopius, and Johannes.

Maximus, actually became emperor in the fifth.⁴⁰ No case is known of *agentes* who had such aspirations.

So much for the organization of the two *scholae*, whose functions bore many similarities. Each corps had a reputation for ferreting out information of interest to the government. In 355 an *agens in rebus*, Gaudentius, reported alleged treasonable statements of the governor of Pannonia Secunda to the chief of staff of the praetorian prefecture. This latter official, Rufinus, was himself a retired *agens in rebus* and trained informer, and he travelled post haste to the imperial court to bring the charges personally before the emperor Constantius II.⁴¹ An innocent remark of slaves during a dinner party in Spain at about the same time was similarly reported as treason by an *agens in rebus* to the Emperor.⁴² The reputation for slander and intrigue attributed to the corps of *agentes* was so great that the Emperor Julian discharged almost the entire *schola*.⁴³ When two *ex agentibus* approached him with the request that they be reinstated on condition that they revealed the whereabouts of an enemy, he refused to listen to them.⁴⁴ During the urban prefecture of Symmachus in 384-85 an *agens* falsely accused two senators of fomenting unrest near Rome.⁴⁵

The *notarii* were used in much the same manner. The same Gaudentius who discovered treason among the Pannonian bureaucrats in 355 later appeared in the capacity of *notarius* in Gaul, where he had been sent by Constantius to spy on Julian.⁴⁶ *Notarii* were present at the trials of men accused of high treason by Gallus Caesar and reported back to him on the cross examination.⁴⁷ The *notarius* Paul, who was later nicknamed "The Chain" because of his relentless espionage, was an informer against the friends of Gallus Caesar himself, after the latter's execution.⁴⁸ Paul also informed Constantius of alleged plots being hatched by the adherents of the general Silvanus, whose downfall had been engineered by an *agens in rebus*.⁴⁹ Under Valentinian I a *notarius* was ordered to investigate affairs in Africa following the complaints of provincials regarding the

⁴⁰ *C. I. L.*, VI, 1749 = Dessau, 809.

⁴¹ *Amm.*, XV, 3, 7 ff.

⁴² *Amm.*, XVI, 8, 9.

⁴³ Libanius, *Or.* 18, 48 ff.

⁴⁴ *Amm.*, XXII, 7, 5.

⁴⁵ *Sym.*, X, 49.

⁴⁶ *Amm.*, XVII, 9, 7.

⁴⁷ *Amm.*, XIV, 9, 3.

⁴⁸ *Amm.*, XV, 3, 3-4.

⁴⁹ *Amm.*, XV, 6, 1.

nefarious activities of Count Romanus.⁵⁰ A *notarius* was associated with the *vicarius urbis Romae*, Maximinus, during the investigation of treason and sorcery in urban Roman senatorial ranks in 370.⁵¹ As late as the sixth century, a *referendarius*, one Cyprianus, appears in the sources as an informer to Theodoric of alleged treason involving leading Roman senators, including Boethius.⁵²

As already indicated, while not soldiers in a strict sense, members of both corps were occasionally associated with the military in supervisory capacities. An edict of the middle of the fourth century permitted *agentes in rebus* to use supplementary horses along the state postal system, since they were "customarily dispatched for the purpose of moving the troops."⁵³ One Apodemius, an *agens in rebus*, supervised the arrest of Gallus Caesar by appearing at the side of Count Barbatio, who was commanding a contingent of troops loyal to Constantius.⁵⁴ An edict of 395 indicates that *agentes in rebus* had accompanied the Emperor Theodosius on campaign and grants advances in rank to *agentes* who would accompany future armies in the field.⁵⁵ Another edict applicable to senior or retired members of the corps suggests that in exercising their quasi-military duties, they were occasionally in situations threatening life and limb.⁵⁶

The sources show that, with few exceptions, the relationship of *notarii* to the military was similar to that of the *agentes in rebus*; that is to say, *notarii* do not appear primarily as commanders in the field or as fighting men, but rather as messengers to, or as supervisors over, the military. A comparison with Soviet political commissars is tempting. Constantius sent a *notarius* to Gaul to order the transfer of Julian's auxiliaries to the eastern front. It was intended that the actual responsibility of leading the troops to the east would fall on two military commanders, Lupicinus, *magister armorum*, and Sintula, *tribunus stabuli*.⁵⁷ The same Gaudentius who, as a *notarius*, spied on Julian in Gaul was later sent by Constantius to Africa to prevent the province from falling into Julian's hands. Gaudentius seems to have been charged only with transmitting imperial

⁵⁰ Amm., XXVIII, 6, 12.

⁵¹ Amm., XXVIII, 1, 12.

⁵² Anon. Vales., 85.

⁵³ Cod. Theod., VIII, 5, 7.

⁵⁴ Amm., XIV, 11, 19.

⁵⁵ Cod. Theod., VI, 27, 7.

⁵⁶ Cod. Iust., XII, 21, 6.

⁵⁷ Amm., XX, 4, 2-3.

orders to the local military establishment and with supervising the collection of troops by the African military, headed by Count Cretio.⁵⁸ Several similar instances occurred under the reign of Valentinian I. A *notarius* was dispatched, together with a *protector domesticus* and *scutarius*, to lead the defense of Africa against the usurper Procopius.⁵⁹ When the Rhine frontier was threatened, Valentinian sent a *notarius* to order the local *dux* to construct fortifications. The *notarius* supervised the work and was the sole survivor of a barbarian attack in the area.⁶⁰ When the Pannonian frontier was threatened with barbarian invasion, a *notarius* was ordered to investigate the situation.⁶¹

Only in a few instances may a case be made for attributing purely martial qualities to *notarii*. Julian's relative, the secretary Procopius, was entrusted with the command of 30,000 troops on the Roman side of the Tigris in 363, but in this case Ammianus is careful to note that Procopius was associated with a military commander in the enterprise, Count Sebastianus, and that Procopius' command was not held independently of the count.⁶² Only once does a *notarius* appear as a combat officer. During the siege of a Mesopotamian town during Julian's campaign, the *primicerius notariorum*, Jovian, was one of the first men to lead the attack.⁶³ As late as the sixth century *notarii* could have military, as well as political and administrative responsibilities. A papyrus of 566 reveals a *referendarius* who was simultaneously *dux et Augustalis* of the Thebaid in Egypt. Granted the uncertain state of this frontier area, such a military command cannot have been purely titular.⁶⁴

Parallel functions performed by the *agentes in rebus* and *notarii* are especially noteworthy when law enforcement demanded the participation of government agents of more than usual power, especially when prominent criminals were arrested. As already noted, an *agens in rebus*, Apodemius, was one of two officials who arrested Gallus Caesar in Noricum upon the latter's

⁵⁸ Amm., XXI, 7, 2.

⁵⁹ Amm., XXVI, 5, 14.

⁶⁰ Amm., XXVIII, 2, 5-9.

⁶¹ Amm., XXX, 3, 2.

⁶² Amm., XXIII, 3, 5.

⁶³ Amm., XXIV, 4, 23. See also Zosimus, III, 22.

⁶⁴ P. Cairo Cat. 1, no. 67.032, col. 2, lines 1 and 22. See Stein, *Histoire*, II, p. 738, n. 1.

fall from power.⁶⁵ At Gallus' formal trial for treason, this same Apodemius together with a *notarius* was present to observe the proceedings.⁶⁶ Apodemius was later commissioned to arrest General Silvanus in Gaul.⁶⁷ Symmachus reports that an *agens* had been commissioned to track down one Valerian, who had eluded the jurisdiction of the courts where he had to answer a civil suit.⁶⁸ In another report to the Emperor he indicates that the Master of the Offices had sent an *agens* to Rome to take into custody a man who claimed to be a *strator* and who had run afoul of the law.⁶⁹ A *curiosus urbis* of Constantinople, almost certainly a retired *agens* and chief of staff in the urban prefecture, enforced the sentence of exile passed on St. John Chrysostom in 404 and escorted the patriarch out of the eastern capital.⁷⁰ In the middle of the fifth century, one Marcianus, called *agens in rebus* in an edict, but more probably an *ex agente* and chief of staff in the urban prefecture at Rome, was ordered to enforce the return to an illustrious family of urban properties seized by another senator.⁷¹

Notarii were empowered directly by imperial commission to act in the same manner. Constantius sent Paul the Chain to Britain to arrest the accomplices of the revolutionary Magnentius.⁷² This *notarius* acted in as ruthless a manner as any *agens in rebus* and, in spite of the protests of the local governor, made wholesale and indiscriminate arrests. Julian commissioned a *notarius* to arrest Vadomarius, King of the Alamanni, if he appeared on the left bank of the Rhine.⁷³ Chrysostom, escorted into exile by a retired *agens in rebus*, was returned to grace in the eastern capital in the company of an imperial secretary.⁷⁴

Members of both corps could be used as ambassadors, in which capacity they were given responsibilities which had often been entrusted to the military in the Principate. A fragment of

⁶⁵ Amm., XIV, 11, 19.

⁶⁶ Amm., XIV, 11, 23.

⁶⁷ Amm., XV, 5, 8.

⁶⁸ Sym., X, 31.

⁶⁹ Sym., X, 38.

⁷⁰ John Chrysostom, *Ep. ad Inn.*, Migne, P. G., LII, p. 532.

⁷¹ *Nov. Val.*, 8, 1.

⁷² Amm., XIV, 5, 4-8.

⁷³ Amm., XXI, 4, 2-6.

⁷⁴ Migne, P. G., LII, p. 532.

Olympiodorus reveals that a certain *magistrianius*, Euplutos, was sent by the Emperor Honorius as an ambassador to the Visigothic King Vallia to conclude a treaty of peace and to bring back to the imperial court Galla Placidia, the widow of Athaulf, and the sister of the emperor.⁷⁵ In 530 the *agens in rebus* Julian was commissioned by Justinian to conclude a commercial treaty with Abyssinia and the Yemen.⁷⁶ This same agent later appears in the capacity of *notarius* and as one of the ambassadors to treat for peace with Chosroes, King of Persia, in 540.⁷⁷ In 558 one Spectatus, *tribunus et notarius*, was one of the ambassadors sent by Constantius to treat with Sapor,⁷⁸ and under Honorius an *ex primicerio notariorum* was envoy to Alaric.⁷⁹

In enforcing governmental regulations regarding the church, both corps acted in almost identical capacities. At the time of the persecution of Egyptian orthodoxy during the patriarchy of Athanasius, the church swore loyalty to Constantius, calling upon the prefect of the province and the *curiosi* to bear witness, a sure indication that *agentes in rebus* were active persecutors.⁸⁰ Ambrose accused *agentes* of interfering in ecclesiastical jurisdiction involving widows⁸¹ and cited their corps as one of several that might take his basilica away from him.⁸² An edict of 407 specifically ordered *agentes in rebus* to aid ecclesiastical authorities in preventing gatherings of Donatists and Manichaeans in Africa.⁸³ *Agentes in rebus* were messengers between the imperial court and church officials, and they were in attendance at the great church councils and synods where they read imperial pronouncements.⁸⁴

These duties find specific parallels in the case of the *notarii*. During the Athanasian persecution, not only *agentes in rebus*,

⁷⁵ *Frag. Olymp.*, I, 31.

⁷⁶ Procopius, *De bello Persico*, I, 20, 9. See Stein, *Histoire*, II, pp. 298 f.

⁷⁷ Procop., *De bell. Pers.*, II, 7, 15.

⁷⁸ *Amm.*, XVII, 5, 15.

⁷⁹ Zosimus, V, 40.

⁸⁰ Athanasius, *Hist. Arian. ad Mon.*, Migne, *P. G.*, XXV, p. 793.

⁸¹ Ambrose, *De officiis minist.*, II, 29, 150, Migne, *P. L.*, XVI, p. 152.

⁸² Ambrose, *Ep.*, XX, 7, Migne, *P. L.*, XVI, p. 1038.

⁸³ *Const. Sirm.*, 12, 5.

⁸⁴ Schwartz, *Acta Conc.*, V, 56, 19; 64, 53; 67, 12.

but *notarii* were law enforcement agents.⁸⁵ *Notarii* appeared as official messengers from court to bishops, and they also were empowered to settle disputes over episcopal sees.⁸⁶ From the middle of the fourth century *notarii* were involved in stamping out the Donatist heresy in Africa, and in the early fifth century, one of them, Flavius Marcellinus, was ordered by imperial rescript to preside at the Council of Carthage, which was called in 411 to cope with the problem.⁸⁷ *Notarii* appeared side by side with *agentes in rebus* at the Council of Chalcedon and informed the prelates of imperial mandates.⁸⁸

Even the miscellaneous functions performed by the two corps in addition to their main duties were similar. Members of both organizations could control commerce. *Agentes in rebus* functioning as *curiosi litorum* were empowered by edict to regulate maritime commerce at ports.⁸⁹ At the beginning of the sixth century an *agens in rebus* was permanently stationed at Clysma, near Suez, the only Roman port where Abyssinian ships were authorized to anchor. He was further charged with leading a yearly commercial fleet to the Abyssinian port of Adulis.⁹⁰ Ammianus tells us that a *notarius* was placed in charge of the port of Boulogne in order to prevent ships from leaving for Britain, since Julian did not want news of his recent elevation as emperor to be made known on the island.⁹¹ Symmachus writes that *notarii* were entrusted with the responsibility of seeing that urban Roman supplies were shipped on time from Africa to Portus.⁹² An inscription shows that *agentes in rebus* could be made responsible for the upkeep of public buildings,⁹³ while a similar, if not absolutely identical function is performed by a *notarius* who investigated the faulty construction of a bridge at Rome during the prefecture of Symmachus.⁹⁴

It seems clear that the functions of the two *scholae* were alike

⁸⁵ Migne, *P. G.*, XXV, pp. 752, 793.

⁸⁶ Ambrose, *Ep.*, XX, 22; XXI, 1; *Collectio Avellana* (*Corpus script. eccl. Latin.*, XXXV), *Ep.*, 14, 15, 16.

⁸⁷ *Cod. Theod.*, XVI, 5, 55.

⁸⁸ Schwartz, *Acta Conc.*, II, 6, 149.

⁸⁹ *Cod. Theod.*, VI, 29, 11; *Nov. Val.*, 13, 7.

⁹⁰ Petr. Diac., *Lib. de locis sanctis* (*Corpus script. eccl. Latin.*, XXXIX), p. 116. See Stein, *Histoire*, II, p. 102.

⁹¹ Amm., XX, 9, 9.

⁹² *C. I. L.*, X, 7200.

⁹³ Sym., X, 18.

⁹⁴ Sym., X, 26.

and that the central government saw in both of them agencies which could play a significant role in the centralization of government. Their relationship appears even more intimate if we examine the personnel and direction of the two corps and call attention to the instances in which members of both worked together on the same missions. Of more than eighty *notarii* known by name, the previous careers of only five can be traced. In four out of the five cases, *notarii* had been recruited from the *schola agentum in rebus*, while in the remaining one, the career of a fledgling senator is indicated.⁹⁵ Even in the face of admittedly scanty evidence, it would be tempting to imagine that many *notarii* had prior training among the *agentes*, since this would be an additional and convenient explanation for the closely related functions which they performed.

The possibly close relationship between the two corps from the point of view of personnel recruitment may be emphasized by examining the four known cases in which *agentes* were promoted directly into the *schola notariorum*. The Gaudentius who, as *agens in rebus*, reported the "treason" of the Pannonian governor in 355, was the same Gaudentius who, as a *notarius*, was sent to spy on Julian in Gaul in 356 and who mobilized the defense of Africa in 361.⁹⁶ Julian himself referred to Gaudentius' activities both as *agens* and as *notarius*, and it is interesting to note that both times the emperor called him simply a "false accuser," and thus recognized no real difference in the duties he performed, even though his official position had changed.⁹⁷ The career of a pagan African, Flavius Arpagius, dated by an inscription around the year 400, is also enlightening.⁹⁸ Arpagius began as a simple *agens* with the rank of *vir clarissimus*, rose to become chief of staff (*adiutor*) with the rank of *spectabilis* in the ministry of the Master of the Offices, and then moved into the *schola notariorum* as a *tribunus*.

Two similar cases are known as late as the sixth century. One Eulogius, a *vir clarissimus* and *agens in rebus*, was used by the

⁹⁵ Rufius Praetextatus Postumianus (*C. I. L.*, VI, 1761 = Dessau, 1285) was *quaestor candidatus* and *praetor urbanus* before becoming *tribunus et notarius*.

⁹⁶ See above, p. 245.

⁹⁷ Julian, *Ep. ad Athen.*, 273c, 282c.

⁹⁸ *C. I. L.*, VIII, 989.

court at Constantinople in 519 as a messenger bearing letters to church officials in Italy. In the following year this same Eulogius returned to Italy in an identical capacity, but in the meantime he had been promoted to the rank of *spectabilis* as a *tribunus et notarius*.⁹⁹ Julian, the *agens in rebus* stationed near Suez to supervise Red Sea trade in 530, appears as an *a secretis* ten years later in the capacity of ambassador to Chosroes.¹⁰⁰

A connection may also be suggested between the *schola notariorum* and the post of Master of the Offices.¹⁰¹ It has already been noted that this latter minister not only supervised the activities of the *agentes in rebus* and used them as clerks in his ministry, but that he also kept the rolls of the *notarii*. In so doing, he must have been familiar with the careers and capabilities of members of both corps. Babut has already noted the frequency with which former *notarii* became Masters of the Offices.¹⁰² A survey of the evidence pertaining to some eighty *notarii* indicates that twenty-three are known to have been promoted into a range of higher civil posts. Of these twenty-three, eight held the position of Master of the Offices, in seven cases immediately upon leaving the *schola notariorum*.¹⁰³ The mastership is more frequently occupied than any other single ministry. It is known that there was no definitely established *cursus honorum* necessarily preceding the holding of the Mastership of the Offices, and that Masters could be chosen from among a wide range of civil functionaries.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, it would seem that an enterprising *notarius* had an excellent prospect of advancing

⁹⁹ *Coll. Avell.*, Ep. 188, 218; 199, 200, 201.

¹⁰⁰ Procop., *De bell. Pers.*, II, 7, 15; Stein, *Histoire*, II, p. 488, n. 1.

¹⁰¹ Ernst Stein, *Geschichte*, I p. 172, suggested such a connection. According to Stein, the ranking praetorian *tribunus* who, in the latter part of the third century, was in charge of the clerical personnel at imperial headquarters, was promoted to ministerial rank by Constantine with the title of Master of the Offices. The former status of this minister is indicated under Constantine by the appellation *tribunus et magister officiorum*.

¹⁰² Babut, *Rev. Hist.*, CXVI, p. 258, n. 2.

¹⁰³ The following *notarii* are known to have later become *magistri officiorum* in the fourth century: Decentius, Palladius, Sophronius, Syagrius (probably), Pentadius, Felix; fifth century: Johannes; sixth century: Cyprian. For details, see *R.-E.*, Sundwall, *Studien*, and Boak, *Master of Offices*, pp. 148-51.

¹⁰⁴ Boak, *Master of Offices*, p. 106.

to this post which, with its control over many branches of the central government, especially over the *agentes in rebus*, has been described by Boak as "the head of the imperial intelligence office."¹⁰⁵

It should not be surprising to find that members of the two *scholae*, so closely related in direction and personnel, worked together on important missions. An *agens* and a *notarius*, together with a Grand Chamberlain, witnessed the execution of Gallus Caesar.¹⁰⁶ Two *agentes in rebus* helped a *notarius* in a complicated plot designed to embarrass Symmachus during the latter's urban prefecture.¹⁰⁷

Even more instructive are the instances in which men simultaneously held appointments in the two corps. Ernst Stein regarded such cumulation of offices as a frequent occurrence, and this would indicate that the central government regarded both *scholae* as parts of the secret service.¹⁰⁸ The cumulation of offices is first to be noted at the Council of Chalcedon. There, two agents of the court, Veronicianus and Constantinus, in attendance at the meetings, are described several times indifferently in the *acta* as being *secretarii* (*a secretis*) and *agentes in rebus* with the epithet *kathosiomenoi* (*devotissimi*), the common predication for officials especially close to the central government.¹⁰⁹ An edict of 524, which in general forbids the simultaneous holding of two or more appointments, grants the *a secretis* special permission to cumulate positions among the *agentes in rebus* and in the *sacra scrinia*.¹¹⁰

The relations of the *agentes* to the *notarii* were especially close in the *sacra scrinia* of the Eastern Empire beginning in the last half of the fifth century. There were three such *scrinia* at the imperial court: the Ministry of Requests (*scrinium memoriae*), of Correspondence (*epistularum*), and of Petitions (*libellorum*), each supervised by a *magister* who, in turn, was responsible in matters of organization and administration to the Master of the

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁰⁶ *Amm.*, XIV, 11, 23.

¹⁰⁷ *Sym.*, X, 23.

¹⁰⁸ Stein, *Officium*, p. 47.

¹⁰⁹ Schwartz, *Acta Conc.*, II, 6, 149. See Stein, *Histoire*, II, p. 737, n. 2.

¹¹⁰ *Cod. Iust.*, XII, 33, 5, 4.

Offices.¹¹¹ An edict issued shortly before 470 permitted *agentes in rebus* to hold appointments simultaneously in these *scrinia* and assumed that the first and third-ranking men of the corps of secretaries, the *primicerius* and *tertiocerus*, would cumulate positions as *magistri scriniorum* in directing the work of the bureaux.¹¹² This must mean that *agentes in rebus*, as *scriniarii*, worked under the supervision of high-ranking *notarii*. Other edicts show that lower-ranking *notarii* cumulated positions in the *scrinia* and accordingly must have worked side by side with *agentes in rebus* authorized to do the same.¹¹³

Granted that the functions of the two corps were almost identical, it may be asked whether the *notarii* were any more effective as agents of the central government or as an internal security police force than the *agentes in rebus*. The evidence shows conclusively that both corps were often involved with the intrigue and corruption which cursed the government of the Late Empire.¹¹⁴ If senatorial letters of recommendation are any indication, the *notarii* were equally liable to the temptations of accepting patronage from aristocrats.¹¹⁵ The effectiveness of their corps was undoubtedly weakened when the young sons of aristocratic houses in the West entered in large numbers, and when the vested interests of the aristocracy attracted the loyalty of its membership.

Thus the evidence indicates that the *schola notariorum* deserves to be recognized as an institution every bit as important to administrative centralization in the Late Empire as the *schola agentum in rebus*. Because they were so alike in functions, personnel, and direction, they apparently formed two interrelated branches of a system which deserves to be called the Late Roman imperial secret service.

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¹¹¹ Boak, *Master of Offices*, pp. 82 ff.

¹¹² *Cod. Iust.*, XII, 20, 5, 1.

¹¹³ *Cod. Iust.*, IV, 59, 1; I, 23, 7, 2.

¹¹⁴ See *Cod. Theod.*, I, 3, 1.

¹¹⁵ Sym., V, 39.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF PLUTARCH,
DE MALIGNITATE HERODOTI.¹

The principal intention of the following remarks is to explain and justify some of the readings that have been adopted in the text of the *De Malignitate* which will appear in the Loeb Classical Library (Plutarch, *Moralia* XI). No text of this essay has been published since the Teubner edition of Bernardakis in 1893. This is an unsatisfactory edition, since its report of the manuscript readings is neither accurate nor complete, and it leaves many problems unsolved. My own knowledge of the manuscript readings is derived from photostatic copies, and I shall not refer to the *apparatus criticus* of Bernardakis except when it may be necessary to point out its errors.

The *De Malignitate* is one of the seven essays of Plutarch which are preserved in only two manuscripts, the Planudean manuscript E (Parisinus 1672) and the 15th century manuscript B (Parisinus 1675). The older view, which is maintained by the present editors of the Teubner series and has recently been re-asserted by Hubert,² regards E and B as derived from a common source, so that each has independent value. On the other hand Manton, who has been supported by Flacelière,³ has presented reasons for believing that B is a copy (though not a direct copy) of E. It is not the purpose of this article to offer any definite opinion on this question, and it cannot be discussed in an authoritative manner unless evidence from all seven essays is considered. But the problem cannot be ignored by an editor of any of these essays, and the opportunity may be taken here

¹ I am much indebted to Prof. Benedict Einarson and Prof. Harold Cherniss, both of whom read this article in manuscript and made valuable criticisms and suggestions.

² K. Hubert, "Die handschriftliche Ueberlieferung für Plutarchs *Moralia* 70-77," *Rh. Mus.*, XCIII (1950), pp. 330-6, *Gnomon*, XXV (1953), pp. 556-7.

³ G. R. Manton, "The Manuscript Tradition of Plutarch's *Moralia* 70-7," *C. Q.*, XLIII (1949), pp. 97-104; R. Flacelière, "La tradition manuscrite des traités 70-77 de Plutarque," *R. E. G.*, LXV (1952), pp. 351-62, and *Plutarque, Dialogue sur l'Amour* (Paris, 1953), pp. 34-8.

to present some evidence from the *De Malignitate* which cannot be found in the Bernardakis edition.

The fact is, as everyone would agree, that B quite frequently offers an obviously correct reading against an incorrect reading in E. Many of these correct readings, as well as others which are either probably or certainly incorrect, can be classified as corrections or attempted improvements of the text of E, editorial alterations well within the powers of a Byzantine copyist. They need not be regarded as evidence for the existence of a different tradition independent of E, and on Manton's hypothesis they can be credited to the scribe of η (his term for the intermediary between E and B). The attempted improvements include changes, not always for the better, in spelling or accentuation,⁴ changes in case endings,⁵ additions or omissions of the definite article,⁶ and alterations in word order.⁷ Some of B's readings, indeed, are hardly explicable except as attempts to improve on the reading of E. Thus in 855C, where the correct reading is certainly Xylander's *θιγῶν ἐνὶ ῥήματι*, B has the correct participle but with the wrong accent (*θίγων*), evidently a correction of E's *θήγων*. In 862C, where the correct reading is Reiske's *ἀφικόμενοι*, *ἀφικομένους* in B is a misguided attempt to improve on E's *ἀφικομενο* (unaccented, and with space for one or perhaps two letters at the end). And in 858D B has *ἐν τοῖσι θυρέοισι*, which is evidently an attempt to correct *ἐν τισι θυρέοισι*

⁴ E.g. 862E (and elsewhere) *Ἀλκμεωνίδας* E: *Ἀλκμαιωνίδας* B; 863D *μῦρα* E: *μύρα* B; 863F *Κυνθίοις* E: *Κυνθίοις* B; 867C *φαεννὰν κρηπίδ'* E: *φαενὰν κρηπίδ'* B; 869B *ἐξελάσαι* E: *ἐξελαῖσαι* B; 869D (and elsewhere) *Πελοποννήσου* E: *Πελοποννήσου* B. Since the presence or absence of iota subscript appears not to be a significant matter, the form which the scribe evidently intended will be normally given here, although the iota subscript is sometimes omitted in both E and B.


⁵ E.g. 857E τὸ Ἄργος E: τὸν Ἄργον B; 858A ἀνθρωπῶν πράγματα E: ἀνθρωπῶν περί (sic) πραγμάτων B; 858F γενναιοτάτων E: γενναιοτάτους B; 859B Πολυκράτη E: Πολυκράτην B; 860A τοιοῦτο E: τοιοῦτον B; 860F κιβδήλῃσι (without iota subscript) E: κιβδήλοισι B; 864F ὁδὸν E: ὁδῶ B; 865C-D (three times) ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ E: ἐν ὁμήρου λ. B (but in 865B both have ὁμήρου).

⁶ E.g. 855C διήγησιν E: τὴν διήγησιν B; 867C τὸ πέρας E: πέρας B.

⁷ E.g. 857D οἶεται δεῖν E: δεῖν οἶεται B; 861D ἐόντας αὐτοῖς E: ὄντας ἑαυτοῖς B; 861E Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ κακοῖθεις E: καὶ κακοῖθεις Λακ. B.

in E; the correct reading, ἐν τῇσι Θυρέῃσι, is easily supplied from Herodotus.⁸

The Aldine and Basle texts of the *De Malignitate* were certainly not copied from E, since they commonly give the readings of B and very rarely support E against B.⁹ But it is also most unlikely that they were taken from B. Apart from the absence of printer's marks in B, like those which have identified J as the source of the Aldine in other essays,¹⁰ the Aldine has some strange readings and some lacunae which are not readily explicable on the assumption that it was based directly on B. Its immediate source, which we may call αλδ, appears to have been a text akin to B, and on Manton's hypothesis the stemma might be tentatively reconstructed as follows (δ is Flacelière's symbol for the source of E):



The Aldine text (unlike the Basle, which has some good corrections)¹¹ is not of much help to an editor seeking to estab-

⁸ For further examples and discussion of variants see the essays of Hubert and Manton cited in notes 2 and 3 above. For examples in the *De Facie* see H. Cherniss in Plutarch, *Moralia* XII (Loeb Cl. Lib.), p. 27, note; for the *Amatorius* see Flacelière, *Plutarque: Dialogue sur l'Amour*, p. 31.

⁹ Examples which I have noted (none of them very significant) are: 856A Πελοποννησιών (B regularly uses a second ν); 867E τὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων: τὸν τὸν Ἑλλήνων B; 870C ἐπεχειργασμένος: ἐπ' ἐχειργασμένος^{οὗς} B; 870D αὐτῶν: αὐτοῦς (i. e. -οὗς or -ῶν) B. When there are alternative readings in B, the Aldine does not always give the better one or the one that differs from the reading of E.

¹⁰ Cf. M. Treu, *Zur Geschichte der Ueberlieferung von Plutarchs Moralia*, III (Breslau, 1884).

¹¹ E. g. 856F ἐβούλοντο, Ἀριστομένη; 857B παισὶ, missing in EB; 865C βουλομένους: μὴ βουλομένους EB; 866D πρῶτον: πρῶτος EB; 868C Ἀβαις: ἄμβραις EB; 873F ἐν ἔπεσι: ἐνέπαισε E: ἐνέπεσε B.

lish correct readings. But some of its peculiarities are worth describing; many of them re-appear in the Basle edition and some of them remained in printed texts until they were purged in Wytttenbach's edition. The numerous corruptions and mistakes in individual words are not worth listing; but it is scarcely credible that a renaissance editor like Dukas can be held responsible for all of them, and since B is written in a very clear hand there can be no question of illegibility if he copied from it. An occasional aberration, like Ἰπποκλείδῃ for Ἡροδότῳ in 867B, might be Dukas' own notion of a good correction. But Ἡραν for ὄναρ (865F), κολάζοντες for μηδίζοντες (868E), and ἡμᾶς for ἀκμᾶς (870E) are not explicable as reproductions of B. In 861A the correct reading ἰστορεῖται is in E, corrupted to ἐστορεῖται in B, and the Aldine has ἐστὶν εἶπας, which is meaningless (an early corrector of the Aldine suggested ἔστιν εἰπεῖν and the Basle edition has simply εἶπας).¹²

Of particular interest are the six lacunae, which look like omissions of a line in the source with no indication that anything has been left out, so that the text reads:

- (1) γενέσθαι προσποιήματι in 858F.
- (2) Λακεδαιμονίους παῖδας in 859F.
- (3) ἀναμνήσκομαι (*sic*) καταλαβεῖν in 862F (the line of verse is omitted).
- (4) χρῆσθαι τὸ δὲ μέγιστον in 865A.
- (5) μαστιγούμενοι μάχεσθαι ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης in 866D.
- (6) Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὸ περιβόητον in 871E.

Haplography seems to be the explanation in (1) γενέσθαι . . . ἐπιθέσθαι προσποιήματι, (2) Λακεδαιμονίους . . . τριακοσίων παῖδας, and (5) μαστιγούμενοι μάχεσθαι . . . μάχεσθαι ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης. In all cases except (1) the omission is equivalent to about a line in B (65-75 letters), but in no instance does it correspond to a whole single line in B. The conclusion seems to be, therefore, that the omissions resulted from careless reading of a codex with

¹² The actual reading in the text of B is ἐστὶν εἶπαι which can be interpreted as an attempt by a second hand to write ἐστὶν εἶπαι. It might be argued that this was an alternate reading in η and αλδ, imperfectly reproduced in the Aldine as ἐστὶν εἶπας.

lines of about the same length as the lines in B; and if the carelessness is attributed to the scribe of αλδ rather than to Dukas, it should follow (on Manton's hypothesis) that the lines of γ are about the same length as in B.

The Aldine text of the *Moralia* was printed in 1509, so that the text from which it was copied might be a later codex than B, which is generally dated about 1440. New evidence for the existence in the first half of the fifteenth century of a text akin to B has now come to light in a manuscript in Venice (Marc. Gr. 517), which includes a number of excerpts from Plutarch's works including the *De Malignitate* and the *Adversus Colotem* and which Aubrey Diller has identified as written in the hand of Georgius Gemistus Pletho.¹³ Pletho died in 1452 at Mistra in the Peloponnese after spending the better part of forty years there. Was there a manuscript at Mistra containing these two essays of Plutarch or was he able to consult E or B, the only known manuscripts which include them?

Pletho attended the Council for the Union of the Churches at Ferrara in 1438, to which the Greek emperor Joannes VIII Palaeologus came, bringing with him a number of precious manuscripts to show the Italian humanists, one of which—a complete text of all the works of Plutarch—can certainly be identified as none other than E.¹⁴ It is possible, therefore, that Pletho made his acquaintance with the *De Malignitate* through this manuscript on his visit to Italy at that time and made notes or excerpts from it which he took back with him to Mistra; and it is also not impossible (so far as we know) that sometime or somewhere, during the latter years of his life, he saw the manuscript B.

Professor Diller kindly allowed me to examine his microfilm copy of Pletho's excerpts in the hope that a collation with the texts of E and B might establish one or the other of these texts as his source. Unfortunately Pletho did not choose to transcribe passages in which the texts of E and B are markedly different;

¹³ A. Diller, "Pletho and Plutarch," *Scriptorium*, VIII (1954), pp. 123-7; "The Autographs of Georgius Gemistus Pletho," *Scriptorium*, X (1956), pp. 27-41.

¹⁴ Diller's identification is based on the description by Traversari of the manuscript brought to the conference (see *Scriptorium*, VIII).

and since he sometimes paraphrases, instead of quoting *verbatim*, one can never be sure how faithfully he is reproducing his original text. The excerpts, each introduced by *ὅτι*, extend from Folio 74 recto, line 9, to Folio 76 recto, line 2, and are as follows (with critical notes appended):

(1) 74 recto, 9-15, *De Malignitate* 858A-B (the story of Pittacus at Sigeum).

858A *προκαλεσαμένον* Pletho, as in Basle text (a certain correction): *προσκαλεσαμένον* EB.

858B *περιβαλὼν* Pletho, as in B: *περιλαβὼν* E.
Πιττάκειον Pletho (the correct form, as conjectured by Cobet): *Πιττάκιον* EB.

(2) 74r. 16-22, 859C-D (the tyrants overthrown by Sparta).

859D *Ἀμπρακίας* Pletho, as in B: *Ἀμβρακίας* E.

ἐκ δὲ . . . Λύγαμιν Pletho, leaving a blank where EB have the corrupt reading *ξενάγον* (for *Νάξου*).

Ἀγγελον Pletho, as in B: *Ἀγελλον* E: *Ἀγέλαον* Hubert.¹⁵

(3) 74r. 23-v.5, 859F-860C (how the Cnidians rescued the Corcyrean boys from Samos).

859F *Ἀλυάτην* Pletho, as in B: *Ἀλυάτην* E.

(4) 74v. 6-12, 861B (Plutarch's complaint that Herodotus has belittled the part played by the Eretrians in the Ionian revolt and suppressed all mention of a sea-battle in which they took part). In the text of EB the sea-battle is described as follows:

καὶ στόλου βασιλικῷ προσπλέοντος ἀπαντήσαντες ἔξω Κυπρίους ἐν τῷ Παμφυλίῳ πελάγει κατενανμάχηνσαν.

Pletho's excerpt begins:

ὅτι Ἑρετριεῖς, καθ' αὐτοὺς πρότερον, στόλῳ βασιλικῷ ἐκ Κύπρου τῇ Ἰωνίᾳ προσπλέοντι, ἔξω ἐν τῷ Παμφυλίῳ πελάγει ἀπαντήσαντες κατενανμάχηνσαν.

Then follows the expedition to Sardis *μετ' Ἀθηναίων*.

Pletho himself can be held responsible for the contrast *καθ' αὐτοὺς πρότερον . . . μετ' Ἀθηναίων*, of which there is no trace

¹⁵ *Rh. Mus.*, XCIII (1950), p. 336.

in the text of EB; and if taken literally it is somewhat absurd since, according to Herodotus (V, 99), the Eretrians provided only five ships for the expedition sent out to help the Ionians and Plutarch does not complain of this figure. If this naval battle about which Herodotus says nothing is not a fiction, we must assume that ships from Miletus and other Ionian cities were present, since not even Lysanias of Mallus, whom Plutarch cites as his authority, can have maintained that five Eretrian ships routed a Persian fleet. But what of the other peculiarities in Pletho's version? The substitution of ἐκ Κύπρου for Κυπρίους absolves the Cyprians from the guilt of fighting on the Persian side—an important matter for the historian, since Herodotus (V, 104) tells us that they joined the rebels actively later—and combined with the addition of τῇ Ἰωνίᾳ it prepares the way for ἔξω, "out into the hostile waters of the Eastern Mediterranean," which in the accepted text has to carry all this meaning by itself.¹⁶ Pletho's text offers a sentence which is grammatically better and perhaps even historically preferable. But this does not mean that it should be accepted as a correct version of what Plutarch—or Lysanias—wrote; and since Pletho does not always quote the precise words of Plutarch, we are not in a position to say exactly what he did find in his text here. The rest of his paraphrase is accurate, and there are no differences between E and B here.

(5) 74v. 13-75r. 19, a paraphrase, with considerable changes in wording, of passages from 864E to 866C (Thermopylae).

864F Ἀτταγίνῳ Pletho (the correct form): Ἀπαγίνῳ EB.

866B πολλοὺς μὲν οὖν Pletho (as conjectured by Cobet): πολλοὺς μὲν EB.

866C The meaningless ἀπεκρίνατο τὰ πράγματα is retained, as in EB.

(6) 75r. 20-26, 869B-C (the part played by the Naxians).

Nothing to note. The unintelligible phrase in 869B (καταπρήσαντα ποιῆσαι κακόν) is not included in the excerpt.

(7) 75v. 1-21, 870E-871B (the epigrams on the Corinthians at Salamis, beginning with the epigram in 871B).

¹⁶ For criticism and suggested emendation of the *textus receptus* see F. Rühl, "Varia," *Rh. Mus.*, LXVII (1912), pp. 163-7.

871B τὴν θεὸν Pletho (correct, as Stephanus): τὸν θεὸν EB.

ἰθυμάχων Pletho, as in B: εἰθυμάχων E.

πολιτητᾶν Pletho (correct, as Stephanus): πολιτᾶν EB.

ἔσταθεν . . . δαιμόνιαι as in EB.

δι' Ἀφροδίτα Pletho (correct, as Stephanus): δι' Ἀφροδίταν EB.

870E νυνὶ δ' ἀνάματος Pletho: νῦν δ' ἀνάματος EB.

ἐνθαδε Πέρσας καὶ Φοινίσσας νῆας Pletho: ἐνθαδε Φοινίσσας νῆας καὶ Πέρσας EB.

ῥυσάμεθα Pletho (Jacobs' conjecture): ῥύομεθα EB.

Ἰσθμοῖ (for ἐν Ἰσθμῷ) and τήνδε (for ταύτην) are not significant changes.

870F ἐπεγέγραπτο Pletho, as in E: ἐπιγέγραπται B (but since Pletho uses the pluperfect form several times in paraphrases, his choice of it here may not be significant).

αὔται and ἀνέθεντο (as in EB), not corrected to ναῦται and ἀνέθεν.

νανμαχίας Pletho, as in E: νανμαχίης B.

ἀμφέθετο Pletho (an obvious correction): ἀμφέθεντο EB.

(8) 75v. 22-76r. 2, 862B, 864D (how the Athenians rewarded Herodotus and the Thebans are said to have rebuffed him).

864D παρὰ Θηβαίων Pletho (an obvious correction): παρ' Ἀθηναίων EB.

Thus it will be seen that there is no conclusive support of one manuscript against the other. Formally Pletho may be said to support B four times (I do not count no. 1) and E twice (in no. 7), but these are not particularly significant examples.¹⁷ The corrections are presumably not beyond his own powers of emendation; indeed, with so many errors corrected it is surprising that he has not corrected the nonsensical αὔται and the unmetrical ἀνέθεντο in no. 7. The only important divergence from the text of EB is in no. 4. If the changes here are not due to Pletho himself, the possibility must be considered that he found them given as a variant reading in the text which he used. It is worth noting that B preserves some variant readings, generally written above the line, of which there is no sign in E, as well as a number of false readings (though not so many as

¹⁷ P. H. DeLacy and B. Einarson, who have collated the excerpts from the *Adversus Colotem*, find the evidence there equally inconclusive.

in the Aldine) which are hardly explicable in a text copied directly from E. The variants may of course have been given in η , whatever their ultimate source may be; if one believes, with Hubert, that B is not a descendant of E, one might assign them to δ ; but if they occur in E, there is no reason why they should not occur—with others as well—in a manuscript taken from the same source as B. This possibility is worth mentioning because of one passage in which B differs from E almost as markedly as does Pletho from the *textus receptus* in no. 4. The passage is in 863E-F, where the Argive behaviour in face of the Persian threat is being discussed:

E: Ἀργεῖοι δ' ὅτι μὲν οὐ συναράμενοι τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐκστάντες κατήσχυναν ἂν τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὴν εὐγένειαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν. Σιφνίοις γὰρ ἦν καὶ Κυνθίοις ἄμεινον ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Ἑλληνας κτλ.

B: Ἀργεῖοι δ' ὅτι μὲν οὐ συναράμενοι τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκστάντες, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν, κατήσχυναν ἂν τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὴν εὐγένειαν. Σιφνίοις γὰρ ἦν καὶ Κυθνίοις ἄμεινον ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Ἑλληνας κτλ.¹⁸

Κυνθίοις (B) is correct, as against the Κυνθίοις of E, and Reiske was right to delete the ἂν after κατήσχυναν (since grammatically it would require μὴ συναράμενοι); and ὑπὸ (Wytttenbach) or σὺν (Meziriac) must be supplied before Σιφνίοις unless we read συνελυθεροῦν. With these changes E's text is acceptable; but B, apart from the nominative Λακεδαιμόνιοι, reads οὐδ' ἔστιν instead of οὐκ ἔστιν, and places it before κατήσχυναν. The result is an anacolouthon (the Argives are left with no main verb) and an entirely different meaning for the closing portion of the sentence: "The Spartans, if they had refused to be brave men because of a quarrel over the leadership, would (undeniably) have disgraced Heracles and their lineage." This is clearly wrong and no editor would prefer B to E in this passage; but, as in Pletho's excerpt no. 4, the aberrations of B suggest a deliberate attempt to rewrite the sentence rather than mere misreading.

¹⁸ The *apparatus criticus* of Bernardakis does not record all the differences of E and B here.

In order not to give the impression that I am definitely adopting Manton's hypothesis, it will be appropriate at this point to mention a passage which might be thought to support Hubert's view. In Herodotus, II, 119, 3, where the flight of Menelaus from Egypt is described, all manuscripts read οἵχετο φεύγων τῇσι νηυσὶ ἐπὶ Αἰβύης. Plutarch (857B) quotes this passage in the accusative and infinitive οἵχεσθαι φεύγοντα νηυσὶν ἦεν (or νηυσὶ νήεν) ἐπὶ Αἰβύης (E), νηυσὶν ἰθύ ἐπὶ Αἰβύης (B). Both manuscripts omit the definite article before νηυσὶν. ἦεν (or νήεν) is a meaningless corruption, but ἰθύ does not appear in any manuscript of Herodotus (though it is adopted in Hude's text) and therefore has not a very strong title to be considered the correct reading in Plutarch. Nor is it likely that ἦεν is a corruption of ἰθύ. A better explanation is that νηυσὶν ἦεν is an attempt to reproduce ΝΗΥΣΙΝΗ.ΣΙΝ (i. e. a faulty repetition of νηυσὶν, with the second *upsilon* obscured or smudged and the second *sigma* mistaken for *epsilon*); in fact it is arguable that the scribe of E, in writing ἦεν, purposely left room for a letter between η and ε. The repeated νηυσὶν might then be explained in its turn as a misreading of ΤΗΥΣΙΝΗΥΣΙΝ, which would be in conformity with our manuscripts of Herodotus. ἰθύ is then to be explained, not as an attempt to emend E's reading, but as a variant in some older text, which has not survived in E.

It is certainly true that some of B's readings look like the result of variants written above the line which have been ignored by the scribe of E. In 854F δυσφορώτατον (B) as compared with δυσφώρατον (E) is probably the result of a variant δύσφορον, written ^{ορ} δυσφώρατον.¹⁹ In 858F, where the correct reading is certainly ἀφίημι τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων, E omits τά, and B has ^{ἀτ}των. In 859E the Herodotean quotation, if correct, should be συνεπέλαβοντο τοῦ στρατεύματος . . . ὥστε γενέσθαι καὶ Κορίνθιοι προθύμως. E reads Κορινθίοις προθύμου, and B agrees, only adding the variant

¹⁹ Cf. Galen, *De Alimentorum Facultatibus* (Corp. Med. Gr., V, iv, 2, p. 296, 15) where the MSS vary between εὐφορώτατον and εὐφώρατον, and Helmreich rightly conjectures εὐφώρατον (I owe this reference to Prof. Einarson).

^{οις}προθύμου. And in 872B, where the right reading is clearly ἀπολεγόμενος, E has ἀπολογουμένους, B ἀπολογουμένους^ε (an incomplete correction).²⁰

On the other hand, B's attempts to supply missing letters in the shorter lacunae can all be explained as the scribe's own attempts to improve on the reading of E.²¹ For example in 861B, in the discussion of the Ionian revolt, E reads ἥδη γὰρ ὥς. . . (gap of five letters) περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν συγκεχυμέν.ν. B keeps the short space after ὥς, but supplies η as the missing letter in the participial form; the supplement is incorrect, and Wyttenbach's proposal ὥς τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν συγκεχυμένων should be accepted.

B is generally faithful in reporting the same lacunae as E and in leaving an approximately equal space. The Aldine text is much less accurate, and ignores some of the lacunae altogether. When a lacuna occurs in a quotation from Herodotus, the missing words are easily supplied; and in all such cases where a blank space is left in E and B it is of appropriate length. Since both manuscripts use some abbreviations and often write letters above the line, one cannot insist that the space should correspond exactly to the necessary number of letters and it is not strictly fair to say that on some occasions B or E reports the lacuna more accurately. In 868B both texts show a gap of about 20 letters for <κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν, ὥς> ἐγὼ συμβαλλόμενος εὕρισκω, in 862F about 10 letters for <θῶμα δέ μοι> καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχομαι, and in 857B about 5 letters for ἐντομά <φρα> ποιῆσαι (cf. 864C, 872F).

On two occasions when a short blank occurs at the end of a line in E and is consequently less conspicuous, it is ignored altogether in B. In 859A the text can be confidently restored (from Herodotus) as ἐπὶ μισθῷ <ὅσῳ δῆ>. E has a space of about 6 letters at the end of the line, but B has no lacuna marked. In 861F (not a Herodotean quotation) Wyttenbach would read μεταφέρεις τὴν πανσέληνον εἰς ἀρχὴν μηνὸς <ἐκ> διχο-

²⁰ But cf. 868C κελεύων E: κλοῦων B. Cf. in *De Facie* 927C ἐκφύονται (correctly) E: ἐμφύονται B.

²¹ But cf. *Amatorius* 754A φρ...ματα E: φρνάγματα B. The Basle edition supplies the correct reading φρνάγματα. Hubert, *Gnomon*, XXV (1953), p. 557 argues that the reading of B can hardly be a conjecture since it is not a Greek word at all. Another notable supplement by B is in 758C-D.

μηνίας. Editors have not reported the blank space of about 3 letters at the end of the line in E, which is long enough for ἐκ but not long enough for Reiske's οὔσαν; there is no lacuna marked in B.²² If these two passages are not accepted as evidence for B's descent from E, one must say that the lacunae were equally inconspicuous in δ.

Since Planudes himself tells us that he saw an old manuscript which contained lacunae and indicated some but not all of them by leaving blank spaces,²³ the assumption is that the lacunae are legacies from δ. Planudes supposes that they were left blank when the scribe was unable to read certain words and phrases. There is in fact one word in the *De Malignitate* which baffled the scribe each time it occurred—the word ἀπειστώ, used by Herodotus in IX, 85 to describe the “absence” of the Corinthians and others from the battle of Plataea. Twice, in 872F, E and B write simply ἀπο . . . , but in 873D, while E still writes ἀπο . . . , B writes ἀπόλειψιν (presumably a mere conjecture). It is perhaps not surprising that this uncommon word should puzzle a scribe, but an examination of other lacunae where restoration is reasonably certain does not suggest that rare words or difficult Greek caused him to leave these empty spaces. There is one other good example in 867F, προς . . . for Προσηΐα, but proper names, though sometimes corrupted,²⁴ are not elsewhere left out except for <τὴν Ἰοῦν> in 856E. Illegible handwriting, therefore, rather than unfamiliar language, is likely to be the original cause of the trouble, unless many restorations which seem obvious are in fact incorrect. Rather curiously the word συμφορά seems to cause difficulty on two occasions. In 864C the Herodotean quotation is easily restored as ἦν γὰρ τις καὶ τοῦτον ἄχαρις συμ<φορὴ λυπεῦσα παιδοφόνος>. In 871C, where the same “misfortune” is mentioned again, both texts read τὴν Ἀμεινοκλέους . . . (gap of about 12 letters) παιδοφονίαν. The supplement <συμφορὰν καὶ> is very attractive.

²² Cf. *De Facie* 942F, with Cherniss' note in Loeb edition (vol. XII), for an inconspicuous lacuna in E which B ignores.

²³ In a note in Codex A (Parisinus 1671), f. 213, quoted by A. Devréesse, *Introduction à l'étude des manuscrits grecs* (Paris, 1954), p. 91.

²⁴ E.g. 873D, Σωχάρης and Δείπνιστος for Sophanes and Aeimnestus, 856F, Aristogenes for Aristomenes, and 858D (see pp. 256-7 above).

The remark of Planudes should prepare us to expect lacunae which are not indicated as well as those which are marked by blank spaces in the manuscripts. Some of the most obvious are the result of haplography and were recognized by the early editors. In 861F we should read, with Xylander, ἦν γὰρ ἰσταμένου μὴνός <ἐνάτη>, ἐνάτη δέ, since this is a quotation of Herodotus, VI, 106; and in 864B either τὴν οὐ <γενομένην> γενομένην δ' ἂν or τὴν <γενομένην μὲν> οὐ, γενομένην δ' ἂν.²⁵ Sometimes a whole line has been dropped as in the familiar Herodotean quotation in 863D λέγειν <ὀφείλω τὰ λ-γόμενα, πείθεσθαι γε μὴν οὐ παντάσῃ> ὀφείλω. These clear examples have led critics to look for the same type of error in other passages where the text is certainly or probably corrupt. In 863B Bernardakis proposes alternative longer or shorter supplements, both of them equally good and acceptable, on the assumption that the scribe's eye jumped from *συμμαχίαν* to *συμμαχίας*.²⁶ In 873C Powell and Manton propose to read τοῦτο μὲν ἐξεκόλαψα <ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος τὸ ἐλεγείον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐπέγραψαν> τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν πόλεων,²⁷ on the principle that the repeated -αψαν caused the omission.

There are three other passages where a similar cure might well be applied. In 866C what is the reply of the second Spartan whom Leonidas tries to send away from Thermopylae, giving him a message to take to Sparta? The reading of EB, ἀπεκρίνατο τὰ πράγματα, is meaningless, and Wytttenbach's ἀπεκρίνατο τῷ πράγματι, "facto respondens," is not much better. The man must say something, not merely take his place in the ranks in silence, if we are to be guided by *Moralia* 225E, where the same story is told and his reply is αὐτοῦ μένων κρέσσων ἂν εἶην.²⁸ It is

²⁵ This is preferable to οὐ <γγενημένην μὲν> γενομένην δ' ἂν which was accepted by Meziriac, Reiske, and Bernardakis. In 868C Meziriac gives the right reading οὐκ <ἀφ' ὧν ἔπραξαν ἄλλ'> ἀφ' ὧν ἔπραξαν ἂν and in 872A Reiske reads ποτὲ <μὲν αἶρει ποτὲ> δὲ καταβάλλει.

²⁶ He also postulates two separate lacunae in 859A, but his argument is less convincing here; the manuscript reading may be right.

²⁷ My own preference would be to read πασῶν δ' ἀντεπέγραψαν in the second half of the lacuna.

²⁸ One cannot insist that when Plutarch tells the same story more than once it will always be told in exactly the same form. But even when details vary, the point should remain the same. A good example, for the textual critic, is the retort of the philosopher Stilpo, when asked if anyone had touched his property when Demetrius captured Megara: Οὐδέτις,

worth noting that the Aldine has a different, though equally meaningless text: ἀπεκρίνοντος (*sic*) τὰ πράγματα. This reading looks more like an old variant than a corruption of an already corrupt text. It suggests that the trouble began after ἀπεκριν-, that this was the point where a line ended in an older text and the scribe jumped to the next line but one which began with -οντος. The true reading, therefore, might be something like this: ἀπεκρίνατο· < ‘Κρείσσων ἐγὼ μένων, καὶ κρείσσον’ ἐμοῦ μένοντος > τὰ πράγματα.

In 870D Wyttenbach's cure is equally inadequate. Plutarch has pointed out the ingenious malice of Herodotus in inventing the story of the flight of the Corinthian Adeimantus from Salamis; the story, he says, will hurt the Corinthians if it is believed and hurt the credit of the Athenians if it is not believed, so that Herodotus wins a point either way. The meaning is clear despite the corrupt text: ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα περίεστιν αὐτῷ, πιστευομένης δὲ τῆς διαβολῆς Κορινθίους ἀδοξεῖν, ἀπιστουμένους Ἀθηναίους, οἱ (ἢ οἱ B) μὴδὲ Κορινθίων Ἀθηναίους ἀλλὰ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοῦ καταψεύδεσθαι. Editors have emended δέ after πιστευομένης to μέν, and ἀπιστουμένους to ἀπιστουμένης δέ, and Wyttenbach's ἦν οἶμαι μὴδέ is accepted by Bernardakis, with τοῦτον, the reading of Turnebus, instead of τούτων. The result is passable Greek: "Which slander, I imagine, was not in fact perpetrated by the Athenians against the Corinthians, but is a lie of his own directed at both of them at once." The cure, however, is not so satisfactory or so complete as to justify four separate emendations in a single sentence. The expression is extremely condensed and offers a rather abrupt termination to the long rhetorical outburst. In particular μὴδὲ Κορινθίων is unsatisfactory. If μὴδέ is to have its proper force, "not even," it should introduce a lesser alternative: "I do not believe this or even that"; and it implies that a greater alternative has been previously mentioned. A lacuna of one line would be enough to make μὴδὲ Κορινθίων Ἀθηναίους into the "not even" alternative. I should propose to adopt Wyttenbach's οἶμαι, but to ignore the

εἶπεν, οὐδένα γὰρ εἶδον ἐπιστάμαν ἀποφέροντα (*Demetrius* 9), Οὐ δῆτα, εἶπε, πόλεμος γὰρ οὐ λαφυραγωγεῖ ἀρετὴν (*Moralia* 5F). In *Moralia* 475C, where the text reads ἔφη μὴδὲν ἰδεῖν τὰμὰ φέροντα, Dübner's emendation ἐπιστάμαν φέροντα is hard to reject, even though τὰμά is defensible and intelligible.

ἡ of B, and to read: οἶμαι δὲ <μηδὲν τοιοῦτ' αὐτὸν Ἀθηναίων ἀκοῦσαι κακιζόντων Κορινθίους> μηδὲ Κορινθίων Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλὰ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοῦ καταψεύδεσθαι. And the two emendations in the first half of the sentence can be avoided very simply if ἀπιστουμένους Ἀθηναίους is transferred to an earlier position in the sentence: ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα περίεστιν αὐτῷ ἀπιστουμένους Ἀθηναίους, πιστενομένης δὲ τῆς διαβολῆς Κορινθίους ἀδοξεῖν:²⁹ "so he gains his point here; the Athenians are discredited if they are disbelieved, but the Corinthians are discredited if the charge is believed; my own opinion, however, is that he never heard either the Athenians making any such complaint against the Corinthians or the Corinthians making any complaint against the Athenians, but that he is libelling both parties at the same time."

The third passage is in 839B. Here Plutarch is objecting to the statement of Herodotus that the Naxians sent ships to support the expedition of Xerxes; after citing the contrary evidence of Hellanicus and Ephorus, he says that the chroniclers of Naxos record how the Naxians repelled Megabates when he attacked with two hundred ships, καὶ Δάτιν αὐθις τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐξελάσαι καταπρήσαντα ποιῆσαι κακόν (EB, with some wrong accents in B). Bernardakis, following Emperius and Westermann, emends this meaningless text to καταπλεύσαντα πλοίοις ἑκατόν. This figure of one hundred ships has no historical foundation³⁰ and Plutarch does not actually deny that Datis landed on the island. It seems better, therefore, to draw on the account of Herodotus in VI, 96³¹ and to restore the passage as follows: καταπρήσαντα <μὲν τὰ ἱερά, αὐτοὺς δὲ Ναξίους οὐδὲν ἐπιχειρήσαντα> ποιῆσαι κακόν. The repeated -ρήσαντα supplies a reason for the scribe's error.

In these passages, then, I would propose to postulate lacunae rather than attempt to emend the words in the text. One passage should be mentioned, however, where the manuscript reading can be restored in place of the traditional emendation, 855F: ὁ δ' ἱστορίαν γράφων ἃ μὲν αἶθεν ἀληθῆ λέγων δίκαιός ἐστιν, τῶν δ' ἀδύλων τὰ βελτίονα δοκεῖν ἀληθῶς λέγεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ χείρονα. Wyttenbach and Bernardakis accept Reiske's emendation λέγειν

²⁹ If the hiatus is considered objectionable, it is easy to read αὐτῷ περίεστιν instead of περίεστιν αὐτῷ.

³⁰ See Jacoby's note in *F. Gr. Hist.*, IIIB, no. 501, F. 3.

³¹ As quoted by Plutarch in the next sentence.

for the manuscript reading λέγων. With this emendation δοκεῖν is presumably to be taken as meaning "to think," as in Wytttenbach's translation: "Qui vero historiam scribit, debet quae vera scit scribere; de incertis meliora putare rectius quam peiora prodi." But it is hard to believe that a man with philosophic training like Plutarch would write δίκαιός ἐστιν δοκεῖν. The "just" historian reveals himself in what he says, not in what he thinks; and can any form of δόξα represent justice for a student of Plato? It is far better to retain λέγων, with a comma clearly following in both E and B, in which case the sentence means: "The historian shows himself just by declaring as true what he knows to be the case and, when the facts are not clear, by saying that the more creditable appears to be the true account rather than the less creditable."

It is not so easy to restore what Plutarch actually said in 855B, where he finds fault with the historian who "uses the severest words and phrases when gentler terms will serve," calling Nicias "a religious maniac" or "a fanatical bigot" (θεόληπτος) instead of "too much addicted to pious practices," and speaking of Cleon's "rashness and insanity" instead of his "unwise speech." Such a writer, according to the text of EB, οὐκ εὐμενής ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπολαύων τῷ σοφῶς διηγέσθαι τοῦ πράγματος. This text can hardly be right, but the emendation σαφῶς, which Bernardakis adopts, does not improve matters much. It is not accurate to say that a man who indulges in name-calling is in any sense "taking advantage of the situation by giving a clear (or specific) narrative"; and the question of σαφῆς διήγησις is not raised until the next section, where Thucydides is commended for not including a "specific narrative" of Cleon's misdeeds. The older emendations must be pronounced equally unsuccessful; the Aldine text has the meaningless τῷ φῶς, which perhaps means that the first syllable of σοφῶς was written obscurely or smudged in an older text; this reading is reproduced in the Basle edition and by Xylander; Stephanus reads πως τῷ and Wytttenbach suggests σοφῶς τῷ. It seems, however, that the correctness of every word except σοφῶς is guaranteed by a passage in the *Quaestiones Conviviales*, 630F. The point is made there that men in convivial company delight in taking the opportunity to describe their political triumphs and their

escapes from danger (if invited to do so) : ἡδέως ἐρωτῶνται πολλάκις καὶ τρόπον τινα τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ πράγματος ἀπολαύοντες ἀπλήστως ἔχουσι τοῦ διηγείσθαι καὶ μνημονεύειν. Such men, as it were, "renew their pleasure in their exploits by talking about them"; the pleasure which they once experienced ἔργῳ they now repeat λόγῳ, and consequently they are insatiable in describing and recalling the πράγμα. The genitive, τοῦ πράγματος, is evidently dependent on ἀπολαύειν in both passages. If Plutarch is thinking along similar lines in the *De Maliginitate*, he must mean that a writer who is abusive about Nicias or Cleon is like a man who renews his delight in his own triumph or his enemy's discomfiture by talking about it. The words as they stand in 855B, no matter what adverb one may substitute for σοφῶς, are too brief to convey all this meaning; perhaps, therefore, this is another passage where a lacuna should be postulated, but an editor can scarcely do more than obelize σοφῶς and wonder if ἀπλήστως might conceivably be the right reading.

In 862F the following text is presented by EB: ³²

ἀλλ' ὅταν γε πάλιν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀλκμεωνιδῶν ἀπολογεῖσθαι προσποιώμεθα ἃ πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἐπενήνοχεν ἐγκλήματα εἶη (lacuna of 10 letters) καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχομαι τὸν λόγον Ἀλκμεωνίδας ἂν ποτε ἀναδείξαι Πέρσῃσιν ἐκ συνθήματος ἀσπίδα βουλομένους γε εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ὑπὸ Ἱππῆϊ, κόμματός τινος ἀναμνησκόμαι παροιμιακοῦ.

Μένε κάρκινε καὶ σε μεθήσω.

Although προσποιώμεθα and εἶη are clearly wrong, the construction of the sentence is clear enough, as well as the meaning: "When he pretends to be defending the Alcmaeonidae against charges which he invented himself and says: 'It is amazing to me, and I cannot accept the story that the Alcmaeonidae would ever have made a pre-arranged shield signal to the Persians, with the intention of making the Athenians subject to Hippias,' I am reminded of a scrap of paroemiac verse:

'Just wait, crab, and I'll let you go free'."

The supplement θῶμα δέ μοι (from Herodotus, VI, 121) is easy and εἶη can be emended to εἶπη, which suggests that a parti-

³² B prefers the spelling Ἀλκμαι- for Ἀλκμε-, and the Aldine omits a line (see p. 258 above).

half lines in B (Bernardakis' estimate of 127-145 letters is too low); the third lacuna is not marked in the manuscripts; as the text stands Bernardakis is justified in proposing to add ἐλέγχειν, but an alternative cure is to restore the long lacuna in such a way as to make an insertion at this point unnecessary.

The old restoration of the first lacuna was τοῦ λογογράφου or τοῦ ἱστορικοῦ, though Wytttenbach thought that no supplement at all was necessary. The old editors, however, seem not to have recognized the stylistic difficulties of the *textus receptus*, with or without any such supplement. In fact the traditional supplement must be rejected, because a phrase like ὁ Ἡρόδοτος ὁ ἱστορικός is contrary to Greek usage. Two articles are not used with proper names of men and women; the usual formula is Ἡρόδοτος ὁ ἱστορικός, Πλάτων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, or ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Πλάτων. If the name is introduced with the definite article no further qualification is needed; ὁ Ἡρόδοτος is "the famous Herodotus," ὁ Πλάτων "the famous Plato" (not the writer of comedies) whom everyone knows to be an Athenian and a philosopher. The usage with two articles is reserved for the immortal gods; it is usual to say Ζεὺς Ὀλύμπιος or ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Ὀλύμπιος (Ζεὺς ὁ Ὀλύμπιος is uncommon, but is occasionally found).³³ And Plutarch appears to follow the classical norm.³⁴ The usage is readily intelligible; there is, as everyone knows, only one Zeus and the epithet does not identify the god, but one of his aspects (Olympius, Eleutherius, Soter).

It is very difficult to find a satisfactory brief alternative for the traditional supplement. τοῦ Ἡροδότου <τῆς ἱστορίας> is hardly acceptable, since the proper form of the phrase would be τῆς τοῦ Ἡροδότου ἱστορίας. But even if some word or phrase can be found that is adequate to the demands of the opening clause, the fact remains that certain limitations are imposed on the form of any sentence in which μέν is postponed beyond the second or third word; and it seems to me that, with or without a supplement, the form of the sentence as it stands must be incorrect. Certain principles appear to regulate the form of

³³ Cf. B. L. Gildersleeve and W. Miller, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, pp. 231-2, 235-6, and Gildersleeve, *A. J. P.*, XI (1890), p. 487.

³⁴ Cf. *De Malig.* 867F τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ Προσηφᾷ, and (for mortal men) 858F, 861C, 864D, 867A, etc.

sentences which begin with a noun or a nominal phrase in the genitive followed by a μέν—δέ dichotomy.³⁵ If the genitive is partitive and the two parts are marked by μέν and δέ, there is no difficulty, as in Andocides, 1, 25: τῶν γὰρ φυγόντων ἐπὶ τοῖς μυστηρίοις οἱ μὲν τινες ἀπέθανον φυγόντες κτλ. Or if the genitive is not a partitive, μέν and δέ may distinguish characteristics of the person or persons named in the genitive, as in the famous verses of Simonides:

τῶν ἐν Θερμοπύλαισι θανόντων
εὐκλέης μὲν ἂ τύχα, καλὸς δ' ὁ πότμος (Fr. 5, Diehl).

In accordance with these principles τοῦ Ἡροδότου ἡ μὲν λέξις would be permissible,³⁶ but πολλοὺς μὲν . . . πλείονες δέ would seem to imply an opening like τῶν τὸν Ἡρόδοτον θαυμαζόντων (i. e. a partitive genitive). If the μέν—δέ dichotomy does not come at the very beginning of the sentence, the phrase which precedes it must prepare the way for it. If this phrase is a nominal phrase in the genitive, it must be of the appropriate type; the only alternative is a participial phrase or a subordinate clause after which a fresh start is made with πολλοὺς μὲν. Possibly, then, an editor might supply a genitive absolute here, if he is prepared to believe that the lacuna is longer than the manuscripts indicate, e. g.: τοῦ Ἡροδότου <ὑπὸ πλείστων ἐπαινουμένου διὰ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τὸ ἥθος> πολλοὺς μὲν. . . .

But there is a shorter and simpler solution. It is in many ways desirable that the essay should begin with the words πολλοὺς μὲν, which is a favourite rhetorical opening;³⁷ a natural and appropriate beginning would be πολλοὺς μὲν, ὧ Ἀλέξανδρε, τοῦ Ἡροδότου καὶ ἡ λέξις,³⁸ and the lacuna could be disregarded. Some examples of faulty word order in the manuscripts have been considered previously, but a mistake at the very beginning of the essay is a special case. What could have induced a scribe

³⁵ The discussion of postponed μέν in Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, pp. 371-3, is rather disappointing, but provides some useful examples.

³⁶ Or even ἐξηπάτηκε μὲν πολλοὺς ἡ λέξις.

³⁷ Cf. e. g. in Demosthenes 1, 1; 2, 1; 9, 1; 18, 3.

³⁸ A sentence almost exactly parallel in form occurs in *Mor.* 500D: λέγομεν οὖν ἐν ὑμῖν ὅτι πολλὰ μὲν, ὧ ἄνθρωπε, σοῦ (v. l. σοί) καὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα φύει καὶ πάθη κτλ. This would be very curious Greek if σοῦ or some similar genitive came before πολλὰ μὲν.

to put τοῦ Ἡροδότου at the beginning instead of after the vocative of address and at the same time to conclude that there was a short lacuna after it? Possibly τοῦ Ἡροδότου was omitted in an earlier copy and then inserted either in the margin or above the line in some way that made a scribe imagine it was intended to come at the beginning. Such a misunderstanding would be easier if, for some reason or other, the opening words πολλοὺς μὲν were indented far over to the right and τοῦ Ἡροδότου was subsequently inserted in the blank space over καὶ ἡ λέξις:

τοῦ Ἡροδότου Πολλοὺς μὲν, ὧ Ἀλέξανδρε,
καὶ ἡ λέξις . . .

I am not convinced that this is the right explanation, but propose in any case to read: πολλοὺς μὲν, ὧ Ἀλέξανδρε, τοῦ Ἡροδότου καὶ ἡ λέξις. . . .

In attempting to restore the second lacuna one can begin by working backwards from μάλιστα πρὸς τε Βοιωτοὺς . . . κέχρηται. A dative is clearly required with κέχρηται and the old restoration <ἐπειδὴ δὲ κακοηθεία>, originally suggested by Turnebus, might satisfy some people who thought it unnecessary to accept the lacuna as a long one. In fact, however, a brief supplement of this kind leaves the argument much too abrupt. The sentence which follows implies that the malice of Herodotus is shown by his unwarranted accusations and slanders and that hitherto no one has exposed them. Hence I should propose to read, *exempli gratia*: <ὅπερ φιλεῖ ποιεῖν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ὁ Ἡρόδοτος, τοῖς μὲν αἰσχίστη τῇ κολακείᾳ χαριζόμενος, τοὺς δὲ διαβάλλον καὶ συκοφαντῶν. νῦν δέ, ὡς οὐδεὶς τετόλμηκεν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψευδολογίαν ἐξελέγχειν, ἥ> μάλιστα. . . .

The infinitive ἐξελέγχειν before ἥ μάλιστα eliminates the necessity for a similar infinitive after ἡμῖν. In this way the third lacuna of Bernardakis ceases to exist.

LIONEL PEARSON.

RESTORATION OF SAPPHO, 98 *a* 1-7.

Fragment 98 of Sappho as printed in Lobel and Page's *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*¹ consists of the contents of two papyri: one *a* now in Copenhagen, the other *b* in Milan. Both were first published by Vogliano; but, I regret to say, his publication of *a* is neither in the Princeton library nor in that of Columbia University.

All the more is this to be regretted, because Vogliano published *b*, in *Philologus*, XCIII (1939), pp. 277-86, before seeing *a*² which he published in a "booklet" that appeared (1941) in Milan. After seeing both *a* and *b*, Vogliano must have had reason to believe, and no doubt stated, two indisputable facts: (1) *a* and *b* were written by the same man; (2) the papyri come from the same roll.

These facts are essential for the forming of a hypothesis that has gained acceptance—that *a* and *b* come from one and the same column. For that more evidence is needed, and it probably does not exist. From the head of a column comes *a*, from the foot of a column comes *b*; but they do not meet. There is said to be a "gap" between their texts. Its size is not stated, which indicates a lack of contact also in the blank spaces between this and the adjacent columns. I believe that much of the difficulty set forth by Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, pp. 97 ff., is produced by this hypothesis. I shall confine myself to *a*, using *b* only as I would use any other fragment of Sappho.

I shall discuss first the metre, postponing for a short time remarks on the changes needed to produce it.

Paul Maas, in Gercke u. Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertums-wissenschaft*, I³, 7, p. 15, mentions as "noch unbenannt" a Sapphic verse: xx - - - - -; Dale mentions it, *C. Q.*, XLIV (1950), p. 139; Page, *op. cit.*, p. 321, includes it as (3) of his miscellaneous metres, citing Sappho 130, 131. I believe it occurred as lines 1-7 of *a*; and suggest that they be read:

¹ Hereafter abbreviated LP.

² Wilhelm Schubart had told him of its existence, but did not believe that it had anything in common with *b* (*Phil.*, XCIII, p. 277, n. 2).

Sappho, Fr. 98 a

1. . .].θος· ἀ δέ μ' ἐγέννα[τ' ἔφα πάλαι
 σ]φᾶς ἐπ' ἀλικίας μέγ[αν ἔμμεναι
 κ]όσμον, αἶ τις ἔχη<σι> φόβα<ι>ς [κάλαις
 πορφύρῳ κατελιξαμέ[γαις πλόκῳι.
 5. ἔμμεναι μάλα τοῦτο δ[όκησι νῦν·
 ἀλλὰ ξανθοτέρα<ι>ς <τρίχας, αἶ κ'> ἔχη
 τὰς κόμας δαίδος, προ[φερεστάτα.

The only alternative to be considered is Page's suggestion (p. 99) that the passage is written in stanzas (scheme c. c. d.³) of the following metre:

xx - u u - u -
 xx - u u - u -
 xx - u u - u u - u -

Metrically we agree about d, that is, about lines 1, 4, 7. However in line 2 my addition of ἔμμεναι seems demanded by the meaning. Page attempts (p. 100) to make ἔμμεναι (in the first line of his third stanza) perform the functions which my addition does; but is evidently not pleased with the result. Consequently if the structure is strophic we must at least change the scheme of the stanza to d. c. d. A corollary is that line 5 must be lengthened, and a use found for the ἔμμεναι at its beginning. I have sought to do both. The remaining lines (3, 6) fit the metre suggested by Page, but line 3 lacks one short syllable of conforming to my suggestion.

Apart from obviously later passages my paper had reached pretty much its present form when I sent carbon copies to friends. Two have kindly told me that they find it difficult to accept my suggestion about the metre because of the amount of emendation it necessitates. I have considered carefully their objection, but cannot agree with it for two reasons: (1) The problem is not whether we can fix a permissible minimum of emendation beyond which no suggestion is worthy of consideration. The question is whether we have found, or can find, something better to suggest. (2) Emendations are not to be simply counted; they need also to be weighed.

In line 1 both friends object to my change of γαρμ (this papyrus uses no lection signs) to δέ μ'. Whether the change be

³ Letters chosen because *a* and *b* have just been used differently.

good or bad has no bearing on the merits of the two metrical patterns under discussion. They agree about the scansion of this line, and call for a short syllable at the point in question to correspond to the short syllables in lines 4 and 7, or as I should prefer to say, in all the other lines. One friend states his trouble: "though the two (words) may mean the same thing, surely it is uncommon for the one to be written in error for the other." I have no collection of relevant examples, but it took little time to find one. Cunliffe cites 8 etc. examples of this use of δέ from the *Iliad* and 5 etc. from the *Odyssey*. Only one of them, B [196]

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλῶν

shows variants. Ludwich reports: δέ Ω . . . δη C; γάρ DY^bH^bX; Leaf reports δέ: γάρ GP: δη Cant. Another example is Hesiod, *Works*, 526 where οὐ γάρ οἱ ἥλιος of the MSS was corrected to οὐδέ οἱ by Hermann, and accepted by Rzach.

The quantity of the material is small, but seems sufficient. It contains not a single example of a *blundering*⁴ interchange of the two words. I am prepared to go even farther than my friend and say that examples of such a thing must be most uncommon. Indeed I doubt if an example of it can be found. The two words are not enough alike in sound to cause their confusion, nor do their written symbols look alike enough. But B [196] shows that the two words can be interchanged *knowingly*, when a scribe fancies he has reason to do so. What happened in this example is quite easily understood. Incomplete knowledge of prosody led various scribes to fancy that what they saw in their models (δέ μέγας) was metrically defective, and that they could remove the offense by substituting γάρ for δέ. Their effort was as fruitful as may be expected of gilding refined gold.

In the Sappho passage a clear-cut decision cannot be reached so easily; partly because we are dependent on a *codex unicus*, partly because a delicate discrimination between shades of meaning is involved. Let us suppose that Sappho is revising her work; she sees seven lines of eleven syllables each. The first two syllables are *incipites* (≡), but eight of the remaining nine syllables correspond precisely, all having in all lines either long or short as the case may be. The ninth is a short syllable six

⁴ For definition of this term cf. my *Athetized Lines of the Iliad*, p. 9.

times, the remaining line has either δέ or γάρ. Which did Sappho choose? Since the range of δέ is extremely wide, cf. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, p. 169: "δέ is not infrequently used where the context admits, or even appears to demand γάρ," there is no reason for Sappho to break her metrical pattern, and write anything but δέ. We can easily understand what happens in the transmission of the text. Some scribe fancies the context actually demands γάρ, and writes it without regard to the metre; or a scribe sees a semantic gloss ὁ δέ, ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ and misinterprets it as an order for the correction of the text. Either will suit our needs.

Two notes before returning to the metrical pattern. The *scriptio continua* leaves us perfectly free choice in separating the next two words: I read μ' ἐγέννατ(ο) since I prefer to follow Sappho's treatment of the syllabic augment, rather than to imitate Alcaeus' treatment of this particular verb, his handling of the augment being different from hers.

I am grateful to Bruno Snell for his supplement ἔφα ποτά. My slight alteration is due to a wish to have a long syllable at the end of this line, as well as at the ends of the six other lines.

In line 2 my supplement ἔμμεναι now seems inevitable. One friend sees its merit, another withholds comment upon it. I have stated above its minimal consequences; I think we may now go farther and see it as indicating that any effort to find a strophic structure in these verses has very little likelihood of success. A possible difficulty is that we have no example of a lengthy poem composed in a repetition of this verse. Sappho 130 and 131 are each a distich; and even if the two are joined—a possibility considered in LP—we get only four verses. I am not greatly troubled by this, and none of my friends has raised it as an objection.

In line 3 the reading of the papyrus ἔχῃ must not be changed to ἔχῃη, as has very often been done to subjunctives of this type. History is clearly against such a change.

For the 3d singular subjunctive of thematic verbs the parent language had two forms. A typical example would be: **bherēt* > Vedic *bharāt*, and **bherēti* > Vedic *bharāti*. The first of these would appear in early Greek as φέρῃ but the analogy of ind. φέρει caused this to be changed to φέρῃη. Buck, *Gr. Dialects*,³ pp. 119 f., summarizes the outcome. The change has been made

in Attic-Ionic by the time of our earliest inscriptions and in the majority of the dialects. But!—there are scattering examples of $-\eta$ in a number of dialects; and—extremely important—it is the only form found in Arcadian. This is in agreement with Bechtel, *Gr. Dial.*, I, p. 367, where the extension of $-\eta$ to the σ -aorist, and to the aorist passive is noted. About Cyprus the two scholars disagree: Bechtel, *op. cit.*, p. 435, cites ἐξ ὀρύξε and λύσε as examples of $-\eta$, and, p. 288, speaks of subjunctives “auf $-\eta$, die auf Kypros und in Arkadien die Alleinherrschaft erlangt haben.” Buck, p. 120, seems to prefer reading these forms with (short) ϵ , while granting that this is “only a possibility.” The epos cannot testify, for while it quite probably had $-\eta$ in the Aeolic stage of its development, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have come to us through Ionia and Athens, and that means the substitution of $-\eta$ in our tradition. Compare also Schwyzler, *Gr. Gram.*, pp. 661, 791.

That should have checked the changing of $-\eta$ to $-\eta$; and now comes Dr. Hamm, *Gram. zu Sappho und Alkaios*, pp. 165 f. with an observation that should put an end to all hesitation. When we have papyrus evidence,⁵ it points very strongly to $-\eta$ especially as four times when the scribe has slipped into the $-\eta$ form [the one he used in daily life] he has corrected himself. Quoters naturally would give $-\eta$ s or $-\eta$.

The parent language had beside the type $*bherē-t$ also $*bherē-ti$ > Vedic $bharāti$. In Greek no trace of the latter has been left except in the epos, where it would appear in the Aeolic stage as $\phiέρησι$, altered to $\phiέρησι$ by Ionic poets, and then passed on to us. Compare Wackernagel, *K.Z.*, XXXIII (1895), pp. 50 f. = *Kl. Schriften*, pp. 811 f. In the *Iliad* such forms appear in the oldest stratum (e. g. ἐθέλῃσι A 408) and a long list is given by Chantraine, *Gram. Hom.*, I, p. 461 without aiming at completeness. There would be no reason to doubt that it may have survived to some extent in the closely related dialect of Lesbos, and I suggest that for the sake of the metre $\xi\chi\eta\langle\sigma\rangle$ be here read.

The objection to be expected—no form of this type is found in the extensive fragments of the Lesbians—is made, but I cannot weight it heavily. A new poem may introduce new features

⁵ Dr. Hamm has included the 2d pers. $-\eta$ s, which it seemed to me unnecessary to mention above.

of language. Compare in our papyrus *ἐριθαλέων* (a 9), the first representative of a large number of adjectival compounds with *ἐρι-*; also a word hitherto unattested *μιτράναν* (a 10), *μιτράν<αν>* (b 3). In a 3 the real question is: can a better suggestion than *ἔχη<σι>* be found to fill the metrical gap? I am ready to welcome one with open arms.

Against the second supplement proposed by Page in line 4: *κατελιξαμέ[γαις πλόκωι*, no valid objection can be made. At first blush it seems strange, because we, members of the English-speaking peoples, and many who have other languages as their native speech, find it almost incredible that there could be a language in whose verb a sharp contrast, active: passive, was lacking.

Long ago Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, paragraph 528 (2d ed., 1889⁶) said: "Voice. There are (as in Greek) two voices, active and middle, distinguished by a difference in the personal endings." In 1891 Monro, *Grammar of the Homeric Dialect*, p. 9, said: "Greek has no Passive endings distinct from those of the Active and Middle: it is desirable therefore to speak, not of Passive forms, but of the Passive meaning or use of a form." Yet in 1915 Herbert Weir Smyth in his most excellent *Greek Grammar for Schools and Colleges*, p. 90, declares: "There are three voices: active, middle, and passive."

It may seem at first that Smyth is flatly contradicting his predecessors; but that is not the best judgment of the situation. Each of the three is chiefly interested in one phase of Greek—Proto-Hellenic, Homeric, Attic—and is content to trust his readers to assume that his sweeping statement is meant to apply only to that phase. It is a dangerous procedure.

In the second edition (1926) of his *Vorlesungen über Syntax* (I, pp. 119-49⁷) Wackernagel gives a beautiful sketch of the development of passive forms from certain I.E. germs. In 1950 in his revision of the second volume of Schwyzler's *Griechische Grammatik*, Debrunner added many details of Greek usage and copious bibliographic information. Compare the section on

⁶ The first edition 1879 is not at hand, but was probably the same.

⁷ The length of the reference will cause surprise, but there are many questions involved; pp. 135-43 treat of the passive problem especially.

Genus verbi in the widest sense, pp. 217-42, and especially subsection δ, *Passiv*, pp. 236-41.

Wackernagel points out, *op. cit.*, p. 123, that Greek is not a complete unit in the matter of voice *indem die Mundarten stark voneinander abweichen, und ferner im Laufe der Jahrhunderte grosse Umgestaltungen eingetreten sind*. More fully, p. 137: We usually say ἐποιεσάμην is middle, ἐποιήθην is passive. That is true in Attic of these and many other verbs. "*Aber es wäre unrichtig zu meinen, dass dieser Unterschied im Griechischen von Anfang an bestanden hätte . . . Zunächst ist festzustellen, dass im ältern und poetischen Griechisch auch die medialen Formen des Aorists Passivbedeutung haben konnten.*" To illustrate: Simonides said ἐπέεθ' ὁ κρύος, Aristophanes in alluding to this (*Clouds*, 1356) uses ἐπέχθη. Debrunner, p. 238 concludes: *Das Griechische hat auf keiner Entwicklungsstufe die scharfe Antithese Aktiv: Passiv erreicht. . . .*"

Page, p. 100, describes what he saw between τοῦτο in line 5 and the breaking of the papyrus. His conclusion is: "the only letter which could have left these traces is Δ." To δ[όκησι no objection can be made on the ground that the verb is not attested in the Lesbians. Derived forms δόκιμος, δοκίμων warrant an expectation that some form of the verb may turn up any day. Indeed a hopelessly mutilated papyrus (Alc. B 4.13) has]νον [...]δοκημ[of which Dr. Hamm, p. 146, § 231, says "δε[δοκημ[? (oder Praes.?) gehört vielleicht zu sonst nicht bei S. und A. belegtem δόκημι = hom. δοκέω (dafür δοκίμων)."

Νῦν is not merely a metrical stop-gap, but contrasts with πάλαι at the end of line 1. Line 5 is a recognition of the fact that an opinion held in olden times is still not obsolete. It may have been the one prevalent in the youth of Sappho's mother, or even a still older one in the now lost beginning of the ode which her opinion was quoted to refute.

If in line 6 one starts with what the scribe must have seen in his model, ἀλλὰ ξανθοτέρας, it is clear that the metre will not permit ἔχῃ to follow immediately. Neither word seems doubtful, and hence something has most probably been lost between them. This is all the more probable because this same scribe, when working on fragment b, marks with obeli the last three lines of its column to show that they are replacements for lines he

has skipped—practically an admission that he has been caught by some haplographic trap.

In attempting to fill the rest of the line, I noted first that $\xi\chi\gamma$ would fit easiest at the end, and that $\alpha\iota\kappa'$ would naturally precede it. Two syllables ($\upsilon\upsilon$) remain, and $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\upsilon$ seemed to meet well the requirements of the meaning.

Then I realized that in trying to restore the text, I had unintentionally built an explanation of the haplography. Ever since my article on "Zenodotus and the dehorning of the horned hind," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 40-4, cf. *Athetized Lines of the Iliad*, pp. 27-8, I have been familiar with the fact that K and IC were often confused, and I recalled that Vogliano, *Phil.*, XCIII, p. 278, had mentioned this fact in connection with the work of our scribe in fragment *b*. We can see now what happened. Our scribe copied $\alpha\lambda\lambda\grave{\alpha}\ \xi\alpha\nu\theta\omicron\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\iota\varsigma$; and when he looked back to his model, his eye fell on AIK which he took to be AIIC and continued with $\xi\chi\gamma$.

At this point I was aware that a suggestion of haplography on such a scale had little chance of being welcomed. Nevertheless I was strongly inclined to hold to it, because otherwise the build-up of the trap would be a most improbable coincidence. But I was also dissatisfied with $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\upsilon$, chiefly because it would stand in hiatus. Since I could think of no other supplement, I decided to let it stand, and minimize the metrical objection as much as possible.

My friends reacted much as expected; but one presented the objection to $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\upsilon$ so convincingly that I saw the necessity of abandoning it. I had almost resolved to print the line with *crucis* when $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}\chi\alpha\varsigma$ occurred to me. To that I see no objection, though I am ready to welcome anything better that may be suggested.

The meaning of the morpheme $\xi\alpha\nu\theta\omicron-$ cannot be pinpointed. That is an annoyance rather than a trouble. It is due to a flaw found in many—perhaps in all—languages. Bloomfield, *Language*, p. 140 says: "Languages mark off different parts [of the color spectrum] quite arbitrarily and without precise limits, in the meanings of such color-names as *violet*, *blue*, *green*, *yellow*, *orange*, *red*, and the color-names of different languages do not embrace the same gradations." Compare also p. 280. I shall use *yellow* as an equivalent without further ado.

The supplement *τρίχας* makes it impossible to emend *τας κομας* in the next line to an accusative plural. It must stay as genitive singular, in spite of the obvious temptation to "correct" it. Two ways of construing it seem possible: (1) to join it with *τρίχας* as a "Genitive of the Divided Whole"⁸ (cf. Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, § 872); (2) to take it with *ξανθοτέρας* 'more yellow than the κόμα of a torch.' The first involves a strange order of words, the second an assumption that κόμα has here some marginal meaning which points metaphorically at some portion of a torch.

Here—since *hair of a torch* is nonsense in English—we run headlong against a belief that was once firmly entrenched in our traditional lore about language. How erroneous it was is shown by Bloomfield, *Language*, p. 150: "We are likely to make the mistake of thinking that the transferred [metaphorical] meanings of our language are natural and even inevitable in human speech . . . while transferred meanings occur in all languages, the particular ones in any given language are by no means to be taken for granted. Neither in French nor in German can we speak of the *eye* of a needle or of an *ear* of grain. To speak of the *foot* of a mountain seems natural to any European, but it would be nonsense in Menomini and doubtless in many other languages."

It is then necessary to examine without prejudice the meaning of κόμα to see whether a suitable marginal [metaphoric] meaning would be available for Sappho.

The Lesbians can give us practically no help; for the only other occurrence of the word in their fragments is in *καλλίκομοί τε Μοῖσαι*, S. 128.

On turning to the epos I note that the singular of κόμη is used in the *Iliad* eight (A 197*, Γ 55, Σ 27*, X 406, Ψ 46, 146, 151, 152) out of nine times. This suggests that the central meaning of the word was at one time the shock of hair growing out of one's scalp—a thing of which no individual could have more than one. There is a slight movement from the center towards the margin, in that the designation of the whole shock comes to be used also of some part of it. This change could be

⁸ Partitive Genitive is for me a more familiar, but less attractive term.

classed with those which Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 151, calls narrowed meanings. He there draws attention to our greater readiness to accept forms in such meanings. I may add that those who try to find in Sappho some such meaning as 'hair more yellow than a torch,' are tacitly treating δαῖδος in this fashion. The central meaning is clear in Γ 55, where Hector speaks contemptuously of Paris' κόμη; the shifted meaning may be seen in A 197* ξανθῆς δὲ κόμης ἔλε Πηλεΐωνα where its presence could be described as due to a function of the genitive. The other six are more or less debatable, especially as the amount of hair shorn in mourning is none too clear.

The shift of meaning opens the way to the use of the plural in making reference to a number of parts, as in P 51 αἰματί οἱ δεύοντο κόμαι.

The *Odyssey* makes little use of the word. In § 198 we have κείρασθαί τε κόμην as in Ψ 46; in ζ 231 = ψ 158 we have the plural καὶ δὲ κάρητος | οὐλας ἦκε κόμας where Athene is beautifying her hero.

Finally there is in ψ 195 an out-and-out metaphor: καὶ τότ' ἔπειτ' ἀπέκοψα κόμην ταυνοφύλλου ἐλαίης where κόμη does not mean "hair" at all. Lawrence (*apud* W. B. Stanford) translates: "I then polled the olive's spreading top."

Κόμη also underlies some *bahuvrīhi* compounds: Θρήϊκες ἀκρόκομοι Δ 533*, cf. Leaf on B 542; ἡύκομος 18 examples in *Iliad* (including A 36*, II 860*), and but 3 in *Odyssey*. It is always used of a woman or a goddess. In both these words κόμη has its central meaning 'shock of hair.' In contrast the marginal meaning 'top' is found in: δρυὸς ὑψικόμοιο μ 357, ξ 328, τ 297; δρυσὶν ὑψικόμοισι Ξ 398, ι 186, δρῦς ὑψικόμους Ψ 118.

A statement that κόμη has a second, metaphoric (marginal) meaning *foliage* seems—from the point of view of a student of the history of language—to be going too fast. The only meaning attested in Homer and in Hesiod (*Shield* 376 δρῦες ὑψίκομοι) is *tree-top* from which *foliage* could develop later. The meaning 'tree-top' probably developed in a way similar to that which has led us to speak of the *beards* of goats and lions, because these beasts have tufts of hair where *beards* grow on men.⁹

⁹ I leave to others the problem of just where κόμη 'luminous tail of a comet' and κομήτης 'comet' fit into the history of this group of

There seems then little reason to question Sappho's τὰς κόμας δάιδος = 'the top of a torch'—the part of greatest interest because it is there that a torch blazes, when it is in use.

I gratefully acknowledge that Page's προ[φέρει πόλυ helped me to suggest προ[φερεστάτα in line 7.

To interpret the poem I must revert to its lost beginning. Here youth seems to have been clamoring for approval of headbands in their hairdo. They believed that headbands—the *dernier cri* from Lydia—were something new. This bit of ignorance Sappho refutes (lines 1-4) by quoting her mother. In line 5 she admits that an effort to bring back this outmoded style has been to some extent successful. But in flat contradiction to it (ἀλλὰ) she sets her own opinion: "if a girl has tresses more flaming than the top of a torch, she is supreme in beauty." It is an early enunciation of a long accepted belief: Beauty unadorned is adorned the most.

This closes the subject; for there is no need to irritate the opposition by decrying headbands. To pass the things in silence is condemnation enough.

In my paraphrase I was content to use a rather vague phrase 'supreme in beauty,' but it is now time to interpret the word chosen by Sappho. Women have rivalries as intense as those of men, and Sappho may well have spoken of the girl with flaming hair as Odysseus spoke of his bowmanship when bragging (θ 220-1) before the Phaeacians. He had just mentioned that before Troy Philoctetes used to beat him in competition and continues:

τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐμέ φημι πολὺ προφερέστατον¹⁰ εἶναι
ὅσσοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονί. . . .

words. The Homeric poems and Hesiod have incidental remarks about stars and constellations—their movements and their names—sufficient to indicate a considerable observation of the heavens at a still earlier time. It seems quite unlikely that comets should then have escaped notice; and there is no linguistic reason to be brought against the existence of the above-mentioned words at that time. Nevertheless, LSJ cite for these words in these meanings only Aristotle and Epicurus. The answer could be that our records lag centuries behind the usage of the language; but also that could be merely wishful thinking.

¹⁰ Our editions read προφερέστερον but Ludwig's commentary shows

"But of all other mortals who are now upon this earth I declare that I am the most excellent."¹¹ My suggestion *προφρεστάτα* praises the beauty of such girls by confidently presenting them as winners in contests of this sort; and at the same time glorifies the rivalries among women by speaking of them in a way hitherto used of the heroes of the nation.

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that his MSS gave weighty support to the superlative, and von der Mühl was able to add the testimony of a papyrus.

¹¹ Notice also how Hesiod picks out for praise one of a group of super-human beings *ἡ δὲ προφρεστάτη ἐστὶν ἀπασέων*, *Theog.*, 79 ~ 361.

CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR.

The recent rehabilitation of the annalistic portions of Livy¹ makes it advisable to give fresh consideration to the circumstances that preceded the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War and to endeavour to examine once again the causes of the renewed conflict between Rome and Macedon.

It is generally agreed that the initial cause of the clash was the aggressive activities of King Philip; the question over which issue is joined is whether the aggressions were confined to the Aegean, as A. H. McDonald, F. W. Walbank, and H. H. Scullard, following Holleaux, maintain,² or whether there were also aggressions in western Greece, as is held by J. P. V. D. Balsdon.³ On this point it may be said that Livy's account, though sometimes lacking in detail, presents a reasonably coherent and consistent picture which we should only be justified in rejecting on the presentation of rather more cogent evidence than has hitherto been adduced.

However that may be, attention has in recent years been concentrated mainly on the actions of Philip that led to the outbreak of war, and insufficient consideration has been given to the reactions of the Romans, which were no less important a contribution to the outbreak of hostilities. It is too frequently overlooked that a war is often caused not merely by the initial act of provocation, actual or alleged, on the part of the one combatant, but also (and sometimes to an even greater extent) by the reaction to this provocation by the other. For example, it can well be argued that the Second Punic War was caused by the reaction at Rome to the capture of Saguntum no less than by Hannibal's attack on that town,⁴ and at a later date an alleged

¹ J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Some Questions about Historical Writing in the 2nd Century B.C.," *C. Q.*, 1953, pp. 158-64; "Rome and Macedon 205-200 B.C.," *J. R. S.*, 1954, pp. 30-42.

² H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics, 220-150 B.C.* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 89-93; A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, "The Origins of the Second Macedonian War," *J. R. S.*, 1937; M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce, et les monarchies hellénistiques* (Paris, 1920), ch. 7 and 8.

³ Balsdon, *J. R. S.*, 1954.

⁴ Cf. F. R. Kramer, "Massilian Diplomacy before the Second Punic

provocation on the part of the Rhodians did not result in the outbreak of war because of the less belligerent temper of the Romans at that particular time. Thus, in considering the causes of the Second Macedonian War, it is necessary to examine not only the aggressive activities of Philip but also the current state of political feeling at Rome.

There were two factors that were of importance in determining the attitude of the Romans towards Macedon just before the start of the Second Macedonian War. In the first place, it is clear that at this time the leading members of the Roman nobility were fired by a very keen desire for winning military renown. Livy XXX contains several references to determined attempts on the part of successive consuls either to deprive Scipio of the glory of concluding the war in Africa or, failing that, to gain some share in it. There was the attempt of Servius Caepio to follow Hannibal across to Africa (24, 1); the attempt of the consuls of the year 202 B.C., M. Servilius Geminus and Ti. Claudius, to supersede Scipio (27, 1-5); and the similar attempt of Cn. Lentulus, consul of the following year (40, 7-16; 43, 1-4). An objection has been made to the authenticity of Claudius' attempt, on the ground that the People had prolonged Scipio's command until the conclusion of hostilities (XXX, 1, 10). However, as this attempt took place after the truce with the Carthaginians had been concluded, but before it had been violated (this is clear from XXX, 38, 6), it could have been argued by Claudius and his supporters that Scipio's command might now legally be terminated.

This desire for military glory is clearly shown by the bitter intrigues for the honour of a triumph that took place during these years. Polybius, writing a generation later about this epoch, stresses the importance of a triumph to a successful general as tangible evidence of his victory.⁵ During the twenty years following the outbreak of the Second Punic War, the right to celebrate a triumph was seldom granted and, when claimed, was bitterly contested. Up to the final victorious campaign in Africa there had been four noteworthy Roman successes: the capture of Syracuse by Marcellus, the conquest of Spain by

War," *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 1-26, for a detailed exposition of this argument; also Scullard, *Roman Politics*, pp. 39-44.

⁵ Polybius, VI, 15.

Scipio, the defeat of Hasdrubal on the Metaurus by Livius and Nero, and the defeat of Mago in North Italy by Cornelius Cethegus. Of these, only the victory at the Metaurus was rewarded with the honour of a full triumph: Marcellus was denied a triumph on the technical grounds that he was unable to withdraw his army from Sicily, and had to be content with an ovation. That Marcellus and his supporters felt that he had been unjustly treated is indicated by his celebration of an unofficial triumph on the Alban Hill.⁶ Scipio, on his return from Spain, put forward tentative feelers, but soon realised that it would be futile to make any formal claim. He would have been confronted by the two fatal technical objections that he was only a *privatus* and that he had not been able to withdraw his army.⁷ There are no indications that Cethegus took any steps towards claiming a triumph for his defeat of Mago. As regards the fourth case, the defeat of Hasdrubal, it is probable that the real reason why a full triumph was granted was that there were two claimants, each from a different political group. Had Livius tried to deny Nero his share in the triumph, Nero's supporters would have tilted the balance against Livius. As it was the combination of the two claimants and their supporters was strong enough to overpower any opposition. After the end of the Second Punic War the same bitter intrigues continued, as can be seen by the cases of L. Cornelius Lentulus, who was refused a triumph on the technical grounds that he was a *privatus* and had to be content with an ovation;⁸ of L. Manlius Acidinus, who was granted an ovation but prevented from holding it by the veto of a hostile tribune;⁹ and L. Furius Purpurio, the praetor, who, after a great deal of subtle political manoeuvring, was granted a triumph for a victory gained in the absence of the consul, C. Aurelius Cotta.¹⁰

It would seem, therefore, that there existed a strong desire for military glory among the senior members of the Senate, in particular among those men who would be likely to hold impor-

⁶ Livy, XXVI, 21.

⁷ These objections were fatal to the claims of Marcellus (Livy, XXVI, 21, 4) and L. Cornelius Lentulus (Livy, XXXI, 20).

⁸ Livy, XXXI, 20.

⁹ Livy, XXXII, 7.

¹⁰ Livy, XXXI, 47-9.

tant commands in the even- of war. As a result of the unbroken series of Roman victories in recent years, and the feeling that now the Roman forces had a definite superiority over any opposition likely to be encountered, the morale of the Roman commanders was very high, and it was only natural that they should use all their influence to gain an opportunity for displaying their prowess and satisfying their jealousy of Scipio by showing themselves to be his equals.¹¹

The other factor was a political one. Each of the three theatres of war outside Italy and Africa seems to have been the special interest of one of the three main party-groups. Spain, of course, had a close connection with the Scipionic group. Sicily, where Marcellus and Otacilius were in command by land and sea during the course of the main fighting there, seems to have had a connection with the Fabian group.¹² Similarly, Greece and Macedonia seem to have been the special interest of the Claudian group, to which the three commanders in that

¹¹ J. Carcopino, *L'impérialisme romain*, pp. 10, 67, concludes that the Second Macedonian War was the result of a desire for military glory among the Roman nobles, but maintains that Scipio was the leading spirit in this movement.

¹² In her review of Scullard's *Roman Politics* (*A. J. P.*, LXXIII [1952], p. 304), Lily Ross Taylor doubts whether Marcellus was a member of the Fabian group: "Marcellus . . . was powerful enough to have a strong party of his own." But military preeminence and spectacular successes in the field did not necessarily give political power too; they might even, as in the case of Scipio Africanus, militate against it. There is another point, too, that should be considered. Marcellus was undoubtedly an enemy of T. Manlius Torquatus, who made a bitter attack on him for his behaviour at Syracuse (*Liv.*, XXVI, 32). Now, in spite of Scullard's argument to the contrary, the evidence seems to indicate that Torquatus was an opponent rather than a supporter of Fabius. In particular, it is most probable, in view of his attitude after Cannae, that Torquatus was largely responsible for the Senate's refusal to ratify the exchange of prisoners that Fabius had negotiated in 217 B.C. (*Livy*, XXII, 23), thereby compelling Fabius to make good his bargain with Hannibal out of his own pocket. It is likely that the incident at the consular elections of 211 B.C. marks Fabius' revenge. On realizing that Manlius was likely to be elected, he may well have threatened to have his election annulled on the grounds of some religious technicality; then Torquatus would have decided to save his dignity by withdrawing on the plea of bad eyesight. If this is the case, and Fabius and Manlius were enemies, the grouping of Marcellus with the Fabian faction becomes very probable.

theatre, Valerius Laevinus, Sulpicius Galba, and Sempronius Tuditanus, all belonged. Moreover, the course of the war in Greece is very significant. Although the treaty between Philip V and Hannibal was known to the Romans by 215 B.C., the Roman-Aetolian alliance was not concluded until 212 or 211, a time when the Claudian group was in power. The war was pursued with some enterprise until 207 B.C., when the Romans ceased to make any further efforts,¹³ and in 205 B.C. the conflict was concluded by the Peace of Phoenice. It is important to note that in these two years the Scipionic group was once again in power, and the Claudian group was suffering a temporary eclipse. However, by the year 202 B.C., thanks to the co-operation of the Servilii, the Claudian group was once more back in power. Ti. Claudius was consul in 202 B.C., Aelius Paetus in 201 B.C., and Sulpicius Galba in 200 B.C. It is not surprising, therefore, that Rome should begin to take a greater interest in the affairs of Greece.¹⁴

A lot of stress has been placed on the alleged war-weariness of the Romans at this time, to support the argument that only a most vital and cogent reason could have induced the Senate to embark upon another war so soon. It is possible, however, that too much emphasis has been placed upon this factor. The greater part of Italy had been free from hostile activities for several years; the lack of any expression of relief at Rome on the evacuation of Hannibal and Mago¹⁵ indicates that life had, to a large extent, returned to normal. Two instalments of the loans made to the treasury in 210 B.C. had already been repaid, and although the expenses of the forthcoming war made it impossible to pay the third instalment that was now due, the creditors were ready to accept public land in lieu.¹⁶ The main objection on the part of the people to another war seems to have been an

¹³ It seems likely that although Sulpicius stayed in Greece until the arrival of P. Sempronius Tuditanus in 205 B.C. he was not in a position to accomplish anything. He seems to have withdrawn his fleet to Aegina shortly after the capture of Opus, and his ships may have suffered serious damage from bad weather during the unsuccessful attempt on Chalcis (Livy, XXVIII, 6).

¹⁴ Cf. Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 4: "the course of foreign policy may be charted through the particular circles in control in critical periods."

¹⁵ Livy, XXX, 21, 6-10.

¹⁶ Livy, XXXI, 13.

aversion to further military service, but the two legions that would be needed for a war against Macedon would not be likely to retard the process of demobilization, already begun, to any serious degree, while the promise that no veteran soldiers would be forced to serve against their will should have gone a long way to satisfy this objection.¹⁷ Finally, the Romans were still keyed up for war, and it is possible that many of them felt that, if a war with Macedon was at all likely, it would be better to embark on it at once.

It is true that the first proposal to declare war on Philip was rejected out of hand by the Comitia. This rejection, however, may have been instigated by Scipio, as H. H. Scullard suggests,¹⁸ as the tribune Baebius, whose vigorous attack on the proposal must have influenced the vote, belonged to a family that seems to have supported Scipio and his group fairly consistently. The motive that Scullard attributes to Scipio is a political one, that he was genuinely opposed to a brusque and immediate declaration of war and would have preferred the Macedonian problem to have been approached by diplomatic methods. However, it is not improbable that Scipio's opposition was due to a more personal motive: he may have wanted to deny his opponents the chance of winning military glory. There can be no doubt that he deeply resented the intrigues that had been carried on against him during the previous two years. The statements of Livy, that one of the considerations that induced Scipio to grant terms of peace after Zama was the prospect of being superseded, and that Scipio himself often blamed the intrigues of Claudius and Lentulus for his failure to end the war with the destruction of Carthage, are generally rejected as improbable.¹⁹ But the arguments advanced in favour of their rejection, if they prove anything, only prove that the Romans were wise in not destroying Carthage, and that the attempt to reduce a city so strong and well-fortified would be a difficult and dangerous undertaking. The evidence of Diodorus, Appian, and Livy²⁰ indicate that the

¹⁷ Livy, XXXI, 8.

¹⁸ Scullard, *Roman Politics*, pp. 86, 87.

¹⁹ Scullard, *Scipio Africanus* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 251-2. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, II, pp. 187-9.

²⁰ Livy, XXX, 42, 20; 41, 1; Appian, *Punica*, 57-65; Diodorus, XXVII, 13-18.

Romans were closer to insisting on the destruction of Carthage at this time than is now generally realised. There is a tendency to under-estimate the violence of the hatred that the Romans must have entertained towards their enemy, a hatred that was all the more implacable in that it was engendered by fear. The persecution of Hannibal and his memory, the constant harping on *Punica fides* in the historical tradition, and the subsequent determination to destroy Carthage barely 50 years later are all clear proof of the strength of the Roman feeling against Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War. As regards Scipio's own attitude, after the Carthaginians' treacherous violation of the truce, and the suspicions he must have felt that their only purpose in originally seeking the truce was to get time for Hannibal to return to Africa,²¹ it seems surprising that he should be willing to conclude the war by a negotiated peace, instead of insisting on the unconditional capitulation of Carthage. It is true that the city was strong and well-fortified; but, according to Appian,²² it was short of food, and there can be no doubt that it was suffering from violent internal dissensions. In these circumstances, if the city were to be closely besieged, there was an excellent chance that the peace party would gain the upper hand and surrender the city to the Romans, especially if they could be led to believe that Scipio and the Romans would spare Carthage once they had it completely at their mercy. However, Scipio must have clearly realised, after the attempts of Tiberius Claudius to supersede him, that if the siege was at all protracted, if it lasted on until the following spring without prospect of immediate success, there would be an odds-on chance of his being superseded by one of the consuls for 201 B. C.; he would never be left alone for as long as Marcellus had been when he was taking Syracuse. If his run of success was checked or interrupted, he would lose the support of the People and would have no defence against his enemies in the Senate. But even if, after weighing up the military considerations alone, Scipio had chosen not to attack Carthage, he must have resented the intrigues that had deprived him of a completely unfettered choice. This is not to belittle the greatness of Scipio; on the contrary, his true greatness will be better appreciated if it is realised that he

²¹ Cf. Livy, XXX, 23, 6-7.

²² Appian, *Punica*, 34, 38.

was only human, and that, like all the Romans of the middle and late Republic who aspired to military greatness, he had to be a politician.

The question now arises as to why the second proposal to declare war on Philip was carried without any opposition from Scipio. The answer to this may be found in Scipio's election as Censor in the following year, and his subsequent nomination by his colleague Aelius Paetus as Princeps Senatus, although there were two patrician ex-Censors senior to him.²³ These honours, though well-deserved, came at a time when Scipio's political influence was at a low ebb, and may well represent a compromise with his political opponents,²⁴ under which he withdrew his opposition to the Macedonian War, and they agreed not to frustrate his election as Censor²⁵ and, further, to afford recognition to his pre-eminent position by procuring his appointment as Princeps Senatus.

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²³ Cf. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, p. 97, n. 1. P. Licinius Crassus was also senior to him, but was a plebeian. It is possible that Cethegus was no longer friendly to Scipio, but had gone over with the Servilii, Livius Drusus, and the Lentuli, and was now aligned with the Claudian group.

²⁴ The basis of this compromise may have been a coalition with the Aelii. The combination with the Servilii and the other old supporters of Scipio may well have given rise to stresses within the Claudian group, and some families may have tended to break away out of personal hostility towards their new adherents.

²⁵ It seems that the College of Augurs was at this time controlled by Scipio's opponents. Cf. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, p. 80, n. 5.

TEXT OF THE SO-CALLED CONSTITUTION OF CHIOS
FROM THE FIRST HALF OF THE
SIXTH CENTURY B. C.

The first document in M. N. Tod's collection of *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1938) is the so-called Constitution of Chios. His text like that of Cauer-Schwyzler 687 rests on the *editio princeps* of Wilamowitz.¹ Recently, however, Miss Jeffery² reexamined the stone in the Archaeological Museum at Constantinople and was able to improve the readings and to propose with convincing arguments an arrangement of the four sides of the text in a somewhat new order. She has lowered the date of the inscription to 575-550 B. C., but she has by no means reduced its recognized importance.

The inscription, engraved *boustrophedon*, seems to have begun on another block. There are no formulas to indicate surely the length of lacunas, but adopting Miss Jeffery's hesitantly offered but attractive restoration ἐ[ξέτασσήν in line 6 and supplying part of one word in line 7, we have a minimum restoration of this gap and a criterion for estimating the extent of the lacunas between other lines.


The following text includes restorations of my own which are made according to sense on the assumption that less is lost than Miss Jeffery believed.

Face A

[τῶν ἱερῶν ἐν]κα: τῆς Ἰστῆς δῆμο
ρήτρας: φυλάσσω[ν: - - - - -]

¹ U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Nordionische Steine," *Abh. Ak. Wiss. Berlin*, 1909, pp. 64-71 (photographs). See also E. Nachmanson, "Epigraphisch-grammatische Bemerkungen: Zur Kyrbis von Chios," *Eranos*, XIII (1913), pp. 91-9 and *Historische griechische Inschriften* (Bonn, 1913), pp. 9-10; Santo Mazzarino, *Fra Oriente e Occidente* (Florence, 1947), pp. 233-41; J. A. O. Larsen, "The Origin and Significance of the Counting of Votes," *C.P.*, XLIV (1949), pp. 170-2; V. Ehrenberg, "Origins of Democracy," *Historia*, I (1950), p. 538.

² L. H. Jeffery, "The Courts of Justice in Archaic Chios," *Annual of the British School at Athens*, LI (1956, published in 1958), pp. 157-67 (with drawing and photographs).



- [---]ον: ἡ (ἐ)ρεῖ: ἡμ μὲν δημαρ-
 4 χῶν: ἡ βασιλεύων: δεκάσ[ηι: τὰπιδέ]-
 [κατα τῇ]s Ἰστίης ἀποδότω: δημα-
 ρχέων: ἐξπρήξαι: τὸν ἐ[ξεταστῇ]-
 [ν ἔμπροσθ]εν δῆμο κεκλημένον.
 8 ἀλοῖαι, τιμὴ διπλησ[ίη· ἐξ ἐρήμο]
 [δ' ἐξπρήσσε]ν ὅσῃν παρ' ἀλοιῶ[ν]

Face B

- [βολ]ῆν δ' ἡ (ἐ)κκληῖτος δι[κᾶσει δημο]-
 [σίην εἶναι:] ἦν δὲ ἀδικῆται: παρὰ
 12 δημάρχῳ: στατῆρ[ας---τιθέτω καὶ]

Face C

- ἐκκαλέσθω ἐς
 βολῆν τὴν δημ-
 οσίην· τῇι τρίτῃ
 16 ἐξ Ἑβδομαίων
 βολῇ ἀγερέσθ-
 ω ἡ δημοσίη ἐ-
 πιθώιος λεκτ-
 20 ἡ πεντήγοντ' ἀπ-
 ὸ φυλῆς· τὰ τ' ἄλ[λ]-
 [α] πρησέτω τὰ δῆ-
 μο καὶ δικά[s ὀ]-
 24 [φύ]σαι ἀν ἔκκλ-
 ηται γένων[τ]-
 [αι] τῷ μηνὸς π-
 άσας ἐπι[...]
 28 [...]σεερ[...]

Face D

- [--- 'A]ρτεμισιώνος
 30 [---]ων ὄρκια ἐπι-
 ταμνέτω ὧ[μνέτω]
 [ἐν τοῖς β]ᾶσιλευσιν νυ

A 1 Oliver. 2 Wilamowitz. 3 ἡ (ἐ)ρεῖ Oliver; ἡμ μὲν Jeffery. 4-5
 δεκάσ[ηι: τὰπιδέ] κατα Oliver, δεκάσ[θῇι Jeffery, δέκα [στατῆρας --- τ]ῆς

Wilamowitz, τῷ ἱερεῖ Nachmanson, — στατήρας ἱεροῦς W. G. Forrest apud Jeffery. 6 ἐξεταστήν Jeffery. 7 ἐμπροσθεν Oliver. 8 ἀλοῖ Wilamowitz, ἀλοῖαι τιμὴ διπλησ[ι]ν Jeffery; ἀλοῖαι et ἐξ ἐρήμο Oliver. 9]ν ὄσσην παραλοιω[.] Jeffery, cetera Oliver.

B 10-11 βολ[ήν] δ' ἡ (ἐ)κκλήτος δι[κάζει δημο[σίην εἶναι] Oliver, ἡκκλητος, δ[ικάζει] Wilamowitz, δι[κῆ] Jeffery. C 9-14 Wilamowitz. D 29 Jeffery. 31 Jeffery. 32 ἐν τοῖς Oliver; β[ασιλευσιν] Wilamowitz.

The text from lines 1 to 7 is bound together, I think, by the two references to Hestia (the goddess rather than the hearth). If the official whom Miss Jeffery hesitantly but attractively identifies with the *exetastes* (not the only possibility but an official actually attested in neighboring cities) is to collect something from the magistrates, the subject should be the property of Hestia. Just as in the fourth century the property of Athena at Athens had to be handed over by one board of treasurers to another in the presence of the 500 councillors, so property of Hestia at Chios might well be handed over in the presence of a large assembly.

The ending of the first extant word suggests a phrase like τῶν ἱερῶν (or χρημάτων) ἕνεκα, because we probably need a summarizing formula or rubric. Then the title of the *exetastes* or *eklogeus* or *eklogistes* (whatever will be restored in line 6) can probably be imagined also in line 2, to be followed, chiefly in line 3, by a verb indicating a ruling on something as belonging to Hestia, e. g. ἐξεταστής κ[α]ρτέω τι ἱερ[όν]. Miss Jeffery has already cited *Ath. Pol.*, 3, 4 to the effect that the thesmothetes were established ὅπως ἀναγράψαντες τὰ θέσμινα φυλάττωσι πρὸς τὴν τῶν [.....] τῶν κρίσιν. The sentence of an early Athenian archon was not a judgment but an order on the basis of an acknowledged principle or of a written law.³

In line 3 the letters HPEI cannot be interpreted as ἥρει, because the iota could not in this period be dropped in the first syllable. As the text in line 10 contracts ἡ (ἐ)κκλήτος, so the text in line 3 seems to contract ἡ (ἐ)ρεῖ. The antecedent of the relative pronoun ἡ is supplied from δήμο ῥήτρας. The singular of the relative pronoun is here used because the relative clause refers to each individual rhetra. A parallel occurs in the description of Xerxes' bridge over the Hellespont with its flaxen and papyrus

³ H. J. Wolff, "The Origin of Judicial Litigation among the Greeks," *Traditio*, IV (1946), pp. 31-87.

cables, where Herodotus, VII, 36, 3 says κατὰ λόγον δὲ ἐμβριθέστερα ἦν τὰ λίνα, τοῦ τάλαντον ὁ πῆχυς εἶλκε. The subject of lines 1-3 seems to be the claim of the goddess to property confiscated for certain crimes and public debts.

In line 4 Miss Jeffery thinks she sees a trace of a sigma, which suggests to her the restoration δεκασ[θῆι. This produces a text which mentions bribery of an official, calls for restitution before conviction, and which leaves the corrupt official still in office. The interpretation seems impossible from the standpoint of public law. If the sigma which Miss Jeffery dots must be accepted, so that the restoration δεκα[τεύσει: τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἰστίνης which had occurred to me becomes impossible, I should then restore the active voice δεκάσ[ηι and give to the verb the etymologically close but hitherto unattested meaning "levy a tithe."

In line 8 the *poena dupli*, the usual penalty in cases of theft and embezzlement,⁴ implies conviction, and therefore the new word read by Miss Jeffery, αλοιαι, cannot mean "assaults" but must mean "convictions." This word, itself from the stem of ἀλίσκομαι, may be compared with the phrase ἀλούσα δίκη which in Attic Greek means "conviction." The cases which carry the same penalty as convictions can only be those lost by default.

Face A, accordingly, contains two sections which may perhaps be freely translated as follows:

As for property sacred to Hestia, (the official) shall constantly observe rhetras of the demos and shall give an order that such and such be sacred by separately citing the rhetra which will so declare. If a demarch or basileus levies a tithe, he shall hand over, while he is in office, what Hestia gets. The auditor shall exact it in the presence of a convocation of the demos.

Convictions: *poena dupli*. After a case lost by default, always exact a penalty as large as that which arises from convictions.

Faces B, C, and D contain a third section.

Lines 10-12 have been so arranged by Miss Jeffery, whereas her predecessors read them in reverse order. In line 10, however, the old accentuation ἡκκλητος no longer is possible, nor are the old restorations. My new restorations confirm Miss Jeffery's

⁴ See R. Düll, "Zum vielfachen Wertersatz im antiken Recht," *Scritti in onore di Contardo Ferrini pubblicati in occasione della sua beatificazione*, III (= *Pubblicazioni dell'Università del Sacro Cuore*, N. S. XXIII [Milan, 1948]), pp. 211-30.

arrangement. The court to hear appeals will not be the old aristocratic council but a new council chosen from the demos. How it will be chosen is specified in lines 19-21 below; hence this seems to be the first establishment of the new council. In line 12 the reference is to court dues such as the Athenians called *παρόρασις* (*Ath. Pol.*, 59, 3) or *τὰ πρῶτα*.

The council which will judge appeals shall be a council from the demos. And in case one claims that an unjust sentence has been given, he shall deposit so many staters with the demarch and shall appeal to the council which is from the demos. On the third day after the Hebdomaia there shall regularly be a gathering of this council which represents the demos, has power to impose fines and is to be empaneled by a selection of fifty men from each tribe. It shall transact the other business of the demos and particularly decide all cases of the month which may occur as appeals.

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THE BLINDING, *OEDIPUS TYRANNUS*, 1271-4.

An old and famous incident in the legend of Oedipus was the blinding of the king.¹ In Sophocles' play the maiming occurs offstage and is narrated in a splendid messenger speech (1237-85) which, if delivered by a skilled actor, never fails to horrify an audience.² Oddly—for the play has been much discussed and

¹ Not known to Homer (Schol. on *Od.*, XI, 275), the blinding appeared in the *Thebaid* and *Oidipodeia* and was popularized by the three dramatists. For a detailed discussion of this part of the saga (there were two versions, self-blinding and blinding by Polybus) see Höfer in Roscher, *Lex. Myth.*, III, sec. 1, p. 730, lines 12 ff. and further Jacoby on *F. Gr. Hist.*, 4 F 97.

² In *Thamyras* I suggest that the actual blinding was done on stage. There is no other way to explain the famous dual-mask (for the mask see: A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, I [Cambridge, 1917], pp. 177-8). If the blinding occurred offstage, the usual blind mask could have been substituted, as in *Oedipus*, for the mask worn earlier in the action. For the technique compare *Lear* iii. 7, where Shakespeare has the eyes of Gloucester put out on stage. P. J. Enk has recently shown in a delightful monograph that in contrast to general opinion on the matter Seneca avoids such atrocities on the stage. See P. J. Enk, "Roman Tragedy," *Neophilologus*, 1957, p. 307.

often edited—there is nothing like unanimity on the interpretation of Oedipus' cry of despair at the moment of self-blinding. Therefore, an analysis of the lines will not be out of place. First there is need to provide a painfully literal translation of *O.T.*, 1271-4, the crucial verses. The text of Pearson, which does not differ from that of Jebb, has been adopted. The difficulties are not concerned with the establishment of the text but with its meaning. "Saying in such wise, that they would not see her nor such things as she was wont to experience nor what sort of evils she was wont to do but in darkness for the rest [of time] whom on the one hand it was not needful they would see, whom on the other hand they were in the habit of desiring they would not know."

The text requires exegesis. At 1271 the pronoun *τοιαῦθ'* does not refer to what goes before but is used adverbially, *in such wise*.³ *ὁθούνεκ'* represents *ὅτι*. See *L.S.J.*, s. v. II, who compare *O.C.*, 944 and translate *that*. The future optative of *oratio obliqua* replaces the future indicative of direct speech.⁴ The first great difficulty is the meaning of the personal pronoun *νῦν* which may be translated *him*, *her*, or *them*. Ellendt-Genthe (p. 330A, line 38) and Jebb on *O.T.*, 1271 vote for *him*. Earle on 1271-2 (p. 278) would choose the neuter plural, sufferings and deeds, and construe as "only the proleptic object to *ᾤψοιντο*." I propose a fresh suggestion that the pronoun should be translated *her* and refers to Iocaste. This becomes evident when one realizes that *οὐκ ᾤψοιντό νῦν* of 1271 repeats with the eyes of Oedipus replacing Oedipus by synecdoche as subject *ὥς ὀρᾷ νῦν* of just six verses earlier. It is clear that the *νῦν* of 1265 can refer only to Iocaste ("... when Oedipus saw Iocaste . . ."). To repeat within twenty-five seconds of playing time an identical expression but with no warning to have intended the pronoun *νῦν* to change its gender would provide too sudden and subtle an ambiguity for an audience to grasp. Further it is the sight of Iocaste that precipitates the maiming, not the sight of himself. For the first time Oedipus has seen Iocaste as mother-wife.⁵ In a state of

³ See Ellendt-Genthe, *Lexicon Sophocleum* (Berlin, 1872), p. 738B, lines 54 ff. and *L.S.J.*, s. v. 6 from whom the translation is taken.

⁴ See Kühner-Gerth, I, 183, who discuss this verse.

⁵ I can not believe with S. M. Adams, *Sophocles the Playwright* (Toronto, 1957), p. 103, that *O.T.*, 1183 proves Oedipus has decided on

frenzy and shock he tears the brooches from the corpse and plunges them into his eyeballs crying: "You shall not see her" and not the rather anticlimactic and foolish "You shall not see me." They are not looking at him to start. They are looking at *her* and shall never do so again.

To translate *viv her* entails an important consequence. The subjects of the subordinate verbs in 1272 can only be Iocaste and not Oedipus as has been generally held. The two clauses are correlative with *viv* and all three serve as objects of *δψοιτρο* as is shown by the neatly and thrice repeated negative *οὐκ . . . οὐθ' . . . οὐθ'.* The eyes of Oedipus shall not see Iocaste nor what she has suffered nor what she has done. The sufferings are mentioned first; for Oedipus has been in large part the cause of them. It is guilt that makes him unable to view her sufferings. Next comes "you shall not see the evil she has wrought." The evil she has done is quite simply and concretely the violence she has done herself, the hanging. There is no need to hunt earlier possible evils such as the exposure of the child on Cithaeron; for they are dramatically implausible if not logically impossible. *ἐπασχεν* as well may be restricted to the hanging; but it is difficult, if not perverse, to separate the physical suffering from the mental anguish that provided the motivation for the suicide.

Next is the enigmatic couplet 1273-4. There is need to determine the identity of the two parties. I shall first criticize the views of certain earlier investigators and then propose a new solution. Jebb on *O. T.*, 1271 believes the division is: (A) Iocaste and Oedipus' children and (B) Oedipus' parents, Laius and Iocaste. The weakness of this division is that Iocaste appears in both groups which then are not mutually exclusive as the antithesis would strongly suggest.

Louis Roussel on 1272 (p. 425) divides: (A) the Thebans and (B) the children; but confesses "le passage demeure obscur." One wonders why at this moment Oedipus should think of the Thebans; and further why in the world "he would see them for the rest of time in darkness." He had been their benefactor; and the chorus express pity not anger at their king's plight.

the blinding before his exit. If anything the verse would suggest, at this moment in the action, thoughts of suicide.

The only harm that he had caused them, and that vicariously and unintentionally, was the plague; and the plague is not a major issue in the drama. The device, taken from *Iliad* I, serves to start off the plot; and, but for an occasional phrase, is forgotten after the prologue.⁶ Roussel's further contention that (B) is the children is more reasonable. He ought to have referred to verses 1375 ff. where the similar language may be construed as a linguistic support for his contention—not a dramatic one for the audience will not have yet heard the lines. There are, however, serious difficulties to this view. First the situation of the remark renders a reference to the children implausible. Oedipus is in the presence of his mother-wife and at the moment there is no reason why his children should be in mind. There is no mention in the context of his children and it is optimistic to consider that a spectator could reasonably relate the line to them.⁷ There is also the verb ἐχρηζεν. What reason would there be for Oedipus to *desire* the children? He was able to see them. He desired those whom he had *not yet* met.

M. L. Earle on 1273 f. divides: (A) Iocaste and (B) "Laius at the crossways." The relative pronouns, however, are plural and one would not immediately expect them to refer to single persons. It is true that in tragic poetry such a free use of number would by no means be impossible but why would Sophocles create a further ambiguity in a passage already uncomfortably enigmatic? It is difficult to discern a reason for Earle's (B). Why for the rest of time would Oedipus not know "Laius at the crossways"? Rather he would know all too keenly that it *was* Laius whom he slew at the crossways.

There is one final suggestion that must be discussed. Schneidewin-Nauck-Bruhn¹⁰ in a note on 1271 ff. that is attributed to a suggestion made by Wilamowitz divide: (A) Oedipus' father and mother and (B) the children. Again the children can not be the second group. Wilamowitz is correct that the first group

⁶ The contention of Schmid-Stählin, I, sec. 2, p. 365, n. 3, that after the prologue the plague is referred to only at vv. 635-6 is not accurate. See the careful calculations of P. W. Harsh, *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), p. 247, n. 10.

⁷ The Messenger did refer to the children in vv. 1250, 1257. And they have been alluded to earlier in the action at vv. 261, 425, 457, 791, and 928.

comprises the parents of Oedipus. The suggestion, however, must have further elaboration.

If a distinction is to be made between the two groups, I offer a suggestion. The people whom the king shall see for the rest of time in the darkness of blindness are, as Wilamowitz realized, his father and mother. More expressly they are Laius, the father whom he murdered and whose wife he married, and Iocaste, the mother whom he violated and drove to suicide. For the rest of his life these spectres shall vividly haunt his conscience.⁸ The second group, the persons "whom he desired but his eyes will not know" comprises his parents as they could have been under normal circumstances, *sc.* as he had once naively considered Polybus and Merope to be (see 1394 ff.). Never will he know such parents but will see only spectres of the first group, the *μνήμη κακῶν* of 1318 (cf. 1371 ff.).

If we must carefully specify the division, this latter one entails the least difficulties. But the very variety of solutions offered by divers and thoughtful readers emphasizes the futility of such specification. The strength of the two verses is rhetorical, not logical. Their essence is their inclusiveness. When an actor recites: "All the *world's* a stage" we ought not to list the countries. The appeal is just in its inclusiveness. And remember the two verses take but some five seconds to say. There is no prolonged pause after and the audience can not stop and scrutinize them; for the actor rushes on with his narrative and the breathless spectator must fasten his attention on the words that are being spoken, listening carefully, never able to rest and think on what has gone before.

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⁸ Schneidewin-Nauck, before the revision of Ewald Bruhn, deleted all these verses as a later interpolation because *inter alia* it is "illogical to say a blindman sees in darkness—owls do—a blindman sees darkness." Bruhn wisely discards the views of his predecessors and retains the lines.

TERENCE, *ANDRIA*, 560-5:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR H. L. LEVY.

SI. . . . spero consuetudine et
coniugio liberali deuinctum, Chreme,
dehinc facile ex illis sese emersurum malis.
CH. Tibi ita hoc uidetur; at ego non posse arbitror
neque illum hanc perpetuo habere neque me perpeti.
SI. Qui scis ergo istuc, nisi periculum feceris?

I. By being more explicit in my explanation of the foregoing passage¹ I could have forestalled some of the objections raised by Professor Levy.²

My translation of Chremes' speech, "But I think it's no go—that he can't be faithful to her [Philumena] and that I can't stand for it," embodies making *illum* the subject of *habere* and *hanc* the object of this infinitive. Thus Levy's detailed note on the use of *habeo* concerning the relation of a man and a woman³ contains nothing detrimental to my interpretation.

In yet another matter I was merely too sparing of words. Levy speaks of "Sturtevant's interpretation, which Murphy rejects on the sole ground of its non-conformity with his negative pattern."⁴ I actually wrote that Sturtevant's interpretation "would be plausible had we no surer guide in Terentian usage itself."⁵ Levy and I reject this interpretation for the same reason, that there is practically no support for it in Latin usage. But while Levy states this objection,⁶ I merely imply it.

II. Levy's criticisms of my treatment of Terence's Latinity I consider unjustified. Of the epexegetic or afterthought type of what I call pattern *neque*, the only type Terence uses, I found in Terence four instances whose meaning presented no problem to anyone, but whose epexegetic character had apparently gone unnoticed. Three moot Terentian passages, including the one under discussion, seemed clearly to possess this same epexegetic

¹ *C. W.*, XLVIII (1954-55), pp. 203-5. References concerning my treatment of this passage will be to this article.

² *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), pp. 173-8. References concerning Professor Levy's views will be to this article.

³ P. 175, n. 10.

⁵ P. 204, n. 2.

⁴ P. 176.

⁶ Pp. 176 f.

character, and I therefore included them in the same category as the four passages that had puzzled no one. Apparently instead of saying, "In passages whose syntax is clear he [Terence] uses this type four times,"⁷ I should have spoken of four "passages whose syntax is *admittedly* clear": there had been general agreement on only four of the passages, but I myself was confident that my approach had clarified the other three, and that other readers who considered the evidence would agree. Therefore, if I show that my interpretation of *Andria*, 560-5, involves no real difficulties of meaning, I shall to that extent have cleared myself of Levy's charge of extrapolation,⁸ and shall be justified in insisting that my interpretations of *Adelphoe*, 291 f., and *Eunuchus*, 722, also be judged on the basis of meaning.

Levy doubts that I have established the absolute nature of *non posse* in our main passage and, in consequence, the epexegetic character of the pattern it introduces.⁹ Let us consider verses 302-3 of the *Phormio*, in which *non potest* is used absolutely by Demipho to denounce his son's marrying a pauper: *Non, non sic futurumst, non potest! / Egon illam cum illo ut patiar nuptam unum diem!* J. Sargeaunt translates thus in the Loeb edition: "It shan't be, it shan't be, it's impossible. What, I let her live with him a single day?" The situations in the passages from the *Phormio* and the *Andria* are comparable with each other: in both passages a father uses a form of absolute *non posse* in objecting to his child's marriage; in the *Phormio* a rhetorical question is used to explain *non potest*, while in the *Andria* infinitives used with disjunctive *neque*'s itemize *non posse*. Levy feels that I blow hot and cold by saying first that *non posse* in the passage from the *Andria* is absolute and then that it is not absolute "in the strictest sense, for its subjects and complementary infinitives follow it."¹⁰ But though I felt obliged to make this quoted concession with reference to the use of *non posse* in the clause as a whole, *non posse* is absolute in the sentence formally complete before the addition of the afterthought: *at ego non posse arbitror* "But I think it's no go."

H. Haffter has called attention to Terence's significant use of the subjective elements of colloquial speech:¹¹ whereas Plautus

⁷ P. 203.

⁹ P. 176, including n. 12.

⁸ P. 174.

¹⁰ Murphy, p. 204, n. 4.

¹¹ *Museum Helveticum*, X (1953), pp. 92-6.

uses *age*, *edepol*, and obtrusive curses as stage furniture, Terence reproduces the speech habits of real life through the accusative of exclamation; the omission of verbs of being, saying, going, and doing; and the use of such particles as *hm* and *au*. I have elsewhere demonstrated the likelihood that the epexegetic type of what I call pattern *neque* developed from the pleonastic negation of early Latin as a natural way of expressing an afterthought, and that pattern *neque* is found with significant frequency in colloquial contexts down to the end of the Augustan Age.¹² And so it seems that in our passage from the *Andria* the interpretation I defend presents the Terentian flavor of colloquial speech in contrast to the unobjectionable but neutral Latinity embodied in Levy's proposal.

III. The subject changes to matters of meaning and dramatic appropriateness. The translation of F. O. Copley preserves an interpretation which, as a whole, both Levy and I reject: "he'll easily pull himself out of the bad habits he's developed. CH. That's what you think. But I don't think he can—and he can't go on keeping that woman, nor would I stand for it."¹³ Levy objects to "the inconcinnity of the meanings assigned to *posse* in the three semantic roles which in this view the word would have to play";¹⁴ and in favor of my interpretation he can only say that it "avoids *some* [italics mine] of the mental gymnastics"¹⁵ which attend the use of *posse* in three different senses.

It is true that I refer *non posse* first to Pamphilus' moral weakness and then to Chremes' inability to compromise with that weakness; but I perform no mental gymnastics other than those necessary for survival in the normal traffic of life. We are here not dealing with an exact philosophical definition but rather with informal conversation, in which one kind of ability can and often does suggest another. Let us consider a passage from one of Cicero's letters to Cassius written in 46 B. C.: *longior autem* [sc. *epistula*] *πλύαρον aliquem habuisset; nam σπουδάζειν sine periculo uix possumus. 'Ridere igitur,' inquires, 'possumus?' Non me hercule facillime; uerum tamen aliam aberrationem a*

¹² A. J. P., LXXVII (1956), pp. 404-6; and LXXIX (1958), pp. 46 f. and 49 f.

¹³ Tr. of *And.* (New York, 1949), p. 30.

¹⁴ P. 174.

¹⁵ P. 176.

molestiis nullam habemus.¹⁶ The inability mentioned in *sine periculo uix possumus* in the first sentence is that of speaking one's mind without the risk of reprisals from the Triumvirs. But in the last sentence, *Non me hercule facillime* [sc. *ridere possumus*] refers to inability to summon enough cheerfulness to jest. A natural transition from one kind of ability to another has taken place, similar to that found in the passage under discussion.

Levy's main objection to the interpretation of the Terentian passage I defend is that it "brings *me perpeti* into strong focus before Simo's *istuc*, and therefore again has him asking, 'How do you know you can't stand for it if you don't try?'"¹⁷ In order to avoid this difficulty in his own interpretation, Levy places a full stop after *arbitror*, making the *non posse* refer to Pamphilus' extricating himself from his troubles mentioned in the preceding verses; then by placing points of suspension after *perpeti* he justifies inferring that Simo "has stopped listening after *arbitror*" since his "attention has been riveted by the words *non posse arbitror*, which he cannot leave unchallenged," and that *istuc* refers to *non posse* without any reference to verse 564.¹⁸ But although I do not object to placing points of suspension after *perpeti* (as Marouzeau has done in the Budé edition, understanding the negative usage essentially as I do), I deny that it is necessary to do so in order to keep Simo's *istuc* from referring to Chremes' *ne perpeti*. Simo's attention is engaged early in Chremes' speech by *non posse arbitror* immediately partially defined by *neque illum hanc perpetuo habere*, and in framing his question he simply ignores *neque me perpeti*. He does well to ignore it, even if it is emphatically delivered; for if Pamphilus shows himself faithful to Philumena, Chremes will not have to stand for that which he now dreads.

I submit that in dramatic appropriateness as in Latinity my explanation preserves the naturally colloquial quality of Terence's dialogue.

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¹⁶ *Fam.*, XV, 18, 1, quoted after Purser in the *O.C.T.* series. The textual problem involving *astem* has no bearing on our subject.

¹⁷ P. 176.

¹⁸ P. 178.

REVIEWS.

GERALD F. ELSE. *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, in cooperation with the State University of Iowa, 1957. Pp. xvi + 670. \$11.00.

The number of those who have set themselves the task of revising our understanding of the *Poetics* as a whole, both in its details and as a coherent system, is small indeed. The latest in this select band of scholars is Professor Else, and his attack is one of the most substantial since the studies of Johannes Vahlen, with whose thought and method those of Else show a remarkable kinship, and to whom Else acknowledges himself indebted on almost every page of the book. Omitting chapters 16, the second half of 19, 20-22, and 25, on the grounds that they are either spurious or "contribute little or nothing to understanding the main core of the work," Else breaks up the treatise into paragraphs consisting of as few as four or as many as thirty lines. Each of these paragraphs is cited in Greek, translated, and then discussed in detail. The result is a synthesis of scholastic exegesis and explication du texte, aided by good if not entirely adequate indices, which allows the reader to digest the argument unit by unit without losing his sense of the coherence of the whole. Else's treatment differs from those of Rostagni and Sykutris in being more exhaustive on any one point, and from that of Gudeman in that he is interested in the logic of the argument rather than in historical or antiquarian problems. There is one further respect in which Else's enterprise is unlike that of some of his distinguished predecessors. As he disarmingly informs us in the preface, his analysis is not based on a fresh examination of the manuscript evidence. In view of the difficulty of establishing a definitive text of the *Poetics*, he decided to publish his studies of the argument before launching himself on the endless road of inquiring into the history of the text. This is a legitimate point, and we must be grateful to the author for braving criticism in order to give us certain results of his researches which in all likelihood will be little affected by new readings or a fresh arrangement of the stemma.

That is not to say, however, that his text is conservative, as the absence of an apparatus might suggest. The opposite is the case; at the end of the book Else lists his emendations and the passages which he believes to be interpolations or later additions by Aristotle himself. Most of these corrections of the vulgate are properly argued in the commentary, but the reader is well advised to keep a copy of Gudeman or Rostagni within reach, and there are occasions when the printed text might convey the wrong impression. For example, at 1454b2 Else writes ἐν Ἀλλίδι for Ἰλιάδι. Unless one reads the discussion with some care, he would not suspect that Else's version is not to be found in the MSS.—At 1459b36 Else proposes to read περιττὴ δὲ for περιττὴ γὰρ, without marking the change as an emendation. One has to go to the index of emendations to find out that δὲ is not a variant reading.—At 1449b26, Else does not sufficiently

justify his reading *ἐκάστω* for the MS *ἐκάστου*; altogether, his discussion of the "definition" of tragedy of which this is a part is disappointingly brief.

Of the emendations, many are successful, testifying to the author's wide reading and sense of style. At 1448a15 Else accepts Vahlen's emendation *γὰρ* for *γὰς*. At 1448a21 Else supplements *ὅτε δ' ἡθὺς τι εἰσάγοντα* and brackets *ἢ ἔτ' ῥόν τι γιγνόμενον* as representing a Platonic rather than an Aristotelian conception of dramatic impersonation. The remedy is daring but Else's discussion makes a good case for it. For other attractive emendations, see the discussions of 1449b36-50a10 (cf., however, below) and 1454a22-24. That some others are less likely to convince is only to be expected in a work which tries resolutely to combat some of the traditional perspectives. At 1448b17, the change of *ἐκείνος* into *ἐκεῖνο* is unnecessary, for there is no reason why a class predicate should not be masculine.—At 1452a17 Else adds *ἥς* to allow the Ricc. reading *ἐξ ἥς* to be read as *ἐξῆς*. But this harping on the principle of continuity is awkward, in spite of Else's contention to the contrary. It is safer to assume that Aristotle here regards the complex plot as the point of departure rather than the subject of the metabasis.—At 1456a17 Else writes *Εὐρυπίδης Ἐκάβην (καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος)* for the vulgate *Εὐρυπίδης, <ἢ> Νιώβην καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος*, on the assumption that for Aristotle Aeschylus is an episodic writer, hence cannot be praised here for the "non-epic" quality of his composition. But Else seems to underrate the parallelism of *καὶ μὴ . . . καὶ μὴ*. Valla is not likely to be right against the unanimous MS tradition.—1448b28-30 Else puts after 34, in the belief that the discussion of poetry proper does not begin till 32, and that *ἐν οἷς* in its present position has no critical antecedent. No palaeographical reason or parallel is given for the shift. Like a number of other dislocations proposed by Else, this suggestion cannot be more than an interesting hypothesis. Perhaps, however, Else himself will write addenda to this subject when he begins to publish the results of his manuscript studies.

As for the additions by Aristotle himself which Else proposes to detect, it is his opinion that the *Poetics* is an early work, written at a time when Aristotle was still close to the Academy in his interests and in his terminology, and that he revised it at a later date, when his increasing preoccupation with the special problem of the epic led him to revise his thoughts concerning the *μῦθος*. Among the arguments for an early date Else cites the prominence of *διαίσεις*, especially in the early chapters, and the gentle tact with which Aristotle is said to plead against a view which, Else feels, must have been Plato's, 1461b26 ff., pp. 633 ff. The theory of a revision, resembling that of Solmsen in *C. Q.*, XXIX (1935), is not unlikely in itself, though it is argued with somewhat more assurance than the state of the evidence permits. But when it is applied to the solution of various cruxes, the results are not entirely successful. Else does not indulge in the excesses of vivisection which characterize the work of de Montmollin, who believes in a similar theory of stratification. Occasionally, however, Else seems to invoke the theory of a later revision only because a paragraph as it stands does not fit the argument as he interprets it. Else's analysis leads to the curious consequence that Aristotle wrote a beautifully constructed and harmonious

first version, and then marred its unbroken flow by inserting irrelevancies or at least disruptive remarks. Else often finds evidence for his view in what he calls doublets, i. e., the near repetition of opening statements toward the end; example: 1448a24-25 and b2-3. If such a method were to be applied to an author like, say, Herodotus, the text would be severely affected. True, Aristotle is not Herodotus. But before applying criteria of this nature, a presentation of principles concerning what constitutes coherence in Aristotle would be in order.—Else's view that ch. 16 is an addition by Aristotle would require the showing that at 1455a22 δὲ δὲ was originally δὲ γὰρ, and was changed to δὲ δὲ only after the inclusion of ch. 16. Are we authorized to assume that Aristotle revises his connectives after adding to a work?

Kurt von Fritz in *Festschrift Ernst Kapp* (Hamburg, 1958), pp. 67-91 has recently pleaded for a greater willingness to read the treatise as it has come down to us instead of stipulating additions and interpolations. Before the rigid demands of this ideal, Else's treatment of the text must appear heretical. And yet, given the nature of his task, and given his conviction that our text is in no sense canonical, a striking out for new approaches is to be expected. The quality of Else's scholarship makes certain that even among the new interpolations which he traces in the text, there is not one whose status as an intrusion is unlikely at first sight, and in some cases he is most probably right. This reviewer is especially impressed with the plausibility of the following excisions: 1448a5 ἡ καὶ τοιούτους and 6 Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους, 1448a33-34 ἐκέιθεν . . . Μάγνητος, 1449a18-21 τρεῖς δὲ . . . ἀπασεμνύνθη, 1450a17-18 καὶ κακοδαιμονία . . . ἐστίν, 1450b5 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων, 1451a7 οὐ τῆς τέχνης, 1453a25-26 αἱ πολλαὶ . . . τελευτῶσιν. Some of the less likely atheteses: At 1447b23 καὶ τοῦτον ποιητὴν . . . is not, *pace* Else, necessarily indirect discourse. Gudemann's suggestion that the *Centaur* was a didactic work must still be in the running, especially if we allow *μικτὴν ῥαψωδίαν* to stand, in spite of the inconclusiveness of the Arabus, whose testimony Else is occasionally inclined to place on a pedestal.—At 1449b1-2, καὶ γὰρ . . . ἦσαν ought not to be thrown out; Else does not succeed in demonstrating that Aristotle's discussion of Attic comedy does not begin at a38.—If 1450a1-2 πέφυκεν . . . ἦθος were an explanatory gloss, its syntax would stand in greater need of explanation than if it is by Aristotle. Actually, though the phrasing is awkward, the passage does add something: *πρᾶξις* is not only characterized by (*διὰ*) but originated by (*αἴτια*) ἦθος and *διάνοια*.—Other criticisms of the text which do not convince occur at 1453a36-39, 1454b14, 1455b7-8, 9-11.

But the treatment of the text is a minor aspect of this work, which is in the main dedicated to analyzing the structural relations, the inner movement and cumulative disposition of the argument of the *Poetics*. From the very beginning, when *ποιητική* is shown to be an activity or a shaping process rather than "art" in the sense of an object or a class, Professor Else succeeds in evoking the vitality and the consistent toughness of the treatise. On every topic he has something important to say, and in the light of his commentary many a passage which in the past had seemed shallow or out of place turns out to be a meaningful step in a subtle argument. Else shows that in

its principal outlines and issues the *Poetics* makes sense; more than that, that its critical perspective, in unsuspected ways, continues to be relevant. It is impossible to mention more than a few of the high-points (a list of what Else himself considers to be his most important contributions to the discussion will be found in his introduction, pp. x-xi). He shows that throughout the work, τραγῳδία equals ποιήσις τραγῳδίας. This is of special significance for an understanding of ch. 6, with its table of the six parts of tragedy. Else manages to demonstrate that ch. 6 is a logical, properly proportioned and well-founded whole, entirely deduced from the earlier discussion. ὄψις turns out to refer to masks and costuming only, not to the stage setting. λέξις, Else argues, denotes the composition of spoken parts, μελοποιία the composition of the sung parts, i. e., both of their music and of their words. Of the two, λέξις is the more important, for "to Aristotle's way of thinking, ποιήσις is primarily incorporated in spoken verses, not in song, and . . . its destiny and 'nature' is to become drama." μέτρον as Blass had already suggested, is *Sprechvers*, i. e., hex, 3ia or 4tro only. Actually, however, Else's strict interpretation of λέξις, though attractive, must remain in some doubt; in *Rhet.* III, 1406b1 λέξις is used of dithyrambs. Similarly the equation of μέτρον with spoken verse and its restriction to dactyls, iambs and trochees is not definitive in view of Else's own qualification at 1447b23 ff., where μέτρον is used of the dithyramb, and must refer to sung verse. In connexion with 1447b12 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τοιούτων, Else asks what other verses Aristotle has in mind, and concludes that he must be referring to mixed or 'epodic' verse. But a) Else's contention that b20-22 show that Aristotle recognizes only 3 μέτρα is questionable; b) even if he does, may there not be other possible *Sprechverse*, not commonly used, for which Aristotle might here be making allowance? And c) does Else suggest that 'epodic' verse was not sung?

Regarding the pre-history of drama, Else gives an interpretation of 1449a2-6 according to which tragedy and comedy arose not so much from improvised hymns and banter as from the forms implicit in Homer. "Aristotle lets tragedy be begotten out of a matrix of social activity (the improvisations), but by individual artistic intuition of a form adumbrated in Homer." As for comedy, Else wisely prints φαντικά† and refuses to speculate on the possibilities.

In 1449b12-16, Else proposes, following an old suggestion of Teichmüller, that μήκος signifies the time it takes to perform a tragedy or recite an epic. His argument is very attractive. There is, however, one difficulty: what precisely is the meaning of ἡ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν? Coming after the reference to the course of the sun, it cannot just mean: tragedy varies little in length, for in that case we should expect καὶ rather than ἢ.—On pp. 304 ff., there are some very good remarks about the nature of the universal in poetry. Later, in the same connexion, ὁμοῖος is shown to refer not to the particular character but to the particular mental tendencies which are in all men in some fashion. At 145b14 Else has a brilliant emendation: οἶον τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὁμοῖον Ὀμηρῳ.—In 1460a27, εἰκότα and ἀπίθανα are said to depend on the skill of the artist rather than on the qualities of the events themselves: "Probability" here is not the austere goddess of chapter 9, presiding over the universal, but a

legalized trick played on the reader by the poet—provided he has the skill." In the crux of 1456a2, Else takes up a suggestion of Post's and writes: [τὸ δὲ τέταρτον] <ἡ δὲ ἐπεισοδιώδης

Perhaps the most daring section in the book is that which deals with the interconnected items ἀμαρτία, ἀναγνώρισις, κάθαρσις and πάθος. Else's sanity here prompts him to reject the free-wheeling conceptions usually associated with these terms, a course which would be cruel indeed were not his own well-argued substitutions also, in their deliberate narrowness, possessed of a grandeur of their own. Briefly, ἀμαρτία is not an element in the hero's character but an element in the complex plot, and denotes particularly a mistake or error or ignorance as to the identity of a blood-relative whom the hero is about to injure or kill. ἀναγνώρισις resolves this mistake, either before the death or after; cf. the remarks on pp. 349 ff., with their convincing explanation of the phrase ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν. Finally, κάθαρσις is, quite literally, the purification from the blood-guilt incurred through the ἀμαρτία. The examples of tragic plots cited by Aristotle 1453a20-21 go far to confirm this radical re-interpretation of a famous complex of questions, showing as they do that when Aristotle talked of tragedy, he had a very specific ideal in mind. At the same time it should be added that, on the score of κάθαρσις, Else is at once more speculative and more on the defensive than anywhere else in his book. 1449b27-28, which he regards as a later addition by Aristotle, he translates more freely than is his wont: "carrying to completion, through a course of events involving pity and fear, the purification of those painful or fatal acts which have that quality." This translation is somewhat at odds with the tenor of his discussion in which he argues that κάθαρσις is analogous to legal absolution, which is surely an absolution of persons rather than acts. κάθαρσις, Else says, is prompted by ἀναγνώρισις; the recognition of ἀμαρτία stamps the past action retroactively as not μαρὸν, hence καθαρὸν. But elsewhere, p. 352, Else notes that ἀναγνώρισις is the recognition of the identity of a person. Thus the last word has not yet been said on κάθαρσις, in spite of Else's remark that since it occurs only once, it cannot be as important a term as is generally believed; a remark which, incidentally, undercuts Else's own notion that Aristotle did not elaborate the term because it was well known and understood. And when, finally, Else concludes his analysis of ἀναγνώρισις by talking about self-knowledge and Platonism, he thoroughly blunts the edge of his critique.

Else's discussion of κάθαρσις is a good specimen of his tendency to narrow down the significance of a notoriously difficult passage until it becomes manageable and concrete. Some will no doubt feel that Else goes too far, and that in his search for clarity he does an injustice to the opacities of the *Poetics*. Else assumes that Aristotle always writes clearly and elegantly; he is unwilling to credit that the style may be relaxed or the argument less than explicit. Among the passages where Else attempts to explain away obscurity or carelessness, we might mention 1448a11-14, 1449a21-24, and 1451a25. As for the last, the puzzle of the boar's hunt, the older explanation, viz., that Aristotle had a different text or that he suffered a lapse of memory, remains more likely.—Finally, a few specific points. At 1447a19-20, Else's explanation of ἔτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς is no more

convincing than earlier attempts based on regarding ἕτεροι as parallel to *types*. Even the Arabus takes it as paralleling οἱ μὲν and οἱ δέ, Tkatsch, II, 98-100. Would it be rash to suggest that we should translate: "some through art, others through habit, others through vocal guidance . . ." ? It is true that διὰ τῆς φωνῆς in this sense does not occur elsewhere in classical Greek. But ἀπὸ φωνῆς in the sense of "dictated by" often appears at the beginning of later commentaries; example: Olympiodorus, in *Gorg.*, p. 1 Norvin. Aristotle must have well known that many artisans do their work neither because they are experts nor because they follow custom but because the master builder tells them what to do. Cf. also Plato, *Laws*, 720 B 2 ff. (about the slave physicians who are not ἰατροὶ κατὰ φύσιν): κατ' ἐπίταξιν δὲ τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ θεωρίαν καὶ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τέχνην κτῶνται But this suggestion cannot be more than a hypothesis, thrown out only because other explanations have not been satisfactory. —1448b10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: Else says that the reference is not to works of art, on the grounds that 4th century art did not represent lowly animals (?), but to diagrams and cadavers used in biological laboratory practice. Hardly; rather, perhaps, the historical paintings in the stoai or other works of art which stimulate the learning process. Cf. also 1462a17, where the phrase must refer to a performance.—P. 302 Else makes the important point that the universality of poetry, as against the particularity of history, is not guaranteed by the nature of poetry itself, but derives from the requirement that the plot be beautiful: "poetic truth is a corollary of poetic beauty." In view of the fact that Aristotle thinks so little of the elements of external beautification, the ἡδύσματα, and also in view of the fact that on Else's own showing, p. 354, Aristotle uses κράτιστος and κάλλιστος interchangeably, it might have been useful to inquire further into the sort of beauty that must attach to a plot.

With respect to 1451b34, 1459b8-10 and other passages concerning plot, it appears that Else's understanding of "episodic" veers between "consisting only of episodes," i. e., having no plot properly speaking, and "having a plot judiciously relieved by episodes." If a plot can be episodic, how can there be a "predominance of episodes over plot"? But perhaps Aristotle's own thought on this head is not clear, along the lines proposed by Else with his theory of a later revision of Aristotle's critical attitudes. We should perhaps say that an episode is either of two things: a) an incident not related to the causally structured plot and interrupting it; b) a part of a plot which is not causally structured. Owing to this uncertainty, some doubt must attach to Else's emendation ἐπεισοδιώδης at 1456a2.—At 1452b12, 53a28, and 56b5 ff. Else overtranslates φαίνεσθαι and φανερός. At 1453a28, e. g., Else translates φαίνεσθαι as "appeal to the audience." But seeing that audience appeal is introduced just below, a33 ff., as an unfortunate factor, we had better translate: "I dare say." Aristotle is talking about inherent stage-worthiness: Euripides' plays are better theater than others.—At 1448b4 ff., in the matter of the two causes of poetry, Else sides with those who recognize the second in our natural bent towards melody and rhythm. But his complicated explanation of why Aristotle touches so cavalierly on this element does not convince. Hence Else's bracketing of 1448b12-19 is desperate.—Else's treatment of 1462b3 ff. is, perhaps, the least

successful item in the book. By means of displacements and excisions he arrives at an interpretation which deprives ἰδαρῆ b7 of all sense, manages to group Homer with all other writers of epic, and ends up contradicting the earlier statement, 1459b2-4, that each of Homer's poems would generate only one, at most two tragedies. Else might have considered that *μία* at the beginning of the section, instead of meaning "unified," may mean something very much like ἀπλοῦς at 1453a13: epic has more scenes and incidents and parallel developments than tragedy. We learn something about its content, not about its composition. An imaginary epic that contains only one action would be either too short or too thin. Homer, like other epic writers, gives us many actions; unlike them, he treats the actions in a unified manner. That ἐτι at the beginning of the argument must mean "further" rather than "still" is clear from a10 and 18. As for the text, Spengel's minor transposition is preferable to Else's wholesale interference.

I do not understand the temporal reference in Else's translation of πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος, 1453b18. Translate: "except in so far as the act itself is pitiable," i. e., except in so far as a mere act, without human involvement, can excite a tragic response.—1449a38-b1 Else translates διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάζεσθαι "because it was not taken seriously." Rather: "because it did not mean to be taken seriously."—At 1449b24 Else translates as if γινόμενον were not associated with ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέγων. But is the notion of a definition 'emerging' stranger than that of the conclusion of a syllogism 'coming about'?—At 1454a28-29 Else fails to make clear in what sense Menelaus in the *Orestes* is needlessly wicked. If Aristotle's complaint really was what Else and others say it was, one must regretfully conclude that Aristotle was less intelligent than he ought to have been. Fortunately, there is an alternative. In the light of 1454a20-22, μὴ ἀναγκαῖον (ἀναγκαῖον still does not convince) must mean: "not required by the sex or status of the character."

But these criticisms are not meant to gainsay the remarkable discipline and analytic rigor which pervade Professor Else's commentary, challenging some of our fondest preconceptions and providing a whole new battery of questions for scholars and critics alike to weigh with all the seriousness which Else's achievement merits. The proof reader has, on the whole, performed a difficult task well. A list of errata, none of which are likely to mislead the reader, has been sent to the author.

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EDUARD FRAENKEL. *Horace*. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. xiv + 464.

One of the most distinguished classical scholars of our time states in his preface that he wrote this book because of a desire "to remove from the poems of Horace some of the crusts with which the industry of many centuries has overlaid them." This operation has not

been, and could not be, performed with bold slashing strokes; rather it has been a work of patient, scientific restoration. There are no flashy hypotheses and there are no meretricious devices for captivating the general reader (or "the modern reader," as he is often referred to in this book), of whom the author in general appears to have a low opinion. The nature of a work of restoration does not favor the rapid reader; *Horace* will undoubtedly be consulted more often than read. But if the serious student of Horace will submit to the severe regime of Professor Fraenkel, he will find it an enlightening and sobering experience to accompany this incomparable philological sleuth as he examines language, style, and poetic pedigree.

With his vast learning and, particularly, his intimate familiarity with the themes of ancient poetry, the author is magnificent in the pursuit of meaning. When it comes to appraising poems for their literary worth, he appears to be less sure of his own judgment; at any rate he is less willing to permit the reader to follow the steps by which he reaches his verdicts. It is clear that the author regards as a good poem one in which the component elements have been harmoniously blended; but he is often contented to express his estimates in purely dogmatic fashion.

Some readers will wish that the material of this book had been presented in the form of a new commentary on Horace, for the strength of the book is in the specific and detailed interpretations, which are more difficult to get at in a volume which is more like a scholar's notebook than an organized treatise. This situation is not alleviated by the completely inadequate general index.

In place of a conventional chapter on the "life and times" of Horace, Fraenkel has written a commentary on Suetonius' *vita Horatii*, which is at once scholarly, imaginative, and romantic. Horace's works in general are made to fill the biographical lacunae of the *vita*. Admirable literary analysis succeeds in clearing Horace of the suspicions traditionally associated with *non bene relictæ parvula* (*Odes*, II, 7, 10).

The chapter on the *Epode*s (I shall follow the order of Fraenkel's discussion rather than try to reorganize his observations according to the normal sequence of the works of Horace)—begins somewhat strangely, so it seems at first, with a detailed analysis of Epode 10. "Preliminary Remarks" (pp. 37-41), which would have made an excellent preface to Horace's lyric poetry, follow the analysis of Epode 10. This analysis is a fine example of Fraenkel at his critical best. The pedigree of the epode is traced with a sure hand. Careful stylistic examination not only strips Maevius of any claim to the enmity of Horace but also of any title to reality whatever. We are told that the content of the poem is poor but its structure good and its detail rich, and we are inclined to agree. The great importance of this opening analysis is the fact that it is a perfect object-lesson in the power of careful objective analysis to lift "some of the crust" of misconceptions from a poem. Thirteen pages are devoted to Epode 16. One point in this richly informative discussion seems to be somewhat questionable. Fraenkel declares himself to be surprised by the audacity of Horace in assuming in this epode the role of a

magistrate in an address to the Roman people. In view of the author's general theory of the artificial character of the *Epodes*, this is a strange suggestion. If we may judge from a passage of the *Ad Herennium* (IV, 39, 51), this sort of thing was familiar enough in schoolroom exercises; Horace would seem merely to have transferred this conventional device to the domain of iambic poetry. The relation of Epode 2 (*Beatus ille*) to Archilochus is a fruitful discussion, but it does not take account of an interesting detail of Horace's poem. Granted that the close of the poem does contain an element of surprise, the thoughtful reader, on arriving at the end of the poem, must concede that the poet has actually given him advance notice of the eventual appearance of *faenerator Alfius* in such phrases as *qui procul negotiis* (line 1) and *solutus omni faenore* (line 4). Epode 13 is declared to be "a perfect poem" (p. 65), chiefly for its "harmonious blending of ideas of very different origin." The poem has claims upon our appreciation, probably most readers will agree, but it is not exactly a *blend* of disparate elements. It would seem to be rather a mechanical joining together of a *gaudeamus-igitur* theme (*donec canities abest morosa*) and the doctrine *vino pellite curas* in a grim context. Part of Fraenkel's demonstration of the essentially artificial character of the *Epodes* is his analysis of Canidia the witch. It is impossible to do justice to this important discussion in a few lines. His sifting of the case of this notorious creature is judicial and satisfying. Wickham long ago was on the point of dismissing Canidia as a literary fiction, but he stopped short of this conclusion. The verdict in this book is unambiguous (p. 63). Canidia belongs to the realm of fiction. Horace required "a fresh victim for the aggressive *iambi*" which he was writing after the manner of Archilochus. Fraenkel's explanation of the poet's choice of this particular type of fresh victim is, at least to this reviewer, less satisfying. The essence of it would seem to be that witches have always captivated the imagination. This part of the mystery regarding Canidia requires further exploration. One might have expected Horace to select a poetaster such as Maevius as his principal victim. There may be a clue in the charge of the poet that Canidia has bewitched him (Epode 17). This last of the *Epodes* is not regarded by Fraenkel as being of any particular significance; it is a labored and rather tiresome production. Is it not possible that this long and admittedly labored piece may have been intended to perform some apologetic, prophetic, or explanatory function commonly associated with epilogues such as we have in a number of Horace's books and which probably were the usual thing in Hellenistic "collected works"?

The ten satires of Book I are discussed in the following order: 2, 3, 1, 6, 5, 9, 7, 8, 4, 10. In appraising the *Satires* Fraenkel abides by the standard set by himself years ago ("Das Reifen der horazischen Satire," *Festschrift Richard Reitzenstein* [1931], pp. 119-36). Those satires are best in which there is the fullest exploitation, as it were, of the poet's own personality. In the early satires the poet can be seen to be feeling his way toward this end and in the later satires (of Book II) to be declining into something resembling the satire of Juvenal. Many people will be less severe than

Fraenkel on the later satires, even though in these pieces Horace has moved away from *risculum* closer to the *acre* and *indignatio*. Fraenkel deepens the familiar study of Horace's references to individuals and what might be called the sham realism of the earliest satires. The analysis of *Sat.*, I, 1 is fascinating in illuminating the elements out of which the piece is constructed but does less than justice to the way in which the poet has made two of the *bioi* give unity to the poem as a whole. There is a most satisfactory analysis and solution of the crux of *Sat.*, I, 1, 108: Fraenkel decides in favor of *nemon' ut avarus*. The *Iter Brundisianum* calls forth a two-page essay on the relation between "*Urerlebnis, Bildungserlebnis*, and poetry that might have been the introduction to a full-scale Horatian synthesis (pp. 106 ff.). *Sat.*, I, 6 is praised as "excellent still life." Curiously enough, an obvious feature of *Sat.*, I, 9 appears to have escaped the notice of Fraenkel as it has of scholars generally. In the first place, *Sat.*, I, 9 appears to have been conceived as a comic version of the lyric convention (cf. *Integer vitae, Odes*, I, 22) according to which the poet, when overtaken by danger during the practice of his art, is rescued by the patron divinity of poets. Horace *ibat via Sacra nescio quis meditans nugarum totus in illis* when danger presented itself in the form of the most prolific (by his own admission) of contemporary poetasters (who has other artistic accomplishments equally abhorred by Horace). It is appropriate, indeed, that the poet should be rescued by Apollo. It is interesting to note that the poetaster is portrayed as the very opposite of Horace's own ideal (as in *Sat.*, I, 6; cf. *Sat.*, II, 1). The "bore," as he is usually called, closely resembles the *poeta* of the concluding section of the *Ars Poetica*. Fraenkel dwells with undisguised amusement upon *Sat.*, I, 8. The analysis of Horace's attitude towards Lucilius is admirable.

Only eighteen pages are devoted to the second book of the *Satires*, whereas sixty are given over to Book I. Only II, 6 and II, 1 are regarded as worth any attention. The exposition of these two pieces makes excellent reading, for Fraenkel gleans much from these familiar texts. It is possible that still more can be found in them. It is interesting that Horace makes the one substantial speech of II, 1; this is an elaborate interpretation of the natural "law" of self-defense for the benefit of the jurist, whose advice he has come to seek. It is worth noting that a travesty of the familiar lyric formula *pone me . . . etc.* (cf. *Odes*, I, 22, 17 ff.) caps Horace's comic peroration. The satires that Fraenkel does not like in Book II are dismissed in something less than a page in all.

In the interpretation of the *Odes* (I-III), as in that of the *Satires*, Fraenkel performs his operation of "removing the crust" from the text of Horace slowly, step-by-step. The modern reader should not anticipate revolutionary theories or flowing and scintillating argument; but, if he will allow himself to be led to the contemplation of the Greek models that are shown him and to be made to scrutinize the Latin text as he has never done before, he will have a new Horace for his pains. The "new Horace" will inevitably provoke his disapproval with regard to many details; but the bulk of what is new will be a valued possession.

"Odes related to Alcaeus" (pp. 154 ff.) begins with an attempt to settle the venerable dispute over *O navis* (I, 14) with a demonstration of its unmistakable allegorical character. There is an illuminating study of the effect of the *lex operis* on the language and tone of I, 37 (*Nunc est bibendum*). The neatness of structure of the little hymn to Mercury (I, 10) is admired but, in the reviewer's opinion, the magnificent contrast between the lighter and the heroic aspects of Mercurial craft is not appreciated by the author. Heinze is severely censured for having "read into" the poem a pious and anachronistic wish on the part of Horace for the ultimate safety of his own soul. There is the most interesting remark (p. 168) that the two Greek genres that exerted the most happy influence on Horace were (1) poems and songs relating to banquets and (2) prayers and hymns. The appeal to the lyre (I, 32) is closely examined. A vigorous argument is made in support of the reading *poscimus* (line 1). *Poscimur* (the reading of one half the ancient tradition, followed by Klingner), it is argued, can have no place whatever in a prayer-like poem. It might be argued, on the other side, that ancient prayers do not normally begin with a bald announcement that "this is a prayer" but postpone the explicit appeal tactfully until later in the poem. *Poscimur* would indeed be appropriate as the dramatic explanation of what follows: it is a symposiac situation in which the poet's turn has come to produce a song. If the lyre is welcome at the banquets of Jove, the lyre will aid the poet now! Fraenkel's judicial handling of the dispute over *quod et hunc in annum*, etc. (lines 2 ff.) is quite convincing. *Vides ut alta* (I, 9) will be found, to the dismay of many, to be, in Fraenkel's opinion, a relatively poor poem. It is winter, says Fraenkel, therefore the picture of spring and summer is incongruous at the end of the poem. Has it been forgotten that this summer is, after all, a mind's-eye picture and a symbolic one at that? The *nunc* (line 18) is not a reference to now-in-the-month-of-January (or whatever it is out there in the snow) but to the springtime of life so obviously in the possession of Thaliarchus. Studied in connection with the other Horatian poems that compare man's short span with the eternal round of the seasons, the poem, in the modest opinion of this reviewer, does not appear to be either difficult or poor. The contrast between winter that has crushed the green of nature and the green and warmth of youth (that must some day—*donec virenti* is most significant—be crushed by life's winter) would seem to have been well thought out and skilfully executed. This defense has been longer than space warrants; it is strange that Fraenkel has given I, 9 such short shrift. Similarly, it is strange that the analysis of *Nullam Vare sacra* (I, 18) is only half complete. One would have been interested in Fraenkel's view of the contrast between I, 18 and II, 19 pointed out by Heinze. *Integer vitae* (I, 22) calls forth one of Fraenkel's most brilliant demonstrations of the validity of his method of investigation. Are the opening lines of this poem serious? A study of structure provides the answer. The models that Horace knew were serious and at the heart of these poems would be found a mythological or historical paradeigma. And in I, 22? At the heart of Horace's poem, instead of the serious *exemplum*, is parody:

a mock-serious episode from the life of the poet himself! The truth about *Integer vitae* was penetrated in a different way by G. L. Hendrickson (*C.J.*, 1910). In the Europa ode (III, 27) Fraenkel sees a magnificent but unsuccessful attempt to reinvest a popular myth with its ancient dignity. Of the "Odes addressed to Maecenas," III, 29 is singled out as a masterpiece. The political aspects of Horace's poems concerned with Augustus have not particularly interested Fraenkel and it is a little disappointing that the "Roman Odes" have not received more of his attention. The Pindaric character of *Descende caelo* (II, 4) has been given a great deal of thought. It is curious that, with complete disregard for the symmetry of the cycle as a whole, III, 4 is regarded as "framed" by *Iustum et tenacem* (III, 5) and the Regulus ode (III, 5). The three "epilogues" (I, 38; II, 20; III, 30) are discussed with the traditional attitude toward II, 20 (*Non usitata*) as a "repulsive poem." Eight of the *Epistles* of Book I are carefully examined. The reviewer cannot sense the intensity of Horace's resentment that Fraenkel finds in I, 19. In I, 13 it is Horace's tact that impresses Fraenkel, but he seems to miss the hilarious gaiety of this letter. The "Epistle to Augustus" is beautifully done. The fifteen odes of Book IV all receive their due. The mellowness of the late odes is emphasized in contrast with the rashness and boldness that Fraenkel found in the early poems of Horace. Of the complete works of Horace, some forty-odd poems are neglected or receive only passing notice.

The reviewer's chief regret about the book is that the author did not look further into the problem of the composition of the various books as a whole. Perhaps the problem has been avoided as one that cannot have a satisfactory solution.

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RONALD SYME. Tacitus. Two Volumes. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Pp. xii + 856. \$13.45.

The appearance of this impressive work by a distinguished historian is an important event in the world of classical scholarship. Not since Boissier's *Tacite* in 1903 has Tacitus, the historian, been presented complete and Boissier wrote an appreciative essay rather than a comprehensive, scholarly evaluation. Other similar productions during the intervening half century have been either partial or contentious. In the meantime the new material on Tacitus and the literature concerning it have been extensive.

Professor Syme covers everything concerning Tacitus and his work which must or might interest the student of history. There will be some who feel that he has given too much material which is not wholly relevant, but second thought will correct this feeling. In the first place, a superfluity of material from a distinguished source calls for gratitude rather than complaint. Secondly, practically all of this material turns out under careful scrutiny to have not only

value in itself but some relevance to the subject in hand. This is obvious in the field of prosopography. Syme is a master in such matters and gives abundantly of the fruit of his research. The result is a harvest of new information as well as a convincing picture of Tacitus the senator and the effect of his associations on Tacitus the historian. The ninety-five appendixes, as they are called, are really extended notes which make complete the documentation of the text.

The book is not only readable: it is often exciting. Syme has immersed himself so thoroughly in his material that his ideas come out in an almost Tacitean style; abrupt, varied, condensed. It is not difficult for anyone with sufficient imagination to supply the verbs.

A work of this sort resulting from long years of research and pondering might easily have been dogmatic or contentious. The author is so completely at home with his subject and so thoroughly the scholar that even the ranks of Tuscany must recognize his poise of judgment and the fairness of his conclusions. Only once is there a serious failure of this objective clarity. In discussing those of us who believe in an early date for the *Dialogus*, Syme says (p. 671): "The thesis could only be supported by perverse argumentation, and it is kept alive by tired or uncritical acquiescence in a fancied *communis opinio*." This is unworthy of a scholar of Syme's stature: the gods should be kinder. If the question were less important both to the thesis of the present book and to the general understanding of Tacitus' literary career it would not be worth laboring in a review. The real fact of the matter is that there is no actual proof for either the early date (say 81) or the late date (say 98, although Syme would seem to prefer 107). In spite of the author's position that only one plea for the early date is possible ("only that of style, and of style imperfectly understood"), proponents of the early date wholeheartedly accept the demonstration of Leo and Hendrickson that the style is primarily determined by the genre. The evidence of "*iuvenis admodum*" has been used by both sides and its evaluation depends on subjective reasoning. There is something a little less than candid about the handling of Fabius Justus. "There is a good chance" that he reached the consulate at an early age; "he may have been born as late as 65." (And, for that matter, he may have been born ten years earlier.) The tone of the essay is also a subjective argument: the *Dialogus* has "a mature and authoritative tone: it is not the product of a youth." Finally, the argument that the *Dialogus* shows knowledge of the *Institutes* of Quintilian "as is generally recognized" would be conclusive if true. But the echo is not a clear one "generally recognized." The general idea which is said to come from the *Institutio* may well have been derived from the familiar teachings of Quintilian. The arguments for an early date are also largely subjective but they are also, may I insist, respectable. It is hard to think of an enforced silence of fifteen years without something openly expressed *before* as well as *after* the interval. The buoyancy of the discussion is hard to reconcile with the furious pessimism of Tacitus deeply established in 98. Without new and definite evidence, the question must remain open no matter how firmly each side holds to its own opinion.

The book is organized in accord with the theory which lies behind the whole, namely, that Tacitus' history is determined both in matter and in manner by the contemporary scene of the days of Trajan and Hadrian. The historian, being unable to speak freely to those actually in power by way of correction or warning, chose parallel situations whose significance could hardly fail to be recognized by his first readers. The theory is highly intriguing and there can be no doubt about the recurrence of similar situations in the first century of our era. To many students of Tacitus it will probably seem unnecessary to find such specific motivation. Arraignment of the early empire was certainly more congenial to Tacitus' grim genius than any "witness to our present good fortune." There will also be many who will not be willing to extend the period of composition of the *Annals* into the middle of the third decade of the second century to accommodate the theory. It is probably stubborn conservatism on my part but I find it very hard to believe that the reference to Trajan's conquests in the East with never a hint of the withdrawal by Hadrian can fail to place the publication of the *Annals* in 117. Syme would like to make the date at late as 123, looking on the withdrawal in the East as nominal and temporary and its concealment as imperial policy. Happily, however, whether the theory is accepted or not, it is highly illuminating and detracts not at all from the value of the Tacitean studies organized around it. At the same time it gives us a large extra dividend in the form of keen analysis of the crises in the Ulpian succession.

The organization of the book is at first confusing. Sections one through six would seem to cover the ground: the political background of the *Histories*; the career of Tacitus within his milieu and his transition from orator to historian; the *Histories*; the background of the Ulpian succession and the reign of Hadrian; the structure, sources, and style of the *Annals*; the *Annals* as history. This would seem to be reasonably complete but there follow three more sections dealing with the time of writing, the author, and the New Romans. These sections serve to reinforce the theory that Tacitus, like Juvenal, is flaying the past for the benefit of the present and to make realistic his position as a "new man" with an imperial understanding of the provinces because he is himself a provincial from Narbonese Gaul. Naturally, there is some repetition of points made earlier but such repetition as there is (done with true Tacitean variety) serves only to recall and reinforce essential material.

Syme has definitely laid the ghost of Mommsen's dictum that Tacitus was the most incompetent of all historians in military matters. He has also done much to strengthen the faith of those who believe that, in spite of enthusiasm, pessimism, and bias in general, Tacitus was never a perverter of the truth. He selected and omitted. He was a master of deadly suggestion. His irony is unmatched. But he was never betrayed into a misstatement of facts. That he made mistakes is not questioned and Syme lists a considerable number, but they are not tendentious mistakes. Syme is also wholly convincing in his exposition of Tacitus' sources, especially the *acta senatus*.

In his treatment of Tacitus' style Syme has not only presented the larger elements forcibly and convincingly but has submitted to the drudgery of detailed exploration. The study of words used in the different productions with an adequate explanation of chronological changes is a major contribution to this section of Tacitean study. Finally, Syme's treatment of Tacitus' use of orations is masterly.

Comparisons are odious and prophecies dangerous. Nevertheless, I venture to express my own belief that this is the best basic book on Tacitus, the historian, which we have and that it will be the classic source book for generations of students to come.

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H. D. F. KITTO. *Sophocles: Dramatist and Philosopher*. Three Lectures Delivered at King's College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. London, Oxford University Press, 1958. Pp. 64.

All who are familiar with Professor Kitto's charming and original approach to Greek Tragedy will be delighted with this little book. The three lectures develop a theme which is one of great importance for the understanding of Kitto's views: the divine drama and the human drama in Sophocles—or the problem of the Horizontal and the Vertical. The present writer has already explained Kitto's solution to this problem in *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), pp. 79-84. Strictly speaking, it will be difficult for the casual reader to comprehend the burden of *Sophocles: Dramatist and Philosopher*, unless he is fairly acquainted with Kitto's earlier works, for a good deal is taken for granted. In any case, the point of intersection between Horizontal and Vertical, where the human and divine dramas meet, is in the notion of *Dikê*. Thus, the core of the present book can perhaps be located on p. 50, where Kitto defines what he means by Retribution. It means "the universal order, which will always reassert itself when it has been disturbed. . . . For this human machine is not a machine operated by some external force; it is a system of human action which has its own inherent laws, and the laws are within the administration of the gods" (pp. 50-1). But the "gods," Kitto is at pains to emphasize, are not transcendent. "These gods, collectively, *are* the natural order of events: they are not 'supernatural' at all, except that they are immortal and omnipresent" (p. 40). There is here, I think, a contradiction in Kitto's conception of Greek religion; if laws *are* the machine, and the gods are merely part of the machine, how can the gods be said to *administer* the laws? In Kitto's view, this would seem to be a mere figure of speech, and, in the last analysis, *all* Greek religion was, theologically, the religion of Epicurus. Rather, I think that Kitto, in an effort to formulate his theory of *Dikê*, has levelled all the conflict and explained fifth-century Greek theology in terms of later, more rationalistic beliefs. Because the Greeks had failed to iron out all the difficulties con-

nected with their traditional religion is no reason for our doing it for them. At any rate, in this small book Kitto has at last stated his position on Sophocles and Greek Tragedy unequivocally.

There are also several new (and, as one would expect, interesting) advances. Kitto gives some attention to the concept of *Tychê* in Sophocles, especially as it is reflected in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 1080 ff., and he cannot resist the impression that it reflects a polemic against "a certain moral and intellectual arrogance that was seeping into contemporary thought" (p. 63). Whether or not this particular passage should be pressed the point is well taken; for Sophocles' theological and moral views were merely the result of a deepening of orthodox Attic tradition. Indeed, even Kitto's view of the gods and *Dikê* would have seemed repugnant to him. My own view of the *Tychê* passage, expressed in an earlier number of this periodical (LXXVIII [1957], p. 47), was that Sophocles has here allowed his hero to abandon himself to the blind forces of the universe, and that the passage contains a primitive reference to the twelve signs of the Zodiac and to the early infiltration of astrology at Athens.

Finally, Kitto sums up Sophocles' religious message most pointedly on his final pages. As he convincingly paraphrases the poet's meaning: "I give you the facts as I see them. I am not a vendor of patent remedies, but a tragic poet; I am not so simple as to believe that the practice of virtue will insure happiness. . . . I do believe that our Universe has its laws, and that we know some of them. . . . To neglect them, to follow our own laws, is folly." The long trial of Sophocles on the charge of Pessimism is over at last, and he is charmingly acquitted through Kitto's advocacy. For it reminds one of the way Sophocles is reported to have proved he was of sound mind before an Athenian inquisition—simply by reading one of his plays.

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OSCAR LANDAU. Mykenisch-griechische Personennamen. Göteborg, 1958. Pp. 305 (plus 1 p. addenda et corrigenda). Sw. kr. 28.00. (*Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*, VII.)

The linguistic information obtained from Mycenaean tablets hitherto discovered is severely limited by the fact that a very high percentage of the forms found consists of proper names.

In the analysis of a text, names present special problems. With other items of the language they share the property of form, by which they can be identified if the graphic rendering allows such identification. They do, however, differ basically from other words in regard to the property of meaning. Ordinary lexical items have meanings which constitute part of the total meaning of the utterances they occur in; the meaning of such items can, therefore, be extracted from an analysis of all their occurrences. Thus, in 'The hunter shot a deer,' the meaning of the noun 'hunter' can be fairly well

approximated by studying other utterances also containing 'hunter' ('The hunter fired his gun,' 'Hunters stayed at the lodge,' etc.), provided the meaning of the constituents of the various frames is known. Such an approach is normal procedure in combinatory analysis of texts in dead languages as well as in the intelligent learning of a living language, both foreign and native. It does not, however, produce the desired results when applied to proper names: The word 'Hunter' can occur in a variety of frames which will not yield any information beyond the purely grammatical, viz., that 'Hunter' is a noun denoting a person: 'Hunter was here,' 'Old man Hunter,' 'The Hunters,' 'That girl Hunter,' etc. The meaning of a common noun or a verb or an adjective is part of a mutual selective system, the meaning of a name is confined to the bounds of the name form. To be sure, ordinary lexical items may be arrangements of constituents whose meaning is not readily discovered from a study of utterance contexts, as in 'moonshine,' 'turncoat,' or similar metaphorical expressions, but such cases are marginal, whereas all names, with the possible exception of situation-bound nicknames, would seem to be closed constructions.

If the identification of the meaning of a name cannot be achieved through study of the context, all has to depend on the form as such. If the form is unambiguously translucent, it—or its constituents—can be equated with forms in the common lexicon of the language, the meaning of which is known, and the internal meaning of the closed construction 'personal name' can be inferred. A meaning of Φίλιππος or of Ξανθίππη can thus only be established because of the fact that the general lexical meaning of the constituent forms is fairly well known, but not on the basis of any study of the contexts in which these names occur.

As soon, however, as ambiguity enters on the formal side, all prospects for successful identification of the meaning of a name disappear. Instead of justifiable tentative statements nothing but, at best, intelligent guesses can be offered, since no outside check remains, and further conclusions one might wish to draw become scientifically unsound.

Mycenaean spelling is anything but unambiguous. True, the near-astronomical figures of theoretically possible readings for certain sign sequences are somewhat reduced by limitations known to have existed in the structure of Greek, and where there is context to help us the margin of possible error is usually tolerable. But once we turn to names, there is—in addition to the lack of context for control—the further uncertainty that we do not know, in many a case, whether Greek structural limitations may be assumed to apply—the name studied might, after all, be foreign.

The book under review has been designed as an all-inclusive analysis of the Mycenaean inventory of proper names. It lists the names, breaks them down into constituent parts, both derivational and compositional, groups the items obtained according to domains, and tries to utilize results as data for a consideration of 'Eigennamen als Spiegel der Kulturgeschichte.'

The book cannot be labeled a success. The essential fault is to

be found in the very plan while it seems perfectly possible to work on Mycenaean names on a selective basis, taking into consideration every clue for formal identification without ambiguity, a wholesale etymological analysis is doomed to failure because too many uncertainties in form and consequently in meaning can never be resolved. If, however, mere conjectures and guesses are the price to be paid for a seeming completeness, completeness ceases to be a goal for a scholarly undertaking.

If the project as a whole has to be considered as based on mistaken judgment, it is no surprising that many points of detail should be open to the same criticism:

Statistics are compiled with too little discrimination—the category 'gedeutet' [237] lumps together items whose formal properties allow a reasonably safe identification (as ko-so-u-to = *Ξούθος* or e-te-wo-ke-re-we-i-jo = *Ἐτφοκλεφῆος* or *-έμιος*) and others for which a whole string of interpretations has been suggested (as ko-ro = *κῶλος*, *χοῖλος*, *χῶλος*, *χοῖρες*, *κόλλος*, to mention a particularly bad case). No distinction is made in the statistics between items to which actually attested Greek names presumably correspond (about 20 percent of the names on the first 100 pages of the initial list) and others for which a Greek match had to be constructed from Greek morphemes (about 49 percent).

Little restraint is shown in the selection of Greek vocabulary items used in such reconstruction of names. At times one cannot help being under the impression that anything attested anywhere in Greek texts or glossaries qualifies as a constituent of a Mycenaean name—*δίξα· αἶξ*. *Λάκωνες* Hesych. just as much as *κῆβος* Aristot., *H. A.* 'long-tailed ape' (one wonders on what occasion a name *Κηβυγένεια* should have been bestowed upon the lucky bearer).

What may, in all probability, be just spelling deficiencies is used by the author as grounds to argue for a rather surprising type of name, viz., name of person matching in form, but derived from, name of place. To be sure, such a Nalde or Hamsun type of name does occur in some languages, but the Greek evidence offered is insufficient—the material adduced is an assortment of eponymic heroes invented to suit a place-name (*Κάσος*, cf. p. 220), regions named after their inhabitants and not vice-versa (*Κρηῆτες*), chance agreements (*Παρνασσός τὸ γένος Σύρος*, cf. p. 184), and a few cases where both place and person may have been named after something else (*Φάλαγθος*?).

Regrettable as that may be in view of the antiquity of our texts, the material is certainly too ambiguous to warrant even speculations about the possibility of identifying proper names with lexical items presumably no longer present in Greek as known to us from later sources (pp. 177-8).

The chief merits of the book lie in its diligently compiled lists, both of the names as formal entities and of their constituent morphological elements as seen by the author. A discriminating user will refer to these indices to his advantage, just as certain points of detail deserve to be lifted from a context which cannot be accepted as a whole: I find, for instance, the observation (p. 231) most in-

triguing that no names containing ἵππος have been found: it seems to go very well with peculiarities in the style of HORSE ideograms, which have been taken to point to an introduction of horses later than the development of the basic sign inventory; if a conclusion can be drawn at all from the apparent absence of ἵππος-names, it might be to the effect that the import was too recent to affect a basically conservative naming system.

The book presents, in the tradition of Scandinavian doctoral theses, an enormous amount of painstaking work; one cannot but feel regret that shortcomings in material available and in theory applied prevented the work from becoming a successful enterprise.

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FRANCESCO DELLA CORTE. Suetonio: Eques Romanus. Milan-Varese, Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1958. Pp. 231. (*Biblioteca Storica Universitaria*, Serie II: *Monografie*, Vol. VIII.)

There has been no full length study of Suetonius since A. Macé's *Essai sur Suétone* (Paris, 1900). Moreover there is not in print at the present any complete edition of the Suetonian corpus. Teubner announces for 1958 a reprint of Ihm's ed. ster. minor of 1933 and without a date an edition of the *de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus* by Brugnoli, to replace the long out of print edition by Roth (latest ed. 1924). The *Vitae Caesarum* are available in text and English translation by J. C. Rolfe in the Loeb Classical Library (1914 and later reprints) and in text and French translation by H. Ailloud in the Budé series (1931/2, reprint 1954). During the past fifty years, the individual *Lives of the Caesars* have been edited by various scholars. Recently, Italian scholars have edited what survives from the *de Viris Illustribus*. C. Bione published a text and commentary on the *de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus* (Palermo, ed. 2, 1941), which supplies the lack occasioned when R. P. Robinson's edition (Paris, 1925) went out of print. A. Rostagni has done the same for the *de Poetis et biografi minori* (Turin, 1944) and E. Paratore criticized this in his *Una nuova ricostruzione del "de Poetis" di Suetonio* (Bari, ed. 2, 1950).

Two recent studies deal with Suetonius as a writer: Paratore's pupil G. D'Anna in his *L'idee letterarie di Suetonio* (Florence, 1954) and W. Steidle in his *Sueton und die antike Biographie* (Munich, 1951). These suggest the desirability of a general reconsideration of ancient biography. F. Leo's long standard *Die griechische-römische Biographie usw.* was published in 1901 and D. R. Stuart's Sather Lectures on *Epochs in Greek and Roman Biography* in 1928. Even G. Misch's *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951) is translated from the third edition (1949/50) of his German book first published in 1907.

Professor Della Corte has been recalling our attention to some

of the secondary figures in Latin literature, among them Cato the Censor (Turin, 1949), Plautus (Genoa, 1952), and Varro (Genoa, 1954). Thus his book on Suetonius both continues this interest and also fills the need for a reappraisal of the author. He begins with a chapter on the life of Suetonius which, as the title of the book suggests, sets the tone of the whole work by emphasizing his career in the equestrian civil service. Our knowledge of his career has been enlarged by a fragmentary inscription from Hippo Regius which E. Marec and H. G. Pflaum edited with restorations and discussion in *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres* for 1952, pp. 76-85. This shows that Suetonius had been a *studius* and a *bybliothecis* (thus) before he became *ab epistulis* under the patronage of the praetorian praefect Septicius Clarus, in whose downfall he shared in 122. Della Corte follows Pflaum in regarding all three posts as equestrian procuratorships (antedating as such the putative reform of the imperial household bureaucracy by Hadrian) which ranked their holder as a *ducenarius* and entitled him to sit on the imperial *consilium*. Thus when Suetonius turned down the military command secured for him by Pliny from Trajan, he was not relegated to a life of scholarly research as a lesser member of Pliny's literary circle but rose to importance in the imperial administration and therefore spoke for the new equestrian bureaucracy which was taking over direction of the empire from the increasingly disinterested senatorial class.

Although Suetonius wrote under the literary influence of Cicero—and who (except Tacitus) could avoid this in a generation brought up by Quintilian?—his political sympathies as an imperial functionary lay with Caesar, the paragon of executive efficiency. The third chapter on “*La religio dei Cesari*” moves out from Suetonius' own interest in religion and superstition to a general consideration of the attitudes of the successive emperors towards these subjects. But Della Corte resumes his main theme in three chapters which show that while Suetonius was conscious of the ideals of government expressed by Pliny in his *Pnegyric*, nevertheless he separated himself both from Pliny and from Tacitus and Plutarch, all of whom reflect the aristocratic and traditional sentiments of the senatorial class. In part this difference derives from Suetonius' own personality and scholarly interests, those of “il memorialista e l'antiquario” who, like Pliny the Elder before him, composed a mosaic of detail and quotation drawn from documentary sources rather than weaving a broad tapestry in his own coloring. Much more, however, Suetonius gave expression to “la mentalità del ceto equestre” which was interested in personalities, court gossip, and administration and not in the grand themes of war and politics. According to Della Corte, Suetonius introduced a new technique of biography which was imitated, though less successfully, by such writers as those preserved in the *Historia Augusta* and which continued to dominate biography in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Della Corte's concentration on Suetonius' “equestrianism” seems exaggerated. Granted that he often mentions the equestrian class and such equestrian officials as the praetorian praefects, he was

equally concerned with the senators and with their treatment by different emperors. Moreover this study shares a fault not uncommon in recent Italian scholarly publication, of blowing up an article or a monograph into a book by ranging far afield from the central theme, as does Della Corte in the chapter on the religion of the Caesars. Nevertheless, this work is readable, balanced, and admirably supported by citation of source material. The omission of any discussion of purely literary matters is understandable since D'Anna's book is so recent; the two together afford an excellent introduction to Suetonius as a person and as a writer.

MASON HAMMOND.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

EINO MIKKOLA. Die Konzessivität bei Livius mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der ersten und fünften Dekade. Eine syntaktisch-stilistische Untersuchung. Helsinki, Akateeminen Kirjakauppa; Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1957. Pp. 181. (*Annales Academiæ Scientiarum Fennicæ*, Ser. B, Tom. 107,1.)

This is an exhaustive monograph on the various grammatical forms used to express concession in the first and fifth decades of Livy's *Ab urbe condita*. The author's first concern, in the absence of previous studies "mit systematischer Einteilung und konzessiver Terminologie" (p. 6), was the establishment of appropriate categories and a vocabulary to identify them. This task he undertakes in his first chapter (pp. 11-38), in which he discusses the concept of concession and the essential components by which it is linguistically expressed (protasis and apodosis); divides into ten categories ("Formen der Konzessivität") the grammatical means whereby the relationship between these two components is indicated; further identifies the nature of the "antithesis" inherent in concessive thought by setting up and labeling three groups of words and phrases ("Strukturwörter") that mark these antitheses; and finally analyzes the concessive thought-content ("Antinomie") into two main groups and fourteen sub-groups, again characterized by recurring words and phrases (this time called "Materialwörter"). The second chapter (pp. 39-143) lists and groups 1266 instances of concession from the first and fifth decades (Chapter I presented 35 others, identified by Roman instead of Arabic numerals, as are those in Chapter II), arranged within each of the ten form categories according to the nature of the antithesis involved, the pertinent antinomy being in each instance also indicated. Important examples are quoted in full, a laudable practice; occasionally, a quotation is inadequately presented for the purpose (e.g., p. 119, Ex. 847, and p. 141, Ex. 1240). There is an abundance of cross-references. These listings are followed by a brief chapter of summary and conclusions (pp. 144-8), statistical tables of occurrences and frequencies (pp. 149-52), a list of the concessions by books

(pp. 153-62), various indic-s (of the Livian passages, in all decades, referred to other than the 1266 plus 35 examples of concession; of other authors, both ancient and modern combined; of grammatical and stylistic terms; and of Latin and Greek words, labeled as to type, with "Lieblingsausdrücke" of Livy expressly noted) (pp. 163-75); an indispensable table of the copiously used abbreviations (pp. 176-7); and three pages of bibliography, including editions used.

This unavoidably lengthy and probably inadequate description may give a hint of the painstaking work that the author has devoted to his project. In this reviewer's mind the question kept arising: "Was it worth it?" After all the labor of discovering—and perhaps inventing—numerous ways of grouping different kinds of concessive thought, of creating an abstruse technical jargon to identify them, and then of carefully labeling each example from several points of view, the end results seem meager. Livy used explicit concessions (limited to phrases and clauses introduced by *quamquam*, *quamvis*, *etsi*, *etiamsi*, and *tametsi*) rarely (1 per 7 Teubner pages) as compared with Cicero (1 per 1½ pages). These explicit concessions, however, form only 7.7% of the 1822 examples found by the author, the others being implicit, i. e., the existence of these concessions depends on the acuity of the reader's—or scholar's—perception. There are fewer concessions in the fifth decade (167.6 per 100 pages) than in the first (243 per 100 pages), a diminution which the author finds only natural, "wenn man die Verarmung und Schematisierung des Sprachgewandes der V. Dekade berücksichtigt, die oft die Dinge in der Art einer trockenen Chronik darstellt, wobei nur gelegentlich noch der stilistische und lexikalische Reichtum der I. Dekade, die lactea ubertas, hervorbricht" (p. 145). I quote this statement in full not because I agree with it but as an example of the author's occasional irresponsible conclusions. (On p. 75 he refers to "ein Ermüden der stilistischen Anstrengungen des Schriftstellers"—perhaps we, and Livy, should be thankful that what Livy wrote after he completed this jejune fifth decade has perished as totally as it has.) To resume the results of the study: about half the total number of concessions is formed by those labeled "adjunctive" and "reversive"; the order of frequency of the other eight being "sociative," "limitative," "conditional," "permissive," "temporal," "responsive," "comparative," and "reservative"—for the distinctions among these the monograph itself must be studied. Concessions occur much more frequently in *oratio recta* and *obliqua* (404.7 and 400 per 100 pages) than in *narratio* (166.1 per 100 pages). Concessions in *narratio* are largely explicit, those in speech, direct or indirect, more often implicit. Livy's concessional syntax is not essentially different from that of his predecessors (an important confirmation for those who deny the existence of "Silver Latinity" in Livy). On the other hand, Livy's stylistic skill in handling the implicit forms of concessive language ("das gleitende Aneinanderfügen der verschiedenen Erzählweisen," "die plastische, oft architektonische Anwendung konzessiver Formen," p. 147) indicates his importance in the development of Latin prose (a statement hardly justified in the absence of similar studies for other writers—as the

author himself indicates). The relative frequency of the various antinomies gives a definite picture of the historian's personality; here I cannot follow the author at all. Many of these antinomies are less than obvious: "catastative," "sensitive," "facultative," "mutative," "simulative"; where the identity of the antinomy is more clearly perceptible (e.g., the "ausive" antinomy deals with bravery regardless of circumstances; the "dignitative" indicates the contrast between a person's *dignitas* and what actually occurs to him; the "justo-sacral" concerns contrasts involving sacred and human law; the "alogical" expresses the irrationality of an occurrence), little seems to be gained by determining that this one or that is more or less frequent. The author indeed tries to draw broad conclusions; their value, however, is more than doubtful, as when he says of the "alogical" antinomy: ". . . ihre geringe Frequenz deutet vielleicht auf den für den Römer charakteristischen Anti-Intellektualismus hin" (p. 148). Despite these criticisms, the avowed purposes (p. 5) of the monograph may certainly be said to have been accomplished: to give "ein Bild von der livianischen Konzessivität"; to determine "Unterschiede in der Darstellung" in narration and speeches; and to determine "Unterschiede innerhalb der livianischen Konzessivität und eventuell eine Entwicklung derselben."

The author's thorough familiarity with his text, as well as his soundly conservative attitude toward the MS tradition, occasions numerous excellent, though sometimes gratuitous, critical remarks, usually in the footnotes: e.g., 3 on p. 49 (on XLV, 19, 9), 1 on p. 60 (on XLIV, 24, 5), 3 on p. 96 (on V, 54, 2-3), and 4 on p. 117 (on XLV, 22, 5), as well as some model discussions of grammatical points, as in the demonstration that in Livy *quamquam* is used exclusively with the indicative, all instances of the subjunctive with this conjunction being attributable to subordination (pp. 103-4), or in the analysis of the restrictive use of *certe* (p. 133). His comparisons of Livian usage with that of other Latin authors and with Greek idiom are also helpful, as is his occasional correcting of predecessors such as Steele. Interesting, too, are the frequent reminders of Livy's use of stylistic devices such as chiasmus and alliteration, though they are usually irrelevant to the author's main purposes. Such side remarks are frequent throughout, e.g., on the use of *procures* (p. 47) or on adverbs in *-im* (p. 56, n. 2).

Errors are, perhaps, unavoidable in a study of this type; those noticed here, in both text and notes, are more numerous than one would expect in such a careful piece of work. Fortunately only a handful are misleading. More serious are the misstatement, at the top of p. 105, that "*quamquam* zugunsten von *quamvis* gemieden wird," which is in contradiction to the statistics presented on pp. 101 and 104-5; and the strange inference in n. 3, p. 123, from Livy's plain statement in IX, 17, 1-2, that his stylistic ideals included a "Neigung zu Exkursen" and a "Bestreben, dem Leser zu gefallen." The German, a translation from the author's Finnish, is very good, though a few unidiomatic turns have crept in.

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- G. PIRE. *Stoïcisme et pédagogie: De Zénon à Marc-Aurèle; De Sénèque à Montaigne et à J.-J. Rousseau.* With a Preface by H.-I. Marrou. Liège, Éditions Classiques, H. Dessain; Paris, Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1958. Pp. 219.

Pire finds in Stoicism certain educational views and practices from which, he believes, modern educators could draw profit and inspiration. The Stoics, he says, looked upon education as a preparation for life and stressed those aspects of education that contribute to the moral character of the student. They recognized the importance of early childhood for later development; they rejected mere training of the memory and mere acquisition of information; they emphasized self-education and continued education throughout life; and they had the psychological insight that enabled them to adapt teaching methods to the individual differences among students. Pire's account is in the usual chronological sequence, with due regard for successive modifications of Stoic doctrine. From the old Stoa he discusses Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; from the middle Stoa, Crates, Panaetius, and Posidonius; from the late Stoa, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. His aim, as expressed in the Introduction, was to give a systematic account of all passages in Stoic texts bearing on education, but he has in fact omitted a number of important sources, for example, Cicero, *De Finibus*, III, and the fragments of Musonius. The argument rests on a careful study of the ancient writers, though the author sometimes used antiquated editions (listed in the bibliography, pp. 9-14) and was apparently unfamiliar with such comparatively recent items as Mette's books on Crates and the article "Poseidonios" by Reinhardt in *R.-E.* Seneca emerges as the most enlightened of Stoic educators, and the influence of Seneca on Montaigne and Rousseau is cited as evidence of his lasting significance. The book concludes with a "Synthèse" (pp. 199-215).

In spite of Pire's favorable account, there is something disappointing about the Stoic treatment of education. Much of what he praises in Seneca, for example, is by no means profound: the importance attached to reading, the remarks on physical exercise, the use of concrete examples, the establishment of a personal bond between teacher and student. To be sure, Seneca criticizes the educational practices of his time, but the essence of his complaint is that some teachers neglect moral and philosophical values. Pire has made the mistake of commending the Stoics for taking a philosophical view of education, without fully appreciating what this particular philosophy does to education. Just as the Athenians (Diog. Laert., VII, 10) praised Zeno for teaching virtue and moderation, so Pire praises the Stoics for attacking the passions and the vices and promoting the virtues—but what else does any moralist do? What he has failed to point out with sufficient clarity is that the Stoics equate education with the pursuit of the Stoic philosophical ideal. The aim of education is the perfection of reason, as seen, for example, in the ideal of the sage. This perfection demands a mastery of Stoic logic, ethics, and physics. (Pire's criticism of Epictetus, p. 140, for not

recognizing the possibility of attaining perfection apart from the study of philosophy is indicative of the inadequacy of his grasp of Stoicism.) The liberal arts have a precarious place in education, as they are defensible only to the extent that they also contribute to the perfection of reason.

There is, moreover, a curious paradox in the relation of Stoic education to "life." In so far as all right choices require judgment, and judgment requires reason, education, being the perfection of reason, is a preparation for life. But since the right use of reason is the only true good, and all else is indifferent, Stoic education has very little to say in specific terms about things to be pursued or avoided. The very universality of Stoicism prevents it from pointing to any one way of life, or, for that matter, any one act, as intrinsically better than another. The conditions of individual existence are never the same for any two persons, and what is rational for one may be irrational for another. Education is directed toward what we have in common, our reason, and not toward our differences; therefore it is unable to tell us what choices to make. Ariston recognized this when he said that there is no reason to choose one thing rather than another (Cicero, *De Fin.*, III, 50), and Herillus found himself in similar difficulty (*Stoic. Vet. Frag.*, Vol. I, 411-17). The distinction between things preferred and things rejected and the separation of *perfecta* from *media officia* were probably designed to provide for the processes of reason a context in which to work; but the Stoics about whom we are best informed, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, made only limited use of these provisions.

Another difficulty confronts the Stoics. If education aims at no particular way of life, but only at the cultivation of reason, and if all else—wealth, security, fame, pleasure, life itself—is indifferent, what inducement is there for the teacher to teach, that is, to concern himself with the perfection of any one's reason other than his own? Cicero (*De Fin.*, III, 65) says that we are "driven by nature" (*impellimur . . . natura*) to a desire to help each other by teaching; but as *nature* for the Stoics is reducible to reason, some sufficient ground is needed for the decision to teach. The solution is, apparently, that as reason is the same for all, each person seeks to assist in the perfection of reason everywhere, as he has no way of distinguishing his own good from the good of others.

Because he did not make a thorough scrutiny of the theoretical basis of Stoic education, Pire's account is rather superficial. The statement that education is a preparation for life is meaningful only in terms of a clear conception of the nature of the good life and of the means of securing it. The emphasis on self-education becomes understandable when we note that the Stoics imposed on themselves the duty of perfecting all men's reason, including their own. The requirement that the student exercise his own judgment is no longer remarkable when we recognize that the end of Stoic education is the perfection of reason. The intellectualism for which Pire censures some of the Stoics is the inevitable outcome of their rationalism. Pire's book, then, is valuable as a collection of materials on Stoic pedagogy, but it fails to account for the distinctive character that these materials exhibit.

PHILLIP DE LACY.

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
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THEODORUS OF GADARA.

The rivalry between the rhetorical school of Apollodorus, who was the teacher of Augustus, and that of his younger contemporary Theodorus, who taught Tiberius,¹ is well known; their followers seem to have continued to be at odds for more than a century; yet the basis of this rivalry has always been something of a mystery. The accepted view until a couple of generations ago, based largely on the evidence of Quintilian, was that their quarrel was concerned only with the minutiae of rhetorical theory. Then, in 1890, M. Schanz published an article² in which he sought to prove that there was a principle involved, that the Apollodoreans were far more rigid in the application of rhetorical rules; that, to them, rhetoric was a science which brooked no exceptions, while to the Theodoreans it was only a *technê*, the rules of which must be adapted to varying circumstances. To prove his point Schanz made good use of the treatise on the parts of a speech known as the *Anonymus Seguerianus*.³ Some years later H. Mutschmann⁴ used the same evidence but went very much further: he maintained that Theodorus applied the

¹ Quintilian, III, 1, 17-18; Suetonius, *Tib.*, 57, 1; Seneca, *Suas.*, 3, 7.

² "Die Apollodoreer und die Theodoreer," *Hermes*, XXV (1890), pp. 36-54, where see references to earlier discussions.

³ This treatise, named after its first editor, will be found in L. Spengel-C. Hammer, *Rhetores Graeci* (Leipzig, 1894), I, Part 2, pp. 353-98. It is divided into short numbered sections and the references made to it are to those sections.

⁴ H. Mutschmann, *Tendenz, Aufbau und Quellen der Schrift vom Erhabenen* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1913), especially pp. 46-70.

principle brought out by Schanz to all the kinds of rhetoric and to literature as well, that he considered pathos and the irrational element generally, including the imagination, as the supremely important factor in all speaking and writing. This picture of Theodorus was then further elaborated by Rostagni.⁵ Both Mutschmann and Rostagni further make the author of *On the Sublime* directly dependent on Theodorus and indeed a younger disciple. My purpose in this article is to show that, whereas Schanz' main point may well be largely accepted and usefully supplements the evidence of Quintilian, the further elaborations of Mutschmann and Rostagni are not only unsupported by the evidence but in fact contradict it, and that 'Longinus' was not only no disciple of Theodorus but that his outlook is essentially different from that which they call 'Theodorean.'

As the view just outlined seems, wholly or in part, to have received wide acceptance,⁶ it seems necessary to review the evidence of Quintilian, the Anonymus Seguerianus, and other sources.

A.

THEODORUS AND APOLLODORUS

Quintilian is without doubt our best authority. His evidence has not been challenged though it has, I feel, been very much ignored of late because of the not unnatural eagerness to make the fullest use of the new light thrown on the problem by the Anonymus.

In the *Institutio Oratoria* (II, 11, 2) both schools are contrasted with those who did not believe in rules of rhetoric, like the rhetor who when asked "Theodoreus an Apollodoreus esset" replied "parmularius sum," thus indicating that the controversies between the two schools were of less interest to him than

⁵ A. Rostagni, *Anonimo del Sublime* (Milan, 1947), especially pp. xiii-xviii, and see also, by the same author, "Il sublime nella storia dell'estetica antica" in *Scritti Minori*, I (Turin, 1955), pp. 447-518.

⁶ See Anlitzky in *R.-E.*, XIII, col. 1416; *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, s. v. Theodorus of Gadara and 'Longinus'; J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (London, Methuen, 1952), II, p. 214. Stegeman in *R.-E.*, V, A, 2, cols. 1847-59 is very much more cautious, however. For full references see Brzoska, s. v. Apollodorus, *R.-E.*, I, cols. 2886-94 as well as the articles of Anlitzky on Longinus and that of Stegeman on Theodorus.

contests between different kinds of gladiators. In his discussion of the third part of a speech, namely proofs and refutation (V, 13, 59), Quintilian raises the question whether commonplaces or *loci* should there be used to play on the feelings of the judges. His own opinion is that some *loci*, being applicable to particular cases, should be used whenever suitable. He then continues:

I am therefore surprised that it is a subject of considerable controversy between what one might call the leaders of the two different schools whether commonplaces (*loci*) should be used in individual questions, as *Theodorus thinks they should*, or whether the judge should be informed of the facts before appeals are made to his emotions, as *Apollodorus recommends*, as though the middle course we suggest did not exist, and one were to decide nothing on the grounds of utility in the particular case. *Such rules are made by men who do not themselves speak in the forum so that the text-books they write in the peaceful security of the study do not stand up to the real battle of the courts.*

This makes quite clear that Quintilian believed both schools to be equally rigid on the question as to whether appeals to the emotions of the judge should be made in the third part of the speech. One said yes and the other said no, but neither was willing to accept a compromise, a *ratio media*. Quintilian then adds:

For nearly all those who have expounded the laws of speech as if they were a kind of mystery have tied us down not only to fixed *loci* (sources of argument) but also to fixed rules for drawing conclusions; . . .

The other references to Theodorus in the *Institutio* all deal with innovations in technical vocabulary or other minutiae, and Theodorus' classifications are at times shown to have been more elaborate than those of Apollodorus. "The Theodoreans" are said (III, 3, 8) to have recognized two kinds of *inventio*, of matter and of words. This is a mere change of terminology, for the *inventio* of words is precisely what others termed *dictio* or *ἐκλογή ὀνομάτων*, i. e. the choice of words. We are told (III, 6, 2) that what Quintilian called *status*, and some others *constitutio* or *quaestio* (i. e. *στάσις* or *θέσις*), the basis of argumentation, was by Theodorus called "caput, id est κεφαλαῖον γενικώτατον," but that these names are of little importance since the

meaning is the same, *quorum diversa appellatio, vis eadem est*. Here the Apollodoreans seem to have been satisfied with the usual term *quaestio* (III, 11, 3). Then the Theodoreans seem to have used their new term in a number of different senses (III, 11, 26-7). Apollodorus again had a simpler division of *status* than Theodorus (III, 6, 35-6).⁷ Quintilian also tells us that one Verginius was mistaken when he said that Theodorus wanted one point to be made on each *quaestio* in the exordium, and continues (IV, 1, 24):

Theodorus does not say this, but that the judge must be prepared for the most important questions that will be raised; this was unobjectionable *except that he made it an absolute rule* (*nisi in universum id praeciperet*) whereas this is not possible in every question, nor does every case require it.

At IV, 2, 31-3, where the *narratio*, the narrative portion of the speech, is being discussed, we find Apollodorus' definition of this as *oratio docens auditorem quid in controversia sit*, i. e. " (the part of) a speech which informs the hearer of the point(s) at issue," and we are told that Theodorus recognized only one virtue of this part, that it should be *verisimilis* (cf. *πιθανότης* below). He considered that the other virtues required here by Isocrates and his school, namely brevity and lucidity, were not always expedient. Quintilian (II, 15, 21) also gives us Theodorus' definition of rhetoric (in the words of his translators): *ars inventrix et indicatrix et nuntiatrix decenti ornatu secundum mentionem eius, quod in quoque potest sumi persuabile, in materia civili*, i. e.: "the art which discovers, selects, and expresses, with appropriate ornamentation in accordance with its

⁷ Quintilian (III, 6, 34-6) maintains that, whatever the technical names used, *status* are basically of two kinds: either the facts are doubtful and must be established (*coniectura*) or, and this includes all other kinds, the facts are known. Apollodorus had a similar main division: (i) the *quaestio* was about the facts (*πραγματικόν*) or (ii) it lay "in nostris opinionibus" (*περὶ ἐννοίας*); this was also true of Theodorus, though his terms were different: *περὶ οὐσίας* and *περὶ συμβεβηκότων*. Apollodorus then subdivided the second kind of *status* into two species, those concerned with quality and those concerned with the nature of the question (Cicero's *quale sit* and *quid sit*), but Theodorus subdivided his second main kind of *status* into four species, i. e. *quid*, *quale*, *quantum*, and *ad aliquid*.

importance, whatever can be found to be persuasive in each case, in the field of public affairs."

The few further significant references to Apollodorus, not mentioned so far, can be reviewed very briefly. He apparently confined himself to forensic rhetoric (III, 1, 1, *contentus solis iudicialibus*), and the aim of this rhetoric was to persuade the judge and to lead his mind to the desired conclusion. Quintilian objects to this definition because it denies that one who fails to persuade is an orator (II, 15, 12). We are given Apollodorus' definition of *causa*,⁸ and we are told that "those who followed Apollodorus" denied that the different ways the judge was to be prepared in the exordium could be reduced to three, as Quintilian holds (IV, 1, 50). Finally, there is an interesting reference to Apollodorus where Quintilian (IX, 1, 10-14) is discussing the meaning of the term figure or *σχῆμα*. It can be used, he tells us, in the general sense of form, and in this sense every expressed thought or speech always must have a *figura* or form, as every body must have; but the word is also used in the particular sense of a figure of speech or thought. If we are content to use it in the general sense only, "then Apollodorus' view is well-founded; he considered, if we may trust Caecilius' account of the matter, that the rhetorical rules on this subject were quite incomprehensible." Quintilian clearly tells us that, according to Caecilius, Apollodorus rejected the rhetorical precepts about figures, presumably because he insisted on using the term *σχῆμα* in its general sense only.⁹

Such is the evidence of Quintilian, and he is obviously our best authority; he is at least a generation closer in time to the two

⁸ III, 5, 17: "causam finit Apollodorus, ut interpretatione Valgi, discipuli eius, utar, ita: causa est negotium omnibus suis partibus spectans ad quaestionem; aut, causa est negotium cuius finis est controversia." And a definition of *negotium* follows.

⁹ "quare illo intellectu priore et communi nihil non figuratum est. quo si contenti sumus, non immerito Apollodorus, si tradenti Caecilio credimus, incomprehensibilia partis huius praecepta existimavit." Now Schanz has pointed out (pp. 50-1) that Alexander (the son of Numenius whom we shall find frequently quoted in the Anonymus Seguerianus), in his *περὶ σχημάτων* (Spengel, III, pp. 11-14) argues in opposition to those who would do away with figures and who maintain that every *logos* has only one *ἰδίον τι σχῆμα κατὰ φύσιν*. This would seem to be the position of Apollodorus as mentioned by Quintilian, against which Alexander argues that there are also *σχήματα κατὰ μίμησιν*.

protagonists than the second-century rhetoricians who are quoted in the Anonymus, whose own treatise is usually dated in the early third century and can hardly be earlier than late in the second. The evidence of Quintilian may well be supplemented from elsewhere, but only the strongest evidence should lead us to challenge it. Let us then briefly summarize the main points in this evidence:

1. Both Theodoreans and Apollodoreans are contrasted with those who thought that natural genius only was the secret of rhetoric.

2. Theodorus and Apollodorus, though they held different views on the subject, were both very dogmatic about the use of *loci* to sway the judges in the third part of a speech. Theodorus was equally dogmatic about the necessity of preparing the judge in the exordium for the main points to be made later. Both rhetoricians are regarded by Quintilian as typical theorists whose rules do not stand up in court.

3. Theodorus' theory on the use of *loci* in the proofs involves the use of *pathos* in that part of the speech; on the other hand Apollodorus' refusal to use them, and also his definition of the narrative, imply that *pathos* should not be used in either of those middle parts.

4. Theodorus introduced a number of new terms for old ideas, and in some cases his classifications are more elaborate than those of Apollodorus.

5. Theodorus said that the only virtue of the narrative part was to be *verisimilis* (this seems to mean at least less use of *pathos* than in other parts of the speech).

6. Theodorus' definition of rhetoric (*in materia civili*) includes both forensic and deliberative or political rhetoric, but does not allow for epideictic, while Apollodorus definitely restricted himself to forensic.

The general impression left by Quintilian is that both Theodorus and Apollodorus were rhetoricians whose rivalry centered on differences of rhetorical theory and minutiae. This impression is confirmed by a passage in Strabo¹⁰ who is clearly contemptuous of the technicalities of both schools.

¹⁰ Strabo, XIII, 4, 3: . . . καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ ῥήτωρ ὁ τὰς τέχνας συγγραψας καὶ τὴν Ἀπολλοδώρειον αἵρεσιν παραγαγών, ἥτις πότ' ἐστίν. πολλὰ γὰρ

There are also two relevant passages in Seneca the Elder. In the first (rightly emphasized by Schanz) one declaimer says to another (*Controv.*, II, 1, 36): "In the first place we have not been trained by the same men, *tu Apollodorum habuisti cui semper narrari placet, ego Theodorum, cui non semper.*" It follows from this, as Schanz says, that Apollodorus insisted that every speech must have a *narratio* or narrative part, while Theodorus allowed it to be omitted in certain cases. The other Senecan reference is more general but no less significant (*Controv.* X, Praef. 15); Seneca says there that a certain Turinus lost much of his vigour as an orator *dum Apollodorum sequitur ac summam legem dicendi sectam putat*, from which we may conclude that some followers of Apollodorus at least were handicapped by the rigidity with which they felt that they must follow his rules, and the implication certainly is that this was expected of them. There is here no direct comparison with the other school, but, taken together, the two passages seem to imply less rigidity among the Theodoreans.

This contrast is Schanz' main point and it is supported, *as far as the theory of the parts of a speech is concerned*, by the Anonymus. This treatise is a straightforward and conventional treatment of the recognized divisions of a speech—exordium, narration, proofs, and peroration—each of which is dealt with in turn, with some remarks at the end on the proper *phrasis* for each. In the course of it there are a number of references to Theodorus and Apollodorus, to the Apollodoreans (but not the Theodoreans), and quotations from "Alexander and Neocles," and from each of them separately. Although both these writers seem to take in general the Theodorean position, as does the Anonymus himself, they at times disagree with one another, and each of them is, at times, critical of Theodorus.¹¹ It is therefore not safe to attribute everything they say to the master, though

ἐπεκράτει, μέλζονα δὲ ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔχοντα τὴν κρίσιν, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ Ἀπολλοδώρειος ἀρρεσις καὶ ἡ Θεοδώρειος. . . . Tacitus also speaks of *quidquid aliud aridissimis Hermagorae et Apollodori libris praecipitur* (*Dialogus*, 19), but Theodorus is not there mentioned.

¹¹ At 49 Alexander is not quite satisfied with Theodorus' definition of the narrative; at 129-31 Alexander will admit no part of the narrative after the proofs; at 135 he disagrees with Theodorus and asserts that there can be only one piece of narrative for each question, even in cases of demurrer; at 144-9 his classification of *ἐντεχνοὶ πύσεις* is quite differ-

Schanz, Mutschmann, and Rostagni do not hesitate to do so. However, the point need not perhaps be laboured, for even if all they say is credited to Theodorus, the position is not much affected; yet the point should be kept in mind.

From Theodorus himself the Anonymus quotes his definition of the narrative as (49): "the exposition in a simple manner of a completed action concerning the past."¹² This is different from the definition of Neocles, and it does not satisfy Alexander because it makes no allowance for rhetorical embellishment. At 103 we read that: "Theodorus of Gadara regards persuasiveness (*πιθανότης*, cf. Quintilian's *verisimilitudo* above) as the only virtue of the narrative and said that the other virtues mentioned were no more characteristic of the narrative than of the rest of the speech." Finally, Theodorus is said to have held that there can be more than one *διήγησις* on the same question, and particularly that in cases of demurrer (*ἐν ταῖς παραγραφαῖς*) there are two. Alexander disagrees with this. These are the only references to Theodorus himself. That there are no references to "the Theodoreans" may well be due to the fact that the author himself, as well as Alexander and Neocles, takes the general Theodorean position, and this seems to be supported by the occasional use of the first person plural.¹³ The position so held is in definite contrast to that of the Apollodoreans.

ent from that of Neocles, and so are his definitions of *παράδειγμα* (155), *epilogos* (198-200), and *pathos* (222-3).

Neocles' definition of the narrative (46) is different from that of Theodorus and from that of Alexander. Besides the other differences already mentioned above, he alone is quoted in discussions of *pathos* (222 on).

It should also be noted that in the discussion of *phrasis* at the end, the Anonymus does not quote from known 'Theodoreans' but from Harpocration who is thought to be an Apollodorean and from Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

¹² *διήγησις ἐστὶ πράγματος αὐτοτελοῦς κατὰ ψιλὴν ἀπόδοσιν ἔκθεσις περὶ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων*. This is the part of a speech to which he assigned the virtue of *πιθανότης*, and there is here no mention of *pathos*. No wonder Alexander criticized it as not allowing for *πομπικόν* and *ῥητορικόν*. We note that *ψιλὴν* is eliminated in Alexander's own definition (51) *διήγησις ἐστὶν ἔκθεσις καὶ παράδοσις τῷ ἀκροατῇ τοῦ πράγματος οὗ κοινοῦμεθα αὐτῷ*, in which the effect on the audience is given some prominence. It is because of differences like this that it seems very injudicious to credit Theodorus with all that is said either by Alexander, Neocles, or the Anonymus himself whenever we find it convenient to do so.

¹³ E. g. at 32, *ἀλλὰ τοῦτό φαμεν*, i. e. that one should adapt oneself to

From Apollodorus we have a very laconic definition of narrative¹⁴ which Alexander did not like at all. Then, in the discussion of the exordium we are told that "some people, like the Apollodoreans" insisted that there must be an exordium in every speech, indeed that every speech must have all four parts (§6-9). This is contrary to the position already taken by the Anonymus himself (21-5) and then Alexander is quoted in reply to their arguments, and he also makes a general comment of great interest (30-2):

Alexander the son of Numenius . . . blames them (i. e. the Apollodoreans) in the first place for misunderstanding the nature of rhetoric which is empirical (στοχαστική). *They have not realized (ἐαυτοὺς λελήθασιν) that they treat it as a science.* Now the difference between a science and a *technê* is that the first consists of infallible rules, all of the same nature, while the rules of a *technê* change and alter their nature. As rhetoric is a *technê* and its rules must be adjusted to the occasion (πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς) they are wrong to issue scientific rules and to say that there must always be an exordium.

Here we have Alexander quoted as saying, in the second century, that the Apollodoreans *are not aware* that they treat rhetoric as if it were a science by making rules to which there must be no exceptions. It follows inevitably that the Apollodoreans did not *say* that rhetoric was a science, and even less can Apollodorus have done so a century before. Nor, probably, did Theocorus say what Alexander says a century later, or some reply would presumably have been made. The words quoted from Alexander clearly mean that the Apollodorean habit of making rules *implies* that they treat rhetoric as if it were a science, which it is not. The words used seem to make it impossible to attribute to Apollodorus a consciously held theory of rhetoric as being a science, and difficult to attribute to Theodorus the opposite theory of rhetoric as a *technê*,¹⁵ though Alexander's words cer-

the circumstances of the particular case. This might, but need not be, transcribed from Alexander who is quoted just above. Also in 33, in the same rebuttal of the Apollodoreans.

¹⁴ At 50: διήγησις ἐστὶ περιστάσεως ἑκθεσις. This is not quite the same definition as in Quintilian, IV, 2, 31, quoted above.

¹⁵ Rostagni (*Scritti Minori*, p. 460), Mutschmann (p. 55), and even Schanz (p. 52) do both without hesitation or compunction.

tainly support the idea that the Apollodoreans and Apollodorus were more rigid in the application of their rhetorical rules than Theodorus and the Theodoreans. This was clearly the case as regards the theory of the four parts of a speech, though in that regard we may remember that neither position was at all original.¹⁶

After this we are not surprised to find (113-15) the Apollodoreans quoted as saying that every speech must have a narrative part, and using much the same arguments as in the case of the exordium, or to find this position opposed by quotations from "Alexander and Neocles" that in certain cases it is more expedient to omit the narrative (116-20). Alexander is then quoted alone to add that the purpose of the narrative is to secure the understanding of the judge and the clarification of the facts (*σύνεσιν καὶ δῆλωσιν*) and that if these are already secured there is no need of a narrative (121).¹⁷

¹⁶ The theory of the four parts of a speech goes back to Aristotle and was, with him, a compromise between the two parts which he thought essential (the statement and the proofs) and the exaggerated number of parts introduced by certain rhetoricians (*Rhet.*, III, 13). He then goes on, in the rest of that book, to study each of the four parts in relation to different kinds of rhetoric and we find that some parts may at times be left out (the exordium, for example, in epideictic and the peroration even in forensic speeches); he has, in any case, told us that only two parts are, in his opinion, really necessary. We have a full analysis of the parts of a speech in Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae*, 8-17 (27-60); the function of each part is there explained in much the same terms as in the Anonymus. So also in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Lysias*, 17-19, except that he makes the *prothesis* a separate part. It is interesting to note that Lysias is there said to have at times omitted the *exordium*, and sometimes the *prothesis* as well, and to have begun with the narrative. The *τέχνη* attributed to Dionysius also clearly states (X, 14, Tauchnitz ed., p. 206) that there is no narrative in *συμβουλευτική*, and that even some forensic speeches dispense with it. Cicero, incidentally, recognized that in the peroration the enumeration can at times be left out (*Part. Orat.*, 17 [60]), and Aristotle already speaks of narrative being introduced in several places (*Rhet.*, III, 16, 11). These theories should therefore not be discussed as if they were discoveries of either the Theodoreans or the Apollodoreans.

¹⁷ Although the possible omission of the narrative is certainly in accordance with the general position of the Theodoreans, we should not without further evidence credit Theodorus with this particular formulation of the purpose of the narrative, for the reasons given above, and see also next note.

Moreover, the Apollodoreans also insist that the narrative must always be in its proper place, i. e. following the exordium, whereas "Alexander and Neocles" say that its place may also vary at times (124-5). It may even be after the proofs, but Alexander is quoted as saying that there should be no narrative after the proofs.¹⁸

There are a number of quotations from Neocles alone. The most important of these, for our purposes, deal with the use of *pathos*. We know already from Quintilian that Theodorus sanctioned the use of emotional appeals in the proofs whereas Apollodorus seemed to exclude *pathos* from both the proofs and the narrative. In this Apollodorus was following a well established rhetorical theory which classed these two parts of the speech as dealing with facts (*πραγματικόν*) and the other two, the exordium and the peroration, as dealing in *pathos*. Whether *pathos* should be so restricted also seems to be a question which had been debated before his time.¹⁹

¹⁸ There is no real contradiction in this passage, as is generally thought (see Schanz, p. 46). The sequence of thought is as follows: (124) the Apollodoreans assign only one place to the narrative, after the exordium; (125) Alexander and Neocles say that the place of the narrative will vary; (126) sometimes it is even before the exordium, if the judge is impatient to have the facts; (127) sometimes it occurs even after the proofs (examples are given from Aeschines and Demosthenes) when the judge has been impressed by the other side and you have to prove your case before he will listen to your narrative; (128) Demetrius of Phalerum is said (*φασίν*) to have put his narrative even after the peroration, and this is right when the accusers have made a great impression on the judge; (129-31) but Alexander says the narrative should never come after the proofs, nor of course after the peroration. The contradiction, that Alexander and Neocles say in 128 that it is right sometimes to have the narrative after even the peroration and that Alexander is then immediately quoted as insisting that it must never be after the proofs, disappears if we realize that "Alexander and Neocles" are quoted only in 125, or at the most in 125-7. The *φασίν* of 128 does not refer to them but is quite general, and the Anonymus is speaking in his own person, indeed he has probably done so since 126. The Anonymus is obviously no fool, and the text makes very good sense. This passage should warn us that *φασίν* must not always be taken to refer to an actual quotation.

¹⁹ The important part played by *pathos* in the peroration is recognized by Aristotle (*Rhet.*, III, 19, 1), and he also mentions the usefulness of amplification and meiosis—*αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι*—in this part of the speech, as, to a lesser extent, in the exordium (III, 14, 7); he too

The longest treatment of *pathos* in the Anonymus naturally occurs in the section on the peroration, which has two functions: recapitulation and emotional appeal. We find a definition of *pathos* from Neocles, which differs from that of Alexander (222-3). Also attributed to Neocles is a division of recapitulation into four kinds. Then comes (224-8) a parallel classification of the four main kinds of passion, and a statement of the importance, in arousing them, of amplification and meiosis, of vivid description or *diatyposis*, and of the ways to arouse pity. But the statement of Neocles on which most has been built is in another section of the treatise, that on proofs, and in particular on *prothesis* (160), the preliminary statement of one's thesis which is "the beginning of the proof." Here Neocles is quoted as saying that there are two ways of dealing with the *prothesis*, namely by amplification and by meiosis, that *πάθη* contribute to both, and that "*these will not be confined to one part of the speech, but will be scattered throughout.*"²⁰

allows *ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγειν* in the narrative (III, 16, 10) even though the narrative as a whole is considered to be *ῥηϊκή*. The theory of two parts of speech as factual and two as "pathetic" is found in Cicero, *Partit. Orat.*, I, 4, where he is obviously expounding orthodox theory when he says: "Earum (i. e. of the four parts) duae valent ad rem docendam, narratio et confirmatio, ad impellendos animos duae, principium et peroratio." This is the Apollodorean theory. Later, however, (8, 27) Cicero qualifies this by saying that while *amplificatio* (= *αὐξησις*) has its proper place in the first and even more in the last part of a speech, yet it may be used also in the other parts, which is the "Theodorean" position before its time! The peroration, he tells us (14, 52) has two parts, *amplificatio* and *enumeratio*, precisely as in the Anonymus. See also, more briefly, *Topica*, 26, 97-9; *De Oratore*, I, 31, 143; II, 79-83 and 310-12. We may note also that in Dionysius' *Lysias*, c. 17 that orator is said not to be *κινητός* in the narrative (i. e. he used *pathos*) but his aim is lucidity, charm, and persuasiveness in that part, and that proofs (19) are said to be of three kinds, *εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἥθος*. Here we have Dionysius taking the "Theodorean" position that *pathos* was not restricted to the exordium and the peroration, but no one seems to have drawn any far-reaching conclusions from this in his case. Of course his works are extant, which restricts the free play of scholarly imagination.

In view of these citations, it is hard to understand Mutschmann's statement (p. 61) "und so dürfen wir wohl auch sagen dass die Begriffe *πραγματικόν* und *παθητικόν* von Apollodor stammen."

²⁰ μάλιστα δὲ τὰ πάθη ταῖς αὐξήσεσι συναγωνίζεται καὶ ταῖς μειώσεσιν. ἔσται δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐν ἐνὶ μέρει τοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλου παρασπαρθήσεται

Much importance has also attached to two further passages, in the discussion of the narrative, where the Anonymus is speaking in his own person. At 94 he says:

Persuasiveness is obtained both by the *êthos* and the *pathos* of the speaker, by the *êthos* if it appears natural (*ἄπλᾶστον*), but *passion not only persuades but also takes the hearer out of himself*,²¹

and a little further on (96):

Vividness also helps to persuade. Vividness is speech which brings what we are explaining before the eyes of the audience.²²

(160, cf. 164-5). Other references to Neocles are his definition of the narrative which differs both from that of Theodorus and that of Alexander (46, 49, 61), his classification of proofs which includes one kind *ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους* (147-9), his definition of *παράδειγμα* (154), of *enthymeme* (157), and his classification of *τόποι* into general and particular (170) under proofs.

²¹ τὸ δὲ πάθος οὐ μόνον πείθει ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξίστησι. There is of course no justification for attributing these words to Theodorus. On the alleged correspondence with the first chapter of the *περὶ ὕψους* see below.

²² συνεργεῖ δὲ πρὸς πειθῶ καὶ ἡ ἐνάργεια, ἔστι δὲ ἐνάργεια λόγος ὅς τις ἄγων τὸ δηλούμενον. Mutschmann (p. 66) and Rostagni (*Anonimo*, p. xvi) attach great importance to this passage and also to 111 which refers back to this definition and quotes, as an example, Demosthenes' *Midias*, 13. On the basis of this passage they attribute to Theodorus a great emphasis on vividness as part of his championing of *pathos* and the irrational, and then link it with *περὶ ὕψους* (15), where *ἐνάργεια* is said to be the aim of oratorical imagination.

But there is no emphasis in the passage from the Anonymus. Surely he could hardly have discussed the narrative without saying this much of vividness as one of its aims, for this too is a rhetorical commonplace. See Aristotle, *Rhet.*, III, 11, 2: λέγω δὴ πρὸς ὁμμάτων ταῦτα ποιῶν ὅσα ἐνεργούντα ποιῶ. *ἐνέργεια* is the Aristotelian term for the later *ἐνέργεια*. In this passage it is connected with active metaphors, but the quality is isolated from metaphors at III, 10, 6, and is still a method of bringing things *πρὸς ὁμμάτων* (See Cope, *Introd. to Arist. Rhet.* [London, 1867], p. 316, n. 3). *ἐνάργεια* in Dionysius is one of the regular virtues of style (*Letter to Pompey*, 3) and defined at *Lysias*, 7 as *δύναμις τις ὅτι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀγούσα τὰ λεγόμενα*. It is linked with *πιθανότης*, the Theophrasian virtue of narrative, by Demetrius (*On Style*, 208) who discusses various means of achieving it.

Quintilian also mentions *ἐνάργεια* (*evidentia*) as a quality of the *narratio* (IV, 2, 63) and defines it (VIII, 3, 61-3) as "... res ... ut cerni videantur enuntiare," and again: "ea ... exprimi et oculis

And we may also note, still under narrative, the statement (138) that where the narrative is intense (δείνωσιν ἔχει) the language must be more exalted, so that we speak ἐν πάθος ἔχει, παθητικῶς, ἐὰν δὲ ἦθος, ἡθικῶς.

From all these passages it may fairly be inferred that whereas Apollodorus considered *pathos* suitable only in the peroration, and presumably in the exordium, Neocles, and probably Theodorus, were on the side of those who, like Cicero, believed that emotional appeals can be used with advantage in *all* the four parts of a speech. All rhetoricians were agreed, however, that the peroration was the part in which *pathos* was used most and most suitably. That much is clear.

Schanz is quite justified when he concludes from the evidence of the Anonymus and that of Seneca that the Apollodoreans insisted that every discourse must have the same four parts, that these must always appear in the same order, i. e. exordium, narrative, proofs, and epilogue, and that, further, each part should form a continuous whole in its proper place; while the Theodoreans held, on the contrary, that any one of the parts, except the proofs,²³ might at times be omitted, that the order of the parts might be changed, and that the parts need not always be continuous, but might be split up, with various sections of the narrative, for example, being interspersed with other parts of the speech. This, clearly, shows a much greater readiness to adapt the rules to the circumstances of the particular occasion. This is more than a difference of rhetorical minutiae, since it affects the very structure of a speech. Schanz also suggests that the same greater adaptability is also shown in Theodorus' refusal

mentis ostendi" (cf. VI, 2, 29). We find another Latin definition in Halm, *Rhet. Lat. Min.*, p. 62: "*ἐνάργεια* est figura qua formam rerum et imaginem ita oratione substituimus ut lectoris oculis praesentiaque subiciamus." Thus vividness is an inevitable quality of the narrative, and little significance can be attached to its brief mention and definition in this context by the Anonymus, or indeed by Theodorus, if we wish to transfer the thought to him.

²³ Anonymus (202) definitely states that in certain cases all except the proofs could be omitted. This Schanz takes to be a theory of Theodorus. If it was, it seems a little strange that the man who, according to Mutschmann and Rostagni, considered *pathos* as all-important should not have put more emphasis on the peroration, where *pathos* was universally recognized to be most important. The proofs are rather the rational, factual, and therefore 'Apollodorean' part.

to consider brevity and lucidity as particularly characteristic of the narrative.²⁴

On the other hand, Schanz goes on to find rigidity also in Apollodorus' attitude towards figures. We remember that Quintilian quotes Caecilius as saying that Apollodorus found the teaching on figures incomprehensible. It may well be also that Alexander is arguing against Apollodorus when he speaks of people who refuse to recognize more than one figure to any saying or speech, but it would seem that the position of Apollodorus was not so much a matter of rigidity as of terminology, i. e. his insistence on using the word *schêma* in its general sense only.²⁵

When Schanz (pp. 52-4) argues, however, that Theodorus' adaptability was an overall principle which he applied to all departments of rhetoric, using the word in the widest sense, and that Theodorus recognized expediency (*τὸ συμφέρον—utilitas*) as the guiding principle at all times, he seems to go beyond his evidence and conveniently to forget Quintilian's explicit statements that Theodorus too was the rigid contriver of absolute rules in other departments of rhetoric and that many of his innovations were purely verbal. Here Schanz leans heavily on the statement we have quoted from Alexander that the Apollodoreans treated rhetoric as a science instead of a *technê*. We have seen reasons²⁶ why this statement cannot be transferred to Theodorus and cannot be used as evidence of clearly distinguished theories held by the two masters at the beginning of the first century. There is, except for that one statement of Alexander, no trace of such a basic difference between the two schools in the Anonymus, and there is not a word about it in Quintilian; indeed several statements of his seem to contradict it. Our evidence, considered as a whole, does not carry us beyond the theory of the parts of speech. To call the Theodoreans "the

²⁴ See Quintilian, IV, 2, 32 (quoted above), but this statement of Theodorus may betray only the usual lack of moral scruple rather than adaptability. Brevity was also rejected by Aristotle (*Rhet.*, III, 16, 4) as a virtue of narrative. Both brevity and lucidity are also regarded as general virtues by Cicero (e.g. *Partit. Orat.*, 6, 19-22) as well as by Dionysius (*Letter to Pompey*, 3).

²⁵ Alexander, *περὶ σχημάτων* (Spengel, III, pp. 9-40) and see note 9 above.

²⁶ Anonymus, 30-2, quoted and discussed above, pp. 345-6.

Anomalists of rhetoric" does seem to go too far. One may feel that such a restricted theoretical difference as a different approach to the theory of the parts of speech does not account for the century-long quarrel between the two schools, but for the rhetorical days of the first century A. D., such a feeling should carry very little weight. While we may accept Schanz' main point, that a principle of difference did exist between the two schools, i. e., the 'scientism' of Apollodorus against the greater adaptability of the Theodoreans, and we know that this applied at least to the important theories of speech structure, we cannot extend that principle to apply beyond rhetorical theory, nor indeed extend it to the whole of that field without flying straight in the face of the explicit, and most reliable, evidence of Quintilian.

Mutschmann accepts the widest application of this principle of difference. He then goes on to argue from the rather conventional statement of Neocles that *pathos* may be in place in every part of a speech. He argues, first, that this was obviously the view of Theodorus. Even if this could be proved, the theory was probably not original, for it is also the view of Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. But when Mutschmann goes on to deduce (pp. 58-61) from this that when *pathos* did occur Theodorus considered that it should be intensified from one part of a speech to the next until it culminates in the peroration, he is on very dubious ground.²⁷ In this context he attaches the great-

²⁷ The only evidence brought in support of this view is that the Anonymus says (237-42), speaking in his own person, that the diction of the exordium should not be elaborate or remarkable but it will contain, in brief summary, some of the things to be mentioned in the narrative; that the language of the narrative should be bolder and take more chances, but with moderation; that the language of the proofs should be vigorous (*ἐναργώνιος*, this does *not* mean passionate, as Mutschmann thinks, see note 37 below) and more bitter, with more finished periods and clauses. The language of the peroration should be emotional (*παθητική*), bolder in thought and tension, and passionate in complaint.

Even if this whole statement of the third century Anonymus is credited back to Theodorus two centuries before (which is of course not justified), it does *not* support the idea of ever-increasing passion in a speech. Indeed that interpretation contradicts the Anonymus himself, for he too discusses *pathos* *mainly* in connection with the exordium and the peroration, and defines the exordium as (5) λόγος κινήτικὸς ἢ

est importance to the inference that the Apollodoreans allowed no *pathos* in the two middle parts. This is probably true, and is, as we saw, a fair inference from the evidence of Quintilian (which Mutschmann ignores). It would certainly give more point to Neocles' statement that *pathos* should not be so restricted. This, however, does not exclude all emotion in those sections of the speech, far from it. In the first place, the milder emotions are included under *êthos*; ²⁸ in the second place, to restrict violent emotional appeals (which is the meaning of *pathos* in this rhetorical context) to exordium and peroration is by no means the same thing as attaching no importance to *pathos*. Everyone agreed, in any case, that such appeals should culminate in the peroration.

Nor does the simple statement of Neocles that *pathos* has a part to play in every section of a speech support the further theory that Theodorus and the Theodoreans looked upon passion, imagination, the irrational element generally, as the most important thing in rhetoric and in literature. Were it so, it would be very strange that it was they (in so far as we take the Anonymus to be a Theodorean) who would omit every part of a speech, at certain times, except the proofs, for one would then have expected the peroration to be vital. There does not seem to be any necessary correlation between the "Theodorean" view of rhetoric as a *technê*, or their greater adaptability in certain respects, with the overriding importance which, in Mutschmann's view, they attached to *pathos* and the irrational, especially if one remembers that emotional appeals were, and had always been, subject to rules and regulations as much as any other

θεραπευτικὸς τῶν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ παθῶν. There are, as we have seen, references to *pathos* in the narrative and the proofs, but in those sections they are incidental. Curiously enough, in his discussion of *εἰρήσεις* at the end of the work, the quotations are not from Theodorean sources but from Harpocration, believed to be an Apollodorean (244-52) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (253). The quotation from the latter is especially interesting, for it is in any case not later than Theodorus. It is from the *Lysias* (9); it too advises a simpler diction for the exordium and a gradually greater degree of elaboration and vigour. But this does not necessarily involve steadily progressing use of *pathos* or emotional appeals, in which in any case Lysias was deficient (D. H., *Lysias*, 13).

²⁸ Quintilian, VI, 2, 4-24 and see also note 10 on p. 16 of my *Longinus On Great Writing* (New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1957).

aspects of the art of rhetoric. There is very little evidence, if any, to show that the theories of Theodorus were applied by him beyond the field of rhetoric; indeed it is very doubtful whether he applied them to the whole of that field.²⁹

All Mutschmann's conclusions are enthusiastically adopted by Rostagni, but he provides no further evidence. He repeats and embellishes the contrast between the Apollodoreans as believers in a schematized, scientific, rationalized rhetoric with inflexible rules and a minimum of emotion, if any, as against the Theodoreans, the empiricists always ready to adjust all their rules to the particular circumstances. He then goes on to draw a splendid imaginative picture of Theodorus himself, the apostle of the passionate as the one element of cardinal importance in art, the champion of the irrational as the *sine qua non*, the root of greatness in all literature.³⁰ He even goes on to extend this contrast to other fields (following a suggestion of Schanz): the Apollodoreans are Atticists and Analogists while the Theo-

²⁹ Rostagni, *Scritti Minori*, p. 456 quotes Suidas' list of the works of Theodorus which includes, besides rhetorical works, a *περὶ ἰστροπίας* and *περὶ πολιτείας*. The latter may only have dealt with political (i. e. deliberative) rhetoric, and is in any case hardly literary; the former (if correct, but Suidas' lists are very poor evidence) seems to be on the writing of history, which would argue some interest in epideictic rhetoric (which included history), and to that extent in literature. But Theodorus restricted himself to political and judicial rhetoric (Quint., II, 15, 21, quoted above).

Mutschmann (pp. 65-6) seems to base his claim that Theodorus was interested in literature in general on the fact that the Anonymus, who restricts himself to forensic rhetoric (this is not quite correct, since the work purports to deal with *πολιτικὸς* as well as *δικανικὸς λόγος*), yet occasionally quotes from or refers to the poets: six times to Homer, three to Euripides, twice to Menander, and once to Sophocles (also to Thucydides). There is, too, the statement of Alexander that the poets give a good starting point for *pathos*. I can see no significance in this, any more than in the statement (195) that some people criticize Plato because he tacked a twofold subject and then dropped one of them (presumably Eros in the *Phaedrus* which the Anonymus has quoted at 207).

³⁰ *Anonimo*, p. xv: "Se poi Apollodoro aveva attribuito la massima importanza all' elemento pragmatico, ossia al contenuto narrativo-espositivo-razionale, facendo che il *πάθος* non intervenisse se non separatamente in parti marginali e accessorie del discorso, Teodoro invece all' elemento patetico dà la funzione dominante; vuole che questo corra e trabocchi per tutto il discorso, come elemento costitutivo, come

doreans are Asianists and Anomalists; the Apollodoreans trace their descent from Aristotle via Alexandria, while the Theodoreans are the spiritual descendants of Plato and the Stoics. But the only evidence given in support of all this are the passages from the Anonymus quoted above.²¹

On any reasonable interpretation of *all* the evidence, from Quintilian, Seneca, and the Anonymus, we are bound to discard Rostagni's splendid picture as quite fanciful. In the main, the impression we get from Quintilian is (as one would expect) correct, though it can be usefully supplemented from the Anony-

essenziale energia vivificatrice" (my italics). The reference in the notes which supports all this is A. S., 30-9, i. e. Alexander's passage on ἐπιστήμη versus τέχνη, and his reasons for occasionally omitting the exordium. See also *Scritti Minori*, pp. 462 ff.

²¹ This spiritual ancestry, as outlined by Rostagni, seems rather surprising, as it was Apollodorus who came from Pergamum and has been thought to be under Stoic influence. The truth is that by the time of Apollodorus and Theodorus, and even more so by the time of the Anonymus, all these problems of rhetoric had been discussed for centuries, and a whole rhetorical and critical literature had developed, in which traces of Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Alexandrian, Pergamene sources were inextricably intermingled. The Anonymus, for example, a Theodorean, quotes Plato (207), Aristotle (102, 170, 208), and Chrysippus (207) with approval; on diction he has a long quotation from Harpocration (alleged to be an Apollodorean) and quotes him three times more (8, 104, 159) without criticism. He also quotes from Dionysius of Halicarnassus with approval and, as we have seen, Aristotelian influence can be seen in a number of places. Then, if Theodorus had really been the apostle of the irrational in literature which Rostagni depicts, one imagines that Plato would have repudiated any responsibility for him. Again, Theodorus refuses to recognize brevity (the Stoic virtue) as characteristic of the narrative, and so on. While it is true that the question as to whether rhetoric is a science can ultimately be traced back to the *Gorgias* (463A, see Mutschmann, p. 55), the terms are used by the Anonymus in an Aristotelian sense. Moreover, the problem as to whether rhetoric was an *ars*, and in what sense it was so, is also discussed in Cicero, by Crassus in *De Oratore*, I, 107-9, and by Antonius, *ibid.*, II, 30-3. On the other hand the notion of one σχῆμα κατὰ φύσιν for every speech, attributed to Apollodorus, would rather seem to be of Stoic origin. Brzoska (*R.-E.*, I, col. 2889) holds that both Apollodorus and Theodorus were Atticists while Stegeman (*R.-E.*, V, A, 2, col. 1850) traces Aristotelian influences in Theodorus and maintains that the differences between them had nothing to do with the Atticism-Asianism controversy (col. 1855) as against Wilamowitz in *Hermes*, XXXV, p. 49, Mutschmann, and Rostagni.

mus. On the important theory of the parts of a speech, the Theodorean showed much greater adaptability while the Apollodoreans were extremely rigid, and the latter were apt to regard rhetoric as a matter of absolute rules. On other matters, however, the Theodorean, or at least Theodorus himself, could be equally rigid. They were both opposed to those who (like Antonius in Cicero) maintained that native talent was all that was required. Both of them, as all the evidence shows, were rhetoricians and teachers of rhetoric. There is no evidence at all that either of them had anything which could be called a general theory of literature.

B.

THEODORUS AND 'LONGINUS'

If, as I have tried to show, the Mutschmann-Rostagni picture of Theodorus is unhistorical, then, of course, the further theory that the author of *On the Sublime* was a direct disciple of Theodorus will fall with it. This further theory, however, also involves a serious misunderstanding of Longinus,³² and the arguments by which it is supported should be examined in themselves, for such an examination will bring out some further points about the statements in the Anonymus and clarify the meaning and purpose of the treatise *On the Sublime*.

It should be clear, to begin with, that nothing in the Anonymus can be used as evidence for dating *On the Sublime*, since, if the traditional third-century date were correct, any similarity of ideas or expressions, whether Theodorean or not, could come direct from this treatise which was in any case not written till late in the second century. Mutschmann is quite clear on this point. He is persuaded on other grounds that *On the Sublime* dates from the first century A. D., and then tries to prove the direct dependence of Longinus on Theodorus from such evidence as he finds in the Anonymus about the theories of the rhetorician. This is quite legitimate. Rostagni, however, does not

³² For the sake of clarity, I shall call the author of the treatise *On the Sublime* Longinus, without prejudice to the question of its authorship, to distinguish him from the Anonymus Seguerianus, whom I shall continue to call the Anonymus. Nor do I here wish to discuss the exact meaning of τὸ ὑψος, for which see my "Notes on the περί ὑψους" in *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 355-60, and, generally, see the introduction to my translation, *Longinus on Great Writing*.

keep the two questions distinct, and he seems to argue for the first-century date on the basis of the Anonymus' evidence.³³ That is merely arguing in a circle.

The main point of contact between Theodorus and Longinus, according to Mutschmann, is that for both men *pathos* is by far the most important factor in great writing.³⁴ As far as Longinus is concerned, this point seems to him to be so obvious as to require no argument, and he refers to a remark of Wilamowitz that "*On the Sublime*" had better have been entitled "*Über das Pathetische*." And yet this all-but identification of *hypsos* with *pathos* seems to me, on the contrary, to be completely mistaken and to be based on a serious misunderstanding of the essential meaning of Longinus.

It is quite true that Longinus rebukes Caecilius for omitting any reference to *pathos* in his discussion of *hypsos*, and that he says (8 *ad fin.*):

If Caecilius thought that passion was not worth mentioning because it does not contribute to great writing, he was altogether deceived. For I would make bold to say that nothing contributes to greatness as much as noble passion in the right place; it breathes the frenzied spirit of its inspiration upon the words and makes them, as it were, inspired.

Many other passages could be quoted to show the important role which Longinus assigns to noble passion in great writing.

On the other hand, he has already stated that if Caecilius omitted to mention passion because he thought it identical with *hypsos*, he was also quite mistaken, and adds that some *πάθη*, such as pity, grief, and fear, do *not* go with *hypsos*, and that there are innumerable passages which are great but devoid of passion (he quotes *Odyssey*, XI, 315-18).

³³ *Anonimo*, pp. x-xiii, and *Scritti Minori*, p. 451.

³⁴ Pp. 6-7: "Denn, dass in den Augen des Autors *περὶ ὕψους* das *πάθος* die Hauptsache ist, sagen seine eben angeführten Worte (i. e. 8,1 und 8,4) deutlich genug; dass es sich wie ein roter Faden durch seine ganze Schrift hindurchzieht, braucht einem aufmerksamen Leser derselben wohl nicht näher nachgewiesen zu werden. Hier ist also der Punkt, an dem unsere Untersuchung einsetzen muss, wenn wir den Sinn der Polemik unseres Autors erfassen wollen." The note then refers to the statement quoted from Wilamowitz, from *Kultur der Gegenwart*, VIII², p. 223.

Moreover, of Longinus' five sources of greatness the first is not passion but τὸ περὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἀδρεπήβολον, i. e. vigour of mental conception or the power to grasp great ideas, and we have the famous phrase, in the same chapter, that *hypsos* is the echo of a noble mind. This is an *intellectual quality*, and once we realize it we can dispose at once of any notion that Longinus was or could be the disciple of any apostle of the irrational in literature. Great minds, of course, are full of passion, but their intensity of feeling is not the main cause of their greatness. Longinus' "strong and inspired emotion" is the *second* cause of greatness. It is akin to the *θεῖα μανία* of Plato's *Phaedrus*³⁵ (where the adjective is essential), for it refers to passion directed to noble ends, not mere irrational intensity of feeling but τὸ γενναῖον πάθος ἐνθα χρή.

That Caecilius also omitted τὸ ἀδρεπήβολον (so Mutschmann, pp. 7-8) is indeed very likely, but there is no suggestion anywhere that this first source of greatness, so obviously of vital importance to Longinus, could be found in any 'Theodorean' writings. Longinus treats of it at length: under this heading he deals with the capacity to select vital details in a situation and weld them into an artistic whole (10), the omission of all irrelevancies, amplification (11), emulation (13-14), imagination, or the capacity to "see" and make an audience "see" things (15). All these are qualities or functions of the mind. Passion is not absent in their application, but it is not the characteristic quality of any one of them, *not even of imagination*.

These first two sources of greatness are largely inborn, though even they can be improved by training and by familiarity with great literature. But there are three other sources of great writing, and these are a matter of art and training: the use of figures, diction, and word-arrangement. No one can suggest that Longinus neglects these or is less enthusiastic in his treatment of them. He is no apostle of natural talent as against training, and he makes it abundantly clear that both are necessary (2).

In the great passage on the imperfections of genius (33-5) there is, it is true, a contrast involved between natural talent and techniques in so far as impeccable technique and minor qualities

³⁵ *Phaedrus*, 244 A ff. Divine "madness" to Plato is passion directed (whether by reason or by the gods) to noble ends. This is a very different thing from irrational emotionalism.

do not outweigh the greatness of genius with its occasional carelessness and imperfections, but this does *not* mean that technique should be neglected, for truly *great passages*, like the famous Marathon oath, *are very clearly a product of both*. Where great writers are careless, the result is *not* ὕψος, but we may forgive them their rare imperfections because their great passages are so very great. This is a very different attitude from that which maintains that genius alone matters, or that great passages are the result only of irrational passion. The first source of greatness throughout remains nobility and vigour of *mind*, and when Longinus tries to explain it he asks (35) "What was it they *saw*, these demigods . . . ?" He does not say: "What was it they *felt*?"

The same confusion between *pathos* and *hypsos* leads Mutschmann (p. 60) to attach great importance to the almost casual remark of the Anonymus (quoted above), where, in the discussion of narrative (94), he states that both *pathos* and *êthos* help persuasiveness; that the character must be genuine, and that "passion *not only* persuades, it *also* takes the hearer out of himself." Mutschmann unhesitatingly attributes this thought to Theodorus and regards it as "echt theodorische Doktrin." He further sees in it the basic thought of Longinus (*der Lieblir-gsgedanke unseres Verfassers der sich durch seine ganze Abhandlung hindurchzieht*); he quotes, *as the same thought*, the description of *hypsos* in the first chapter of Longinus.

To this we may reply that it is, in the first place, quite gratuitous to credit the words of the Anonymus to Theodorus two centuries before, merely on the evidence of a common theory of the need of adaptability in the treatment of the parts of a speech and the admitting of *pathos* in each part. Of course, Theodorus *may* well have said something of the kind, for the thought that passion takes the hearer out of himself is in any case a commonplace of rhetorical theory.³⁶ For that matter, Apollodorus might have said the same thing, for the fact that he restricted *pathos* to the exordium and the peroration is no evidence at all

³⁶ The meaning of ἐκίστημι as to confound, to amaze, to take out of oneself is frequent in classical texts and is found in this context in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (III, 8, 4). The expression in Longinus, however, is εἰς ἐκστάσιν ἄγειν. As for the thought, we think of the many passages in Cicero on the power of the orator to excite the passions of his audience.

that he attached no importance to it. What is far more important, however, is that what Longinus says is something entirely different. He is talking of *hypsos*, not *pathos*; and he *contrasts* the ecstasy of being taken out of oneself with persuasion which is something quite different (whereas the Anonymus took *ekstasis* as a sort of extra):

Great writing (τὰ ὑπερφυῖα) does *not* persuade; it takes the reader out of himself. The startling and amazing is more powerful than the charming and persuasive, if indeed it be true that to be convinced is usually within our control whereas amazement is the result of an irresistible force beyond the control of any audience. We become aware of a writer's inventive skill, the structure and arrangement of his subject matter, not from one or two passages but as these qualities slowly emerge from the texture of the whole work. But greatness appears suddenly; like a thunderbolt it carries all before it and reveals the writer's full power in a flash.

The subject, the language, the feeling, and the meaning of the two passages are as different as any two passages can be. The Anonymus is a Theodorean rhetorician painstakingly listing all the factors that may contribute to persuasion in the narrative. The other is . . . the author of *On the Sublime*!

Apart from the basic confusion between *hypsos* and *pathos* which vitiates his whole argument for a 'Theodorean' Longinus, Mutschmann gives a number of supposed "parallels" between the Anonymus and Longinus to support his main argument. These may be briefly reviewed:

1. In developing his view that the theory of the parts of speech must be adapted to the needs of the case, the Anonymus naturally uses not infrequently such words as *καίρος*, *εὐκαιρος*, *συμφέρων* and the like. Half a dozen uses of these words and the ideas they signify are then produced from Longinus. At 2, 2 he says that natural talent provides much, but that study helps to find the right measure and the *right moment* (*καίρον*) in each case. At 3, 5 what "Theodorus used to call parenthesis" is described as *untimely* passion, *πάθος ἄκαιρον* (here we may well have a quotation from Theodorus).³⁷ At 8, 4 nothing is so conducive to

³⁷ Both Mutschmann (p. 51) and Rostagni (*Anonimo*, p. x) insist that the use of the imperfect ὅτε Θεόδωρος ἐκάλει must mean that Longinus heard him say so. This is not true, see note 22 on p. xx of my translation (above, note 32) where I compare Demetrius, 76.

greatness as "passion in the right place, *ἐνθα χρή*." At 42, 2 we find the expression *παρὰ καιρὸν μῆκος*, i. e. "length which the occasion does not require." At 43, 3 Theopompus is blamed for the use of lowly words *παρὰ καιρὸν*, at the wrong time. Nothing is more common, in ancient rhetorical theory and criticism, than the idea of *πρέπον*, suitability. I do not see how Mutschmann can (p. 56) persuade himself that these passages (to which I am sure others might be added) are proofs of 'Theodorianism.'

2. Mutschmann (p. 59) insists that the words *ἀγών* and *ἐναγώνιος* are identical in meaning with *πάθος* and *ἐμπαθής*. He then lists a number of examples of the former in Longinus and regards these as proof that his thought is "rooted in" Theodorus. But *ἀγών* means an actual trial or debate (the real battle, as Cicero and Quintilian used to say) and the adjective *ἐναγώνιος* refers to the qualities then displayed, i. e. vividness, actuality, realism, etc. As the meaning of the words is quite different, the conclusion in any case does not follow.³⁸

³⁸ *ἀγών* naturally refers to the actual debate in court, the performance. Aristotle in the *Poetics* (6, 9, 1450 b 19) speaks of appreciating a tragedy on reading it, *καὶ ἀνεὺ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν*. The adjectives then came to refer to the kind of style or delivery that one uses in actual debate, and so *Rhet.*, III, 12, 1: οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγωνιστικὴ (*λέξις*). See also Demetrius, 193 (cf. 226 and 271), where the omission of connectives is *ἐναγώνιος*, suited to actual debate, and the *ἐναγώνιοι λόγοι* of Demosthenes mean in Dionysius (*Demosth.*, 45) the speeches delivered in court or before the Assembly. Elsewhere the same author (*ibid.*, 30 *ad fin.*) draws a contrast between courtroom oratory and *πολιτικὸν σχῆμα* which is *οὐκ ἐναγώνιον*, i. e. less vivid or vigorous.

So *ἐναγώνιος λέξις* has the qualities of style that are characteristic of actual debate, or that give an impression of actual debate, a feeling of reality or actuality. This may include passion, but the word never carries that meaning by itself. Hence the word-arrangement of Isocrates is less *ἐναγώνιος* than that of Lysias (*D. H., Isocrates*, 2), and Dionysius can speak of his own History (*Rom. Ant.*, I, 8) as *ἐξ ἐπάσης ιδέας μικτὸν ἐναγωνίου τε καὶ θεωρητικῆς*, i. e. a mixture of both action and reflection that will thus appeal both to politicians and philosophers. When, therefore, the Anonymus applies the term *ἐναγώνιος* to the language of the proofs, he means vigorous or vivid (or perhaps contentious) but he does not mean passionate, or at any rate not exclusively.

The examples in Longinus which convince Mutschmann that *ἀγών* is equivalent to *πάθος* and *ἐναγώνιος* to *ἐμπαθής* in fact prove the opposite. They are:

- i) At 11, 2: amplification should be used "whenever the subject or

3. Great importance is then attached (Mutschmann, pp. 59-60) to the contrast between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in chapter 9, where Longinus describes the former as δραματικὸν καὶ ἐναγώνιον whereas the latter is διηγηματικόν. The *Iliad* is said to have πάθος, the *Odyssey* ἥθος. This distinction is, of course, as old as Aristotle,³⁹ but its significance, to Mutschmann, resides

the circumstances of the case—πραγμάτων καὶ ἀγώνων—allow pauses and fresh starts. . . .” ἀγών is here used in its original sense of the actual case in court, and to see here a reference to the division of the parts of a speech into πραγματικά and παθητικά seems quite pointless.

ii) At 15, 9: Imaginative representations contribute many ἐναγώνια καὶ ἐμπαθέη. The words are not synonymous. ἐναγώνια means vigour, vividness, a sense of actuality or the like.

iii) At 22, 1 hyperbaton is οἶονεὶ χαρακτήρ ἐναγωνίου πάθους, i. e. “as it were the true stamp of living passion” (i. e. real, actual). So too τὰ ἀγωνιστικόν and ἀγωνία occur in the same chapter and they too refer to an impression of actuality or reality.

iv) 26, 3: Suddenly to address the reader in the second person makes him ἐμπαθέστερον, προσεκτικώτερον, καὶ ἀγῶνος ἔμπλεων, i. e. “it enlists his feelings, secures his attention, and makes the situation real to him.” So at the beginning of the chapter this figure is said to be ἐναγώνιος, i. e. to give an impression of actuality.

v) 15, 1: we are told that the use of imagination achieves ὄγκος, μεγαληγορία, and ἀγών. This is not “nichts anders als πάθος,” but again the word means a sense of actuality.

vi) 18, 2: The effectiveness of rhetorical questions: “just as those who are suddenly asked questions by others are provoked to answer ἐναγωνίως καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας.” The adverb should not be identified “ohne weiteres” with παθητικῶς but it means that as in life people are provoked to answer “actually and truthfully” so the rhetorical question gives a similar impression of spontaneity.

vii) 9, 13: The *Iliad* is said to be δραματικὸν καὶ ἐναγώνιον while the *Odyssey* is διηγηματικόν. Here I should translate that the *Iliad* is “full of drama and action” (cf. Dionysius on his History, above, and see note 39).

viii) In 25, by the use of the historic present οὐ διήγησιν ἔτι τὸν λόγον ἀλλ’ ἐναγώνιον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεις, i. e. “You will be describing the event as actually happening and no longer narrating what has happened.”

Thus the very example quoted by Mutschmann from Longinus to prove that in every case ἀγών and ἐναγώνιος refer to passion actually show the opposite. We may add two further examples: at 19 asyndeton φέρει ἀγωνίας ἔμφασιν and at 23, 1 various figures are said to be ἀγωνιστικά. In both cases the word should again be translated: “give a sense of actuality (or realism).”

³⁹ *Poetics*, 24, 2 (1459 b 14): ἡ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἡ δ’

in the fact that Neocles, too, identified ἦθος with narrative (A. S., 94). Since, however, Neocles also spoke of πάθος in the narrative, and it was the Apollodoreans who forbade it there, one would have thought that any clear distinction between ἦθος and διήγησις on the one side with πάθος on the other was Apollodorean rather than Theodorean.

4. Mutschmann (p. 62) also finds a particularly significant connection between Neocles' statement (A. S., 239) that appeals to the emotions are particularly useful when you have a weak case, as the judge, emotionally intoxicated (μεθυσκοόμενος), no longer examines things exactly, and Longinus' statement that *hypsos* and *pathos* will allay the suspicions which the clever use of figures would otherwise arouse (17, 1 and a similar statement at 32, 4 on the use of numerous metaphors). Such an idea, we are told, *must* come from Theodorus.

There are no similarities of language, and the circumstances are quite different, as is the subject discussed. It is possible, of course, that his idea came to Longinus after reading the Anonymus, or some work of Theodorus, but nothing follows. For he might have got it from Cicero, or a dozen other places. He might even, to suggest the unthinkable, have thought of it himself! True, both Neocles and Longinus refer to Demosthenes here, but their examples are different. This surely can hardly be thought to be significant.

5. Longinus speaks of a mixture of figures.⁴⁰ This, Mutschmann tells us (p. 63), is Theodorean, and cannot have come from Apollodorus. The latter is probably true, if we remember Apollodorus' remarks on figures quoted by Quintilian, though we may also remember that Caecilius, whom Mutschmann, Rostagni, and others regard as an Apollodorean, wrote on figures!⁴¹ We find mixed figures discussed, of course, by Aristotle, Demetrius, Cicero, and others, as well as Alexander.

6. Mutschmann also (p. 64) attaches great importance to the chapter in which Longinus discusses *phantasia*, imagination. The function of the rhetorical imagination, he there tells us,

Ὀδύσσεια πεπλεγμένον . . . καὶ ἠθικὴ. See also note 10 on p. 16 of my *Longinus On Great Writing*.

⁴⁰ At 20, and also 16, the discussion of the Marathon oath.

⁴¹ As Stegeman has pointed out (*R.-H.*, V, A, col. 1855). See the references to Caecilius in Quintilian, IX, 3, namely 38, 46, 89, 91, 97.

"is perhaps to contribute vividness and passion (*ἐναγόνια καὶ ἐμπαθῆ*) in many other ways but, above all, when mixed with practical argumentation, *κατακυριωμένη ταῖς πρακτικαῖς ἐπιχειρήσεσι*, to master the hearer rather than persuade him" (15, 9) and again "in the midst of factual arguments he uses his imagination and goes beyond persuasion" (15, 10). Mutschmann sees here a clear parallel to the theory developed in the Anonymus that pathos may be mixed into the argumentative part of a speech. I cannot see that Longinus has that theory in mind, and, in any case, as we have seen, others besides Theodorus (e. g. Cicero) admitted pathos there.

Mutschmann points out, quite rightly, that while Longinus distinguishes between the poetic and the rhetorical imagination, he fails to keep the two distinct and actually uses examples from the poets to illustrate the rhetorical kind.⁴² But I cannot see that this bears any relation to the statement of Alexander (A. S., 234) that drama will provide the orator with good examples of *παθητικόν*. The advice to read the poets was given to the orators at least as early as Theophrastus.⁴³

It is natural enough that vividness should be mentioned when discussing imaginative pictures, and we do find that Longinus (15, 1) defines it as *ὑπ' ὅψιν τιθέναι* and the Anonymus (96) as *ὑπ' ὅψιν ἄγειν*. Obviously, we are told, this must be the source of Longinus' definition, but once again we are in the presence of a definition as old as Aristotle.⁴⁴

7. Two more verbal parallels are emphasized, though Mutschmann himself admits (p. 66) that they might be coincidental. The same passage of Demosthenes (*Midias*, 72) is used as an example of *diatyposis* by Longinus (20, 1) and by the Anonymus (233). Also, in discussing Hyperides (34, 2) Longinus mentions as an example of his versatility that his story of Leto is close to poetry. The story of Leto by Hyperides is also mentioned by the Anonymus (99), and the words *ἡδύ* and *ἀσσεῖσμός* occur somewhere in the neighbourhood in both places. These examples must have come from a common source, we are told,

⁴² In ch. 15, though Longinus might reply that he should not be blamed if the poets, Euripides for example, make use of oratorical rather than poetic imagination.

⁴³ See Quintilian, X, 1, 27.

⁴⁴ See note 22 above.

and the source must have been Theodorean. They may well have come from a common source, but in view of the frequent occurrence of the same examples in rhetorical writings, it is rather the small number of such true parallels between the two treatises that should impress one, and very little significance can be attached to one or two.

Such are the arguments, similarities, and parallels upon which Mutschmann bases his theory of the Theodorean nature of the treatise "On the Sublime." Rostagni accepts all this and is even willing to name Hermagoras, the disciple of Theodorus,⁴⁵ as the author of the treatise. Their case is, in my opinion, completely unconvincing and should never have received acceptance. It is based on a highly misleading use of evidence and a serious misunderstanding of Longinus.

After reviewing all the evidence we concluded, in the first part of this article, that the view of Theodoreanism propounded by Mutschmann and elaborated by Rostagni was ill-founded. We may now add that the attempt to make Longinus into a disciple of such 'Theodoreanism' is equally mistaken. Longinus does quote Theodorus once, explicitly. He may here and there have drawn upon Theodorean sources, as he did on many other kinds, but there is no evidence that he did so, and the attempt to make him into a follower of Theodorus is, on any view of that rhetorician, quite contrary to all that we know of both men.

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⁴⁵ *Anonimo*, pp. xi-xiii. This Hermagoras is mentioned by Quintilian (III, 1, 18) as a prominent disciple of Theodorus.

AN ATHENIAN MONUMENT TO THEODOROS OF GADARA.

In the course of the excavation of the southwest corner of the Agora of Athens, a fragmentary statue base of dark Eleusinian limestone was discovered.¹ The base had been broken up and its fragments used in the construction of the enclosure wall of the late Roman gymnasium complex of the fifth century after Christ which passed over the ruins of the Civic Offices in front of the Middle Stoa, just opposite the Tholos.² Not all the fragments of the base were recovered from the wall, but enough to give the overall dimensions and to allow an almost certain restoration of the inscription.

The base is a low, broad one,³ and the cuttings on its top show that it once supported a life-sized bronze figure standing with the right foot slightly advanced. There is an inscription on the front face of the base. The existing inscription is not the first one to have been written there, however; an earlier inscription has been carefully erased by dressing down the surface wherever necessary, but only a few slight traces of the earlier letters remain.⁴ The existing inscription, which may be dated in the first century before or the first century after Christ by the letter forms and by the spelling 'Αρήου for 'Αρείου which is especially common in Augustan times, reads as follows:⁵


¹ Agora Inv. No. I 6051. Found on July 25, 1947. The base has not been published previously, and since the editor of this Journal has invited me to present it here in company with Mr. Grube's article, I am grateful to Messrs. H. A. Thompson and B. D. Meritt for permission to do so.

² The spot where the base was found lies in square I 12 of the actual state plan of the Agora which is published in *Hesperia*, XXII (1953), Pl. 12, as well as in all volumes of the *Athenian Agora* series.

³ Height 0.25 m. Width 0.83 m. Thickness 0.62 m. The fragments forming the right corner of the base do not actually join the main mass, but their position is fixed by the inscription, the upper tops of the *upsilon* of 'Αρήου appearing on either side of the gap.

⁴ These are shown in thin lines on the drawing. The dressed down area is stippled.

⁵ Average height of letters 0.035 m.



AGORA I 6051

Inscription on Statue Base in Athens Honoring Theodoros of Gadara.
Drawing by M. R. Jones.

aetate	[^τ Η β]ουλλή [^η ε]ξ Ἀρχίου Πάγου
Augusti	Θεόδ[ωρ]ον Εἰσιδώρου
	[^ρ ή]τορα

The restoration of the last line as [^ρή]τορα seems virtually certain. There is uninscribed space to the left of the break showing that the word was a short one and that at most two letters are missing.⁶

The name of the person honored is most probably to be restored as above, although Θεόδ[ωρ]ον, a somewhat less common name, would be equally acceptable epigraphically.

If now we seek to identify the person honored, our thoughts naturally turn to the famous rhetorician, Theodoros of Gadara; indeed, he is the only person who comes seriously into consideration. It is unfortunate that, on the one hand, his father's name has not come down to us in the literary tradition, and that, on the other hand, the base does not give the ethnic, for in either case the identification would then have been sure. The man honored, however, was evidently a famous person, for he is identified by the profession in which he had distinguished himself rather than by his place of origin. He will have been a foreigner rather than an Athenian, for had he been an Athenian his demotic would surely have been added, being an integral part of his name.⁷ Athens at this period was bestowing honors lavishly on distinguished persons, foreigners and natives alike, as a glance at the *Corpus* of inscriptions shows,⁸ and we should not be surprised to find the city honoring this well-known rhetorician who was then teaching at Rhodes. It may be that Theodoros even visited Athens, which would have furnished an occasion for the erection of a statue to him, though we have no record of such a visit.⁹

⁶ C. D. Buck and W. Peterson, *A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives*, pp. 306-10 lists words ending in -ωρ.

⁷ We may therefore exclude any connection with the family of Isidoros son of Theodoros of Anagyrous whose name appears on an ephebic list of the early first century B. C.: *I. G.*, II², 1039, line 80; J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, No. 7706.

⁸ Inscriptions honoring men of letters are published in *I. G.*, II², among numbers 3774-3821.

⁹ The few facts known about Theodoros' life are conveniently available at the beginning of Stegemann's article in *R.-E.*, s. v. Theodoros (No. 39) von Gadara, cols. 1847 f.

It seems therefore most likely that Theodoros of Gadara is the person honored by our base in spite of the lack of the ethnic, and, if so, we learn his father's name, Eisidoros or Isidoros, for the first time.

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ABBREVIATION OF HIERONYMUS IN DIODORUS.

It has long been recognised that, apart from the Sicilian chapters, the narrative in Diodorus, XVIII-XX, is derived, directly or indirectly, from the lost history of Hieronymus of Cardia.¹ It is also known that Hieronymus was the principal source for Plutarch's life of Eumenes, and was of considerable importance for his lives of Demetrius and Pyrrhus, if one may judge by the close correspondence which the major part of these biographies shows with the parallel account in Diodorus, and the explicit reference to, and quotations from, Hieronymus.² The peculiar method of Plutarch in constructing his biographies, the uncritical accumulation of material from different sources and the striking chronological gaps, necessitates a careful handling of them by modern historians. The straightforward narrative in Diodorus, XVIII-XX, on the other hand, would seem to present far less difficulty in its use. It is therefore important to insist upon the fact that Diodorus too gives a somewhat distorted reflection of Hieronymus, for this has a bearing on one's assessment of the parallel accounts in Diodorus and Plutarch and their comparative merits, as well as on the general value of Diodorus where he is our only source. This distortion arises from Diodorus abbreviating Hieronymus or using him at second hand in an author where the abbreviation had already taken place. There is, indeed, powerful evidence to support the belief that Diodorus uses Hieronymus through an intermediate author of the Alexandrian age, probably Agatharchides of Cnidus.³ The purpose of the present paper, however,

¹ Cf. Reuss, *Hieronimos von Cardia, Studien zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*; Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit*, I, pp. 560 ff.; Jacoby, *R.-E.*, VIII, cols. 1540 ff.; *F. Gr. H.*, 154; Brown, *A. H. R.*, LII (1947), pp. 684 ff.

² Plutarch, *Eumenes*, 12; *Demetrius*, 39; *Pyrrhus*, 17 = *F. Gr. H.*, 154 F 11; *Pyrr.*, 21 = *F. Gr. H.*, 154 F 12; *Pyrr.*, 27 = *F. Gr. H.*, 154 F 14. For Plutarch's use of Hieronymus in *Eum.*, 3 see De Sanctis, *Problemi di storia antica*, p. 145, n. 3.

³ *F. Gr. H.*, 86; *ib.*, II A C, pp. 150 ff.; cf. Susemihl, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 685 ff. Agatharchides lived through the middle of the second century B. C. He

is merely to illustrate the fact of the abbreviation, not the process by which it came about.

It is proposed to list first of all a number of places where Diodorus appears, on the evidence of a parallel account extant in another author, to have abbreviated Hieronymus. Secondly, other cases will be brought forward where no parallel reference survives but where the process of abbreviation can be deduced on grounds of probability. I reserve for special notice the case of the fragments preserved of Arrian's *History of the events following the death of Alexander*, for, although this furnishes a precise parallel with the relevant section of Diodorus and is of the greatest importance for the critic in evaluating the character of the two histories, the events covered embrace only a very brief space of time. In conclusion, some observations will be made on the scale of this part of Diodorus' history and its significance for the modern student in working out his reconstruction of the period.

The evidence for abbreviation of Hieronymus in Diodorus is so abundant that it will suffice to give only a selection of examples:⁴

(1) The important part played by Eumenes in composing the quarrel that broke out between the two parties within the Macedonian army after the death of Alexander is mentioned by Plutarch (*Eumenes*, 3), no doubt following Hieronymus, who will himself have received his information on the matter from Eumenes. Now, although most of Plutarch's life of Eumenes

wrote two comprehensive histories, one on European history in forty-nine books, the other on Asiatic in ten. The second book of his Asiatic history was used by Diodorus in his third, and in part of his first, book; and he was acquainted with the work of Hieronymus, as proved by one of his fragments. These two facts bring him into consideration as a possible intermediary between Hieronymus and Diodorus (Diod., I, 41, 4; III, 11, 1; *F. Gr. H.*, 154 T 2 = *ib.*, 86 F 4). As an Alexandrian, his claim is the stronger for the presence in Diodorus of the "Ptolemaic" passages, on which see Jacoby, *R.-E.*, VIII, cols. 1554 ff.; Schubert, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, pp. 184 ff.; 196 ff. It is strange that Kallenberg (*Berl. Phil. Woch.*, 1915, p. 297) and Brown (*loc. cit.*, p. 695) should take these passages to be from Hieronymus.

⁴ Cf. Schubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 272 ff.; Bauer, *Die Heidelberger Epitome*, pp. 15 ff. (many examples); *F. Gr. H.*, II B D, p. 545; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², IV, 1, p. 137, n. 1; p. 152, n. 2; p. 153, n. 2; p. 162, n. 1.

can be paralleled with the narrative in Diodorus, Hieronymus being clearly the common source, no mention of this event occurs in Diodorus. It is, however, possible that Diodorus does not use Hieronymus at all for the opening chapters of his eighteenth book.⁵

(2) Plutarch (*Eum.*, 4) refers in passing to some kind of attempt by Neoptolemus to reduce his newly assigned province of Armenia.⁶ No mention of this is to be found in Diodorus.

(3) Plutarch (*Eum.*, 12) and, more briefly, Cornelius Nepos (*Eumenes*, 5, 7) describe the device by which Eumenes in 319 was able to escape from the fortress of Nora on the border of Lycaonia and Cappadocia when closely guarded by troops of Antigonus. The story is not altogether clear but runs something like this: Eumenes was granted a truce and was invited to take an oath of friendship and alliance with Antigonus, the text being submitted through the historian Hieronymus, at this time a companion of Eumenes and acting as an envoy; this oath made only perfunctory mention of the kings at the beginning, and the main part referred entirely to Antigonus alone; Eumenes altered it by associating Olympias, the queen-mother, with the kings in the prologue of the oath, by swearing loyalty not only to Antigonus but to Olympias and the kings, and by a similar alteration in the clause regarding having the same friends and enemies as Antigonus; Eumenes then submitted the amended text to the judgment of the Macedonian infantry besieging him; being traditionally loyal to the royal house, they accepted this version, and Eumenes was permitted to leave Nora to go to exchange oaths with Antigonus who was at a distance.⁷ Diodorus (XVIII, 53, 5) does not tell the full story, and so conveys a misleading impression of what happened. He merely states that Antigonus raised the siege on receipt of an oath-bound pledge.⁸

⁵ Cf. Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, II, pp. 380 ff.

⁶ Cf. Arrian, *Historia Successorum Alexandri*, I^b, 6 (ed. Roos).

⁷ Nietzold (*Die Überlieferung der Diadochengeschichte bis zur Schlacht von Ipsos*, p. 87) only half believes Plutarch's story of the successful alteration of the oath by Eumenes; but, as Vezin (*Eumenes von Kardia, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, p. 154) points out, the story should be accepted in its entirety or else totally rejected.

⁸ According to Justin (XIV, 2, 4), the siege was raised because of help sent by Antipater to whom Eumenes had earlier sent an embassy

(4) Diodorus (XIX, 56, 2: great services by Peithon and Peucestas to Antigonus unrewarded) suggests that Peucestas had arranged in advance with Antigonus to betray Eumenes.⁹ Plutarch (*Eum.*, 16) says that even before the final battle at Gabiene there were plots in motion among the other generals to deprive Eumenes of his command: nothing corresponding to this can be found in Diodorus.¹⁰

(5) Compare Diod., XIX, 46, 4 with Polyaeus, IV, 6, 14. It will be found that the two accounts tally well enough, except that, whereas Polyaeus says that Peithon was sentenced by the Macedonian army-in-assembly before his execution, Diodorus only tells of a sentence before the private council (*synhedrion*). Juridically, a condemnation by the assembly of soldiers seems appropriate, and Polyaeus may therefore give the truer version.¹¹ Hieronymus perhaps reported both stages but was shortened by Diodorus.

(6) It should be noticed that the account in Diodorus of the redistribution of the eastern satrapies is incomplete (XIX, 48). He does not mention Parthia, and he omits the replacement of Amphimachus by Blitor in Mesopotamia, a detail preserved by Appian (*Syriace*, 53).¹²

(7) Plutarch (*Demetrius*, 7) mentions that Demetrius relieved Halicarnassus when it was being besieged by Ptolemy. Similar relieving operations by Demetrius, as well as the raids of Ptolemy around the coasts of Asia Minor, are reported by Diodorus in respect of several other cities but not Halicarnassus.¹³ Plutarch's report seems perfectly reliable: Diodorus has probably omitted the relevant portion of Hieronymus.

(cf. Diod., XVIII, 42, 1; 50, 4). But Antipater hated Eumenes (Plut., *Eum.*, 3; 5) and never took a hostile step against Antigonus. Moreover, the sequence of events argues against Justin's version: the siege of Nora ended after news of Antipater's death reached Asia (Plut., *Eum.*, 12); cf. Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit*, I, p. 105, n. 2.

⁹ Cf. Vezin, *op. cit.*, p. 116, n. 2; Berve, *R.-E.*, XIX, cols. 1397 f.

¹⁰ Consequently Kaerst (*R.-E.*, VI, col. 1090) rejects Plutarch's story, but see Vezin, *loc. cit.*

¹¹ Cf. Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung*, p. 96.

¹² It is probable that Appian was able to use Hieronymus: Appian, *Mithridatice*, 8 = *F. Gr. H.*, 154 F 3 (Hieronymus).

¹³ Diod., XX, 19, 4 f.; 27, 1 f.; XIX, 58, 5 f.; 79, 6.

(8) When Demetrius left Ephesus in 307 on his first expedition to Greece, Plutarch reports that he took with him five thousand talents and two hundred and fifty ships (*Dem.*, 8), while Diodorus (XX, 45, 1) speaks of this event only in general terms and gives no figures. Yet this part of Diodorus is noted for its abundance and precision of detail, virtues ascribed to his use of Hieronymus. At this point he must have whittled down his source so that the figures were lost. Plutarch was able, in some way or other, to get hold of the original, fuller account.

(9) In his account of the liberation of Athens by Demetrius in 307, Diodorus does not mention the execution of Dionysius, Cassander's commander of the fort at Munychia, which is given by Suidas and may have come originally from Hieronymus.¹⁴

(10) The renewal of the Hellenic League by Antigonos and Demetrius in 303/2 is not mentioned by Diodorus, but is referred to by Plutarch (*Dem.*, 25) whose report is confirmed by an important inscription.¹⁵

(11) The history of Seleucus in the Indian satrapies in the years after his return to Babylon in 312 is known through short references in Appian, Strabo, and Justin.¹⁶ There is nothing about it in Diodorus.

From a more general standpoint, it can be observed that Hieronymus appears to have reported speeches quite fully in his history.¹⁷ Many of these must have been shortened or excised by Diodorus,¹⁸ who also displays a tendency to level off his source and make it less precise.¹⁹ At XVIII, 72, 3, for example, he speaks of Nicanor having more than a hundred ships: Polyaeus (IV, 6, 8) gives the number as one hundred and thirty, probably from Hieronymus.

There are in these books of Diodorus many incidents and

¹⁴ Suidas s. v. Δημήτριος; cf. *Diod.*, XX, 45, 7.

¹⁵ *I. G.*, IV, 1², 68; cf. Wilcken, *Berl. Sitzb.*, 1927, pp. 286 ff. (improved edition).

¹⁶ Strabo, XV, 689; 724; Appian, *Syr.*, 55; Justin, XV, 4, 12 ff.

¹⁷ E. g. *Diod.*, XIX, 97, 3 ff.; cf. *Plut.*, *Eum.*, 17; Justin, XIV, 4, 2 ff.

¹⁸ An instance of this seems to be *Diod.*, XVIII, 63, 5; and cf. Beloch, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, p. 100, n. 1.

¹⁹ Cf. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien*, *Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa*, p. 189.

episodes insufficiently explained; or so inadequately related that many points are left in doubt, and where large omissions can be certainly assumed, even though no parallel account exists in other authors as a means of control. This situation results from careless and uneven abridgement of the source rather than from the use of divergent accounts, which might otherwise be suggested by inconsistencies in the narrative.²⁰ The following examples may be given:

(1) The definite mistake in Diod., XVIII, 28, 3 on the burial place of Alexander²¹ may have come in the first place from Hieronymus, though it falls below his usual standard of accuracy. Or Diodorus may be using a different source who was more likely to blunder. Or again, the intermediate author (Agatharchides?) may have confused the original with the final burial. But there is a further possibility—that Diodorus has shortened Hieronymus so forcibly as to distort what he had written.

(2) The invasion of Thessaly by the Aetolians in 322 presupposes an agreement by them with Perdiccas. Such an agreement is indeed mentioned by Diodorus in his account of the campaign (XVIII, 38, 1), but in such a way as to make it clear that he has omitted a description of how and when it came about as given earlier by his source.²²

(3) Diodorus describes the order of battle at Paraitacene in 317, including the disposition of the elephants on each side (XIX, 27-9). But his subsequent account of the battle is obviously defective in many respects, so that, for example, nothing further is mentioned concerning the rôle of the elephants (*ib.*, 30-1). His failure to provide a balanced and complete account is clearly the result of his methods of excerpting and shortening his source.²³

²⁰ For a possible case of misrepresentation of his source by Diodorus see my note in *Historia*, VI (1957), pp. 504 f.; and cf. Hammond, *C. Q.*, XXXI (1937), p. 79; XXXII (1938), p. 139.

²¹ Alexandria: so also Strabo, XVII, 794; Memphis, correctly: Pausanias, I, 6, 3; 7, 1.

²² See Westlake, *C. R.*, LXIII (1949), p. 89, n. 6; similarly, at Diod., XVIII, 23, 4 the use of the definite article suggests that details given earlier have been omitted.

²³ Cf. Vezin, *op. cit.*, pp. 103 ff.; 142 ff.

(4) The withdrawal of Polemaeus from Attica in 312 after the initial success of his invasion (Diod., XIX, 78, 3 f.) is not satisfactorily accounted for.²⁴

The practice of reduplication and amplification may also be found in this part of Diodorus' history. Thus, the presence of several repetitions²⁵ need not be a sign of the use of two sources, but rather a proof that Diodorus had difficulty in controlling his material. In describing a confused and troubled period, with frequent shifts of locale, repetitions were no doubt hard to avoid.²⁶ No particular significance attaches to them and we may assume that Diodorus is to blame unless some other cause can be proved.²⁷

Only occasionally does Diodorus amplify the account of Hieronymus in a matter of substance.²⁸ There is the case of the Salamis campaign of 306, where it is thought that he has tampered with his source to bring it into line with naval practice in his own day;²⁹ and the foolish assertion that the 'Silver-Shields' (veterans of Alexander's campaigns) in the army of Eumenes were all over sixty years of age cannot conceivably come from Hieronymus who was an eye-witness.³⁰

Arrian's *History of the events following the death of Alexander*³¹ is probably derived substantially from Hieronymus. It was in ten books covering a period of only two to three years, from the death of Alexander to Antipater's return to Macedonia

²⁴ See my note in *Mnemosyne*, VIII (1955), pp. 34 ff.

²⁵ Diod., XIX, 36, 1 and 49, 1 (circumvallation of Pydna); XX, 45, 5 and 46, 1 ff. (liberation of Athens by Demetrius). On the repetition II, 48, 6 and XIX, 98, 1 ff. (description of the Dead Sea) see Krumbholz, *Rh. Mus.*, XLIV (1889), p. 291.

²⁶ On Diodorus' control of his material cf. the remarks of von Mess, *Rh. Mus.*, LXI (1906), p. 266.

²⁷ Cf. Krumbholz, *loc. cit.*, pp. 286 ff.; Kallenberg, *Berl. Phil. Woch.*, 1909, p. 242; Palm, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 f.

²⁸ Diodorus frequently adds rhetorical and pathetic touches of his own to the narrative of his source; see Palm, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

²⁹ Hill, *History of Cyprus*, I, p. 165, n. 3.

³⁰ Diod., XIX, 30, 5; 41, 2; cf. Plut., *Eum.*, 16. The story must have originated in the Alexander-romance; see Tarn, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 123 f. It is still repeated in Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques*, p. 299.

³¹ τὰ μετ' Ἀλέξανδρον, ed. Roos (Teubner, 1928).

after the settlement at Triparadeisus. From the great detail with which single episodes are related (in the original, non-excerpted form of the work) it is obvious that the treatment was exhaustive. It was far fuller than the corresponding narrative in Diodorus. Yet, if we allow for this difference in scale, the pattern for both histories seems to be the same.³² Therefore if Hieronymus was the main source for Diodorus in this period, it will follow that the same is true for Arrian. This conclusion is all the more plausible when we remember that Arrian, in writing his history of Alexander, had turned to the best earliest accounts, those of Ptolemy and Aristobulus.³³ By a discriminating mind like this the choice of Hieronymus as main source for a history of the early Successors must have been made at once; and, apart from Duris whose unreliability was notorious,³⁴ there can have been few rival versions to claim his notice.³⁵

As for the difference in scale between Arrian and Diodorus (revealed first in the Vatican palimpsest published by Reitzenstein in 1888,³⁶ for the other fragments are mere epitomes by Photius of whole books), this might be the result of Arrian conflating Hieronymus with another author. But, while allowing for the presence in Arrian of material not from Hieronymus (as we also do in Diodorus), the best explanation of it is that Diodorus has drastically shortened Hieronymus. The Reitzenstein fragment is valuable on this account alone: it reveals how far the process of abbreviation has gone in Diodorus. Even in its absence, however, the fact of a shortening of Hieronymus by Diodorus could not be overlooked, as has been already shown.

For the period 323-318 Diodorus devotes seventy-five consecutive chapters to the history of Macedonia, Greece, and Asia

³² See the comparative table in *F. Gr. H.*, II BD, pp. 554 f.

³³ Arrian, *Anabasis Alexandri*, I, proem. 1 f.; cf. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, III, 4)*, pp. 308 f.

³⁴ *F. Gr. H.*, 76 T 7, 8, 9; cf. II AC, p. 116; Wachsmuth, *Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte*, pp. 544 ff.; Schubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 60 ff. Beloch (*op. cit.*, IV, 1, pp. 479 f.) is alone in taking a favourable view of Duris.

³⁵ The works of Diyllus and Nymphis may be mentioned. It is very unlikely that they would be used by Arrian.

³⁶ *Breslauer Phil. Abh.*, III, Heft 3.

(XVIII, 1-75); for the period 317-15 fifty-four chapters (XIX, 11-64); for the period 314-311 thirty-two chapters (XIX, 66-105 [with gaps]); and for the period 310-302 forty-seven chapters (XX, 19-133 [with gaps]).³⁷ These figures make it clear that there is a progressive change in the scale of Diodorus' treatment of events in this area. The comparatively full account in the eighteenth and in the first part of the nineteenth book gives way to a much more sketchy narrative in the remainder of the nineteenth and in the twentieth book. One reason for this is perhaps that Diodorus became absorbed in the story of his compatriot, Agathocles, which begins in the first chapter of the nineteenth book. To have continued the narrative of events in Greece and Asia on the same scale as hitherto would have been perfectly possible had he so wished, but we may surmise that his keen interest in Sicilian history lessened his enthusiasm for what was his major theme.³⁸

It is conceivable that Hieronymus' own history displayed similar disparities of scale, at least within single books. From Diodorus' reproduction it appears that Hieronymus gave fuller accounts of those events in which he had been personally involved than of other events,³⁹ though this of course can be no more than a conjectural probability. How far Diodorus' reduction in scale of treatment in the period as a whole reflects that of Hieronymus himself cannot be determined. One would gladly assume that Hieronymus maintained an equal scale throughout, and there is nothing against such an assumption. In any case, it can be seen that Diodorus' reduction in scale is not made in a systematic and even manner.⁴⁰ Isolated incidents of minor importance are preserved in full and given undue prominence by contrast with the truncated passages between which they are

³⁷ Excluding the extract from the history of the kings in the Bosphorus (XX, 22-26, 2).

³⁸ Similarly, in his fourteenth book, Diodorus devotes seventy-six out of one hundred and seventeen chapters to Sicilian or Italian history.

³⁹ Especially in regard to Eumenes (Diod., XVIII, 29-32; 58-63; XIX, 12-15; 17-44), the battle at Gaza (XIX, 80-6), and the Nabataean Arabs and the Dead Sea (XIX, 94-100, 2).

⁴⁰ On his method in the sixteenth book cf. the important remarks of Hammond, *C. Q.*, XXXII (1938), p. 150.

set.⁴¹ In particular, much is omitted that should have found a place in the history of the years after 311. Thus, we are badly informed about the activities of Antigonus in contrast to the fairly full accounts before 311 and especially before 315. For example, Diodorus offers nothing on the important campaigns waged by Antigonus against Seleucus in the years 310-8 and 304-3, a very serious omission which can be filled only in a very partial manner from the difficult account preserved in Babylonian documents of the time.⁴²

One important respect, therefore, in which the historian of today will be aided by a recognition of the extent to which Diodorus has abbreviated his source will be in reassessing the policy of Antigonus after 311. Before the discovery of the Babylonian documents and in the silence of Diodorus upon the activity of Antigonus during the years 311-8 and 305-3, it could be assumed that the time was passed by him in idleness or in peaceful pursuits not worth recording, with old age suspected as a reason for his inability to round off his early successes by completing the conquest of the empire. This idea can now be seen to be erroneous. The truth is that wherever Antigonus appears he displays energy and bellicosity to the very end, and the silence of Diodorus can be due only to a remarkably incomplete transcription of his source.

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NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE.

⁴¹ E. g. the imprisonment of the followers of Alcetas (XIX, 16), the flood at Rhodes (XIX, 45), and the crossing of the Black Sea by Pleistarchus (XX, 112).

⁴² Cuneiform records of events inscribed on clay tablets. There are three main texts: (1) The Diadochi Chronicle, a contemporary native record, edited by Smith, *Babylonian Historical Texts*, pp. 124-49 (with illustrative plates xv-xvii); (2) The Saros Chronicle, of later date (see Olmstead, *C. P.*, XXXII [1937], pp. 1 ff.); (3) a text of the late third century B. C. which checks dates by astronomy (see Kugler, *Orientalia*, II [1933], p. 105). These texts are couched in somewhat imprecise language, and it is not always clear to what they refer. Moreover there remain serious chronological difficulties to clear up (Olmstead, *loc. cit.*, pp. 1 ff.; cf. Parker and Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology 626 B. C.-A. D. 45* [*Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization*, no. 24], pp. 17 f.).

A POMPEIAN DISTICH.

The presence, among the *graffiti* upon Pompeian wall-surfaces, of numerous palpable quotations or reminiscences from Vergil, Ovid, and other standard Roman poets, tempts one almost irresistibly, in the case of inadequately transmitted verse, to an effort to assign such fragments to their proper setting. Students are constantly reminded of the elusive nature of such an undertaking; and the *prudenteriores* eschew this treacherous field.

Instances must indeed be few where a fortunate combination of circumstances or turn of events results in *divinatio* being replaced by material evidence. The case now under consideration may claim especial attention partly by reason of the two names, eminent in Latin literature, which it evokes, partly for its testimony to a detail in the usages of ancient letter-writers.

C. I. L., IV, 1698 with Add., p. 463 and Tab. IV, 6; *C. L. E.*, under no. 359: a *graffito* formerly read upon a house-front facing the Via degli Augustali:

GEMMA VELIM FIERI HORA NON

The learned comment and interpretation which this tantalizing fragment has aroused is impressive: the residuum is presented in E. Diehl, *Pompeianische Wandinschriften*, no. 679, to which may be added Marcello Gigante, in *Pompeiana* (1950), p. 133. *T. L. L.*, VI, 1753 considers it "dub. interpr.," but scholars in general appear to have acquiesced in reading *hora non(a)* and understanding an allusion to a gem-encrusted goblet¹ for use at the conventional banquetting hour.²

Our own feeling of vague distrust of this interpretation has probably been shared by others, who may also have thought—somewhat in the spirit of Dio Chrysostom (II, 95), Athenaeus (XV, 695 c), and the *Palatine Anthology* (V, 83 and 84)—of the gem-medallion which adorned the intersection of the decorated straps³ suspended from the shoulders and then en-

¹ Juv., 5, 43-4: *gemmas ad pocula transfert / a digitis*.

² The various meanings of *gemma* are, of course, tabulated in *T. L. L.*, s. v.

³ *Catenae*, Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXIII, 40.

circling the hips, a feature of the *mundus muliebris* which first appears, under Syrian influence, on numerous figurines, mostly of Aphrodite, from Myrina, and then recurs occasionally, and at Pompeii has long been familiar from the painting⁴ which gave the name of *Casa di Marte e Venere* to a house situated immediately to the north of the *Edificio di Eumachia*.⁵

An even more effective representation—in gold-leaf—of this ornament occurs upon a statuette in alabastrine marble, part of a group of Aphrodite and two attendant divinities, discovered during the current excavations of Pompeii, in a regrettable environment, Reg. II, Ins. i, No. 6, and now (autumn of 1958) published by Matteo Della Corte in his engrossing volume, *Amori e amanti di Pompei antica (Antologia erotica pompeiana)*, p. 72 with photograph on p. 57 and colored photograph on the front cover. This may have been the Alexandrians' conception of the *κεστός ἰμάς* of *Il.*, XIV, 214-20.

The definitive solution, however, of the problem evoked by this haunting half-line comes from another angle, and from another area of the new excavations: a *graffito* in the niche of tomb 29 beside the street of tombs leading out from the Nuceria Gate. In the volume just cited, the same expert in the deciphering of such texts presents a facsimile on plate V, and on p. 92 he transcribes thus:

Vellem essem gemma hora nona, melius una,
Ut tibi signanti oscula missa darem.

On the same plate he supplies a facsimile of the fragment with which our present inquiry started (if this is based on the one in *C. I. L.*,—it is not a photograph from that plate,—the final A is unattested).

The ancient *scriptor* had been badly served by either his memory or his eyes; his opening unmetrical hemistich must be replaced from the other copy, and his *melius* rectified from *Aen.*, I, 683: . . . *noctem non amplius unam*. The ablatives may be allowed to stand, in the light of, e. g., Ovid, *Met.*, X, 734: . . . *nec plena longior hora*, and *A. A.*, II, 223: . . . *iussa maturius hora*.

⁴ Herrmann-Bruckmann, Taf. 4.

⁵ The embellishment was not limited to goddesses: Concetta Barini, *Ornatus Muliebris* (Torino, 1958), pp. 49-64.

Gemma velim fieri appears to be a remote echo of Ovid, *Am.*, II, 15, 9:⁶

O utinam fieri . . .

But, what is more important, the second verse:

Ut tibi signanti oscula missa darem,

embodies the same conceit as Ovid, *loc. cit.*, lines 15-18:

Idem ego, ut arcanas possim signare tabellas,
Neve tenax ceram siccaque gemma trahat,
Umida formosae tangam prius ora puellae:
Tantum ne signem scripta dolenda mihi.

The *gemma*, then, was to be the bezel-stone of the adored one's signet-ring; and the lover's sighs were directed towards imprinting kisses upon her moist lips.

To conclude: The archetype of the two *graffiti* read:

Gemma velim fieri hora non amplius una,
ut tibi signanti oscula missa darem.

The anonymous poet, or adapter, was a person of some literary pretensions, acquainted with the verse of Vergil and Ovid.⁷ It was not to be expected, however, that the Vergilian reminiscence should adapt itself with perfect ease to its new setting.

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⁶ This composition has been treated by Revillo P. Oliver, *C. P.*, LIII (1958), pp. 103-5.

⁷ Della Corte suggests that the younger M. Loreius Tiburtinus was the author of the metrically defective and otherwise infelicitous version; but this surely was not the original form of the distich.

STENTOR AND HESIOD.

Some years ago *Punch* regaled its readers with the lament of the Greek leaders before Troy, as a woebegone Stentor crouched over a mustard bath: "And now, just at the very peak of the cold war, Stentor's gone and lost his voice." I see from *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), p. 211, n. 6 that we now know who has filched it. For Professor Bolling, who has long maintained that *Il.*, V, 786 is a gloss (*The External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* [1925], p. 89), has now used the variant¹ recorded in *Il.*, V, 785 by Papyrus Bodmer I (ed. by V. Martin, 1954) to cast doubts on whether Stentor made any appearance at all in the archetype Π (ca. 550). The vulgate reads:

Στέντορι είσαμένη μεγαλήτορι χαλκεόφωνε,
ὅς τόσον αὐδήσασχ' ὅσον ἄλλοι πεντήκοντα.

The lack of early evidence for the line and the paucity of ancient knowledge about Stentor of course add fuel to his fire.

I am not confident that the last word can be said on this subject at this time, but the rarity of χαλκεόφωνος calls for some sort of comment. It calls to mind the passage in which the Hound of Hell is first explicitly called Cerberus, the offspring of Echidna and Typhon, a brother of Geryon's dog, Orthus, and the Hydra of Lerna (Hes., *Theog.*, 310 ff.):

δεύτερον αὖτις ἔτικτεν ἀμήχανον, οὗ τι φατειὸν
Κέρβερον ὠμροστήν, Ἄϊδεω κύνα χαλκεόφωνον,
πεντηκοντακέφαλον, ἀναιδέα τε κρατερόν τε.

When the epithet next appears it is an echo of this passage (Dion. Perieget., 788-9: ἐνθ' ἐνέπουσιν | οὐδαίου Κρονίδαο μέγαν κύνα χαλκεόφωνον . . .). Now one might have expected κύνα in this position to evoke the traditional epithet καρχαρόδοντα as elsewhere (e. g. at *Il.*, X, 360; XIII, 198; Hes., *Op.*, 604, 796; *Scut.*, 303), and there is room for belief that both χαλκεόφωνον and the ascription of fifty heads to Cerberus are reflections of the poet's personal cerebration.

¹ Στέντορι είσαμένη ήμὲν δέμας ήδὲ καὶ αὐδὴν.

But the Hesiodic passage is also challenged. Goettling drew attention to the scholion at *Theog.*, 311: ὁ μὲν Πίνδαρος ἑκατοντακέφαλόν φησιν εἶναι τὸν Τυφωέα, οὗτος δὲ πεντηκοντακέφαλον, and consequently regarded line 312 as appearing after 306 in the scholiast's copy. However it seems to me that Immisch (Roscher, s. v. *Kerberos*, cols. 1119-20) is right in objecting that Κέρβερον must be substituted for Τυφωέα, on the evidence of Schol. Ven., *Il.*, VIII, 368: Πίνδαρος γοῦν ἑκατὸν, Ἡσίοδος δὲ πεντήκοντα. ἔχειν αὐτὸν (i. e. Cerberum) κεφαλὰς φησιν. If Hesiod's text is accurate at this point and Pindar had elsewhere discussed Cerberus, it is just possible that Pindar was the source of Horace's *belua centiceps* (*Carm.*, II, 13, 34 ff.). At any rate, such a table of genealogical descent as Hesiod's is clearly prone to misquotation by later writers. One notices, for example, that the Hydra is discussed immediately after Cerberus, and we know that Simonides credited the Hydra with fifty heads (fr. 206 Edmonds, ap. Schol. Hes., *Theog.*, 313). If one were disposed to relate these two references, would it be more desirable to assume that line 312 had appeared after 313 (with a minor change to *κρατερήν*) or that Hesiod was being subjected to either faulty reminiscence or literary elaboration? All would agree, I think, that the latter suggestion was preferable and that dislocation of the text is an assumption not lightly to be made.²

But Hesiod is also under attack from another quarter. Elsewhere he mentions Cerberus only at *Theog.*, 767 ff.:

ἔνθα θεοῦ χθονίου πρόσθεν δόμοι ἡχήμεντες
ἰφθίμου τ' Αἰδέω καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείης

² Has anyone, incidentally, commented on another poetic testimonium for the fifty-headed Hydra, at Eudoc., *Violarium*, ch. 436 (p. 208 Teubner ed.)? Here the description of Heracles' second Labour opens with a pendent clause: Δεύτερον ἀνελὼν τὴν πεντηκοντακέφαλον ὕδραν, which seems to me juggling with a hexametric line: Δεύτερον αὐτ' ἀνελὼν τὴν πεντηκοντακέφαλον | ὕδραν. (In support of *πεντηκοντακέφαλον* see Rzach [1902] ad Hes., *Theog.*, 287, 312, and van Leeuwen ad Ar., *Eqvūt.*, 417). For all its lateness this work incorporates some ancient material; for example, although at p. 215, 17 Cerberus has to be content with the canonical three heads, Hesiod's influence is still strong at p. 215, 20-1: τοῦτον νεκροφύλακα ἐν Αἰδου φασὶ κατατεθῆσθαι χαλκεόφωνον ὄντα. It should also be mentioned that the line of the *Violarium* under discussion does not occur in Nonn. Abbas, I, 49 (Migne, *P. G.*, XXXVI, pp. 985 ff.), on which the former work has drawn freely.

ἔσταισιν, δεινὸς δὲ κύων προπάροιθε φυλάσσει
 νηλειῆς, τέχνην δὲ κακὴν ἔχει· ἐς μὲν ἰόντας
 σαίνει ὁμῶς οὐρῇ τε καὶ οὐασιν ἀμφοτέροισιν,
 ἐξελθεῖν δ' οὐκ αὐτίς ἐᾷ πάλιν, ἀλλὰ δοκεύων
 ἔσθλῃ, ὃν κε λάβησι πυλέων ἔκτοσθεν ἰόντα.

"Surely," claim e. g. Goettling, Cook (*Zeus*, III, i, p. 403, n. 1), Eitrem (*R.-E.*, s. v. *Kerberos*, col. 272), and Ziegler (Roscher, s. v. *Theogonien*, col. 1489), "Hesiod has forgotten that he has credited Cerberus with fifty heads. Otherwise we would hear of one hundred ears, not two, drooping at the approach of the new guests." This places one or other of the passages under a cloud, and Grimal (*Dict. de la myth. grecque et romaine*) has no hesitation in declaring *Theog.*, 769 ff. interpolated. It would indeed be odd for Hesiod to forget if, as I believe, the ascription of fifty heads to Cerberus is his own contribution to Greek necrology. Solmsen (*Hesiod and Aeschylus*, p. 60, n. 197) aptly remarks on Hesiod's eschatological studies in the *Theogony* that "to call vv. 742 (or 746)-806 a *vulgaris tritaeque inferorum descriptio* . . . is a great mistake, for we shall find in it Hesiod's most characteristic and personal thought." This is certainly true of the Cerberus episode. Hesiod is primarily concerned with portraying canine goodwill, and the sort of expression he would use would be that used by Homer in describing Argus' reactions (*Od.*, XVII, 302): οὐρῇ μὲν ῥ' ὁ γ' ἔσσηνε καὶ οὐατα κάββαλεν ἄμφω. Of course Cerberus is a monster, but some such formula suggests what the poet requires. To ask him to indulge in mathematical niceties is to ask him to descend to bathos. Do those who impugn Hesiod here consciously imagine that at Hor., *Carm.*, II, 13, 34 (*demittit atras belua centiceps aures*) the poet intends us to visualize the sweep of so great a bank of ears?

In point of fact there is good evidence that Hesiod wrote the passage, if we study the ambivalent values attached here to Cerberus. A didactic poet who is concerned both with dissuading his audience from folly and with directing them towards right conduct may well devote much thought to those courses of action which become moral or immoral only in the light of attendant circumstances. There is abundant evidence that Hesiod had thought about these ambivalent qualities. Eris is both good

and bad (*Op.*, 11 ff.; *Theog.*, 225); so too Zelos (*Theog.*, 386-7; *Op.*, 196: cf. Solmsen, *op. cit.*, p. 32), Philotes (*Theog.*, 205-6, with reference to courtly love: cf. *Il.*, XIV, 216 f.; *Theog.*, 223-5), Horkos (contrast its normal meaning with *Theog.*, 226 ff.; *Op.*, 194), Aidos (*Op.*, 317-19), Nemesis (*Op.*, 197 ff.; *Theog.*, 223: cf. Solmsen, p. 81, n. 18), Elpis (*Op.*, 500), and, I suspect, Pistis (*Op.*, 372).³ That Hesiod, as a genealogical poet, would have encountered the same bipolar tendencies among the gods (with their ability both to bestow and withhold) calls for no argument.

Solmsen (*op. cit.*, p. 81) has already pointed out that Hesiod's description of Good Eris is the only passage in the *Works and Days* in which the genealogical point of view asserts itself (and that therefore it is reasonable to assume that he is correcting earlier thoughts in the *Theogony*). The Cerberus episode also points to a homogeneity of thought in the two poems. For the function of a guardian of the Underworld is inevitably ambivalent; he must keep out the living and keep in the dead. But Cerberus shows the same pattern also in his dealings with the dead. New arrivals are assured of a hearty welcome, but should they afterwards seek to leave, of a rapid dissolution.⁴ An impressive picture, and likely to have influenced Aeschylus, when he has Darius say on his return from the dead (*Pers.*, 688 ff.): ἐστὶ δ' οὐκ εὐέξοδον, | ἄλλως τε πάντως χοῖ κατὰ χθονὸς θεοὶ | λαβεῖν ἀμείνους εἰσὶν ἢ μεθιέναι.⁵ Now in his behaviour Cerberus is thoroughly canine. Many have had experience of similarly perverse dogs who fawn on the visitor but, the moment he turns to leave, resume their role as watchdogs with unpleasant results.

³ πίστεις γάρ τοι ὁμῶς καὶ ἀπιστίαι ὤλεσαν ἄνδρας. This suggests that Hesiod distinguishes between a Good Pistis (and Apistia), based on accurate judgment, and a hasty and thoughtless trust and mistrust. Cf. Theognis, 831: Πίστει χρήματ' ὄλεσσα, ἀπιστίῃ δ' ἐσάωσα and *Trag. Graec. Fragm.*, Adespota 113 Nauck² (which Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, LXIV [1929], p. 465, would relate to pseudo-Epicharmus): πῶλλ' ἀπιστία δέδρακεν ἀγαθὰ καὶ πίστις κακά.

⁴ The ambivalence is faithfully preserved by Aristophanes (*Equit.*, 1030-4) and e.g. Lucian (*de Luctu*, 4).

⁵ Cf. Stanford, *Aeschylus*, p. 28 for a possible influence of the description of Cerberus upon the characterization of Clytaemnestra at *Agam.*, 1228-30.

Philo, for one, was aware of it when he wrote: ἡδοναὶ γὰρ αἱ ἀτίθασοι πολλάκις, ὅταν κυνῶν τρόπον προσσαίνωσιν, ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἀνίατα ἔδακον (*On the Giants*, 35, Loeb ed., II, p. 462).⁶ If then Hesiod had observed this characteristic in dogs and worked it into his description of Cerberus, it was because it illustrated a line of enquiry which had already started to occupy his thoughts.

I see therefore no good reason for robbing Hesiod of *Theog.*, 767 ff. and every reason for retaining them. *Theog.*, 310 ff. also seems to me to reflect Hesiod's own thinking. Immisch declared that "die Zahl der Köpfe bei Hesiod offenbar οὐκ ἀριθμητικῶς, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ πολυκέφαλος"; this may be so, but we are entitled to ask why a creature who is so consistently given two or three heads in Classical art and literature should first have been thought of as *many*-headed. Cook (*Zeus*, III, i, p. 403, n. 1) follows Postgate's solution to this problem: "A dog with 50 or 100 heads could hardly be visualised unless . . . the heads were those of snakes." But this argument seeks a degree of precision which Hesiod was not concerned to provide, for it can hardly be said that a monster is any closer to being visualized by such a description as ἀμήχανον, οὐ τι φατειόν . . . ὤμωστήν . . . ἀναιδέα τε κρατερόν τε. Hesiod is content to create a suggestion of horror, and leave us to exercise our imagination.

Now that a vindication of the presence and significance of Cerberus in Hesiod has been attempted we may return to Stentor. As long as Stentor has a respected place in the Homeric text, the terms of *Theog.*, 310 ff. can be conveniently explained. In casting about for imagery with which to describe Cerberus Hesiod recalled the striking application of χαλκεόφωνος to Stentor and, precisely because χαλκεόφωνος Stentor had the vocal power of fifty men, equipped Cerberus with the number of heads appropriate to produce the same result. Χαλκεόφωνος and πεντήκοντα close two successive lines in Homer; χαλκεόφωνος and πεντηκοντακέφαλος follow one another in Hesiod. This seems too neat to be accidental. The rarity of the epithet makes, I think, an association of the two passages inevitable and the alternative—that pseudo-Homer is the debtor—seems pointless.

There is undoubtedly still a mystery in the Greek neglect of

⁶ Cf. *σαλveis δάκνονσα καὶ κύων λαίθαργος εἰ*, Soph., *fr.* 885 (and Jebb-Pearson *ad loc.*).

Stentor. The secondary reading of the Bodmer papyrus may well be due, as Professor Bolling hints, to the influence of *Il.*, XIII, 45: (Poseidon) εἰσάμενος Κάλχαντι δέμας καὶ ἀτειρέα φωνήν and XVII, 555: (Athena) εἰσαμένη Φοίνικι δέμας καὶ ἀτειρέα φωνήν. But it may at the same time reflect dissatisfaction with the application to Stentor of an epithet which Hesiod made inseparable from the Hound of Hell. Professor Bolling (*op. cit.*, p. 210) writes: "No example in the *Iliad* of ἡμὲν—ἡδὲ would tend to suggest the variant. Where did it come from?" Surely from the *Odyssey*, where we find the formula

Μέντορι εἰδομένη ἡμὲν δέμας ἡδὲ καὶ αὐδήν

(II, 268, 401; XXII, 206; XXIV, 503, 548). This makes it clear, I think, that the Bodmer papyrus version has been suggested by the Στέντορι: Μέντορι echo and gives no authority to emend the traditional text. Further it makes it possible that it is εἰδομένη rather than εἰσαμένη that we should restore in the papyrus reading.

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DRAMATIC TENSION IN *ODYSSEY*, VI, 210 ff.

P. W. Harsh, *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 2-3, has drawn attention to the Odyssean passages which support a claim that "the poet of the *Odyssey* leans heavily on the implicit and the subtle." In these passages "the poet does not explain, but the commentators feel called upon to do so." I suspect that there is one passage which they have missed, in a context which scholars have often approached preoccupied with the morphological complications of λούω in Homer, and as a result have failed to comment on a dramatic tension which appears in the episode.

At *Odyssey*, VI, 210 Nausicaa, after rallying her frightened handmaids, orders them to wash (λούσατε) Odysseus in the river. But in actual fact the girls, who show a natural reluctance (cf. καὶ ἀλλήλῃσι κέλευσαν, 211, with Stanford's note), gave him oil, ἡνωγον δ' ἄρα μιν λοῦσθαι ποταμοῖο ῥοῇσι (216).¹ It is easy to

¹ The irregularity cannot be resolved by Shaw's drastic translation:

imagine that Nausicaa would have had something to say about this act of disobedience if she had been within earshot (cf. *ἀπάνευθεν*, 223). However Odysseus saves the situation by shrinking from showing his briny nakedness before the handmaids (221-2). When the girls withdraw and tell the tale to Nausicaa the act serves a double purpose. The tale will naturally provide fresh evidence for Nausicaa's belief that the sailor, beneath his brine, is a polished nobleman, but also in the telling will save the girls from their mistress' wrath. In the normal Homeric way, one would expect Odysseus' words to be reported to Nausicaa almost verbatim, with only the normal minimum concession to change of person and time. Eustathius realized this much when he wrote *ad loc.*: ἃ μὴ θέλων ὁ ποιητὴς διςσεῦσαι διὰ τῶν δουλίδων πρὸς τὴν Ναυσικάαν, φησὶ κομματικῶς καὶ πάνυ γοργῶς, εἶπον δ' ἄρα κούρη. This surely is the reason why Homer causes Odysseus considerably to introduce a gratuitous *ἄφρ' ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἄλμην ὤμοῦν ἀπολούσομαι*, a turn of phrase which in the telling would imply that the attendants had in fact followed Nausicaa's instructions to the letter, but had been rebuffed.

Hence *ἄρα* in *εἶπον δ' ἄρα κούρη* (223) is likely to illustrate the "lively feeling of interest" which Denniston (*Greek Particles*,² pp. 33 ff.) judged to be the primary association of the particle. It will have the dramatic value of "as you might expect" and will call attention not only to the light thrown on Odysseus' character but also to the welcome escape from the deserts of their delinquency which the hero has provided for the girls.²

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"and urged him to be washed." Moreover Homeric usage seems invariably to ascribe the bathing and anointing to the same person or persons, and the handing over of the oil to Odysseus prepares us for the following disclosure of the girls' reluctance.

² It is difficult to determine the value of *Od.*, VII, 296, *καὶ λαῦσ' ἐν ποταμῷ*, where Odysseus alludes to the incident. It may reflect an earlier version of the story in which the princess herself tended the shipwrecked sailor; or the form "she had me bathed" (the causative sense is natural enough) may be used to prevent misunderstanding. The truth ("I washed myself") would have given Alcinous further grounds for believing that his daughter had been all too imperfect a hostess.

STATIUS, *SILVAE*, V, 4 AND FIAMMETTA'S
PRAYER TO SLEEP.

This note is concerned primarily with resemblances between a poem of Statius and a passage in Boccaccio's *Elegia di Madonna Fiammetta* (the story of a beautiful Neapolitan lady whose lover, Panfilo, left her, promising to come back in a short time, and never returned). In order to provide background for a treatment of this question, I should like to touch briefly on earlier discussions of classical influence on this and certain other portions of the *Fiammetta*.

Among the comparatively few studies dealing with Boccaccio's use of the Latin classics, Crescini's *Contributo agli studi sul Boccaccio* holds a position of great distinction. In this book Crescini discussed in turn each of Boccaccio's early works, from the *Filocolo* to the *Ninfale Fiesolano*, showing, by a careful citation of parallel passages, how Boccaccio's thought and phrasing had been influenced by the Roman poets. After discussing Boccaccio's debt in the *Fiammetta* to Ovid's *Heroides*, Crescini remarked: "Dovendo fare uno studio completo della *Fiammetta*, si potrebbero citare imitazioni da altri poeti latini," and then quoted from the scene between Fiammetta and her nurse in the first chapter of the *Fiammetta* four passages which closely resemble the dialogue between Phaedra and her nurse in the first act of Seneca's tragedy, together with the corresponding lines of this play.¹

Twenty years later Professor A. S. Cook of Yale University, apparently without any knowledge of Crescini's work, published a brief note commenting on Boccaccio's interest in Seneca's dramas, as shown by quotations in his great mythological treatise, the *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium*, and in his commentary on Dante. Cook remarked that, among the tragedies, the *Hippolytus* (*Phaedra*) was one of Boccaccio's favorites, and noted his indebtedness to lines 285-357 and 186-93 of this play in the long speech of Venus in the first chapter of the *Fiammetta*,

¹ Vincenzo Crescini, *Contributo agli studi sul Boccaccio* (Torino, 1887), p. 160, n. 2.

supporting his statements by quotations from Boccaccio's work, with the Senecan parallels.²

Some years later Crescini returned to the subject, analyzing the scene to which Cook had called attention as well as the one that he himself had previously mentioned, and remarking that Boccaccio, in adapting the material from Seneca, used the technique of a maker of inlays, "pigliando dal dramma i pezzetti, che gli occorrono e meglio gli garbano, e riconnettendoli a gusto suo."³

The investigation of Boccaccio's debt to Seneca was carried farther about ten years ago by two other Italian scholars: Aurelio Roncaglia and Mario Serafini.⁴ In a discussion of the sources of Giovanni della Casa's sonnet "Al Sonno," Roncaglia noted that the opening phrases of Fiammetta's appeal to Sleep (uttered when she is anxiously awaiting Panfilo's return)⁵ are taken from Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, XI, 623-5, and that this debt is acknowledged in the notes ("Chiose") found in some manuscripts of the *Fiammetta*;⁶ also that, in addition to this borrowing, there is, in the latter part of the prayer, a translation (not acknowledged in the Chiose) of part of a chorus of Seneca's *Hercules Furens* (lines 1065-98). Serafini, after an examination of later chapters of the *Fiammetta*, quoted from Chapters V, VI, and VII a large number of translations and adaptations of passages of Seneca's tragedies, including the prayer to Sleep in Chapter V.⁷ It is the purpose of the present note to call

² Albert S. Cook, "Boccaccio, *Fiammetta*, Chap. I, and Seneca, *Hippolytus*, Act I," in *A. J. P.*, XXVIII (1907), pp. 200-4.

³ "Il primo atto della 'Fedra' di Seneca nel primo cap. della 'Fiammetta' del Boccaccio," in *Atti d. R. Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti*, LXXX (1920-1921), Part II, pp. 455-66.

⁴ Aurelio Roncaglia, "Sulle fonti del sonetto 'al Sonno' di Giovanni della Casa," in *Giorn. stor. della lett. ital.*, CXXV (1948), pp. 42-53; Mario Serafini, "Le tragedie di Seneca nella 'Fiammetta' di Giovanni Boccaccio," in *Giorn. stor. della lett. ital.*, CXXVI (1949), pp. 95-105.

⁵ *L'Elegia di Madonna Fiammetta*, ed. V. Pernicone (Bari, 1939), Chapter V, pp. 76-7.

⁶ Boccaccio had already used these lines in a scene of the *Filocolo* (ed. S. Battaglia [Bari, 1938], Book III, p. 220) which is closely modeled on the scene of the *Metamorphoses*. The translation in the *Fiammetta* seems to represent a revised and improved version.

⁷ Manuscripts of Seneca's tragedies uniformly give *mortem* as the

attention to another parallel to Fiammetta's prayer (apparently hitherto unnoticed) in classical Latin literature.

The prayer reads:

O Sonno, piacevolissima quiete di tutte le cose, e degli animi vera pace, il quale ogni cura fugge come nemico, vieni a me, e le mie sollecitudini alquanto col tuo operare caccia del petto mio. O tu, che i corpi ne' duri affanni gravati diletta, e ripari alle nuove fatiche, come non vieni? Deh, tu dá ora a ciascun altro riposo: donalo a me, piú che altra di ciò bisognosa. Fuggi degli occhi alle liete giovani, le

last word of line 1076. Arguing from Boccaccio's translation of this line as *costringi ad apparare le sue lunghe dimore*, Roncaglia suggested (p. 46, n. c) that Boccaccio's text of Seneca may have had *moram* rather than *mortem* at the end of the line. Serafini commented (pp. 102-3) that, assuming that Boccaccio's manuscript of the tragedies was still in existence, it should not be too difficult to identify it, but that in actual fact the identification is not easy; that his manuscript was certainly not the Codex Etruscus, which was not known until after Boccaccio's death, and that, of the other extant manuscripts, none agrees absolutely with the text of the *Fiammetta*. Actually, Boccaccio's manuscript of Seneca's tragedies was identified about fifty years ago by Oskar Hecker (*Boccaccio-Funde* [Braunschweig, 1902], pp. 35-6) as Riccardianus 527, a fourteenth century codex of the A group, written by a scribe who recorded the fact that he was born "apud urbem Florentie super illud montium quod vocatur mont. Senarium." Cf. Ezio Franceschini, *Studi e note di filologia latina medievale* (Milano, 1938), p. 78. Hecker identified this manuscript and nine others as having once belonged to Boccaccio, from information given in an inventory of the "Parva Libreria" of the convent of Santo Spirito in Florence, which had been recognized in the latter part of the nineteenth century as representing the remains of Boccaccio's library. Hecker described Riccardianus 527 under the heading, "Manuskripte, deren Herkunft aus Boccaccios Bibliothek nur wahrscheinlich"; but there can be no reasonable doubt that the identification is correct. The *incipit* of the manuscript and the *explicit* of the next to last folio are the same as those given in the inventory; and Boccaccio's quotations from Seneca's tragedies in the *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium* and in his commentary on Dante agree with the text of this manuscript: e.g., *Herc. Fur.*, 813 [Taenari] *trenari* Ricc. 527; *Traenari Com.* (ed. D. Guerri [Bari, 1918]), I, p. 214; *Thyest.*, 726 [Plisthenem] *phistenem* Ricc. 527; *Phystenem Gen. Deor.* (ed. V. Romano [Bari, 1951]), XII, 8. The reading of this manuscript in line 1076 is *cogis longam discere mortem*; and the marginal note entered by the original scribe, "quia sententialiter dum homo dormit similis est mortuo," supports this reading. In *Gen. Deor.*, I, 31 and *Com.*, II, p. 4 Boccaccio quotes the line, with the reading *mortem*.

quali ora tenendo i loro amanti in braccio nelle palestre di Venere esercitandosi, te rifiutano e odiano, ed entra negli occhi miei, che sola e abbandonata, e vinta dalle lagrime e da' sospiri dimoro. O domatore de' mali e parte migliore dell'umana vita, consolami di te, e lo stare a me lontano riserba a quando Panfilo co' suoi piacevoli ragionari diletterà le mie avido orecchie di lui udire. O languido fratello della dura morte, il quale le false cose alle vere rimescoli, entra negli occhi tristi! Tu già i cento d'Argo volenti veggiare occupasti; deh, occupa ora i miei due che ti disiderano! O porto di vita, o di luce riposo, e della notte compagno, il quale parimente vieni grazioso agli eccelsi re e agli umili servi, entra nel tristo petto, e piacevole alquanto le mie forze ricrea. O dolcissimo Sonno, il quale l'umana generazione pavida della morte costringi ad apparare le sue lunghe dimore, occupa me con le forze tue e da me caccia gl'insani movimenti, ne' quali l'animo se medesimo senza pro fatica.⁸

The classical parallel of which I wish to speak is Statius, *Silvae*, V, 4, a nineteen-line hexameter poem in which the poet, who has suffered from insomnia for seven successive nights, draws a contrast (probably with a conscious reminiscence of *Aeneid*, IV, 522-32) between his own restlessness and the quiet of the world of nature, and begs this gentlest of the gods to come to his relief. Lines 1-8 and 11-16 of the poem read:

Crimine quo merui, iuvenis, placidissime divum,	
quove errore miser, donis ut solus egerem,	
Somne, tuis? tacet omne pecus volucresque feraeque	
et simulant fessos curvata cacumina somnos,	
nec trucibus fluviis idem sonus; occidit horror	5
aequoris, et terris maria acclinata quiescunt.	
septima iam rediens Phoebe mihi respicit aegras	
stare genas; . . .	
unde ego sufficiam? non si mihi lumina mille	11
quae sacer alterna tantum statione tenebat	
Argus et haud umquam vigilabat corpore toto.	
at nunc nescioquis longa sub nocte puellae	
braccia nexa tenens ultro te, Somne, repellit:	15
inde veni! ⁹	

⁸ The text of the quotation follows that of Pernicione's edition, except that I have adopted two readings from Roncaglia's quotation of the passage (*op. cit.*, pp. 45-6): in the second sentence, *alle* (for Pernicione's *le*) *nuove fatiche*; and in the fifth sentence, *a quando* (for Pernicione's *quando*).

⁹ Ed. J. S. Phillimore (Oxford, 1917). In line 1 I have followed other

In many ways this poem is actually a closer parallel to Fiammetta's prayer than the passages from Ovid and Seneca cited by Roncaglia and Serafini. In both the poem of Statius and Fiammetta's prayer the appeal to Sleep is the expression of strong personal feeling. Fiammetta's question, "Come non vieni?" at the end of the second sentence, corresponds to the question, "Crimine quo merui?" at the beginning of Statius' appeal. In both prayers Sleep is addressed as a giver of gifts (*donis . . . tuis; dáí, donalo*); and in both a sharp contrast is drawn between the rest of mankind, to whom repose has been granted, and the unhappy suppliant, who finds no such peace. Both authors refer to Argus, the guarder of Io, and his many watchful eyes (*cento* in Boccaccio, following Ovid; *mille* in Statius); and Boccaccio's picture of the young lovers, happy now in each other's arms, hating Sleep and driving him away, is startlingly like Statius' "nunc nescioquis longa sub nocte puellae / brachia nexa tenens, ultro te, Somne, repellit."

It is of course possible that two writers, both familiar with Vergil and Ovid, might have arrived independently at the same combination of ideas; but, for readers who have observed Boccaccio's skill as a maker of inlays in other parts of the *Fiammetta*, a more satisfying explanation of the resemblance would be that here, too, he was working from a classical model. That he should have had a complete manuscript of the *Silvae* before him would seem to be out of the question, for all the available evidence indicates that the complete text of this work was introduced into Italy by Poggio, who found it north of the Alps in 1416 or 1417. It is possible, however, that some poems of this collection may have circulated separately. MS Laur. 29. 32 (a tenth century codex of miscellaneous contents) includes the poem in honor of Lucan's birthday (*Silvae*, II, 7) in a text different from that of Poggio's manuscript.¹⁰ It is conceivable that *Silvae*, V, 4 was included in a similar miscellany, and that

editors in inserting a comma after *merui*. In line 14 Phillimore prints *nescioquis* for the manuscript reading *heus aliquis*. Some other editors print *heu! si aliquis*.

¹⁰ See M. Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, II, revised by C. Hosius (München, 1927-1935), pp. 542-3; R. Sabbadini, *Le scoperte dei codici latini e greci ne' secoli XIV e XV* (Firenze, 1905), I, p. 150 and n. 45; II, p. 253.

Boccaccio had access to it, or that this poem was written in the margin of some other text that he used.¹¹ If any reader of this note should come across evidence pointing toward either of these possibilities, it is to be hoped that he will report his discovery at once, for it will be of considerable importance, both for an understanding of Boccaccio's acquaintance with the classics and for the history of the text of Statius' *Silvae*.¹²

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¹¹ If Boccaccio did have access to *Silvae*, V, 4 when he wrote the *Fiammetta*, he apparently no longer had the poem with him in his later years, when he wrote the *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium* and the commentary on Dante, and it may even have passed completely from his mind. There is no mention of it in the chapter on Somnus in the *Genealogia* (I, 31), where he quotes *Metamorphoses*, XI, 623-5 and *Hercules Furens*, 1065-78, nor in the *Comento* (II, p. 4), where, as Roncaglia noted (*op. cit.*, p. 46, n. d), he quotes the passages from Ovid and Seneca again, in the same order. Boccaccio's silence in these later works can not, however, be taken as proof that he had never read *Silvae*, V, 4. He is equally silent about the address to Sleep in Statius, *Thebaid*, X, 126-7, though he made extensive use of the *Thebaid* in both the *Filocolo* and the *Teseida* and possessed a copy of this work at the time of his death (Parva Libreria VIII. 9; cf. Hecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-4). And as for remembering—he remarks in *Epist.* 23 (written in 1374?) that "memoriam labilem" is especially characteristic of old men, and admits that he does not remember the meaning of "Terapon" (*Opere Latine Minori*, ed. A. F. Massèra [Bari, 1928], p. 220), although he must have encountered the word *θεράπων* in his study of Homer, and he understood its significance well enough to use it as the name of a servant in Eclogue 14.

¹² After this note had gone to press, my attention was called to Guido Billanovich's study, "'Veterum Vestigia Vatum' nei carmi dei preumanisti padovani" (extract from *Italia medioevale e umanistica*, I [1958], pp. 155-243), in which Billanovich devotes pp. 239-43 to "vestigia" of the *Silvae* of Statius. While I have not had time to test out Billanovich's work in detail, my feeling is that this collection of parallels should be used with caution, because of the possibility that the "vestigia" in the Paduan pre-humanists may go back, not simply to Statius, but to one of the earlier Roman poets. *Tui cura secunda*, *Lupus*, and *tua cura potissima*, *Gallus* (p. 239), for instance, would both seem to have been inspired by *tua cura Lycoris* of Vergil's tenth eclogue, line 22.

A LITERARY REFERENCE TO THE INCARNATION.
A NOTE ON *ANTHOLOGIA GRAECA*, XV, 28.

ἀλλ' ἀκέων τετάνυστο καὶ οὐκ ἀπαμύνητο Χριστός, 10
Χριστός, ὁ καὶ Μαρίας καὶ ἀθανάτου πατρὸς υἱός.
ταῦτα τίς ἀνθρώπων ἀγέρωχος νήπιος ἔσται
κῆρι λογιζόμενος καὶ ὀρώμενος ἐν πινάκεσσιν;
ἀνδρὸς γὰρ θεός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ βροτὸς οὐδὲν ἀρείων.

In this brief poem, which may well have been a dedication on a picture of the crucifixion, Anastasius Traulus¹ describes the sufferings of Christ on the cross and presents a poetic expression of the mystery of the Incarnation. Classical scholars have found the final line of the poem difficult, if not impossible, merely because they seem to have failed to perceive the poet's reference to this mystery. A few brief considerations will serve to demonstrate this point and, although they may not solve all difficulties with regard to this line, they shall at least afford a basis for further consideration.

The poem as we have it falls into two parts.² The first nine lines are rather descriptive, the last five somewhat philosophical and contemplative. Up to the final line the poem is quite clear but about the fourteenth line, as has been noted, scholars are perplexed.

The text, as presented, is that of Jacobs (1814).³ Dübner (1872)⁴ punctuates the final line with a comma after *ἐστιν*, and

¹ Anastasius Traulus (Anastasius, the Lisper) is known to us through this poem alone. Perhaps he may be identified with one of the many Anastasii of early Christian literature and history. His dates are not known but his presence in the *Anthology* definitely places him in or before the tenth century. The *Enciclopedia Cattolica* states the possible identification of *Anastasio il Questore* and *Anastasio, il Balbo*. The former lived about the beginning of the tenth century.

² It is interesting to note that this poem is also found without the last five lines. Cf. the observations in the editions of Jacobs and Dübner.

³ F. Jacobs, ed., *Anthologia graeca ad fidem codicis olim Palatini nunc Parisini edita* (Lipsiae, 1813-1817, 3 vols.).

⁴ F. Dübner, ed., *Epigrammatum Anthologia Palatina cum Planudeis et appendice nova epigrammatum veterum ex libris et marmoribus ductorum, annotatione inedita Boissonadiei, etc. et apparatu critico* (Paris, 1864, 1872, 2 vols.).

translates: "*viro nempe deus est melior, mortalis vero minime deo melior.*" He notes "*Gallicus recens interpres legit: θεός ἐστιν ὁδε βροτοῦ.*" W. R. Paton (1918)⁵ reads as Dübner in this final line and, perhaps following Dübner's Latin version, translates: "for God is better than men, but man in no way better than God." He notes, however: "This line is so silly that I think it must be corrupt."

As Dübner and Paton understand this line it is "silly," and it would seem that it may have been just such an interpretation which led the anonymous "*gallicus recens interpres*" to his conjecture, which, while perhaps making clear the meaning of the line, nonetheless gives rise to a metrical difficulty.⁶ And yet, it is quite easy to make sense—grammatical, poetical, and theological sense—of this line as it now stands. And this is especially true if the line is considered in connection with the previous four lines and, as it were, as summarizing the sense of the entire poem.

In line 11 Christ is spoken of as the son of Mary and the son of an immortal Father. This is an obvious reference to Christ as the God-Man, a reference to the Incarnation. This line is the key to the fourteenth line. The poet is led by the thought of Christ's parentage to moralize in lines 12 and 13 on this scene which he has just verbally drawn, and finally to present in line 14 the principle upon which his moralizing is founded. The poem is, therefore, a logical and artistic unit and, far from being "silly," the fourteenth line, even as it now stands, is the culmination of the entire poem.

The poet reasons: Christ suffered on the cross. Christ was God and man. How could any mere man be so stupid or so childish as to be proud in any circumstances if he would only stop and consider this scene? For, here God, the son of the immortal Father, Who is infinitely superior to man, is suffering in His manhood, as the son of Mary, the tortures that any man might be forced to suffer. Christ has humbled Himself and has

⁵ W. R. Paton, ed., *The Greek Anthology* (Loeb Classical Library, 1916-1918, 5 vols.).

⁶ It is true that a metrical lapse in a poem of this calibre would not be surprising, nor would it be the only one. There seems to be no sense, however, in making an emendation—especially with a faulty reading—when the original reading is perfectly clear and sound.

become man. And, as man, He is suffering as any man might suffer and has made Himself no better than other men.

In this interpretation *ἀνδρὸς* and *ἀπέλων* at the extremities of the line are employed twice in a double comparison—a neat literary and stylistic twist. *θεός*, Christ as the son of the immortal Father, is the subject of one of these comparisons, while *βροτὸς*, Christ as the son of Mary, is the subject of the other. The close juxtaposition of these two words, which in Greek are the common words for “god” or “immortal” and “mortal” or “man,” shows the trend of the poet’s thought. Moreover, the placement of both of these words—their identical positions in the dactyls of the second and fourth feet, and their enclosing of *ἔστιν*—seems more than fortuitous and strengthens the case for the employment of *ἀνδρὸς* and *ἀπέλων* as mentioned above. The δὲ after the ὁ denotes the change of subject, or rather the aspect of the subject viewed: Christ as man, Christ as God. Thus in a very concise, artistic, and well-balanced line the poet has summed up the moral of this verbal—and perhaps visual—portrait of the crucifixion.

Possibly this interpretation may be considered too refined, studied, and technical for such a late, and in many ways rough, poet. Yet, it is, it seems, a logical and acceptable interpretation. Perhaps another grouping of words may be suggested—indeed, others have suggested themselves—but for the reasons advanced above the present interpretation seems best. No matter what the grouping of words, however, the thought of the passage must be such as has been presented here. Otherwise, the poem is, admittedly, reduced to absurdities.

Besides the philological, stylistic, and aesthetic arguments in favor of this interpretation, it is found to harmonize well with the Pauline doctrine on the Incarnation. Paul declares that Christ has become like men in all things, sin alone excepted: “It is not as if our high priest was incapable of feeling for us in our humiliations; he has been through every trial, fashioned as we are, only sinless.”⁷ Anastasius is almost certainly paraphrasing these words.

The last five lines, therefore, may be translated:

⁷ *Hebrews*, iv, 15 (Knox, tr.); cf. ii, 7; v, 8; *et passim*.

But Christ outstretched on the cross, spoke not nor defended
Himself,

Christ, the son of Mary and the son of an immortal Father.

What man will be childishly (or foolishly) proud if he thinks
of these things in his heart

Or contemplates them painted in pictures? ⁸

For, as God, He is better than man, but, as man, He in no way
is better.

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⁸ It will be noted that in lines 12 and 13 a radical departure is made from Paton's rendering. The present translation is made in accordance with the texts of Jacobs and Dübner. In both these texts *τίς* is accented as an interrogative pronoun and the sentence is punctuated accordingly. Dübner's Latin, following the Greek, reads as an interrogative sentence: "*Haec quis hominum superbus infans erit / animo reputans et intuens in tabulis pictis?*" It is difficult to see how Paton could accent *τίς* as an interrogative and punctuate the sentence as a declarative. The sentence should read either *ταῦτα τίς . . . πινάκεσσιν*; or *ταῦτά τις . . . πινάκεσσιν* (.) but never *ταῦτα τίς . . . πινάκεσσιν* as Paton has. This is impossible. Besides the argument of consistency which gives preference to the readings of Jacobs and Dübner, the interrogative seems more effective in this passage, and certainly seems to have more authority. Even if Paton's text were justifiable, however, his text and translation seem irreconcilable.

A PASSAGE IN MENANDER'S *DYSCOLUS*.

Despite the many textual errors to be found in the recently published *Dyscolus* of Menander, quite a large number are obvious at first glance and easy to correct.¹ Professor Martin has performed a very valuable service to scholarship in publishing the papyrus as he did, for the transcript, the corrected text, and the excellent photographs supply the student of Menander with all the necessary tools to test for himself the readings of the new play.

In this issue of the *Journal* will be found a critical review of the new Menander, by Professor L. A. Post, who suggests numerous emendations of the text. I believe the following might be added as highly probable: a passage where the papyrus shows a verb which was rejected as false by the editor. To remove that word and substitute another seems to me a procedure of the last resort, especially when the papyrus may mean something much different from what the editor thought. The passage is found near the beginning of the play where Pyrrhias rushes onto the stage in a dead run, shouting and explaining the story of his meeting with Cnemon. In line 93 he says according to Martin's text:

ἐλθὼν τι πάλλων ἤκε. δεύ[τερον βαλῶν]
εὐδηλὸς ἐστὶ.

This means, "He came flourishing something and threw it. He'll surely throw it again." Martin has here supplied πάλλων to take the place of the papyrus reading of πεπαρών, which he rejects because it is found only in Pindar and not in Menander. After reading the entire passage we see that Pyrrhias at first gives only a very brief indication that Cnemon is a very unsociable fellow who is pursuing him. A moment later, when he catches his breath, he tells the whole story, how Cnemon attacked and struck him *repeatedly* with any available weapon. After a wild chase over hills and through the woods he finally makes a temporary escape. After all these experiences it sounds a little

¹ Victor Martin, *Ménandre: Le Dyscolos* (*Papyrus Bodmer*, IV, Bibliotheca Bodmeriana, 1958).

strange for him to say, "He came flourishing something and threw it. He'll surely throw it again." The emphasis appears wrong, but, of course, it is possible that he could have expressed himself that way. But the papyrus seems to say something else:

ἐλθὼν δὲ πεπαρώγηκε. δὲϋ[ρο νῦν ἰὼν]
εὐδηλός ἐστι.

This means, "He came and gave me a rough time. He is surely on his way here now." The verb *παροινεῖν* is found frequently in comedy and fits the sense here perfectly.² Evidently the very tiny space between the letters of the verb on the papyrus led Martin to believe that it was a case of two words rather than one. Ordinarily a short space on this papyrus indicates the separation of words, but in many places an empty space is found in the middle of a word.³ And although the iota subscript is frequently expressed in this section of the papyrus, it is not always expressed. The papyrus here is correct, I think, except for *τι*. And this error is very easy to explain. The scribe wanted to write *ἐλθωνδε*, but his eye happened to see *σχεδοντι* in the line directly above, and this caused the mistake.

The restored *ἰὼν* need not be the exact verb, of course, since any verb of a similar meaning would fit the sense. I feel, however, that a present participle is to be preferred to an aorist, regardless of the verb.

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² It is found four times in Menander alone (Körte³): *Comodia Florentina*, 41; *Epitrepontes*, 296; *Periceiomene* 410; fragment 513. The basic meaning is "to act badly while drunk, play drunken tricks," and by extension of this meaning "to insult, maltreat, act like a drunkard, do violence to."

³ E. g. lines 1 (*νομίζετε*), 2 (*τὸ νυμφαῖον*), 27 (*μειρακύλλιον*), 44 (*ἐν-θεαστικῶς*), 176 (*οἰκοδομήσατε*), 197 (*Νύμφαι*).

REVIEWS.

VICTOR MARTIN. Ménandre: Le Dyseolos. Bibliotheca Bodmeriana, 1958. Pp. 116, with a file of 21 unbound photographs of the pages of the Bodmer papyrus and a separate pamphlet containing an English and a German translation, on facing pages, of the French Introduction and Translation. (*Papyrus Bodmer*, IV.)

The reviewer has to pass judgment on two matters, the play of Menander and the editing of Professor Martin. We must be grateful to the latter in any case for publishing the play without more delay. It actually appeared about March 1, 1959, approximately a year and a half after the existence of the papyrus was first reported. The accompanying photographs are the main thing; they will enable scholars to construct their own text.

What we have are 21 pages of a codex that were once preceded by 18 pages not represented and followed no doubt by others. The Cairo papyrus codex that was discovered during archeological search by Lefebvre in 1905 contained at least five plays. That codex had been torn up in ancient times. If this codex too originally contained five plays, was this one play separated from the rest in ancient or in modern times? If in recent times, where are the other plays? Will they too appear on the market when the time is ripe? Only time can tell, for silence about discoveries is usual in the market for papyri. The estimated date of the codex is 250-300 A. D. (Turner).

The first page contains preliminary matter: the hypothesis of Aristophanes Grammaticus; a didascaly, which gives the name of the actor, Aristodemus of Scarphe, and from which the date of first performance, 316 B. C., is deduced; and the list of masks for speaking characters in the order of their appearance. Menander won first prize at the Lenaea, and the *Dyscolus* has an alternate title, *Misanthropus*. In English I should call it *The Old Grouch or The Misanthropist*, but at the moment *Curmudgeon* seems to be in general use for the title.

We shall consider later whether the marked difference between this play and those found in the Cairo codex is due to the comparative youth of Menander (25 years old) in 316 or to the recent rise to power of the philosophic dictator, Demetrius of Phalerum. He was supported by Macedonian arms and imposed sumptuary laws on the rich Athenians. Was Menander's victory, his first, due to the plaudits of the multitude, or had Demetrius introduced a reform urged by Plato (*Laws*, II, 659 A-C) and emboldened the judges to disregard applause and decide the merits of the play by philosophic standards? The latter seems more probable.

Let us list the features that distinguish this play of Menander from those previously known.

1. There are no mistaken identities or recognitions. Hence the plot is not complex by Aristotle's definition. It is simple and moral or ethical.

2. The play ends with a burlesque ballet, to use Turner's expression. In this it somewhat resembles the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, where an old man is persuaded to make merry. In this play the angry old man is not willingly converted at the end. Compare the surrender of Morose to persecutors in Ben Jonson's *Epicoene or The Silent Woman*, a suggestion that I owe to Mrs. Ira Reid, formerly Professor Anne Cooke, head of the department of drama at Howard University. There may of course have been a similar ending in the other plays, but it does not seem likely. To be sure, the fifth act of the *Epitrepontes* seems to a modern audience superfluous, as does that of *Dyscolus*. In both there is a determination of the fate of a second female character, followed by a scene of slaves baiting an obstinate old man. The baiting, however, is philosophical and literary in the *Epitrepontes* and need not have led to a burlesque ballet.

3. The play has an opening prologue by the god Pan and is divided into five acts by a chorus of devotees of Pan. Some other plays had such a prologue and all probably had five acts.

4. The love interest in *Dyscolus* is that of a youth who has fallen in love at first sight with an unknown maiden. Here I must recant, for I had supposed that only a baby recognized by the father could bind two lovers sufficiently to produce a conflict with parents. But Pan works the miracle of a binding love on the part of Sostratus. The maiden is taken for granted. Sostratus wins his beloved by a fortunate accident, after he has demonstrated his worthiness by refusal to be discouraged by rebuffs and hardship.

5. Married ladies are mute, though a virgin speaks on the comic stage for the first time. She is not named. Nor is Sostratus' mother named, though she obviously rules the roost. She inconveniences her household by frequent religious picnics, expiating a bad dream by feasting on mutton at a local shrine. Myrrhine, wife of the *dyscolus*, who has left him to live with her son Gorgias, is addressed by name, but does not speak.

6. The citizens chiefly concerned are farmers. Sostratus' father Callippides is very rich. Cnemon, the *dyscolus*, is worth two talents. Gorgias, his stepson, is miserably poor, but has a slave and keeps his mother also. The rustic atmosphere is genuine and moving. The country girl is expected to be an ideal wife. No one who knows Wycherley's *The Country Wife* or the play of Molière on which it is based can ever again confuse Menander's moral comedy and English or French comedy of manners.

7. There are no identical twins, intriguing slaves, noble prostitutes, or other characters such as are supposed to be characteristic of New Comedy. The slave Daos persuades Sostratus to pretend to be a hard-working farmer, not a citified son of luxury, but this bit of intrigue brings only comic frustration and a sunburn. But the sunburn is comically helpful later. The intrigue contributes to comedy, but plays no great part in the plot.

8. The young men are extremely virtuous. Cnemon proclaims the goodness of Gorgias; Gorgias proclaims the goodness of Sostratus. No one proclaims his own goodness. Gorgias in returning good for evil has done, Cnemon says, what only a very great gentleman could

have done. Gorgias says that Sostratus has passed the acid test by working hard and putting himself on a level with a poor man. Even the man in opposition, who must be overcome, Cnemon, suffers rather from ingrown virtue than from vice. He wanted to keep himself uncontaminated by the self-seeking of social groups. But in so doing he abolished friendship.

9. The play is an unusually explicit sermon on togetherness. All characters except the two who disappear after the first act are united in the end at the shrine of Pan and the Nymphs. To be sure, Menander always ends a play with domestic bonds renewed or tightened, but here social equality is carried so far that wealth is shared and slaves make merry beside their masters. Note that this is ethical, not political, propaganda, though a political leader may have prompted it. We are not far from a revival of the days of Cronus.

10. Comic scenes in the manner of Aristophanes and Plautus abound even before the final burlesque. But there is no Aristophanic obscenity except for a reference to female servants with an itch. And there are no Aristophanic puns. There is one implicit pun, a sheep that will not walk ahead as a *probaton* should. There is also a reference to idle strolling that must be a twit at the *schola Peripatetica*. Anyone who looks for agon, parabasis, and impostors can find them with sufficient good will. Cnemon's insistence on the virtues of honesty and plain living seem to be meant for the admonition of the audience.

It is not surprising that the play has at first sight encouraged detractors and shocked admirers of Menander. We know from Plutarch (*Moralia* 853 F) that Menander improved as he grew older and that his death at 52 years of age cut short great promise of future improvement. Even those who belittle the play may see in it evidence of the long way that Menander had to go before he reached the high level of *Epileptontes*, a play with tragic moments and a profound conversion. Cnemon learned that he had made a mistake in trying to live alone without friends, when he fell into the well; but he still felt no love for his fellow man. He alone is defeated, not enlightened at the end. Homer, in the simple plot of the *Iliad*, introduced an accident, the death of Patroclus. But the psychological change in Achilles is also clearly depicted. Cnemon finds truth at the bottom of a well, but his truth is not so deep as a well.

Those who look for symbolism in drama may suppose that Menander had in mind the saying that has been attributed to Democritus in modern times, that "truth lieth at the bottom of a deep well." This will not do, however, since Democritus in his Greek says nothing of a well, merely ἐν βύθῳ (Diog. Laert., IX, 72), Latin in *profundo* (Cicero, *Acad. Pr.*, II, 10, 32), that is, "far below the surface." Isidore, *Etym.*, VIII, 6, 12, says in *puteo* alto.

Still it is a brilliant play, far more entertaining than the early work of Shakespeare and Molière. They would not be rated high if we had only *Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *L'Étourdi* to judge them by. Menander wrote fast-moving plays that must be acted with agility. The modern critic, being accustomed to slow motion or to no motion, as in Becker's *Waiting for Godot*, is likely to assume that

a fast-moving play is a farce. But a farce aims only at laughter. Menander aims at concern. He lets us see the woes and scruples of his characters and gets the audience interested in their fate. This was illustrated on June 3, when I gave a dramatic reading of my translation of *Dyscolus* to an audience at Haverford College. The effect was much greater than I had expected.

There is much shifting from character to character in Menander, but his construction is admirable. Scenes are never irrelevant to the main theme or to the moral impact. When Geta the slave and Sicon the cook are successively routed by the ferocious Cnemon, Sostratus' goal of winning Cnemon's daughter seems to recede. When Gorgias lectures Sostratus on the wickedness of seducing a citizen's daughter, Sostratus' honorable intentions invest the sermon with comic irony. His courteous reception of the charge is just the thing to win the friendship of Gorgias. The girl's boldness in leaving the house is made virtuous by her motive, to save the old slave woman Simike from a beating at the risk of getting a beating herself. Each episode is not only a surprise itself but leads to future surprises and delights.

The play is dominated by Pan, who speaks the prologue. Menander did to him something like what Aeschylus did to the Erinyes in his *Eumenides*. All primitive crudity has disappeared. The god and his Nymphs appreciate piety and take steps to get a rich and virtuous husband for Cnemon's lonely daughter. Stories of neglected women who get husbands in spite of all are still popular. Pan makes Sostratus fall in love at first sight. From then on the power of Pan and the virtue of Sostratus are indistinguishable. It is by winning Gorgias that he gains the girl, for after the accident the old man takes back his wife and adopts Gorgias, giving him control of his affairs. Sostratus' family are in the course of the play installed in the shrine of the Nymphs between Cnemon's house and Gorgias'. The newcomers soon establish unfriendly relations with Cnemon by being too rich and too sociable, but in the end even Cnemon joins the family into which his daughter marries.

Gorgias too has his success story, which also involves his slave Daos. Gorgias is the poor boy who has known nothing but hard work and trouble, but has maintained his courage and honesty. He is shy socially and truculent morally. Unlike the heroes of Horatio Alger, he does not leave the farm to seek his fortune. Fortune seeks him out on the farm through his rescue of Cnemon and through his friendship with Sostratus. His house is at stage left, the direction from which the representatives of wealth and city life come, while the fields are reached by going off at stage right near the house of Cnemon. That gives the impression at times of a beleaguered castle.

The main theme is obviously the story of Sostratus' love and how it wins against what look like overwhelming odds. The first act shows him frustrated, first by the feeble support of Chaireas, his parasite, who has scruples about helping a friend into matrimony with no more motive than romantic love. How different from Terence's Phormio! Pyrrhias, the huntsman slave, is equally unhelpful. His great concern is to persuade Sostratus to flee from Cnemon. Cnemon beats Pyrrhias, beats the cook, who is a metic, as well as his own aged female slave, Simike. We are told that he would have

beaten his daughter and his stepson's slave if he had caught them disobeying orders. The formula, "You aren't going to hit me, are you," familiar from *Samia* 229, saves the citizen Sostratus from *hybris*. The biting sarcasm of Cnemon is almost as bad. Sostratus gets a moment of happiness only when the Girl emerges to get water from the Nymphs' shrine and permits Sostratus to help her. The chapter of accidents has begun. Simike had dropped Cnemon's bucket into the well. But Sostratus is frustrated again when Daos interferes between him and the Girl. He goes to look for help from his father's slave Getas. This is not, however, a play in which some clever slave does all the work. Getas has gone to engage a cook for a religious picnic, by his mistress' orders, and Sostratus is forced to rely on himself.

At the beginning of Act 2 Gorgias comes in from the field to protect his sister. He is rebuking Daos for not getting the young man's name and for not warning him off. When Sostratus returns and is about to knock boldly at Cnemon's door, Gorgias lectures him sternly, denouncing his wicked scheme to take advantage of an innocent girl. Sostratus protests his honorable intentions, wins Gorgias' friendship, and hopes to get his help. Gorgias offers to let him hear Cnemon denouncing contemporary youth, particularly the idle rich, if they can meet him in the fields. Daos persuades him that it will be better to take a heavy two-pronged grubbing-hoe and pose as a poor farmer working for pay. No sooner have the three gone off to the field than forerunners of mother's picnic party appear, the cook Sicon and the slave Getas. We hear that Sostratus' mother had dreamed that he was forced to do hard labor wielding a mattock and clothed in a sheepskin. This is enough to justify propitiating Pan in a very jolly way. Husband and son are invited to the feast but are evidently not consulted beforehand. Note that Sostratus' tool is a heavy *bidens* or mattock, not a fork as the Oxford dictionary unaccountably has it. See Jebb on *Antigone* 250 or *bidens* in Harper's Latin dictionary. A fork is pushed; a mattock is driven in and pulled.

With the third Act the rest of the party have arrived and are ready to start the religious procession, led by Sostratus' sister Plangon. The flutegirl Parthenis is obviously, like Habrotonon at the Tauropolia in the *Epitrepontes*, not yet practicing the profession for which she is destined. Cnemon sees the company and decides to stay at home and guard his property. Sostratus is foiled again. He is toiling with the mattock, but Cnemon and his daughter will be far away. When Getas and the cook successively try to borrow a kettle from the god's neighbor, Cnemon reacts vigorously. So might a tourist fare today among rusties who expect to be exploited if they are courteous. Sostratus arrives exhausted from the fields and describes the effect on his back of steady grubbing. When he sees the feast preparing, he goes back to the field to invite his new friends to take part. Before he returns at the end of the act, Simike has entered briefly to tell how she lost the hoe while fishing for the bucket. Getas finds her predicament very funny. Cnemon drives her in, proposing to go down the well himself. Getas insults Cnemon and later grumbles when Sostratus returns with the two local yokels as guests. He instructs Gorgias to bring his mother along.

The fourth Act begins with a shout for help from Simike. Sicon protests that she is interrupting a libation. We are thus informed that lunch has been eaten during the intermission. Hence Gorgias, Myrrhine, and Daos will be with the party in the shrine. Cnemon is in the well. Gorgias and Sostratus dash to the rescue. Sicon sees the accident as a judgment on the farmer who had beaten a cook. "There's a divinity doth hedge a cook. Never mind the butler." Sostratus returns in great excitement. Gorgias had gone down the well, while Sostratus tried to pull on the rope and gaze at the farmer's daughter at once. Cnemon was at last brought up by Gorgias, but injured and unable to get to his feet unaided. When he is brought in, he sends for his wife and tells her and Gorgias something that is lost in a gap of four lines. He admits only one mistake, the attempt to be self-sufficient. A man needs one acquaintance in case of emergency. Cnemon had supposed it impossible for a man to be benevolent, but Gorgias had nobly saved the man who spurned him. He adopts Gorgias and assigns all his property to him with responsibility for wife and daughter. He will remain a recluse. Gorgias introduces Sostratus, whose sunburn persuades Cnemon that he is a working farmer, "no spoiled child of luxury, nor yet the sort to stroll all day about a campus unemployed." Cnemon is carried off to rest and Gorgias gives the girl in marriage to Sostratus. The father of Sostratus, Callippides, arrives; he is late for lunch and very hungry. Fortunately there is a break between acts that gives him time to satisfy himself with food kept expressly for him.

The fifth Act shows how Sostratus persuaded his father to give his daughter in marriage to Gorgias. Gorgias with a fine exhibition of "noble foolishness" refuses the girl if he must take a large dowry, but soon finds himself married to Plangon with three talents. He is also told to keep the one talent that Cnemon had reserved as dowry for his daughter. The houses of Gorgias and Cnemon are now emptied except for Cnemon asleep at home, as even Simike goes to the wedding. Getas sees the opportunity, summons Sicon, and the two bring Cnemon out, still asleep, then wake him by knocking at the door and demanding loans of all sorts of luxurious articles. Cnemon is helpless. Then they describe the festivities going on in the shrine, which are of a new and simple sort. There was plenty of diluted wine, and the servants, joining hands, danced a modest measure. Cnemon decides that it will be better, or at least no worse, to yield and go to the wedding. He is borne in triumphantly with wreath and torch, as Getas invites the audience to applaud and award the victory. We know from Plato's *Laws* that the judges' votes were normally a mere validation of the preference shown by the audience.

Certainly Menander is not writing farce in this play. True, he tells a gay story with uproariously funny scenes as the peevish hermit repels visitors. When two of them triumph over him in the last act, the tormenting of a crippled old man may seem cruel, but the scene is transposed into something like Old Comedy, which often ended in a riot of sex and feasting. In Old Comedy, however, it is citizens who riot; and citizens have been made to participate in scurrilous scenes throughout the action. In Menander scurrility is limited to Getas, Sicon, and the villain Cnemon. Others, whether slave or citizen, are realistically portrayed. The baiting of the bear

at the end is obviously not realistic and not immoral, for Cnemon is only getting his own back. The ridicule is therapeutic. Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew* is built along the same lines.

Note that the rioting of slaves at the end of a comedy, as in the *Stichus* of Plautus for instance, which is based on Menander's first *Adelphi*, is a development from the rioting of citizens in Old Comedy. This illustrates a frequent phenomenon in the history of ritual, the social downgrading of old rituals. Fertility rites that were once important to chiefs and priests, and that were celebrated without shame or restraint, will later survive only because they are kept up by the vulgar. Respectable people in ancient Greece, as in modern China, stayed away from riotous occasions or at least went only as spectators and chaperoned their daughters. This is seen in the account of the Tauropolia in the *Epitrepontes*. Where anti-quarian interest sets in, it is not the license of old rites that is revived. The modern May Day is aesthetic and respectable. As comedy with Menander began to tell romantic tales of real people, the real people had to behave themselves in his plays. They could not be misrepresented for the worse or made ugly. Comedy in Aristotle's sense had to give way to the ethical interest, concern for the success of ingratiating characters. But low characters could still provide some comedy, and they might be allowed to punish with ridicule even citizens who deserved it. Plato in his *Laws* (816 E, see also 935 C—936 B) forbade his citizens to act in comedies or even to watch comedies in which citizens were lampooned. Such laughter was for the vulgar, though Plato strongly approved of gentlemanly wit and good humor. We see that the philosophic view gradually prevailed. Old-fashioned scurrility was largely discarded in the theater.

It would not take much thumbing of the Index of Plato's *Laws* to find points where the morality of Menander follows pretty closely that of the philosopher. Plato decreed that young people should see each other "unclad save so far as modesty prescribes" before marriage (772 A). Callippides holds that for a sound marriage Eros must play a part in persuading a young man to marry (*Dyscolus* 789 f.). The lesson of the *Dyscolus* that the rich should marry the poor regardless of dowries was taught by Plato in the *Laws* (773 E). Cnemon's account of the good old days (743 ff.) when each man was content with his modest property, none wronged his neighbor, and there were no courts, no jails, no war, sounds very like *Laws* 679 B-C. Plato will allow his citizens to seek profit only in farming (743 D). Gorgias proclaims (775) Callippides honestly rich, because he is unbeatable as a farmer. All other gains are evidently ill-gotten in his view. The absence of hired entertainers at the final party may well be due to philosophic influence. So might a modern Puritan advocate substituting the Virginia reel for jazz, and with equal chance of success.

Demetrius of Phalerum, whose ten-year stewardship of Athens began less than a year before the *Dyscolus* was produced, probably deserves credit for the obtrusive morality in this play. Menander always wrote moral comedy in which virtue is rewarded, but nowhere else does he include such specific praise of virtuous action. As Onesimus is a reflection of his master on a lower plane in the *Epitrepontes*, so in the *Dyscolus* Daos is hard-working and strict

in his morals like Gorgias, but he does not succumb so easily to the charm of Sostratus' courtesy. The comic characters Getas and Sicon are foils. They do not return good for evil or appreciate the rustic life. They have only contempt for farmers and for life on the farm. Sostratus can be chummy with Gorgias, but Getas disapproves of the connection and sees little difference between master and slave, since both know only the life of the farm.

The fabulist Phaedrus (V, 1) describes the first meeting of Menander and Demetrius. At the end of the long line of those who came to pay their respects to the new dictator straggled the inert and unpolitical citizens. Last among this group was Menander, dripping with perfume, clothed in flowing robes, stepping delicately and languidly. On seeing him the tyrant asked: "Who is that pansy coming so boldly into my presence?" But when those near him replied: "The writer Menander," he changed his tone at once, because he had read and admired Menander. "There could not be created a more handsome man," he declared. What happened next the poet does not say, but it is easy to imagine the philosopher challenging the dramatist to write a comedy that would omit all luxury, city life, and unceremonious love and would show for once only noble and well-behaved young men, while praising the old-fashioned, honest rustic life.

So Menander gave him a hero who for the sake of an honest love laid aside his fashionable garments and worked in the fields. It is usually assumed that Phaedrus had no authority for his statements, but Menander's contemporaries were fond of gossip. There were also writers who saw to it that anecdotes did not remain unpublished. I suspect that in this one play we find Menander laboring to cultivate the philosophic field of Demetrius. He too discards his finery and wears rustic garb in his imagination.

Yet his clear insight is displayed in passing hints. Getas describes (603-6) the farmer's life as one that knows all pains and gets no good of them. Gorgias is so uncouth that he shies (871 f.) at the prospect of meeting strange ladies in a family gathering. He is at once awkward and vehement when he reproves Sostratus. His attempt to be eloquent betrays his lack of education. The hostility of the rustic to the man of leisure is plainly indicated, as is the rustic belief that higher education is a dodge to avoid work (755). A student is *οἷος ἀργὸς περιπατεῖν τὴν ἡμέραν*, a palpable hit at the Peripatetic School. Philosophy admired the farmer, but the farmer did not admire philosophy. The philosophic view of religion that emphasizes the goodness of the gods is implicit in the figure of Pan in the play. Yet characters like Simike (875-8) and Sicon (643-6) attribute Cnemon's accident to the vengeance of the gods. Pan himself says nothing of this. Only low characters are afraid of the gods. Piety is rewarded in the case of Cnemon's daughter. Sostratus too always salutes the god in passing. Yet Cnemon sees the piety of Sostratus' mother as a mere excuse for comfortable feasting. Each character and act may be reflected as in a mirror by any other character with effects that are refreshing and amusing.

Though Menander was later to reach greater heights, it will not do to dismiss the *Dyscolus* as a mere youthful essay in which he does not succeed in the effort to suppress comedy in the interest of realism. Menander's most attractive characters in any play of his

are always comic from some point of view. They take themselves seriously, even the slaves. What could be finer than the irrepressible zeal of Simike or Daos for decency and propriety and the welfare of any member of the family, no matter how austere the master may be? Menander's characters are also, like Homer's, spontaneous. The action springs from them; their motives are always clear. Even though Sostratus is under the spell of Pan, his energy seems to be natural to him. He is praised for his virtue, but even that does not make him unattractive. His universal friendliness includes the slave Daos, who obviously hopes at first to make a fool of him. He takes calmly the almost unbearably stilted sermon of Gorgias, which ends with a gorgeously incoherent attempt at logic (297 f.). He even admits (151) that he is afraid of Cnemon, yet stands his ground in spite of fear. His constant courtesy helps him to win friends and influence the course of the action. No wonder that his father finds him irresistible or that Daos considers him a menace to susceptible maidens.

The usual complaint that New Comedy repeats its plots and its characters finds no support here. What kind of parasite is Chaireas? He is far from the usual flatterer. His skill is in evasion. Getas is as clever as Onesimus in the *Epitrepontes* is stupid, but his cleverness serves others, not himself. There is no other cook with whom to compare Sicon. He may well be typical. But Callippides is no typical angry father. Perhaps it is a sign of immaturity in Menander that he tries to tell a tale with so many characters (12) while limited by the conventions of the Greek stage.

We must remember that much that now appears obvious was strikingly new at the time in Menander's art. The success of his innovations has made them suffer from imitation and repetition. He aimed to show people as they are, but at the same time to be uplifting. The term need not be derogatory. It only means that he made goodness seem attractive and so led people painlessly to feel kindness and sympathy for others. That kind of story is left nowadays to popular magazines, to the movies, and to television. People have grown tired of uplift. They want comedy of manners, not moral comedy. If critics want to understand Menander, they will have to learn to take moral comedy in their stride. Menander's morality is not ours in all of its aspects, but then, neither is that of Homer or that of Sophocles. In literature we must learn to be tolerant of the morality of other times. We are tolerant enough of their immorality.

The technique of Menander is wholly admirable. With only three actors he gives us an action that involves fifteen characters including the mutes. Sostratus' mother is a good example of a character that might have been presented, and probably was in some other play, in the full glory of matriarchy. Menander's art gives us a sense of unexplored possibilities as in our daily life. He is like a juggler with two, or rather three, hands who keeps a dozen balls in the air. Characters are addressed, seen, or heard speaking offstage. The picnic party progresses during action and intermissions alike, for we have frequent indications of what is going on. In Act 1 Chaireas sees Cnemon coming in the distance and Pyrrhias takes flight. If he did not, Cnemon could never appear, since one actor animates both masks. In Act 2 Daos shows his enthusiasm for agriculture by racing ahead

to work in the field. The actor must come on as Sicon a moment later. In Act 4 Sostratus races across the stage without speaking. He is mute, for the three actors are busy as Sicon, Simike, and Gorgias. An actor had to be prepared to take on any mask of the drama. In this play the two female parts may have been taken by the same actor, for Simike and the Girl do not appear together, but it seems more likely that they were played by different actors. It seems more likely that the same actor played Cnemon in Act 1 and Act 3. He would then play the Girl in Act 1, but could not take Simike in Act 3, since she is onstage with Cnemon. Cnemon and Sostratus are played by the same actor in Act 3. In Act 1 Sostratus must be taken by one of the other actors, since he and Cnemon are on together. It seems like a difficult system, and I cannot think of any other theatre in which actors are so versatile. Menander is perfectly at ease with the system. His characters move on and off with sufficient plausibility. Some modern dramatists would suffer by comparison. The acting was evidently of the lively sort that does not tolerate gaps in the speaking or even in the action. An actor who crosses the stage has something to say as he does it, and a character who has a long speech often crosses the stage while he makes it, as Cnemon does on his first appearance.

The four breaks between acts are made thoroughly plausible. The action is not interrupted, but goes on offstage. Only the actors have a rest, which no doubt they needed. At the end of Act 1, Daos goes to find Gorgias and Sostratus to find Getas. It is not surprising that they return at almost the same moment. At the end of Act 2 preparations for the sacrifice continue, but the sacrificers are late. The cook complains of having to wait. The women might have been allowed to arrive on time if there had been no forced intermission. Between Acts 3 and 4 about an hour elapses while everyone enjoys his lunch. Of course Cnemon does not need so long for his lunch, but he had first the job of punishing Simike and may well have thought a while before starting his descent into the well. Gorgias, Daos, and Myrrhine had come from their house to the shrine. When Sicon at the beginning of Act 4 protests that Simike's anguished appeal for assistance is out of place while a libation is going on, we know that the party has reached the wine, as in *Epitrepontes* 208. Except for this hint, we might wonder whether Gorgias and Sostratus had lunch and why they say nothing of missing it. Gorgias must enter from the shrine, not from his house. Writers of farce do not worry much about the offstage life of their characters. In Menander everything is thought out and explicitly indicated. Everyone must have time for lunch. So between Acts 4 and 5 enough time elapses for Callippides, who has come late, to satisfy arrears of appetite. The dramatist had to provide an intermission. Therefore Callippides has to come late to provide the excuse. Perhaps the obstinate refusal of Cnemon at the end to join the party was chiefly needed in order to provide an excuse to describe the festivities that were going on offstage. At any rate they would not have offended Demetrius' overseers of women. Plato had found the problem of regulating women too hard for the legislator (*Laws* 781 C). Demetrius tackled the problem in the spirit of Plato.

Since there is no recognition scene in the play, there is no occasion for a mask with two faces as in the case of Pamphila in

the *Epitrepontes*. She must brighten up at the moment when she recognizes her infant. In the *Epitrepontes* there is also a conversion, so that Charisius must appear in a new mask. There is careful preparation to see that the audience know that he is the same man with a new expression. So in the *Dyscolus* both Sostratus and Sicon warn the audience that Cnemon's face will be a strange sight when he enters after his accident. Sicon expects to gloat. Sostratus merely remarks as he sees Cnemon coming that he is a strange sight. It is just possible that Cnemon's new mask may have had two faces to permit the old grouch to go off at the end looking merry at last. He is immobile until he is carried out, and it would be easy enough to show the other face of the mask as he is carried out. The text could hardly be expected to prove this point, but the dramatic advantage of a sudden transformation at the end is obvious.

Metrically there is a surprise. The final scene of the baiting of Cnemon is in iambic tetrameters, hitherto unattested for Menander. Earlier there is a long passage in trochaic tetrameter from the point where Cnemon addresses his wife and stepson to the end of Act 4. There are also trochaic tetrameters in *Perikeiromene*. Menander's gift of using assonance and rhythm to convey emotion or the sense of action is illustrated in two passages. In line 54 Sostratus has four times in one line to repeat palatal stop plus omega, as if he were choking on a prune:

σκόπτεις, ἐγὼ δέ, Χαιρέα, κακῶς ἔχω.

When Sostratus describes (525-9) his energetic efforts with the mattock followed by exhaustion, there is, if my emendation is correct, a thumping rhythm with a rapid slowdown and silence to follow. I am reminded of the story so popular with small children of the train that started out saying merrily, "I think I can, I think I can," but came to a stop when the grade was too steep with "I thought I could." The papyrus has *ειγαίπλειον*, which is meaningless. Here is my revision:

νεανίας ἐγὼ τις, ἐξαίρων ἄνω
σφόδρα τὴν δίκηλλαν, ὥσ' ἐργάτης βαθὺ
εἷς γε πέδον ἐπεκείμην φιλοπόνως οὐ πολλὸν
χρόνον.

In terms of short syllables followed by longs in the last line and a fraction the numerical descent is 5, 3, 1, 0. After each long at the end of a word there is a break corresponding to strokes of the mattock. When at the end there is no long, it is as if the mattock ceased to thump. Vergil gets a similar dying effect with *munere* at the beginning of a line at *Aeneid*, VI, 886. This is as expressive as the unique trimeter at *Epitrepontes* 706, which accompanies Smicrines' vigorous shaking of Sophrona. It is unique in combining assonance with two anapestic words to start a line: *προπετὴς ἀπάγω*.

Incidentally the combination *σφόδρα ἐργάτης* in line 527 may perhaps explain *σποδρεγάτης* as an epithet of Euripides on the back of the Didot papyrus better than Rademacher's *σπονδεργάτης*.

To take up now the question whether this first edition of the text is a safe guide, the answer must be that it is not. It is no easy matter to transcribe a text correctly. Many marks of punctuation are not noted in this transcription, and there are other more serious mistakes. Since the photograph is there for consultation, mere misprints like *χορηγ* (349) and *μλησιον* (351) will not mislead. The correct forms are found on the opposite page, which gives the text in modern form. In line 348 part of the stroke of a nu is visible at the beginning. Read then *οὐ μὲν ἀδικεῖς* not *οὐ δῆτ'*. It is clear that further study of the papyrus will yield appreciable improvements.

But it is in the separation of words, the pointing of the text, and the assignment of speeches to characters that there is most room for variation. Having myself in many cases failed to get from the transcription a plausible sense, I am grateful to the editor for the many cases in which he provided a solution that was at least possible or even plausible. In other cases my own solution appears to me better. Some passages have been explained for me by E. G. Turner, F. H. Sandbach, or T. B. L. Webster, often from suggestions furnished by others. I will not trespass on their preserves and will bring forward here only my own attempts. Let me echo the modest statement of M. Martin. I have no doubt that others will find flaws in many or most of my proposals and will improve on them.

At line 249 Martin emends the papyrus, which has] *εμαῖ*. His *ὁρᾷ, πολεμεῖ* should be *ὁρᾷ, κρεμᾷ*, "he will string me up for a beating if he sees me." At line 300 a slave speaks. It cannot be Pyrrhias, as Martin has it, for the three actors are wearing the masks of Sostratus, Gorgias, and Daos. Pyrrhias may be present as a mute. In any case the speaker is interrupting Sostratus, thereby putting one more obstacle in his path. His courtesy to the hostile slave is ingratiating. Dramatically the line must go to Daos as a representative of the opposition. Nor would Sostratus address his own slave as Mr. Speaker. He would know his name. At line 52 the footnote calls attention to Fragment 120, which ends *εὐθὺς ὡς ταχύ*. Dramatically Sostratus must fall in love on the instant, not come away instantly. That would be very odd behavior for a man in love. Yet Martin gives us *εὐθ[ε]ως ταχύ*, though the gap in the papyrus obviously requires more than one letter to fill it. Chaireas must say, "How quick," and continue, "Did you plan it so on setting out?" Though the papyrus reads *ηπουτ' εβουλευσ'*, Martin emends to *ἦ τοῦτο βεβούλευσ'*, "is this your purpose?" and adds a useless note *de anapaestis dilaceratis*. The pluperfect is required.

Fortunately most of the editing of the text is better than this beginning. But at 288 Martin inserts *δὴ* to mend the meter, regardless of the strange anapest that is produced. A change of order from *τί σοι* to *σοί τι* is all that is required. At 313, where a syllable must be added, he inserts *δ'* to obtain *τετάραραγμαί δ' ἴσθ' ὅτι*. The conjunction is not plausible. Read *τετάραραγμ' <εὐ> ἴσθ' ὅτι*. At line 354 I propose *ἴδοιμι κᾶ]ν αἰτὸς*, line 388 *πατὴρ μετ' ἀγρίου*, line 423 *ἀνεσπακότ', ὃ τρισάθλιε*. Line 445 I should emend to *ἄγαν παροικουῖς*, "they live too near." In line 454 supply *φυλακτέον* at the end. In line 516 no emendation is needed. Sicon asks himself, "Am I to go to another door," then states the objection that he may get another beating. In 546 f. there is no need to emend if we supply the missing letters:

τί τὸ κ]ακόν; οἷε χεῖρας ἐξήκοντά με,
 ἄνθρ]ωπ', ἔχειν;

Of the 200 lines emended in this edition, many are torn, not mended. Particularly unfortunate is *θυίονσα* for *θύουσα* in line 262. Sostratus' mother is no maenad.

At 597 there is no reason for giving the line to Simike. It is Cnemon who must bewail his isolation, and the papyrus has a masculine adjective. Dramatically some foreshadowing of Cnemon's adventure in the well is needed. Hence φίλος or

φιλῆ
 ὥς οὐδὲ εἷς, καταβήσομ' εἰ[κότως ἐγώ.
 εἴτ' ἔστιν ἄλλ'; ΓΕ. ἡμεῖς ποριού[μεθά σοι βρόχον
 καὶ σχοινίον.

In the gap at 650 the voice of Sostratus may have been heard offstage saying something like: "You say that he's alive down there." That would give Sicon the cue to pray for a lesser disaster than death. At 775 Martin's emendation ἀπολοῦμαι spoils a good statement ἀπο<λέ>λειμμι, "I am late." But such possible improvements are too numerous to mention. It is only too likely that my attempts have either been anticipated by others or will be found inferior to their solutions. In any case the search for truth is much easier for those who begin where someone else has left off.

The notes are very scanty, but often helpful. To do more would have delayed publication. The French introduction of eight pages is chiefly concerned with a description of the papyrus. There is no discussion of the dramatic quality of the play. The French translation, which accompanies the text at the bottom of the page, does not always make the most of dramatic situations. At 504 ἤκε πάλιν is a sarcastic imperative from Cnemon to Sicon, whom he has beaten: "Come again!" Martin translates it as an indicative. At 573 φιλανθρωπεύσομαι is a promise of future benevolences, that is, gifts to the god. Martin makes it present and translates *en homme bien élevé*. At 578 Simike says that she had hoped to retrieve the bucket herself without the master knowing. Instead of making the participle nom. fem. in 577, Martin gives us *comme l'ordonnait mon maître*, and gets rid of αὐτῇ "myself" by putting it in the accusative and leaving it untranslated. At 596 and elsewhere θάρρον is translated *plus vite que ça*, though with the imperative it always means "at once." At 617 the text gives a speech to Gorgias that begins with μηδαμῶς, obviously with imperative force. Since Gorgias is receiving, not dispensing, imperatives in this scene, it is clear that in spite of the papyrus Sostratus must say "not leaving your mother alone on any account." In other words, "we want her at the party too." At 628 the text has been correctly repointed since the translation was made: *Il a joliment bien fait, par le ciel!* Sicon says actually: "Of course. The fierce old man had not done good deeds, I swear by Uranus."

The English and German translations are done from the French, which they seem to follow faithfully. In the translation of the introduction I note "spirit" for "breathing" and "epuration" for "emendation." But scholars will know what is meant. At 771

Sostratus is obviously correcting Gorgias with his *μὲν οὖν*. *Oui* is not the word. Better: "No, no, I shall be much better," reading *κρείττω[ν ἐγώ]*. This explains his apology for boasting in the next line.

The stage directions are often incomplete or mistaken. At 206 Daos is correctly made to enter from the house of Gorgias, but his words should be taken as addressed to Myrrhine inside. He refers to Gorgias as working alone for a long time. In the French *πάλαι* becomes *un moment*, and Daos is made to say that he must go to help Cnemon. This is contradicted by Daos' statement at 247-9 that he is afraid to go to Cnemon's door and by Gorgias' at 331 that Cnemon never has help in his work. At the end of Act 1 Daos is made to reënter the house of Gorgias. But Gorgias is in the field and Daos must go off stage right to find him. It might not matter to other playwrights, but in Menander Daos must be given some distance to go in order to fill the intermission. In a modern play one act may begin precisely where another leaves off, but Menander has to invent business to fill the time. These are only samples chosen largely at random of the sort of mistakes that haunt the whole work. But I have found no false quantities in the meters.

There is an Index of proper names and one of Greek words by Miss P. Photiades. Words found only in the supplements are not usually included. Words introduced by emendation are included, sometimes with a warning bracket to show that something has been added. There is no reference to *μάγειρος* at 645, though the supplement is certain and confirmed by a previously known fragment. It would be helpful to have a list of words not indexed, like *διὰ* and *μέν*. It would have been easy to include them with a warning that references are not complete. Perhaps it would have been better to include more words from the supplements, with a warning, since in any case some very unpalatable ones are included, like *διάκονοι* in 546, to which there is a reference via the verb. But the index is useful as it is. Typography and get up are excellent, except that the binding soon works loose. It is not flimsy though. We are grateful to Professor Martin for promptness and for clear photographs of the papyrus. The rest is of minor importance.

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R. A. B. MYNORS, ed. *C. Valerii Catulli Carmina*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Pp. xvi + 113. (*Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*.)

Though within the last two decades at least three reasonably good texts of Catullus had already appeared,¹ the need for a sound critical edition was by no means yet wholly satisfied. Cazzaniga well realized the necessity of exploring systematically the interrelation of the

¹ E. Cazzaniga, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Turin, 1945); E. V. D'Arbela, *Catullo, I Carmi* (Milan, 1947), accompanied by a trans-

extant manuscripts, but war-time exigencies prevented him from doing so. D'Arbela and Schuster, on the other hand, showed little inclination to come to real grips with the complicated problem, and their critical apparatuses appear to constitute, for the most part, centos of previous works. Thus, since Hale had never fulfilled his promise to publish the complete results of his exhaustive investigations in the Catullian tradition,² none of these recent editors possessed a firm basis upon which he might evaluate the testimony of the numerous known manuscripts, other than O (= Oxoniensis Bodl. Canon. lat. 30) and G (= Parisinus Bibl. Nat. lat. 14137), for the reconstruction of the archetypal text in the lost V(eronensis). As a result, their apparatuses are cluttered in varying degrees with sporadic and usually second-hand reports of the readings in certain lesser manuscripts, and, in particular, the position of Hale's highly prized codex R (= Vaticanus Ottob. lat. 1829) in the tradition remained unclarified.

A fresh and expert scrutiny of the large bulk of extant manuscripts was plainly long overdue,³ and in this respect the new *OCT* Catullus represents a considerable advance over all previous editions. Mynors, distinguished both as a palaeographer and as an editor, has himself examined not only the major manuscripts but also more than eighty of the others, dating from *saec.* xv-xvi *in*. He relies on his predecessors for readings only in the case of ten more of these *deteriores*.⁴ His conclusions regarding the tradition are not substantially different from those of Hale and Merrill⁵ and make, in effect, slight impact on the actual text of the poet. However, since they embody the fruits of his major contribution to Catullian scholarship, they rightly claim special attention. Mynors estimates O to be probably the earliest extant representative of V but takes no stand on the academic question whether it derives directly from V, as Hale believed, or through a now lost intermediary, as Morgenthau held.⁶ Next in age, according to the editor, comes G, but in his *praefatio* he shows himself non-committal as to the relevance of the date "1375 mensis octobris 19" contained in an adscript at the end of the codex. Some scholars accept it as the date when G itself was completed, while others trace it back to the exemplar from which G was copied. In view of Mynors' wide palaeographical experience an expressed opinion would have been welcome. His neutrality on this issue might perhaps be interpreted as indicating an implicit judgment that the matter is indeterminable, but on p. xvi, where his

lation; M. Schuster, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig, 1949). L. Herrmann's recent *Les deux livres de Catulle* (Brussels, 1957) constitutes a curious attempt to reconstruct the so-called original Catullus in two books, but his arbitrary text creates more problems than it solves, and its apparatus is of no value.

² Cf. R. G. C. Levens, "Catullus," in M. Platnauer's *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford, 1954), p. 295 and the references in n. 33.

³ A list of 120 Catullus manuscripts, of which a few are fragmentary, has been compiled by W. G. Hale, "The Manuscripts of Catullus," *C.P.*, III (1908), pp. 236-43.

⁴ Cf. Mynors' *Praefatio*, p. viii.

⁵ Cf. E. T. Merrill, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig, 1923), p. iii.

⁶ Cf. Hale, "Catullus Once More," *C.R.*, XX (1906), p. 162; A. Morgenthau, *De Catulli Codicibus* (diss., Strassburg, 1909), p. 52.

sigla are given, G is confidently assigned to the year 1375. A question mark would certainly be in order here.⁷

For R, the most controversial manuscript in the Catullian tradition, Mynors holds a higher regard than any editor since Merrill published his Teubner edition in 1923. Following Hale, he considers R "brother" to G rather than "nephew," as Morgenthauer argued. Further, against Schulze he supports Hale's contention that codex m (= Venetus Marc. lat. xii. 80 [4167]) descended from R after correction or from a lost copy of it and served as the immediate source for a later emendator of G.⁸ In promoting R to the same level as G Mynors closely approaches Hale's main thesis that "All our other MSS (with the exception of T [= Parisinus Bibl. Nat. lat. 8071, a miscellany containing 62]) are descended from O, G and R—principally from R, with a certain amount of crossing from O and G."⁹ However, the editor does not go quite all the way and, allowing for certain unknowns, cautiously hedges by stating that these other manuscripts *omnes a codicibus OGR originem aut duxerunt aut, quod nobis idem ualeat, duxisse possunt*.¹⁰ The latter alternative appears to represent a slight compromise with Hale's opponents by implicitly admitting the possibility of a descent of some *deteriores* from the common archetype of G and R through a lost manuscript fraternally related to G and R. But this concession as phrased by Mynors also necessitates the inference that, for all practical purposes, the text of V can be reconstituted from OGR alone and that, where OGR show a common corruption, good readings in other manuscripts are no more than felicitous conjectures by scribes or readers. Hence, favorite manuscripts of earlier editors, like Schulze's m, Friedrich's Datanus (= Cod. Berolinensis Diez. B. Sant. 37), and Stampini's Br. (= Brixianus Bibl. Quer. A. vii. 7) are now downgraded and need only be cited in the apparatus when, as in the case of other *deteriores* or modern scholars, they happen to furnish an editor with an attractive emendation for an otherwise hopeless corruption in OGR.

Mynors' apparatus combines in admirable fashion compact simplicity with fulness of essential information. In dealing with the plethora of *deteriores* he recognized that the web of cross-currents rendered it impractical, if not impossible, to stemmatize them adequately in traditional manner. Hence, for purposes of convenient citation, he distributes them into eight groups (a through θ) on the basis of significant emendations that they possess in common and

⁷ The conclusion of the dated subscription with "etc." on f. 36r has, with some justification, been taken as a sign that the scribe of G was copying from a longer note in his exemplar; cf. E. Chatelain, *Paléographie des classiques latins*, I (Paris, 1884-1892), p. 4; Hale, *C.R.*, XX (1906), p. 162; *id.*, *C.P.*, III (1908), p. 234.

⁸ Hale would have m come directly from R rather than through an intermediary; cf. Hale, *C.R.*, XX (1906), pp. 161-2; *id.*, *C.P.*, III (1908), pp. 252-6; *id.*, "Stampini and Pascal on the Catullus Manuscripts," *T.A.P.A.*, LIII (1922), p. 111.

⁹ Hale, *C.P.*, III (1908), p. 234. Though Hale staunchly upheld this position from the time of his discovery of R in 1896 until his last article on the subject in *T.A.P.A.*, LIII (1922), pp. 103-12, he never supplied the detailed proof.

¹⁰ *Praefatio*, p. viii.

assigns to each group the date of the earliest known representative. Thus, in scanning the apparatus the curious reader is not left in the dark by the vague and ubiquitous ς of other editions, nor is he so overwhelmed by the sheer number of secondary manuscripts cited for a correction that he may be inclined to give it more authority than is justified. Further, a study of the new apparatus shows that the editor was far more scrupulous than his predecessors in tracing back emendations to their earliest printed sources.

Students of the Catullian tradition will be especially interested in the detailed report of Mynors' re-examination of G and R. Through his inspection of these two important codices he has discovered that, even far more than has hitherto been known or suspected, many readings in G and R, usually regarded as original, are, in fact, due to one or more correctors, collectively designated as g and r, respectively. This situation directly affects not only the weight to be attached to certain lections in both manuscripts, as Mynors rightly points out, but also, to some extent, the supposed character of their common parent X and, ultimately, of the archetype V. For if, as Hale and Mynors argue, G was corrected by g from m or a manuscript like it, which, in turn, derives directly or indirectly from R after emendation by r, then the readings in G attributable to g have no independent value for the reconstitution of X. The same may be said of the contributions by r since the source or sources utilized for the corrections are not known and to assume that they necessarily come from X is to beg the question.

The real crux of Hale's reconstitution of V from OGR and of his thesis regarding the descent of the *deteriores* from R lies essentially in the great number of variants that R contains, and of this manuscript's testimony Mynors offers in his apparatus a fuller account than has previously been published.¹¹ Scholars who are familiar with the palaeographical difficulties of this codex will be especially grateful to the editor for his expert judgment in distinguishing an original reading from a correction. However, his method of reporting the variants in R is not entirely satisfactory and for the uninitiated can, unfortunately, often be quite misleading. Whereas Mynors properly differentiates the early corrections from the original text by the symbol r,¹² he tacitly includes under the siglum R, directly or by implication with X (= GR), variants and other additions by one or more hands different from that of the first scribe. The editor errs gravely and unnecessarily here, for even Hale

¹¹ Hale's complete collation of R has remained unpublished and now rests presumably, along with those of the other Catullus manuscripts, in the possession of B. L. Ullman, who presented some of R's readings in his dissertation, *The Identification of the Manuscripts of Catullus Cited in Statius' Edition of 1566* (Chicago, 1908), pp. 27-62; on the collection of Hale's collations see Ullman, "The Sixth-Century (?) Fragment of Catullus at Leningrad," *C.P.*, XXIV (1929), p. 295. Readings from R are also found in the editions of Ellis, Lafaye, Merrill, Cazzaniga, D'Arbela, and Schuster. Of these editors only Ellis appears to have examined the manuscript directly, and he is known to have been inaccurate in his report of its readings; cf. Hale, *C.R.*, XX (1906), p. 160.

¹² Cf. Mynors' *Praefatio*, p. vii. Hale believed that no fewer than eight different hands worked upon R; cf. Hale, *C.R.*, XX (1906), p. 160.

recognized long ago that a second hand, R², similar to but distinguishable from R, was responsible for many variants in the manuscript. Moreover, on the basis of striking graphic resemblances Hale thought that he was able to identify R² with Coluccio Salutati (1330-1406), the celebrated former owner of the codex.¹³ Where short interlinear or marginal variants are concerned, only a trained eye can often tell which hand is at work, but there are longer passages in which scribal differences are quite manifest.¹⁴ Indeed, a re-examination of all the variants in R makes it quite clear that there is no palaeographical justification for attributing them, as Mynors appears to do, almost wholesale to the original scribe.¹⁵

It seems hardly credible that the editor could have overlooked the undeniable differences in the script of these variants,¹⁶ but, if he did recognize them, his practice becomes comprehensible only on the assumption that he was implicitly following Hale's theory that R² represents the same line of tradition as R, that is, that Coluccio (or others) added variants to R directly from X, the archetype of GR. If this is the basis for the dubious economy of notation in recording the variants in R, an explicit statement to that effect was certainly in order.¹⁷ Moreover, since no systematic attempt has yet been made to determine if and to what extent Hale's view concerning the immediate source of R² is valid, the issue should not have been prejudiced by a procedure that implies what is still to be demonstrated.

¹³ Cf. Hale, *C.P.*, III (1908), p. 244; *id.*, *T.A.P.A.*, LIII (1922), p. 111. This identification has been recently confirmed by Ullman; cf. Levens, *op. cit.*, p. 303, n. 33.

¹⁴ A most obvious instance is found on f. 26r, where vv. 353-6 of 64, omitted by R, were added in the lower margin by R². By not reporting the omission in his apparatus Mynors seems to imply that the lines were written by R, but even a cursory inspection of the characteristic shape of the letters d, g, l of R and R² readily reveals the distinctness of the two hands. Similarly, on f. 17r, where vv. 142 (149)-146 (153) of 61 were omitted by R and supplied in the margin by R², the editor neglects to mention the omission by R. On the other hand, with puzzling inconsistency he does record the omission of 42, 12 by R on f. 11r, where R² again supplied the missing line.

¹⁵ In a partial list of readings from R Ullman assigns to R² some forty variants which are now recorded as al. R (or al. X) in Mynors' apparatus; cf. Ullman, *The Identification of the Manuscripts of Catullus Cited in Statius' Edition of 1566*, pp. 27-62. The attribution of variants in R to r, like *phasidos* on f. 20v (64, 3) and *celtum* on f. 28r (66, 48)—each by a different hand, is quite exceptional in Mynors' apparatus. So far as the variant readings in R are concerned, the scanty apparatus of Merrill's Teubner edition (1923) is often more helpful.

¹⁶ Yet Mynors' statement in the *Praefatio*, p. vii, would not contradict such an inference, for he says, in speaking of the very close relationship of G and R: . . . *eaedem inter uersus lectiones uariae utrique ab ipso scriba ascriptae*. Similarly, he remarks on p. viii: . . . *unde plerumque illa in GR lectionum uarietas siglo al. (=aliter) ab ipsis scribis insignita*.

¹⁷ Mynors' words in the *Praefatio*, p. vii, appear to imply that Coluccio's handiwork in R is included under the siglum r: *correxerunt* (so. R) *plures manus, quas hic omnes praeter recentissimas inuitus r appello, dum spero quendam de Colucii eiusque amicorum studiis peritisimum nos tandem aliquando plenius esse docturum*.

The problem of variants in R is far more complicated than Mynors' edition allows the ordinary reader to surmise, for, on palaeographical grounds, not all the variants assigned by him to R can be said to have been written either at the same time or always by the same hand. Thus, for example, the double variant *al. sublamia uel sublimina* on f. 27v (= 66, 5) is attributed in the new edition to R, but a study of the manuscript reveals that *uel sublimina* was added by a hand different from that of *al. sublamia* and that neither of these hands is to be identified with that of the original scribe. The same is true of the double variant *al. neptine al. neutumne* on f. 21r (= 64, 28), where actually there is a third variant *al. neptimine* by a still later hand. Quite clearly, the practice of inscribing variants in R must have been fairly common among its early users, but there is no reason to suppose that in almost every case the variant was derived directly from X.¹⁸ The possibility of cross-currents in R as in other manuscripts of Catullus cannot be ignored, nor, when a variant seems indubitably correct, should the conjectural talents of Coluccio Salutati and his fellow humanists be underestimated. Hence, until such time as the various strains in R can be expertly unraveled through a searching palaeographical examination, it must needs remain, as it always has been, a controversial manuscript in the Catullian tradition. It is to be hoped that the present editor may be prevailed upon to undertake this task for which he is so eminently qualified.

In the constitution of the text itself Mynors felicitously combines reasonable conservatism with solid independence of judgment. Though he does not venture to make or propose emendations of his own, it is usually evident that he has given careful consideration to the now traditional *crucis* in Catullus. Thus, in the matter of hiatus he reacts against the tendency of recent editors to preserve it almost everywhere that it occurs. For out of eleven instances of this phenomenon which Levens discovers in the important manuscripts,¹⁹ Mynors accepts only four, whereas Cazzaniga retains nine, D'Arbela eight, and Schuster ten.²⁰ Conservatism does not prevent him from adopting emendations that other editors, printing the *textus receptus*, either relegate to the apparatus or ignore altogether. Here especially some disagreement with his judgment is likely to arise since an element of subjectivity often enters into the consideration. Thus, the new editor prefers Passerat's *differtus* to the *dis(s)ertus* of V in 12, 7 and Bergk's *gaudente* to the *gaudete* of GR (*gaude* O) in 31, 13. However, neither of these corrections seems particularly

¹⁸ Such is often the unwarranted implication when Mynors assigns to X a variant found in G and R, as, for example, in the case of *crude* on f. 14r (55, 16) and *tibi* on f. 25r (64, 276). Both variants were plainly written in R by a later hand, which Hale would identify with the correcting hand of m; cf. Hale, *C.P.*, III (1908), p. 250, n. 1.

¹⁹ Cf. Levens, *op. cit.*, p. 296, who excludes from consideration cases involving *o* or *io* or the shortening of a syllable.

²⁰ Mynors accepts hiatus in 38, 2; 66, 11; 68, 158; 107, 1. He rejects it in 11, 11; 66, 48; 67, 44; 76, 10; 97, 2; 99, 8. An obelus is used in 114, 6. For a full discussion of hiatus in Catullus cf. G. P. Goold, "A New Text of Catullus," *Phoenix*, XII (1958), pp. 106-11, who would remove all instances of its occurrence.

cogent or necessarily superior to the traditional text. *Differtus* is designed primarily to ease the construction of the genitive phrase *leporum ac facetiarum*, but curiously, unlike its cognate *refertus*, it does not appear to occur elsewhere with that case. Hence, if the analogy of other adjectives is to be invoked to justify the syntax with *differtus*, this same reasoning can also serve to defend *dis(s)ertus*, which, though somewhat bolder in expression, pregnantly suggests an important aspect of youthful Pollio's lauded urbanity and has therefore, *pace* Passerat, a contextual propriety far surpassing the hoary emendation. *Gaudente*, like *differtus*, involves only the slightest palaeographical change. If the participle had been transmitted by the codices, the reading would probably never have been challenged since it would supply *ero* with a desirable qualifier,²¹ introduce a specious conceit with the preceding *gaude*, and normalize the force of *-que* in *uosque* as 'and' instead of 'too.'²² Moreover, it would settle once for all the syntactical construction of *quidquid est domi cachinnorum* as internal object of *ridete*. Yet a study of the relevant verses shows that *gaudente* is decidedly inferior in its poetic effects; cf. vv. 12-14:

salve, o uenusta Sirmio, atque ero gaude
gaudente, uosque, o Lydiae lacus undae,
ridete quidquid est domi cachinnorum.

The emendation incongruously retards the wonderfully effervescent tone of joyous excitement that Catullus plainly strives to convey by the use of imperatives and vocatives, for the participle supplants *gaudete* in its own line and requires *quidquid . . . cachinnorum* in the next to be object to *ridete*. On the other hand, with *gaudete* each of the last three lines contains both imperative and vocative expressions. This surely is what the context demands, for *domi*, which constitutes the focal point of the poet's perspective and the ultimate source of his present bliss, can receive the full value of its climactic force only as the integral part of a final address.

In dealing with the text of 68, the notorious enigma of Catullian interpretation, Mynors aligns himself with the unitarians, for which he is to be commended. He settles for himself the immediate problem of the name of the addressee by adopting in vv. 11 and 30 Lachmann's conjecture *Mani* for the *mali* of V as vocative praenomen of Allius. However, such use of a solitary praenomen is contrary to the poet's own regular method, while the only other likely emendation, *mi Alli*, proposed by Schöll, involves a unique type of elision for Catullus in the thesis of the sixth foot of v. 11.²³ Hence, in a

²¹ Cf. Goold, *Phoenix*, XII (1958), p. 94.

²² However, for *-que* as 'too' cf. 102, 3. It should be noted that *uosque* is an emendation found only in certain *deteriores*, whereas V actually had an unmetrical *uos quoque*, arising from a gloss on the original reading.

²³ In the apparatus Mynors, like Schuster, attributes *mi Alli* to Schöll for vv. 11 and 30. In fairness to Schöll it should be pointed out that he well recognized the prosodic difficulty in v. 11 and suggested that an original *amice* was first glossed and then expelled by *mali*. In v. 30 Schöll actually proposed *mi, Alli, mi* being the dative pronoun; Cf. F. Schöll, "Zu Catull," *Neue Jahrb.*, CXXI (1880), p. 473.

poem where so much else of his intention is obscure, it would perhaps be just as well to allow the gentile name indicated by the manuscripts in vv. 11 and 30 to stand, be it as Mallius or Manlius, and in this way to encourage literary critics to make their interpretation square with the text rather than *vice versa*. On principle, it seems rather dubious practice to reject in two places the same well-attested reading in favor of a correction that violates an author's intuitive procedure. Moreover, need the admission of two gentile names for the correspondent in different sections of the intricately constructed poem wholly preclude its circumstantial unity? May not this situation, in fact, provide a clue to the complexity of the poet's motives in so extraordinary a composition? In this connection, Palmer's long neglected view that Allius may be a pseudonym for Manlius in the second part of the poem merits more serious examination and fuller exploitation than it has so far received.²⁴

In 68, 68 Mynors, following many of his distinguished predecessors, adopts Froehlich's conjecture *dominae* in preference to the *dominam* of V. In so doing, he must equate *domina* in 68 with Catullus' beloved, presumably Lesbia, though, strangely enough, she is not named in the entire poem. The immediate context of the word is provided by vv. 67-71:

is clausum lato patefecit limite campum,
isque domum nobis isque dedit dominae,
ad quam communes exerceremus amores.
quo mea se molli candida diua pede
intulit . . .

It should be observed that, if the identification of *domina* with Lesbia is valid, this marks the first occurrence of the term in the erotic sense so common in later elegy.²⁵ But, as Postgate long ago pointed out with trenchant arguments,²⁶ intrinsic difficulties beset the correction with the special sense of *domina* that it entails. The dative form vitiates the studied balance of the poetic diction, where the third *is* falls flat without a third accusative noun to underscore the service that *Allius* rendered to *Catullus*, not to *Catullus* and Lesbia. And if in v. 68 *dominae*, or for that matter even *dominam*, be taken as alluding to Lesbia, it mars by anticipatory mention the dramatic epiphany of the *candida diua*. Her first appearance, postponed until a most effective moment, takes place in v. 70, a pentameter which with startling swiftness plunges the reader into a new phase in the development of the theme. Surely the *domina* is none other than the anonymous mistress of the *domus* in which Allius arranged for Catullus to meet with his beloved.

To interpret *domina* otherwise in 68, 156 has a detrimental effect on the epilogue of the poem; cf. vv. 155 ff:

sitis felices et tu simul et tua uita,

²⁴ Cf. A. Palmer, in his review of Ellis' *Catullus, Hermathena*, III (1879), p. 348.

²⁵ The first instance of this usage cited in *T.L.L.*, s. v. *dominus* (*domina*), col. 1938, 1-27, is Lucilius 730 M, but the context is far from certain and the word there may well bear its ordinary connotation.

²⁶ Cf. J. P. Postgate, "Catulliana," *Journ. Phil.*, XVII (1888), p. 252.

et domus <ipsa> in qua lusimus et domina,

. . .

et longe ante omnes mihi quae me carior ipso est,
lux mea, qua uiua uiuere dulce mihi est.

If *domina* is equated with Lesbia, Mynors' text here renders Catullus guilty, at best, only of poor writing, but, at worst, of both awkward Latin and ineffective style. Without other punctuation, the construction of the word in v. 156 is somewhat ambiguous. If *domina* is to be taken as syntactically parallel to *domus*, it is also part of the subject of *sitis* in v. 155. But in that case *lux mea* in v. 160, since it too belongs to the subject, becomes a clumsy and intolerable repetition of *domina*, from which it is separated in the manuscripts by the problematic couplet in vv. 157-8. If, on the other hand, *domina* in v. 156 is intended by the editor as part of the subject of *lusimus*, then *ipsa* is for him an unhappy choice of emendation from certain *deteriores* to fill out the meter of the line. In such a phrase normal Latin idiom would favor some explicit pronominal form indicating the first person to join with *domina* as subject of the plural verb, like Pantagathus' *ipsi* before *qua* or the *nos* added in other *deteriores* after *qua*. Moreover, the identification of *domina* with Lesbia is, as earlier in v. 68, stylistically objectionable, for it saps by anticipation the crowning force of *lux mea* in the very last line of the poem. However vv. 157-8 are to be interpreted, the final couplets of 68 are skilfully contrived by Catullus to draw together the principal elements that actually figured in the drama of his illicit love, and, as a fitting climax, the ultimate and highest tribute is reserved for her who was his leading lady.

It would be ungenerous to continue with such criticism of the new text. Where literary interpretation is involved, the editor obviously finds himself at a decided disadvantage. In the restricted space of the apparatus he has no opportunity to defend his views adequately, though he may, in fact, possess strong arguments to support his judgments. Hence a supplementary article similar to Schuster's "Marginalien zu einer neuen Ausgabe Catulls" ²⁷ would be more than welcome from the hands of Mynors.

In addition to the text and apparatus the new edition provides an interesting reconstruction of the arrangement of the poems and titles in the archetype. Moreover, the extant Greek texts corresponding to 51 and 66 are conveniently available in an appendix. However, apart from these "extras" and the handy *index nominum* at the end, the slender volume offers none of the other fringe benefits that are included in Schuster's edition, which has select bibliographical references accompanying each poem and appendices on meter and style. Such materials, albeit useful, would doubtless exceed the severe limits of economy imposed upon *OCT* editions.

To sum up, Mynors provides readers with a well-established, essentially sound text, though he appears prone on occasion to accept a specious emendation where no correction seems required. Some lack of poetic insight may be sensed here. The chief merit of the new edition lies in the critical apparatus which succinctly em-

²⁷ *Wien. Stud.*, LXIV (1949), pp. 82-106; see also *id.*, "Kritische-exegetische Nachlese zu Catull," *ibid.*, LXV (1950-1951), pp. 42-53.

bodies the results of an independent and extensive study of the manuscript tradition. In this respect it far outshines its predecessors, and, if only codex R were more satisfactorily treated, it would clearly deserve to be regarded as definitive. With some slight revision it could readily become so.

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W. K. C. GUTHRIE. In the Beginning: Some Greek Views on the Origins of Life and the Early State of Man. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1957. Pp. 151. \$2.50.

The Messenger Lectures were established by bequest at Cornell University in 1923, and were to have as their theme the "Evolution of Civilization." They were allotted to the Classics department for the first time in 1957, and the department is to be congratulated upon its choice of Professor Guthrie as its lecturer on the Greek views, particularly those of the Pre-Socratics, on the evolution of civilization. The present book now makes these lectures available to a wider public in printed form. Since the framework of the Messenger Lectures compelled Professor Guthrie to address himself to a general audience rather than to specialists, we cannot expect to find something new or controversial on every page. But he succeeds admirably in presenting more or less well-known facts clearly and without distortion to the intelligent layman, and in emphasizing synthesis and general trends of thought rather than painstaking philological or philosophical analysis of detail.

As the subtitle of the book indicates, Guthrie sets out to discuss only "some" Greek views on the origin of life in general and of man and society in particular, and he discusses this subject "as an instance of the remarkable way in which Greek thought provides a bridge between the worlds of myth and reason" (p. 17). This, one might say, is the thesis of the book. In other words, Guthrie's purpose is to do for cosmology, biology, and anthropology what Snell, Nestle, H. Fränkel, *et al.* have done for other aspects of Greek thought.

The first chapter opens with some preliminary remarks on mythical and rational thought, and correctly points out that the transition from one to the other was not a sudden transformation, but a gradual development. Thales, for example, who took the first decisive step from myth to philosophy, shared with mythical thought the conviction that all things were begotten out of one primordial substance. The substance that is most frequently celebrated as having engendered men in the beginning is Earth, and, accordingly, the remainder of the first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the origin of life and of man from Mother Earth in mythology, while the second chapter deals with the same problem as treated by the early scientists.

The "earth-born men" of Cadmus and Jason, as well as other examples of *gēgeneis* both as human and as gigantic forebears of the

human race, are cited as evidence for the mythological version, legends about Pelasgos and his father Palaichthon, about Erechtheus, Erichthonios, and Cecrops are mentioned, and the Athenian and Carian claim of being *autochthones* is discussed. Finally, the Deucalion story is exploited to demonstrate (a) that the myths do not think in universal terms, but that each one attributes the origin of man to one or more specific localities; (b) that a story about human origin from the earth (in this case equated with stones) may be connected with a belief in a universal catastrophe preceding the origin of life as we know it; and (c) that there are two strands in Greek thought about the origin of life: one, that the world had a beginning in time, e.g. Hesiod's belief in a development from a primordial Chaos, while the other, reflected, for example, in the Deucalion myth and in various passages in Plato and Aristotle, regards the world as eternal but subject to recurrent cataclysms.

Chapter 2, entitled "Mother Earth: The Scientific Approach," shows how the mythological heritage was revaluated by the early physical thinkers. Earth and water, which loom large as progenitors of all things in some myths, retain an important place in the accounts of Anaximander,¹ Anaxagoras, Democritus, Archelaus, and Epicurus; but the divine apparatus of the myth is absent. All this is nothing new, but the freshness and cogency with which Guthrie presents his argument makes it very much worth reading. Moreover, he relates these accounts in a most interesting manner to an Arabic version of the twelfth century of our era and to the Pythagorean abstention from eating beans. Still, it must remain doubtful whether Guthrie is right in seeing an "influence" or "reflection" here (p. 38) of the specific theories advanced by the physical thinkers he discusses. The persistence of beliefs in the spontaneous generative power of the earth, usually through putrefaction, was prevalent throughout antiquity (with the notable exception of the Pythagoreans), and Guthrie illustrates it with examples from Aristotle, Theophrastus, Diodorus, and St. Augustine.

The most impressive part of this chapter is Guthrie's discussion of the doctrines of Empedocles, wisely reserved for the end. Guthrie believes that in Empedocles we find the most complete and harmonious fusion of mythical and rational thought. This is indicated not only by the role which Empedocles assigns to the mythical forces of Love and Strife, but more especially by the way in which observed phenomena, such as the fact that one tree may combine two sexes, make him place the origin of trees before that of men in the period of Strife, and by the ingenuity with which the early part of the period of Love is used to explain rationally the existence of compound mythical monsters. Guthrie is right, I think, in suggesting that we find in Empedocles "the first hint in European thought of a doctrine of evolution by natural selection" (p. 45).

The nature rather than the origins of life forms the subject matter of the third chapter. While earth and water received the principal stress in chs. 1 and 2, Guthrie's attention is now focused

¹ On p. 119, n. 3, the sources of Anaximander A 10 and 11 are indicated in reverse order. Also, the parenthetical note on citations from Diels-Kranz ought to be transferred to n. 2, where the relevant abbreviations first occur.

on air and fire. Air, as the prime self-moving element, was first singled out by Anaximenes as the substance of life, a view that was further developed by Diogenes of Apollonia, who identified it with divine intelligence and with the portion of the divine in man. *Aither*, in mythology and in popular belief the home of Zeus as well as the abode of the soul after death, is in philosophy first formally identified with fire by Anaxagoras. But even before him, fire, as the purest of all substances, had been considered as the seat of everlasting life and had been related to the soul by philosophers such as Heraclitus. This is of course true, but Guthrie seems to stretch the evidence a little when he suggests (pp. 51-2), on the basis only of *Phaedo* 81 C, that philosophers, too, believed that the souls of good men are merged into the *aither* after death.

Guthrie rightly stresses the revolutionary achievement of Anaxagoras. No longer is vital motion carried by one or the other of the elements, but *Nous* becomes the first cause of motion, even though, like the God of the Deists, it withdraws and lets matter take its own course. Though Anaxagoras still regarded *Nous* as material, by positing it as the prime mover he took the most decisive step in developing a concept of a non-material first cause of motion. But despite this progress in rational analysis, traces of a mythical way of thinking remain in his teaching. For instance, not only is the fertilizing influence of rain taken by Anaxagoras as the prototype of the origin of plant life, but also the *aer*, which is here treated less as a separate element than as containing within it the seeds of all things, generates every living thing by "raining" its seeds upon the earth. Thus, according to Guthrie, Anaxagoras gave a most ingenious twist to the doctrines of Anaximenes, Diogenes, Archelaus, and others that *psyche* is air-like. There may be some features in this reconstruction with which one might take issue; still, I find in Guthrie's lively and intelligent account more sense than in any other reconstruction of Anaxagoras' philosophy that I have seen. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to early views of the kinship of all life, as reflected in the mystical beliefs of the Pythagoreans in transmigration and the role of the elements as self-moving and life-causing in other Ionian thinkers.

In the fourth chapter, Guthrie begins his discussion of Greek views about the origin of human civilization. After a brief review of theories of a cyclic movement of the universe, in which recurrent cataclysms, floods, and conflagrations compel man to construct his social life all over again, he divides the Greek theories about human history into those that assert a belief in progress, i. e., a gradual improvement in human life, and those which place a happier Golden Age in the distant past. While the former is reserved for discussion in ch. 5, the rest of the present chapter deals with the Golden Age. The term "Golden" Age was first coined by Hesiod to refer to the excellence of the men then living, and he identified it with the reign of Kronos: it was a "countryman's paradise," as Guthrie felicitously puts it, in which the toil of the farmer was unknown. The essential features of this myth were elaborated by Plato in the *Politicus* and the *Laws* in order to demonstrate the insufficiency of man to rule himself by assuming an age in which nature gave her abundance without cultivation. Though some writers, e. g. Aristophanes, ridiculed the simplicity of the age of Kronos,

Empedocles took up and developed the Hesiodic idea by making his period of Love, in which no blood was shed and no flesh eaten, precede even the age of Kronos. With these discussions, Guthrie juxtaposes Dicaearchus' account of early men, as preserved by Porphyry (*De Abstinentia*, 4, 2 ff.). In a rationalistic analysis of Hesiod's picture of the age of Kronos, Dicaearchus attributed the absence of agriculture to the fact that man had as yet not learned any of the *technai*; as a result, he could not eat more than was good for him and contracted no disease; moreover, there was nothing worth fighting for, so that war did not exist. Only in the later stages—the pastoral and the agricultural—did the *technai* develop and with them the notion of property. In this kind of explanation of the absence of agriculture from early society, Guthrie sees in Dicaearchus an ancient precursor of Rousseau and Burke.

Whereas Dicaearchus presents the early stage in an optimistic light—for nature herself supplied all the needs of men—there were also more pessimistic versions. Lucretius, a staunch believer in progress, seems to have thought that, despite all bliss, the death rate of primitive man was slightly higher, and Diodorus emphasized the discomfort and suffering of early man, lacking clothes, shelter, and the art of husbandry. Guthrie finally raises the question whether the Greeks were optimistic believers in progress or pessimists about the steady decline from a better time in the past. Citing evidence for both views he concludes that they were "neither wholly optimistic nor wholly pessimistic in their outlook" (p. 79). But he seems to be more Christian than Greek when he suggests that the Greeks looked to religion for an answer to this enigma.

"The Idea of Progress" is the title of the fifth chapter. The Cyclopes, treated by both Homer and by Plato in *Laws* 680 B as a society enjoying all the material amenities of a Golden Age yet living in savagery, are cited as the earliest example of a separation of primeval material bliss from peace and harmony. Still, in placing the heroic age in the past, Homer implied elsewhere a belief in degeneracy rather than in progress. The first believer in the possibility of progress through human effort was Xenophanes, and similar views were expressed, Guthrie thinks, by Aeschylus in the figure of Prometheus (= 'forethinker' or 'forethought'), who taught men the arts and crafts. However, the extent to which Aeschylus meant his hero to be mere allegory in this sense must remain questionable. I do not think that there is in tragedy a clear statement of the idea of progress through *human* agency before Sophocles' famous ode in the *Antigone*, which Guthrie also cites.

After a brief mention of Anaxagoras and Democritus as believers in progress through learning, Guthrie next turns to a fairly detailed discussion of the myth put by Plato into the mouth of Protagoras. There is much more reason here to take the figure of Prometheus as allegorical than there is in Aeschylus, and Guthrie's careful analysis of the myth impresses this reviewer as perhaps the best single part of the whole book. He demonstrates Protagoras' use of fifth-century science in explaining the physical origin of man, and shows how the technical ability provided by "forethought" served man in the same way as hoofs, wings, and other protective devices served the animals. Thus man entered the light of day already equipped with reason, his share in the divine, as the means needed to ensure his survival. The fact

that man immediately began to worship the gods is rightly taken by Guthrie not as an indication of Protagoras' belief in the existence of gods, but as an awareness on the part of Protagoras of the universal diffusion of divine worship. Yet there was no defense against wild beasts without political wisdom, consisting in *dike* and *aidos*.² These qualities, i. e. the moral virtues, were given by Zeus and, in contrast to the arts, equally distributed among all men. Their universality is emphasized by the mention of people incapable of acquiring them, who are, accordingly, to be put to death. I think Guthrie is right in dismissing the figure of Zeus as merely part of the mythical framework chosen by Protagoras, and in stressing the fact that, according to Protagoras, these virtues are actually imparted through the teaching of parents, teachers, and society at large. Guthrie admirably relates the myth to the rest of Plato's *Protagoras* by pointing out that Protagoras chose the mythical form in order to defend two apparently irreconcilable positions: (1) to justify his own function as a teacher, he had to assert that *arete* is not a natural endowment, but is acquired only by teaching, and (2) to defend the Athenian democracy he had to take the position that nobody is entirely devoid of *arete*, although some can teach it better than others. This attitude defines, according to Guthrie, Protagoras' place in the *nomos-physis* controversy: though he did not believe that *aidos* and *dike* exist by nature, he refused to discard them, but regarded them as the precondition of any social life.

The belief in a Golden Age in the distant past implies that the present generation of men is degenerate; the belief in progress implies that we are better than our forebears. The meaning of this dichotomy in Greek thought concerning the state of man is explored in the sixth and final chapter of the book.

From the classical period on, Guthrie believes, the idea of progress with its corollary, that early man was brutish and even cannibalistic, held the field. In most accounts, the discovery of either fire or agriculture was held to be the first step by which man emerged from savagery and entered upon the path of civilization, and Guthrie holds these two up as complementary symbols to designate technical and moral development respectively. There is of course no difficulty in associating fire with technical advance; but the fact that the gift of grain from Demeter and Triptolemus was celebrated by the Thesmophoria seems to me to be very meagre evidence that the Greeks identified agricultural with moral progress.

Guthrie next turns to Plato and Aristotle. While earlier believers in human progress stood in the Ionian tradition of free inquiry for its own sake, Plato and Aristotle were interested in early society only for the purpose of finding the best form of political life. In the case of Plato, this is most clearly seen in the "city of pigs" in the *Republic*, where it is not helplessness in the face of wild beasts, but the diversity of human needs that makes community life necessary. Similarly, Aristotle is less interested in the historical origins of society than in the life of the contemporary *polis*, in which alone man can gain the *autarkeia* needed for living the good life.

² Guthrie translates *aidos* adequately as 'respect for others' on p. 87; but 'altruism,' which he uses on pp. 89 and 94, seems much too strong. Altruism never was a Greek virtue.

Guthrie concludes his book by isolating two strands of belief about the nature of man in Greek thought. The one asserts, as it were, the primacy of nature over mind. This is the view of the Milesians, Empedocles, and the atomists: they posit no transcendent rational being separate from the world, creating or organizing it. Instead, they thought of some material force as shaping the world "by necessity." Even the *Nous* of Anaxagoras, which comes closer than anything else to being a transcendent cause, withdraws as soon as it has set the universe in motion. The second view is that of Plato, who shows nature to be the work of reason, i. e., of a transcendent being that overrules chance and necessity. Plato and Socrates developed this view, according to Guthrie, because of their pre-occupation with moral issues rather than with free scientific curiosity, and particularly in opposition to those Sophists who had based their teaching of the relativity of moral standards on Ionian science. This, Guthrie believes, is the reason why Plato felt called upon to give an entirely new cosmology in the *Timaeus*, intended as a preface to a justification of his whole conception of human life. Reason and order have gone into the structure of the universe from the beginning, inasmuch as it was created by a rational divinity and is itself a living creature whose rationality is evinced by its circular motion. Necessity, to be sure, still exists in the form of matter; but it is almost completely subject to mind. Man's reason links him to the divine, but he is prevented from realizing it completely, because he is also enchained by the "necessity" of his body. As reason is also moral, morality is for Plato not contrary to nature but identical with it.

Guthrie ends with a plea for tolerance of other views in a world in which a Marxist belief in material necessity is ranged against the Christian belief in a transcendent First Cause "whose mind is reflected, however feebly, in the thoughts and wills of men."

I have summarized and given incidental criticisms of the main argument of the book. There is one point of a more general nature that I should like to add. Like many other recent writers on the subject of mythical and rational thought, Guthrie fails to draw a sufficiently stringent line of demarcation between, on the one hand, the traditional myths which are anterior to or independent of the influence of philosophical speculation, and, on the other hand, what we may call "secondary" myths which are influenced or inspired by the rational arguments of the philosophers. For example, when Guthrie asserts on p. 19 that the idea of Heaven and Earth as originally "one form" is recurrent in Greek mythology, he cites the separation by Kronos of Ouranos and Gaia in Hesiod, *Theog.*, 154 ff. as the only early example (p. 112, n. 7). Apart from the fact that this is not strong positive evidence, it is at least traditionally mythical. The same cannot be said of any of the other passages adduced to support the contention: the language of Euripides, frg. 484, reflects direct philosophical influence, and what mythical element there is in Apollonius Rhod., I, 496-8, Diog. Laert., *Prooem.*, 3, and Diodorus, I, 7, 1 is decidedly "secondary." In fact, the idea of Heaven and Earth as originally "one form" is much more recurrent in philosophy from Anaximander's *apeiron* on. In traditional mythology, on the other hand, the stories about an original mating of Heaven and Earth, implying that the two were originally separate,

and cited by Guthrie on p. 30, seem to have been much more prevalent. Moreover, on p. 26 two beliefs in Greek thought about the origin of life are cited: (a) that the world had a beginning in time and (b) that the world is eternal but subject to recurrent catastrophes. Yet what Guthrie fails to point out is that the traditional version of the Deucalion myth, his chief example for (b), does not necessarily imply a recurrence of the catastrophe (the Flood in *Genesis* does not), and that all the accounts of recurrent catastrophes that we know are found in philosophical contexts and are, therefore, "secondary" in nature.

But apart from that, Guthrie's book is an eminently sane synthesis of a subject which, to the best of my knowledge, has never received the same kind of systematic attention before. That it is written with ease and urbanity is only to be expected from the author of *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, *The Greek Philosophers*, and *The Greeks and their Gods*; but what deserves special mention is the gracious compliment he pays the land of his hosts by relating, in his preface, the legend of the earth-born men of Thebes to that of the Five Indian Tribes sown by Owayneo, in the country where these lectures were delivered.³

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VICTOR A. TEHERIKOVER, ed., in collaboration with ALEXANDER FUKS.
Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum, Vol. I. Cambridge, Mass.,
Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. xx + 294. Published for
the Magnes Press, The Hebrew University.

The title of this last work of the late Professor Teherikover, the distinguished Professor of Ancient History in the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is likely, at first sight, to mislead the reader. And yet, it is a perfectly justifiable title. The purpose of the author was to assemble and to analyze, in one comprehensive treatise, all papyri and ostraca from Egypt that may be related to Jews and Judaism. This method of investigation—the analysis of all the surviving documents of a specific category, however insignificant the individual documents may be when taken in isolation—has often produced most fruitful results, both in classical studies and in most other scientific pursuits, and it is of especial interest to notice in connection with Teherikover's work a similar corpus, compiled with a similar purpose: J.-B. Frey, *Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum* (Vols. I, II; Rome, 1936, 1952). Frey's work, it may be said, contains only a comparatively few inscriptions in a Semitic tongue, while Volume I of Teherikover's *Corpus* contains no document at all in a Semitic tongue. It is this feature of Teherikover's work which accounts for my willingness (I can claim no competence whatsoever in Semitic languages and history) to undertake a review of this important book. Hence, while I shall try to give the reader a summation of the

³ A list of misprints has been forwarded to Professor Guthrie.

contents of the book, I shall refrain from comment upon matters which require competence in the field of Jewish studies, restricting my comments to a consideration of the volume as a publication of Greek papyri.

But, to return to the title of Tcherikover's book, the reader is entitled to ask what constitutes a "Jewish papyrus." Tcherikover's criteria for identifying Jewish papyri (and ostraca), it may be said, are somewhat more rigorous and exact than the criteria which Father Frey used in identifying Jewish inscriptions. Here it will suffice to repeat Tcherikover's four criteria in his own words (p. xvii):

1. Papyri in which the word 'Ιουδαῖος, or Ἑβραῖος, appears.
2. Papyri which mention events or technical terms that point to Jews or Judaism (for instance, a papyrus in which the words *προσευχή* or *σάββαθα* appear is considered as "Jewish," as are papyri mentioning the Jewish revolt under Trajan).
3. Documents originating from what are known to have been places of exclusively Jewish settlement, e. g. the ostraka from the Jewish quarter of Edfu.
4. Papyri containing Jewish names.

The discussion of the fourth criterion (pp. xvii-xix) is especially valuable, for Tcherikover was able to identify various non-Jewish names which were frequently taken by Jews. An interesting conclusion in this connection is that he has "... considered all non-ecclesiastics called by Biblical names in the papyrological documents *before* that date <i. e. 337 A. D.> as Jews, *after* it, more probably as Christians."

Professor Tcherikover began work on the *Corpus* some twenty years ago, but when, during wartime, it was not feasible to continue the work, he utilized the material then in hand in the writing of his book on *The Jews in Egypt in the Hellenistic-Roman Age in the Light of the Papyri* (in Hebrew, with summations in English [Jerusalem, 1943]), from which much of the material in the Prolegomena in the first volume of the *Corpus* seems to have been drawn. Three volumes of the *Corpus* are projected: the first includes the Prolegomena and the Ptolemaic documents; the second is to include Early Roman documents, and the third Late Roman and Byzantine documents, appendices, and plates. It is much to be hoped that Dr. A. Fuks, who is Tcherikover's young colleague and collaborator, may be able to carry this valuable undertaking through to completion.

The nature of the contents of Volume I of the *Corpus* is shown most conveniently by the headings of the main sections of the volume, as follows: Introduction (pp. xvii-xx). Prolegomena (pp. 1-111); 1. The Ptolemaic Period (323-30 B. C.) (pp. 1-47); 2. The Early Roman Period (30 B. C.-A. D. 117) (pp. 48-93); 3. The Late Roman and the Byzantine Period (A. D. 117-641) (pp. 93-111). Documents of the Ptolemaic Period (pp. 113-256): Section I, Jews of Palestine in the Zenon Papyri (pp. 115-30); Section II, Jews of the Fayûm in the Zenon Papyri (pp. 131-46); Section III, Jewish Soldiers and Military Settlers in the Third and Second Centuries B. C. (pp.

147-78); Section IV, Jewish Peasants, Shepherds, and Artisans in the Fayûm (pp. 179-93); Section V, Jewish Tax-Collectors, Government Officials, and Peasants in Upper Egypt (pp. 194-226); Section VI, Various Documents of the Ptolemaic Period (pp. 227-56). Indexes (pp. 257-94): Index to the Prolegomena (pp. 259-78); Index to the Documents (pp. 279-90); Index to Sources (pp. 291-4). The texts of one hundred and forty-one papyri (and ostraca) are reproduced in this first volume of the *Corpus*—taken over directly, in large part, from their original publications, yet with frequent revisions and restorations. Papyri published in more recent years, by scholars of standing and in conformity with modern practice, are reproduced much as they appear in the original publication, while documents published at an earlier date receive more extensive interpretation. The commentary, although devoted, in general, to Jewish matters and Judaism, treats of other subjects as well and is intended for the general reader, as well as for the specialist in papyrology. The bibliographies that accompany the individual documents are especially full—the authors express the hope that little is missing, “especially in English” (p. v), but, since work on the Prolegomena was finished in 1952, and on the documents in 1954, some of the more recently published bibliography is inevitably missing. This bibliography will appear in Addenda in Volume III. As for the division of the work between the authors, it will suffice to quote the Preface (pp. v-vi): “In the present volume, the *Prolegomena*, the introductions to all sections, and most of the commentaries are the work of V. Tcherikover. Those written by A. Fuks are signed A. F.; the commentary to No. 138 is by Mr. M. Stern. Each of us takes full responsibility for the opinions expressed in his parts of the work.”

Some twenty years ago Father Frey aptly observed (*Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaicarum*, I, p. vii) that, while the Jews were almost totally isolated intellectually and in religion from the rest of the Mediterranean world, in the sphere of economic life they were most intimately a part of that world. For the intellectual and religious life of the Jews one could, of course, get information from Jewish writers. But these writers were silent concerning the participation of Jews in the economic life of the times—and concerning the ideas, beliefs, and practices of the Jewish masses—while Greek and Roman writers ignored the Jews, and the Christian writers treated them merely as religious adversaries. Hence the importance of inscriptions, as Father Frey observed—of papyri and ostraca, as Professor Tcherikover now shows—in bringing to us valuable information concerning various vital aspects of Jewish life about which literary sources tell us practically nothing at all. It is these contributions of the papyri and ostraca to our knowledge of the life of the Jews in Egypt (especially)—along with political factors that influenced Jewish social and cultural life—that Tcherikover discusses most interestingly and in considerable detail in the Prolegomena in this first volume of the *Corpus*. The discussion covers the Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine periods, citing in support of its various conclusions the papyrological documents as they are numbered (and to be numbered) in the *Corpus*. Hence the conclusions concerning the

Roman and Byzantine periods are supported by documents cited only by a *Corpus* number which will appear, along with the text, in Volumes II and III of the *Corpus*, with the result that the reader of the Prolegomena is left without the necessary support of the argument for those periods. Perhaps it would have been justifiable, in the interest of clarity, to sacrifice simplicity of documentation and to give both the citation of the original publication of the papyrus (or ostrakon) and the number of the corresponding document as it will appear in Volume II or III of the *Corpus*.

Some indication of the more noteworthy contributions of the Prolegomena to our knowledge of the life of the Jews in Egypt may be of interest. There were Jewish farmers in Egypt in considerable numbers, in all periods. In the Ptolemaic period the Jews appear as soldiers, as functionaries of the king ranging from petty officials to courtiers, and, in the *chora*, as policemen and tax-collectors. Rostovtzeff, in his *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, I (Oxford, 1941), p. 328, held to the opinion that the same individual was never both tax-collector and tax-farmer, but now, from the papyrological evidence, Tcherikover is able to show (p. 18) that individual Jews probably performed both functions at the same time. The Jew in the *chora*, being less educated than the Alexandrian Jew and, at the same time, more subject to the influence of his environment, became Egyptianized, taking Egyptian names and, apparently, for the most part, speaking Egyptian. In Alexandria conditions differed greatly from those in the *chora*. In the city we find the Jews greatly attracted by Hellenism. Not only did they take Greek names and speak the Greek language and adhere to the current Ptolemaic practices in business matters, but they made full use of the current Hellenistic law in most respects. Jewish legal documents followed the usual Hellenistic forms and were drawn up in the office of the governmental notary (and with the signature of the *agoranomos*), and Jews brought their complaints before the usual governmental authorities. Moreover, the papyri make it perfectly clear that, despite the *politeuma* granted the Jewish community in Alexandria—permitting them to live according to their “ancestral laws”—all sorts of matters relating to Jewish family life, including marriage and divorce, came before Greek tribunals which functioned in accordance with Hellenistic law. Such evidence as we have tends to indicate that many of the Alexandrian Jews were poor, or, at best, only moderately well off. For the idea generally held of the Jew as wealthy merchant and money-lender there is no evidence from the Ptolemaic period, partly because we have no Ptolemaic papyri from Alexandria, partly also because the banks were a governmental monopoly.

The evidence we have for Jews in trade and money-lending comes from the Roman period. But even during that period, it is most interesting to observe, not a single name of a Jewish bank or banker appears in the exhaustive list compiled by A. Calderini, “Censimento topografico delle banche dell'Egitto greco-romano,” in *Aegyptus*, XVIII (1938), pp. 244-78. A striking change from his employment in the Ptolemaic period occurs in the Jew's disappearance, under the Romans, from the list of soldiers and tax-gatherers. A more

striking change still begins to set in—in the cultural sphere—for at Edfu in the first century of our era the rising nationalistic Jewish feeling is made clear in nomenclature, Greek and Egyptian names for Jews giving way to Jewish names. Jewish revulsion against Greeks and Romans reached its peak in the great Jewish revolt in the time of Trajan (115-117 A. D.). From the papyri Tcherikover has been able to elicit important information concerning the five following aspects of that revolt: (1) its geographical extent, (2) its chronology, (3) the general development of events, (4) atrocities and depopulation of the country, and (5) the Messianic character of the revolt, which, while not altogether certain, is supported by Tcherikover. A detailed treatment of the subject has been published by A. Fuks, "The Jewish Revolt in Egypt (A. D. 115-117) in the Light of the Papyri," in *Aegyptus*, XXXIII (1953), pp. 131-58.

Following 117 A. D. Tcherikover finds in the papyrological evidence indications of a "complete breakdown of Jewish life in Egypt," many of the Jewish communities being exterminated, with here and there remnants that resisted assimilation. One item in Tcherikover's evidence for this development must, however, be rejected. The evidence cited on the point in question is his document No. 460, which must certainly be *P. Ryl.*, IV, 594; it will appear in Volume III of the *Corpus*. It is incorrect to write, as he does on p. 94, that in this papyrus (italics his) "only *one* Jew is recorded." No names or nationalities are recorded in this brief, fragmentary document, which appears to be a toparchic account of tax collections at Karanis at about the middle of the second century. Instead, there is recorded the collection of the "Jewish tax" in an amount that indicates payment by one individual. It is necessary, however, to call attention to the fact that our knowledge of such documents indicates that they do not contain records of *complete* collections of taxes. Hence it is not at all conclusive that there was only one Jewish resident of Karanis in the middle of the second century. See the remarks in *P. Col.*, V (= J. Day and C. W. Keyes, *Tax Documents from Theadelphia* [New York, 1956]), pp. 65-6. By 400 A. D. the attraction of Hellenism had long since passed for the Egyptian Jew. At that time we find evidence that the official language of the Jewish communities was Hebrew, the Biblical language—not the vernacular Aramaic.

From the point of view of the papyrologist, it may be said that the documents in the *Corpus* have been skilfully handled. The following cursory notes will call attention to noteworthy items (interesting content, newly published papyri, and new readings of papyri already published), along with a few minor suggestions and corrections. On p. 107 the curious misspellings "Monophisite" and "Monophisitie" will be noticed. In No. 1 (= *P. Cairo Zen.*, 50003; *P. Edgar*, 3; *SB*, III, 6709; A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, *Select Papyri*, I, No. 31 [Loeb Classical Library, London, 1932]; with restorations by Tcherikover) the slave girl, Tcherikover plausibly suggests, is Sidonian, not Babylonian. No. 2d is *P. Lond.*, Inv. No. 2358 (A), Col. III, line 17 and Col. IX, lines 10-16, published here for the first time. No. 3 is *P. Iand.*, Inv. No. 413 *verso*, published here for the first time. In No. 4 (= *P. Edgar*, 84; *P. Cairo Zen.*, 59076, a b;

SB, III, 6790), line 4 Tcherikover restores οἰκε]τικά to read παιδά[ρια οἰκε]τικά. No. 12 (= *P. Cairo Zen.*, 59509), lines 13-14, . . . οὐκ ἱκανὸν οὖν [ἐστ]ιν οὐδὲ τὰ παιδάρια [διαβό]σκειν is racily rendered as "and that isn't even enough to feed the kids." No. 12 also provides evidence for the existence of private, as distinct from state, *thesauroi*. εἰς τὸν ἐπερχόμενον χρόνον in No. 13 (= *P. Cairo Zen.*, 59377), lines 9-10 is rendered "for the time being." "For the succeeding time" seems more felicitous. Additional commentary on No. 14 (= *P. S. I.*, IV, 393 + *P. S. I.*, VI, p. xiii) would have been useful, especially since the desired explanations have not been given in the original publication of the document. The *prosangelma* here addressed to the police of Philadelphia appears along with a duplicate, in which a later hand has altered the phrase which gives the time of the robbery that is reported. Tcherikover's translation of the two phrases may puzzle the "general" reader, to whom, along with the specialist, he addressed his work. Thus, in line 4, τῇ νυκτὶ τῇ πρὸ τῆς ις is rendered "On the night of the 15th"; in line 18, τῇ ις τοῦ Tybi νυκτός is rendered "On Tybi 16th, at night." Possibly, the proper explanation of the discrepancy is to be found in variant methods of time-reckoning—the Greek, on the one hand, reckoning the day from sunset to sunset; the Roman, on the other, from midnight to midnight. This explanation would assume, then, that the original declaration adhered to the Roman reckoning ("On the night before the 16th," the 16th beginning at midnight, the robbery occurring before midnight), and that the duplicate was altered to adhere to the Greek reckoning ("On the 16th of Tybi, at night," the 16th beginning at sunset, the robbery occurring between sunset and midnight). No. 17 (= *P. Lond.*, Inv. No. 2378, Frag. 1, verso, Col. II) is published here for the first time. In No. 19 (= *P. Gurob*, 2. Tcherikover's text is "based on the edition" by A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, *Select Papyri*, II, No. 256), lines 9-10, Tcherikover offers a restoration, to read καθίσ[αι αὐτῇ κατομό]σαντας. In No. 22 (= *P. Tebt.*, III, i, 820), line 36, Tcherikover reads the proper name Σαββαθαῖος.

The introduction to Section V, "Jewish Tax-Collectors, Government Officials, and Peasants in Upper Egypt," contains a number of very interesting and important observations. All the evidence is derived from ostraca. Tcherikover accepts the thesis of Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka aus Ägypten und Nubien*, I (Leipzig, 1899), p. 72, that the taxpayers to whom the banks issued receipts were the tax-collectors, not private taxpayers, but he does not accept the arguments by which Wilcken reached that conclusion. Instead, Tcherikover supports the conclusion by the following arguments: (1) *Some* of the taxes mentioned in the ostraca were certainly farmed out, and we know that almost all money taxes were farmed out by the Ptolemies. (2) Frequently partnerships were formed for collecting taxes. In the ostraca some receipts are delivered to a man and his partners (μέτοχοι). (3) ". . . the great variety of sums delivered to the bank is more in favour of the supposition that the persons concerned were tax-collectors and not peasants: otherwise we should expect more or less fixed sums paid at fixed intervals," With respect to the receipts issued by granaries, Wilcken thought originally (*Griechische Ostraka*, I, p. 98) that they

were issued to tax-collectors, but later (in "Zum alexandrinischen Antisemitismus," in *Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der königlich sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, XXVII [1909], pp. 783-839, especially p. 788, note 3) he changed his mind, holding that they were given to landholders or tillers of crown land. Again, Tcherikover accepts Wilcken's conclusion—specifically, his later conclusion—but rejects his reasoning. Instead, he accepts two arguments advanced by J. G. Milne, in *O. Theb.*, pp. 81-2. First, the Ptolemaic receipts are similar to various Roman receipts which were certainly given to tillers. Second, the amounts delivered to the granaries were usually very small, much too small to be considered deposits by a collector. To these two arguments Tcherikover adds a third (p. 197). The tax was frequently described as paid *ὑπὲρ τοῦ τόπου*—i. e. for the district—but the name of the tax was not given, for the name was really unnecessary, inasmuch as the tax in question was always the same tax. Pages 199-202 of this introduction to Section V contain a very important list of the Jewish names which appear on the ostraca.

In No. 48 (= *O. Bodl.*, 46), line 4, Tcherikover restores [τέλος οὖν]ου. The translation of *ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ὀμβίτου* in No. 96 (= *B. G. U.*, VI, 1443), lines 4-5, by "on behalf of Ombites" is infelicitous. Certainly it is "for the Ombite nome," i. e. payment for a district, according to a formula to which Tcherikover paid particular attention, as we observed in the preceding paragraph. In No. 126 (= *P. Petrie*, III, 7, p. 14), at the beginning of line 9, Tcherikover restores *δεξιάν* to read *δεξιάν εἴη μὲν* (in a lacuna already partially restored); in line 13 he restores *οἰκετικὰ σώματα*. The complex of documents published by Tcherikover as Nos. 127 a-e interestingly establishes the historicity and the career of that Dositheos, son of Drimylos, who, according to III *Macc.*, I, 3, saved Ptolemy IV Philopator from an assassin. In No. 128 (= *P. Ent.*, 23), line 1, Tcherikover restores: *Βασιλεῖ Πτολεμ[αίω χαίρειν Ἑλλαδότη Φιλωνίδου. ἀδικούμαι ὑπὸ Ἰωνάθου Ἰουδαίου. . . .] .ου. συγγραψα[μένου] . . .* In No. 130 (= *P. Tebt.*, III, i, 793, Col. II, Frag. I, *recto* II), line 21, notice should be taken of the plausible reading of *τῶι πρό(τερον) κομογραμματεῖ*, in place of *τῶι προκομογραμματεῖ*. In No. 133 (= *P. Tebt.*, III, i, 800), line 6, Tcherikover restores [(ἐτους) κη Παῦνι]. No. 141 (= *PIAFO*, Inv. No. 104) is published here for the first time.

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M. ROSTOVITZEFF. *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*. Edited by P. M. Fraser. Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press, 1957.

Bibliography of SEHRE. About the various printings good historians are sometimes uncertain; the following is a fuller statement than would have been suitable in C. B. Welles' bibliography of Rostovtzeff in *Historia*, V (1956), pp. 358-81.—Abbreviations,

SEHRE, etc., indicate the four important versions. All the volumes are octavos.

SEHRE 1926: Michael Ivanovich Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, ed. 1, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926 (but completed 1925). One vol.: pages xxvi, 696 (text 487; notes separate, 143; indexes, 61). 60 plates.

SEHRE 1931: the same, revised, enlarged, and translated into German. Translator, L. Wickert; title, *Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft im römischen Kaiserreich*, Leipzig, Quelle u. Meyer, 1931 (but completed Dec. 1929; begun 1927). Two vols. Referred to by Rostovtzeff as a "second edition."

SEHRE 1933: the same, further revised, enlarged, and translated into Italian. Translator, G. Sanna; title, *Storia economica e sociale dell'Impero romano*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1933. "Presentazione" by G. de Sanctis, pp. v-vii, called "Prefazione" on the title-page, but there is a "Prefazione all'Edizione Italiana" by Rostovtzeff, pp. ix-x. One vol. 80 plates. Referred to by Rostovtzeff (*ibid.*, p. ix) as a "third edition."

The same, reprinted; Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1946.

A translation into Spanish, from the original English, but said to incorporate all the additions of the German and Italian editions. Translator, L. López-Ballesteros; title, *Historia social y economica del Imperio Romano*. Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1937. Two vols. This edition is not even mentioned in *SEHRE* 1957 and outside Spain is virtually unknown.

SEHRE 1957: the same, corrected and translated from the Italian, with some of the references to works cited brought up to date; title, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, "second edition," edited by P[eter] M. Fraser. Oxford, Clarendon Press, and New York, Dec. 1957. Two vols., continuously pagged: I, pp. xxxii, Text 1-542, with 80 plates; II, pages x, Notes 543-751 (i. e. 209 pages), Indexes 752-848 (i. e. 93 pages). Oxford, £8/8/-; New York, \$26.90.

(A revised Italian edition is said to be in preparation.)

The Planning of SEHRE 1957. In a review of *SEHWW* (*Isis*, XXXIV [1942], pp. 173-4), M. Hammond expressed the hope that the second English edition of *SEHRE* would be "even fuller and more useful than the three versions of its first edition." But Rostovtzeff died in 1952 without undertaking it. Over the years since 1933, the army of researchers has piled up new stores of data for practically every province and for many aspects of the Empire. The *Cambridge Ancient History* was finished with three plump volumes on the Roman Empire (X, 1934; XI, 1936; XII, 1939; plus Vols. of Plates IV and V). F. M. Heichelheim's wide-ranging *Wirtschaftsgeschichte* appeared in 1938; a new edition is in progress (1958-). In *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (1939), A. H. M. Jones wrote a kind of positive social history: he worked solely from facts, including political ones, and was influenced, I should guess, by Sir William Tarn's *Hellenistic Civilisation* (1927; now in ed. 3, 1952, with G. T. Griffith as co-editor). T. Frank's *ESAR* was brought to a close in 1940; it contains vast quantities of (largely raw) material, much of it gathered and sorted for the

first time, on ten of the principal regions. At present out of print, the set is costly when, rarely, it comes on the market. D. Magie's *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950), though restricted to one region, is as large as all of *SEHRE*. Much of the work of L. Robert is relevant, but the mere thought of trying to garner in the results of the prodigious publications of this one scholar is enough to produce vertigo. To incorporate any fair part of all this today in a new edition of *SEHRE* would require a scholar as robust as Rostovtzeff, half a life-time of preparation, like Rostovtzeff's, and then many years of single, hard-driving devotion, to re-write not his own but Rostovtzeff's book. No such scholar has appeared.

Instead, a quite different conception was adopted, and it had a precedent. *SEHHW* had also gone out of print. The decision was to re-issue *SEHHW* without re-setting the type, by lithographic printing from the sheets of 1941. Some corrections of quoted matter, a few more up-to-date bibliographical references, and the like, were admitted. The new impression was issued in 1953, and the Editor was P. M. Fraser. No advantage was taken of the opportunity to make any material addition whatever. But this caused no outcry. *SEHHW* was a better book to start with—i. e. more respectful of the political facts, and generally more mature (also a shade less exciting)—; it had been out only a dozen years, about half of them war years, hence it was not so much out of date; and it was almost twice as long as *SEHRE*, so that the cost of an extensive revision could easily become large. (A translation of *SEHHW* into German by G. and E. Bayer was published in 1955-1956, and an Italian edition is in preparation.)

About the time the new printing in English of *SEHHW* was done, i. e. in 1952 (the year Rostovtzeff died, but he had been unable to take part), conferences were begun on a new version of the inferior, shorter, older work, *SEHRE*. It was decided to re-set all the type, *but*, just as in *SEHHW*, to make no material changes whatever. P. M. Fraser, who participated, and was again made Editor, defends the decision (p. vii), but he was not alone or, necessarily, free.

The New "Edition." The result is before us. *SEHRE* is again available in English. To have text and notes in different volumes is a great gain in itself, and they are handsome, well-made books. The text itself is declared to be, and appears to be, virtually unchanged: it is the Italian (1933) translated; as contrasted with the former English, it is now 541 pages, and with more on each page, as against the 487 of 1926. Ch. VII had gained most, with a section added on Nubia, and with Cyrene expanded; but by 1933 additions had been made in nearly all chapters.

The notes in each of the previous editions had the same numbers: additional notes were inserted in the order and were indicated by letters, so that in the Italian edition e. g. Ch. VII has Notes up to 50k. In the 1957 version, these numerals with letters, 50k and the rest, have been made wholly into numerals, so that now the numbers mostly differ from the Italian edition. The total is the same (643 notes in all), but most references in other works will not apply to *SEHRE* 1957. A table of the two sets of numbers should have been printed. In the Notes, there has been checking, correcting, and regularizing by the Editor. Undoubtedly much labor that will never

be recognized has gone into this task. The work seems to have been well done. The Indexes, wholly new, do more than any other one feature to justify the new printing (*infra*). I have noticed only a few errors, mostly in modern personal names.¹

The intention was that new versions of publications cited in the 1933 edition, e.g. texts mentioned then and re-edited since then, should be cited [in square brackets] by up-to-date references. Some are given, especially of inscriptions; but the total is not great, and there is one conspicuous omission. The literary work which Rostovtzeff made central in *SEHRE* is Aelius Aristides' Roman oration. J. H. Oliver, himself a pupil of Rostovtzeff's, has re-edited the text (the latest edition was B. Keil's of 1898), and has supplied not only a full-length commentary and a translation, but also a series of fine essays: *The Ruling Power: A Study of the Roman Empire in the Second Century after Christ through the Roman Oration of Aelius Aristides* (Trans. Am. Philos. Soc., N. S. XLIII, Part 4 [1953], pp. 869-1004; \$2). It seems a pity that *SEHRE* 1957 (pp. 592, 824) should have no reference to this.

In short, the new "edition" is a re-issue of the Italian of 1933. Everything possible has been done to make the old ship seaworthy—except to replace any one material part, one timber, one sail, one sheet. The German and Italian editions made considerable advances over the English. This new edition makes no material advance over the Italian. It hardly seems possible, but, to take the most surprising instance, still, even now, *ESAR* is not once mentioned—not even for its new edition of Diocletian's Price Edict (Vol. V, pp. 305-421, by E. R. Graser; the reference in *SEHRE* 1957 ought to be in 749, n. 5).²

Taking a social-and-economic view, and considering that the price is eight guineas—plus \$3.38 more in New York than in Oxford—even a friendly critic must feel disappointed. This one time, the English instinct for a sensible compromise failed. A sensible compromise might have taken some such form as the following. Prefixed to the Notes on each of the twelve chapters there might have been (1) a new bibliographical note, giving at least some of the most recent bibliographies and other "literature," with the aid of which the reader could find the other references to take him back to 1933; and (2) a second new page or so for each section, indicating however sketchily the general drift of opinion since 1933. Granted,

¹ P. xix, line 6, for G. F. Richter read G. M. A. Richter; p. xix, line 17, for Kimbell read Kimball; p. 678, line 1, for Sayer read Sayce. Legend to Plate VII, p. 56, third paragraph of 2: the quotation mark ending Rostovtzeff's paraphrase should be moved from the end of line 11 to the middle of line 13, at the semi-colon, as in ed. 1; and the word 'like' has dropped out between the end of line 12 and the beginning of line 13.

² Yet Rostovtzeff himself published a 17-page review of *ESAR* IV, in *A.J.P.*, LX (1939), pp. 363-79. It is appreciative, but with a tart flavor: the interest of it is to show Rostovtzeff's tremendous knowledge, discernment, and powers of comparison involving all the fields reviewed—including Greece. Frank himself, who had requested Rostovtzeff to write the review, died without seeing it, evidently just as it was in proof. A footnote added on the first page by Rostovtzeff speaks in admiration of Frank, but the criticisms of the volume were allowed to stand.

specialists on any one province know these things, still no one is a specialist on all the provinces, and *SEHRE*, especially in its new form, is not a work primarily for specialists. Granted also, that two or three dozen new pages would not really satisfy any earnest student—they would only help him to proceed by himself. But that would be far better than what we now have. Material from A. Piganiol, *Historie de Rome* (*Clio* III; ed. 4, Paris, 1954), could easily have been utilized and added to.

Indexes. There is only one new element to review. So vast a work, with notes obviously intended in the main for reference, depends not a little for its usefulness on the Index, which includes all the notes and all the legends set opposite the plates. The present Index is wholly new and is an improvement on the old, which was very good as indexes go. Under "Merchants," for instance, the old (1926) has 22 undifferentiated entries (too many, of course) followed by 75 under sub-headings, printed in a solid lump. The new edition s. v. "Merchants" has 27 undifferentiated entries (still too many) plus 88, the 88 being printed in the useful way, i. e. with a new line for each new entry. "Greece" is very good, and "Greek." "Technique" appears to be deficient, with 15 entries. There are too few cross references: Woods refers to Forests, but the reader must himself find Carpenters; Deforestation; Lumber; Ships, building of; Timber; Wood. This Index (Names and Subjects) is by H. C. Oakley. As formerly, there is an Index of Inscriptions and an Index of Papyri, with Ostraca, Parchments, etc. added. This is by P. M. Fraser. The Editor has also done over, from the Italian, an Index of [passages referred to in] Ancient Authors, itself no small labor. All of these appear to be excellent. The indexes together occupied 61 pages in 1926; now they run to 93. The Italian edition contained an index of the modern authors cited in the Notes, useful in a work of which the bibliographical importance is so prominent. This is not repeated.

A discussion of *SEHRE* as a "classic" will appear in the *American Historical Review*.

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CEDRIC H. WHITMAN. *Homer and the Homeric Tradition*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958. Pp. xii + 356. \$6.75.

Mr. Whitman's search for the poet who, in Eighth-century Greece, composed the *Iliad*, and perhaps the *Odyssey*, substantially as we have them, will be variously appraised. Those who can believe in such a poet will find the book most wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort. Others will feel that the author has repeated the experience of Columbus, and discovered instead of the old continent for which he set sail, a strange new world, a Homer not of the eighth but of the twentieth century. These may still value the book as a study of what the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* can be taken or made to

mean for a present-day reader, approaching them with a full consciousness of contemporary literary and psychological theory, for this at least is something we can know; we can never know precisely what the poems meant for their first hearers, and may well suspect that it was something quite different from anything we can possibly conceive. Though we may bring into the foreground certain presumed or probable aspects of the experience of the first hearers, it is impossible for us to remove from the background the experience we have accumulated since that time.

Still others will protest that Whitman has invented a completely gratuitous poet in the shape of a Geometric potter. For he has carried the analogy between potter and poet much further than the Greek proverb, or the speculations of other modern scholars, had done, and derives from the principles of pattern employed in the ornamentation of Geometric vases a date for the composition of the *Iliad*, and a clue to the labyrinth of its structure. The poem is analysed into an elaborate interlocking of balanced episodes, to which a close parallel is found in the design of Athenian pottery in the Geometric period. The correspondence is sometimes fragile; for some of the "ring composition" a ready explanation might be found in the natural tendency of any narrator to expand a story, if he wishes to expand it, by inserting or elaborating episodes, rather than tacking them on at the end or the beginning of a story; and the captious might wonder what contemporary pots reflect the use of a similar technique by Catullus and Virgil, for example.

Yet after all reservations have been made, an impressively complex symmetry does remain; Whitman's elaborate chart is extracted from, not imposed on, the poem's structure. The pattern at first sight looks formidably elaborate for an oral poet, but there is no necessity to suppose that it was achieved all at once, or in advance of the poem's composition. Such a poem would be a long-term investment, and Whitman perhaps understates the mnemonic convenience of an elaborate and balanced structure in a long poem committed to memory; the mnemonic devices recommended to orators for much shorter works are proportionately quite as elaborate.

That a poet should be aware of, or even unconsciously influenced by, contemporary development in other arts, in his own or in a neighboring country, is neither inevitable nor impossible; and the unbeliever may say that anyone who can accept a single poet as author of the *Iliad* need not boggle at supposing him also a connoisseur of pots. Both in design and in temper, it is claimed, the *Iliad* is linked with the taste which produced, and appreciated, the great Geometric vases; and the duration of this period hardly allows for the shaping of the poem by more than one major poet. To this major poet an Athenian origin is, somewhat regretfully, not ascribed, though an Athenian tradition is discerned behind him. The archaeological evidence from Ionia and Aeolis is interpreted as indicating that continuity of tradition there between the twelfth and the eighth century was impossible. Athens, on the other hand, by the evidence of tradition and of archaeology, displays precisely the continuity of tradition required. Athens was the longest-lived of the Mycenaean states, she survived the Dorian assault, and received suppliants from cities which did not survive. The special sociological conditions that may be found in Attica between 1150 and 750 will

account not only for the survival of the tradition, but for the formation of the epic dialect, which is presented as basically Old Attic, with many Aeolic formulae absorbed probably by contact with Boeotia and Thessaly, where more of the old culture and the old songs may have survived than in the Peloponnese; this dialect was further influenced by some features of the later speech of Athens and her Ionian offspring.

As for the Achaeans, they are conjectured to have come from Asia to continental Greece at a time indicated by the short genealogies of their chief princely houses, the Pelopids and the Aeacids; the name Danaoi may belong to the earlier Greeks, represented by Abantids, Cadmeans, Erechtheids. "There is a plausible consensus between archaeology and tradition that the sons of Pelops were the warlike rulers of Late Helladic III B and C, under whom the city (Mycenae) achieved a grim, final magnificence, not long before its fall" (p. 37). These Achaeans represent the Age of Heroes, whom Hesiod distinguished from the other Bronze Age men.

The survival of Mycenaean tradition in the continuity of Athens is sufficient to account for Athens' contribution to the epic. Pisi-stratus' contribution is reduced to making, or enforcing, a law instructing the rhapsodes to sing in order; possibly he purchased a manuscript of Homer from an Ionian guild; perhaps he decided to include the Doloneia in the festival performances. The *Iliad*, though composed by an oral poet, was written down, probably from dictation, for performance at a three-day festival "by a group of adjutants to the poet, who could not sing the whole thing himself, nor trust others to sing it in his inimitable way, without the written word" (p. 82).

Whitman's analysis of the *poietic* implications of the formulaic method is particularly illuminating. He is not hampered, as some critics have been, by a perhaps subconscious feeling that *formula* is synonymous with *cliché*, that composing with formulae is, so to speak, a lazy man's substitute for composing with words. One cannot understand oral formulaic composition by thinking of written, word-by-word composition, and simply substituting formulae for words. In this idiom, poetic originality lies, and must lie, not in the creation of novel imagery, of unique phrases and lines, but in the design made by selection, arrangement, and repetition of the recognised and accepted imagery, to produce a unique pattern of events and personalities. Thus all "earlier *Iliads*" must have been by Homer. Perhaps a latent memory of this poetic process is partly responsible for the gulf that separates much modern criticism of poetry from one main line of ancient criticism, that represented by Aristotle and Horace. For us, pure poetry has been essentially the lyric element, the private expression, overheard rather than heard, of a real emotion or experience; even in epic it is something of this nature that we tend to look for as the supreme value; for them, pure poetry was dramatic poetry, the public presentation of an imagined situation.

The discussion of the poet's use of imagery is extremely perceptive, not only the investigation of the special significance of fire, water, and cloud images, but particularly the acute recognition of the poetic device of transferring image to action, metaphor to miracle, that is to say, the dramatization of a formula, the acting out of a figure of speech. This perception illuminates and makes fully available for

our enjoyment a number of otherwise recalcitrant scenes; for example, the re-arming of the Greeks in *Iliad* XIV, the Fight in the River, Athena's lamp-carrying for Odysseus, the strange behavior of the suitors at the feast in *Odyssey* XX. The discussion of imagery leads to the conclusion:

"Image-making is basically a subrational process, and creates its own characteristic tenor differently in different poetic minds. In Greek epic, the process is predetermined to a degree by the formulaic material, which is the germinal of its imagery; but the selective principle, operating at high speed in oral composition, is the individual singer's own responsibility and opportunity. Beneath that selective principle, and directing it, must lie half-conscious or unconscious patterns of association and symbolific consistency which constitute at least one root of the poetic urge itself. Therefore, where the resultant images form a design consistent with and illustrating the action of a long narrative, and sometimes even supplanting it, it is difficult to see how more than one mind could have worked upon such a structure. However many bards may have sung its constituent episodes before, the *Iliad* which we possess is structurally and imagistically a single reconception of all that is in it, a unity in traditional terms, both in intention and in execution" (p. 153).

Subsequent chapters investigate the transformation of traditional material into the creation of character: Agamemnon, presented in the *Iliad*, though not necessarily elsewhere, with traits that make him a foil to Achilles; Diomedes and Ajax, embodying respectively, though not exclusively, activity and endurance; Odysseus, who "sees reality as the situation or problem before him," and Achilles, who sees it as something to be realized within himself. Achilles receives a chapter to himself. It is a subtle analysis of the hero's self-discovery, his exploration of the true meaning of heroic honor, and of Patroclus' rôle as Achilles' proxy, the representative of his humane side. Readers who are willing to accept the necessity of subordinating the demands of pedestrian realism to the requirements of poetic imagery will be rewarded by the disappearance of many superficial difficulties and inconsistencies.

The discussion of Homer's use of the gods greatly strengthens the assumption of unity on which it depends. Whatever the gods may have been or meant outside the poems, in the poems they are "symbolic predicates of action, character, and circumstance." They are a formulation of humanly improbable or inexplicable success, failure, ingenuity or prowess; they constitute an imaginative extension of the context of human action, to which they owe their immediate aspects. Thus the so-called Plan of Zeus is the immediate offspring of the Wrath of Achilles; it objectifies in concrete terms the force and consequence of the hero's rage, coexists with it, is limited by it, and disappears with it. "The god's participation extends the scope of the hero's action to include an aspect of the absolute and irreversible." Thus Achilles is not really absent from the central books; the will of Zeus is in fact the will of Achilles.

Not that Zeus is a mere divine reflection of Achilles, for the gods continue to reflect the totality of things; they are, in the poem, the poet's presentation of the feeling that there are some men the

attainment or frustration of whose purposes seems to involve forces far beyond their personal activity or inactivity. Athena is the embodiment of success in battle; Whitman calls her the embodiment of Greek success, but surely this is too narrow; her help to Achilles or to Diomedes is a dramatic visualisation of the fact that they were successful; her beguiling of Hector, we may suppose, similarly portrays his groundless hopes of success; she rejects the Trojan prayers not because she was the goddess of Greek success, but because she was the goddess of success, and the Trojans were not destined to be successful; we know they were not, because the event showed that they failed. Their fate is bound up rather with Ares, "the god of war in its aspect of turmoil, defeat and disgrace."

For Fate, in the poem, is not so much what must happen, as what in the poetic tradition, or the poet's handling of the poetic tradition, did happen. There is no systematic morality which the gods sustain; what Zeus states is not the law of the world, but the law of the poem.

"The 'fate' which Zeus must acknowledge is the poet's scenario viewed as ineluctable fact, and herein lies the real meaning of the frequent phrases 'according to fate' and 'contrary to fate'. . . . When Homer says, 'Then such-and-such would have happened contrary to fate, had not . . .' he means little more than that it almost happened, but did not. . . . The gods of Homer were conceived to ratify and enlarge a human scheme in a poetic context, not to define the nature of divinity. . . . And this result is not the product of deliberate, conscious symbolizing, but rather of the wholly classical envisioning of the world's divine agents as executors of what was and is, and therefore must be."

The *Odyssey* receives less detailed treatment. Several aspects of it have already come under consideration, and much that has been said of the *Iliad* is equally valid for the *Odyssey*. No such complete Geometric symmetry is discovered as in the *Iliad*, rather some affinity with the early stages of proto-Attic pottery. Against the "heroic death consciousness which pervades the *Iliad*" and the Geometric masterpieces, the focus of the *Odyssey* is seen as "life in all its variety and directness" recalling "the more lyrical responses of proto-Attic art, where life as daily lived and observed, unmediated by anything but the senses, finds its first expression since the fall of the Bronze Age." In the matter of characterization, too, the methods of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey* are seen to differ, in the direction of greater description, even in minor detail, in the later work. For all this, Whitman is unable to recognise a single cogent argument, from subject matter, from linguistic usage, or from poetic technique, to the effect that the poems must belong to different hands or to different eras. "Both great epics belong to the most mature period of oral composition; both reflect the synthetic and formalized vision of the heroic Bronze Age in essentially the same way; both have ecumenical breadth, and tend to draw into their schemes large sections of the myth of Troy not immediately involved in the plot; both are complex, monumental, and retrospective; and both show much in common with the Athenian artistic approach, at once vivid, lucid, and subtle" (pp. 286-7).

The shaping intention of each poem is presented as permeating all its aspects, in a way possible only if a single guiding intelligence is assumed. Believers in a single Homer, even if they have difficulty in fully accepting the transfer of techniques from one artistic medium to another, will judge that in this book a firm grasp of the poem as a whole steadies and directs the understanding of details, that the analysis of structure, of character, and of the rôle of the gods reinforces the assumption of unity, and is illuminated by it. They will be rewarded by a new and more subtle perception of the poem's balance, harmonies, and insight. Those who do not accept the hypothesis of a single author, at least for each poem, will not be convinced; they will protest that the demonstration of single authorship rests too much on the assumption of a single author; if this is rejected, much of the subtle analysis of character, and of the rôle of the gods, falls apart. Substantial agreement can never be expected between those who see the *Iliad* as a great poem, and those who see it as a rather haphazard collection of good and bad verses from the used-goods counter; these will refuse to hear the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely.

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G. M. KIRKWOOD. *A Study of Sophoclean Drama*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958. Pp. xiii + 304. \$5.00. (*Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, XXXI.)

The present volume is in every way a most welcome addition to the rapidly expanding bibliography on Sophocles. In addition to a complete command of the literature, Kirkwood displays the sure touch of one who has been familiar with his author for years. His analysis and exposition have a deft clarity which is not only scholarly but wholly charming. Kirkwood's judgments, even where we might disagree with them, always reflect good sense and mature deliberation: nothing is tentative, haphazard, or extempore.

It would require a good deal of space to discuss in detail all the excellent facets of Kirkwood's *Study*; it is a detailed analysis of all the important areas of Sophocles' art: plot-structure, character, the Chorus, poetic diction, and dramatic irony; there is a good appendix on the date of the *Trachiniae*, and a very useful bibliographical note. An enumeration can hardly do justice to the richness of content. But especially fine are the discussions of the dramatist's character-portrayal (pp. 157 ff. are particularly good for the psychological approach); the complex role of the Chorus (pp. 181-214); the ambiguities of Sophoclean irony (pp. 246-87). Scattered throughout are brief, nugget-like passages which reveal all the author's virtuosity and sound textual awareness. On p. 276, n. 35, he makes a good case for the retention of the reading of *O. T.*, 376 which has become all but universal since the emendation of Brunck:

It is not fated that *you* should fall at *my* hands;

but we are faced by the disturbing fact that all the ancient MSS (for example, LAGR) and the fifth-century Oxyrhynchus papyrus no. 22 all read:

It is not fated that *I* should fall at *your* hands,

and this is followed by Bernard Knox and others. Indeed, a reading such as this, the only one known to the ancient sources (and presumably the Scholiast) carries the presumption of authenticity. The meaning is to be taken as follows. "You cannot harm me," says Oedipus to Teiresias (*O.T.*, 375); and Teiresias does not reply to this directly, as the reading of Brunek would suggest; rather, his retort is indirect, as is the wont of stichomythia: "nor will *you* destroy *me*—Apollo is all-adequate for both of us," in this way referring ambiguously to Oedipus' fall, without making it so obviously the work of Apollo. Indeed, such an attribution of the hero's fall to Apollo as Brunek's emendation would imply is quite out of character for Teiresias, and its ingenuity is a snare which should no longer attract us.

Kirkwood's discussion of the famous "Herodotus-passage" in *Antigone*, 905-12, and his reasons for retaining it (pp. 163-5), revives a fascinating perennial problem even though it still seems impossible of solution. But here, as always, the author is both interesting and instructive.

The longer discussions are equally thorough and painstaking. In a well-written and nuanced section (pp. 183 ff.) Kirkwood points out the fallacy of accepting Schlegel's oversimplification of the Chorus as the "ideal spectator." The Chorus, especially in Sophocles, is an extremely subtle instrument: as it moves back and forth between the heroic dimension of tragic fantasy and the prosaic world of everyday Athens, it speaks now in character, and now with the manic-prophetic voice of the poet, thus lending the dramatic *mimesis* a new dynamic tension. Kirkwood traces the poet's choral technique through the various plays, admitting at the end that his study must of necessity be incomplete. Again, on the problem of character-portrayal Kirkwood displays a deep familiarity with the sometimes twisted psychology of Sophocles' heroes and heroines: thus there is a sound discussion of the *hamartia*-question (pp. 172 ff.); and there are some fine, concise pages devoted to the Sophoclean and Athenian-aristocratic ideal of *eugeneia* as a clue to the tragic focus in a good number if not all of the plays. It should be noted, however, that the concept of *aretê* is not so central in Kirkwood's synthesis as it would seem to be in Whitman's.

In short, the new volume of *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, issued under the auspices of such competent editors, rivals all the best of the monographs that have gone before. Kirkwood modestly protests that his *Study* cannot claim to be complete—and indeed this is as it should be. All sincere discourse about the masterpieces of art and literature must always leave the last word unspoken; for just as every serious work of art is an exploration of the problem of man, so all serious study of it—and this is eminently true of Sophocles—is a study of ourselves. I need but add that Kirkwood's book closes with an Index whose thoroughness and accuracy are a joy to behold.

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HERBERT MUSURILLO, S. J.

JEAN HUBAUX. Avec la collaboration de Jeanne Hubaux. Rome et Véies. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1958. Pp. 406. 1200 Belgian fr. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège*, Vol. 145.)

The subtitle declares the content of the book: "Recherches sur la chronologie légendaire du moyen âge romain." The author does not precisely limit the period which he calls the Middle Ages of Rome, but his chief concentration is on the sack of the city by the Gauls and on the war with Veii. His declared purpose is to reconstruct the stories which the annalists had told about those dark ages, and especially the legends inspired by the (approximate) synchronism of the fall of Veii in 396 B. C. and the "death" and resurrection of Rome only six years later. He brands the tales as pure fiction (cf. pp. 70, 228) and imagines a bevy of mythopoeic annalists who busied themselves after the events with what seems a most un-Roman task of elaborating chronological patterns of mystic parallels and cyclic recurrences (pp. 68 f.). The results of their creative effort have reached us only in "echoes" in Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch, who abridged or, worse yet, rationalized what they found in their sources. The author sets himself to restore the lost color and true meaning of the stories. To do so, he must go through something of the same process as his annalists, but the results he achieves far surpass anything suggested by the dry fragments of the annalists we know. The reader must envy the students of Liège who have enjoyed Professor Hubaux's lectures. It is not history, but legend with which he is dealing (p. 340, n. 1), but the course of his work has taken him, as he says himself in his foreword, more than once from one end to the other of Roman history. He begins with the fourth century A. D. where a "cyclic crisis" occurs to furnish a parallel for the Rome-Veii situation in the fourth century B. C. The Christian Church had then endured for 365 years since its founding by St. Peter after the Passion. Thus the time was running out which was ensured (according to Jewish or pagan slanders) by the foundation sacrifice of a "puer anniculus," a child of just as many days as the years allotted to the church. The wealth of detail with which the variations on this theme are developed can hardly be suggested in a brief review. We must pass over St. Augustine's fight against superstitious fears for the end of the world (*C. D.*, XVIII), the year of the Phoenix with its fascinating symbolism, and Claudian's hope of a new Camillus to save Rome from a new destruction. In the days of the first Camillus Rome had lived through her own "grande année" of 365 years beginning with the death of Remus, another foundation sacrifice and the great "original sin" of Rome. But Rome, laid waste by the Gauls, could rise like the Phoenix from her ashes because her gods had not abandoned her, nor she her gods, thanks to Camillus; while Veii, who had lost her religious vitality with the *evocatio* of her divine protectors, was dead indeed in the midst of her surviving streets and buildings (p. 80).

With the famous ridgepole terracottas from the temple at Veii

(pp. 248-64) we reach the most brilliant application of the author's method. He has imagined the impact on the attacking Romans of the great mythological drama they saw played out against the sky, and their learning about the interrupted offering it represents. (He has not realized fully, perhaps, how clearly the detail could be seen because of the position of the temple on a terrace below the top of the hill. An observer on the higher ground could view the figures on the roof almost from their own level.) The striking accident that *Camillus* was an Etruscan name for *Hermes*, the helper of *Heracles* at the sacrifice, could bring the scene for the Romans into relation with their own general. From their impression of the strange and vivid figures as they carried the memory of them home, those annalists could have shaped the story of another interrupted sacrifice, the dramatic but incredible incident of *Camillus* in the temple of *Juno*. There the Roman general, emerging suddenly from the mine he had dug beneath the citadel, strode forward like the implacable terracotta *Apollo* to snatch the victim from the paralyzed attendants, and by taking the part of the *Camillus*, the "acolyte," and completing the sacrifice with his own hands, to fulfill the words the priest was even then speaking. The association with the statues would explain why *Camillus* included *Apollo* with *Juno* in his vows (p. 261). Hubaux is less happy in supporting his interpretation of *Valeria Luperca* of *Falerii* (p. 90, n. 1) by that lamentable *Diana* in *St. Louis* (cf. Miss Bieber's review of *Herbig*, *A. J. A.*, LXII [1958], pp. 341 f.).

Other small questions arise. Since when was *Veii* a Trojan foundation (p. 272)? What *Veientine* would measure the distance to the *Alban Lake* through *Rome*? But perhaps we should take geographical adjustments in the same spirit as the chronological, where we are constantly reminded that approximations are good enough (pp. 67, 72 f., 343, etc.). Ideas seem to dissolve and re-shape themselves like dreams, and with each reappearance of a motif something more has been added. So without the acknowledgment of any essential change we pass from the ritual stroke of the *lupercus* running with his goatskin thong through the crowd, to the trouncing of the *Faliscan schoolmaster*, to the beating to death of *Manlius Capitolinus*. The latter must perish according to *Cornelius Nepos* because the *Livian* hurling from the rock would not justify *Camillus* as the *lupercus* of the "great year" on the two counts of being a "ravisser des entrails" and a flagellator (pp. 295, 310, 312). When we have been beguiled into accepting the prodigious hind as the life token or "separable soul" of *Capua*, we find ourselves committed to a similar creature for *Veii*. The magic of the number 365 (p. 65) on which so much depends presupposes on the part of the annalists a knowledge of the year of 365 days long before the *Julian reform*. How long? "C'est ce qu'il ne nous incombe pas d'établir ici" (p. 67). Those annalists who were "haunted" by cyclic periods (p. 69) for some reason departed from 365 to equate the number of the *Fabii* with the pre-Julian year of 305 days. Why the *Fabii* should be involved with the calendar at all is a mystery to be explained only by the fact that the annalistic mind did not operate like ours, as the author says in an earlier discussion of the question (*Les grands*

mythes de Rome [Paris, 1945], p. 69). Why should even the analistic mind, once committed to the association, abandon 305 and count the Fabii as 306 warriors plus one small boy left at home? This seems one approximation too many.

In its very nature, *Rome et Véies*, which aims to establish not history, but rather the patterns and processes by which history is distorted into legend and folktale, will be frustrating to many sober-minded students. At the same time it is richly rewarding in its learning unspoiled by pedantry, and in the charm of the presentation which makes interest at times mount to excitement. It is itself the proof of the concluding statement: "Tant il est vrai que l'historiographie n'est pas morte, et que la curiosité des hommes n'a jamais fini de répondre aux énigmes antiques."

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Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, Vol. XXV. Rome, 1957.

Pp. 193; 45 pls.

This volume of the *Memoirs* contains three papers. James H. Oliver's "Symmachi, Homo Felix" (pp. 7-16) is a new study of a pair of Roman mosaics, nos. 3600 and 3601, now in Madrid. Both mosaics show gladiatorial combats and by comparing them Oliver is able to arrive at a clever solution for the rather baffling inscription which accompanies no. 3601. The key to the problem, provided by the comparison, is that both mosaics are divided into two registers devoted to a "before" and "after" presentation showing the beginning and end of the combat.

"Cosa: Black-Glaze Pottery" by Doris M. Taylor (pp. 65-193) consists of a classification of pottery from five deposits at Cosa which range in date over a period of 200 years (ca. 225-30 B. C.). The changes in style of the local and imported fragments are of interest, while the quality and provenience of the imports reflect somewhat the economic changes in Italy during the later Republic.

Mason Hammond (pp. 17-64) deals with imperial elements in the formula of the Roman emperors from the time of Augustus to that of Alexander Severus. Personal names and titles, epithets, and ancestral lists are considered. The occurrences of these elements in inscriptions and coin legends are analyzed in considerable detail, but few startling conclusions are forthcoming. It is shown that Augustus set formulaic precedents which were followed with reasonable fidelity by his successors. The trend was toward an increasingly monarchical significance in the titles, with the emphasis placed on *Imperator* as a praenomen, *Augustus* as a cognomen, and *Caesar* as a gentile nomen which was transformed into a title. It is Hammond's opinion that *Caesar* did not become a title under the Flavians, as is generally supposed, but rather under the emperors of the late second century.

Although other details might be mentioned, it is perhaps best to reserve judgment until the appearance of the concluding study on the Antonine monarchy for which this paper and the one in the preceding volume of the *Memoirs* are intended to provide the groundwork. It might be mentioned, however, that the present study of imperial titles seems strangely incomplete confined as it is to the Latin inscriptions (and coins) with no corresponding analysis of their Greek counterparts. Some facts of significance might be revealed by a study of the use of the Greek equivalents for *Augustus*, *Imperator*, *Proconsul*, etc., and it would seem especially desirable to observe the use and position in the formula of the untranslatable *Kaisar*.

All in all, the present volume of the *Memoirs* does not seem up to the standards of the past.

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FILIPPO CASSOLA. *La Ionia nel mondo Miceneo*. Naples, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1957. Pp. 373. L. 3000.

Cassola has undertaken a task demanding great energy and reading, the collection of all the available evidence bearing on the complex problem of the Ionian Migration and the formation of Greek politics along the coast of Asia Minor. The result is a treasury of bibliography and references in varied fields, which nevertheless disappoints as a commentary or new solution of the problem. Cassola's command of the relevant disciplines is impressive, combining Aegean and oriental archaeology, literary sources, classical and Hellenistic history, linguistics, and religion; he is one of the few theoreticians who is able to relate Mycenaean expansion eastward to later Greek developments in the same area with full appreciation of the varying types of evidence which must be taken into account. The information presented ranges from Hittite archives to Hellenistic glosses, from Mycenaean surface finds in Cilicia through classical dialect studies to Roman survivals of Ionian cults. It is this very abundance of information which makes the book difficult to read; it behaves less like a survey than a dictionary, but the index is not organized for this latter function.

Cassola's thesis is important, and one which has needed a new exploration. Reduced to oversimplified formula, it states that: Mycenaean expansion into the east is well documented through pottery from ca. 1425 to 1200 B. C.; the cities on the Ionian coast which later became centers of classical Greek culture have, in many cases, an underlying Mycenaean stratum; the Mycenaean pottery of the expansion period is so homogeneous in style that it presupposes a political homogeneity controlling it; this homogeneity continues in a less vivid way through Protogeometric and Geometric down to the decentralizations of the age of tyrants and independent democracies;

the Ionian federation owes its partial unity to a history of persistent Greek coalition in the face of oriental and Hittite threats; the late reference in Ephesos to the office of βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἴωνων has in fact a Bronze Age ancestry which may be typified in such figures as Aleksanduš of Vilusa; in short, the Greek colonization of the fringe of Asia must not be looked upon as a new experiment of classical times but rather as a consolidation of previous Mycenaean Greek efforts. The links in this argument are not always convincing, but until the archaeological history of the coastal sites from 1300 to 800 B. C. is definitively explored, Cassola's theories will remain attractive and suggestive. It is refreshing to find an attack on this problem which recognizes the need for more historical equipment than naive reliance on genealogies.

If the book occasionally presents the appearance of a vast collection of file cards from which the information has been reported without truly discriminate selection, the incidental information which this arrangement provides is still valuable for less industrious scholars, and offers a decent foundation for the final solution of an enigmatic period in Greek history.

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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